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INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

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Bucknell University

and

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TO
M. L. S. AND W. W. W.

PREFACE

Students who register for introductory sociology expect the course to be practical in the sense that it gives them a new knowledge of their own social nature and of the social world in which they live. They are not impatient with theories and research if these data serve the pragmatic function of giving real insight into social situations which they recognize as their own. This book is written on the assumption that such immediate interests on the part of students are not only justifiable, but that they should be taken advantage of as useful motivation in moving from a casual acquaintance with social situations to a fundamental understanding of the processes involved.

The book is so organized into different major divisions that the instructor may open the course with the approach to the field which he considers the most closely related to the interests of his own students and most logically related to the other subjects which they have studied. For example, he may begin with part I, preparing the students for analysis of their present social world by first giving them insight into their cultural heritage. Or, he may start directly with the problem of man's social nature and the development of personality in the individual which form the subject matter of part II. There follows in part III a preview of the way man behaves in various types of collective relationships. In part IV the local social world—that is, the community and its social organization—is the focus of attention. The basic social processes whose operation has been observed concretely in the earlier chapters of the book are examined in part V as a theoretical basis for the analysis of collective behavior. The problem of long-time and short-time social changes and their control constitutes the last division of the book.

The authors have not limited the text strictly to any one school of thought, but have drawn upon the data and conclusions of many different scholars. The subject matter in the book includes analy-

ses of all the concepts in the field of sociology recommended for the introductory course by the special committee of the American Sociological Society in its report at the annual meeting in 1932.

To each chapter is appended a list of references suggested as possible supplementary reading. The references classified under "A" are in general either more concrete or more elementary in nature than those listed under "B." An attempt has been made thus to segregate the case materials bearing on the subject matter of the chapter and the discussions of a more colorful and, to students, more "interesting" character from the more fundamental and perhaps somewhat more difficult treatments. The entire reference list is, however, in each case intended for undergraduate use.

Acknowledgment of the courtesy of publishers and authors in granting permission to use printed sources has been made at the point of inclusion. The authors are especially indebted to Dr. Floyd House, under whose editorial direction the manuscript was prepared. They also express their appreciation to Marjorie Lewis Sutherland and Winifred Walz Woodward, who examined the entire manuscript and assisted in many phases of its preparation; and to the following persons who read and criticized certain chapters while they were in second draft form: Professors Frank S. Freeman, Mark Entorf, and Dr. R. Lauriston Sharp of Cornell University; Professors Meyer F. Nimkoff and Wilfrid H. Crook of Bucknell University; Professor Forrest E. Keller of the University of West Virginia; Professor J. Howell Atwood of Knox College; and Dr. Wilbur H. York of Princeton University. The authors' thanks are also due to members of the introductory sociology classes at Cornell University and Bucknell University who have offered helpful suggestions following their use of the text in mimeographed form.

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INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

SOCIOLOGY is one of the social sciences, together with economics, anthropology, government, social psychology, and jurisprudence. The general subject for the investigation of the whole group is human society in all its manifold phases, but each special social science has within this broad field a roughly delimited garden plot of its own to cultivate. Sociology is one of the younger of the social science disciplines, and in its brief history of about one hundred years it has gardened intensively in several different patches while at the same time undertaking in its more expansive moods to exercise an oversight over the social science rancho as a whole. Which of the two functions, overseer (synthesizer) or intensive cultivator, the sociologist *should* perform is a matter which concerns not us, but the advanced theorists. What he *has* done in either capacity is of much more importance, and what are the cooperative results of his and his brother social scientists' efforts is of greater importance still. After all, social relations are *social*, not sociological or economic or governmental, and they cannot therefore be solved by any one group of specialists working separately. The boundary lines between the patches must remain ill-defined, with no barriers against easy traversal, if the progress of all the social sciences and the welfare of society are to be best served.

No attempt will be made, therefore, to define in formal terms the province of the sociologist. To the question "What is sociology?" the whole book is the best answer. After he has finished it the student will realize that the sociologist does have a point of view and a focus of interest that differentiates him from his social science colleagues. It will then be a good exercise to try to put these differences into words, if only so as to be sure one understands the current division of labor among the social sciences. But it must always be remembered that this division of labor is not permanent. All the social sciences are developing and pushing out into new

fields and new aspects of social living. No one of them can be embalmed in a definition; they are too vital and dynamic for that.

The organization of the book. Any attempt to organize as broad a field of knowledge as that currently encompassed in the word "sociology" must have some logic about it. The plan of this book involves taking successively three points of vantage for observation of human social behavior. First, we shall stand far off and view the behavior as the work of societies and civilizations rather than of individuals. We shall be concerned with the "manners and customs," the traditions, the social heritages that different societies, past and present, have accumulated. How these social habits differ in different parts of the world and in different epochs and how and why they change will be the questions we shall in some measure try to answer in this section (parts I and VI).

While we may talk about customs and traditions of a society we must not forget that societies are composed of human beings and that all behavior, traditional or not, is individual behavior. Consequently the second approach (in part II) will be through the analysis of the effect of group living on the individual growing up from infancy to adulthood in some human society. How is he influenced by the contacts with his fellows? How does he come to believe in and follow the same traditions that they conform to? How does he react on and modify this tradition as his own original contribution to the life of the social group?

Within the greater society individuals are found united in many different kinds of temporary and permanent groupings. They form families, gangs, corporations, states, crowds, play-groups. The most important of all these forms of social union to the sociologist is the community. In this group both sexes and all ages are represented and all the varied activities of human living are carried on. The community is the social world in which the individual grows up, it is the group which conserves and administers custom and tradition. Our third point of vantage will be one from which we can observe the functioning of this natural social unit and the interrelationships of its members (parts III, IV, and V).

The individual and the process of fitting him into the community and society; the community, its organization and the types of human relationship that obtain within it and between it and other communities; the human social heritage and how it affects and is affected by individuals and communities—these are the three

major divisions of the field we shall cover. They are three of the many aspects from which one may view human life.

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PART I
MAN'S CULTURAL HERITAGE

Chapter 2

THE NATURE OF CULTURE

THE HOPI AND THE KWAKIUTL¹

THE HOPI live in rectangular, flat roofed houses of sandstone built on the mesas high above the level of the desert. The men not only raise corn, but weave cloth and make moccasins—an employment that on the Plains would stamp them as mollycoddles. . . . On the other hand, pottery—the outstanding art industry—is wholly in the hands of the women. It is their duty further to grind corn in stone hand-mills and to cook. They also own the houses—and thereby hangs a tale. When a man marries, he goes to live with his wife in her mother's house. Her sisters also bring their husbands to the same or adjacent houses. The children take the mother's clan name and are associated with whatever sacred objects and ceremonies happen to be linked with their mother's household. When a sacred office is passed on, it goes, not to a son, but to a younger brother or a sister's son—for these are the members of the original incumbent's clan while his own son would not be.

Nevertheless, males are not trodden under foot, at least, no more so than among other folk. A man divorced by his wife has to leave her house, but he has a legal claim for shelter on his mother and sisters. Further, while he is prevented from marrying more than one wife at a time, it is easy to pass progressively from one spouse to another. As for government, no one has ever heard of a female Hopi chief, and ceremonially, while the women have some dances, the more important rites are wholly in the custody of the men.

The chief, incidentally, wields only a modest authority. He is not an oriental potentate disposing of his subjects' property and persons. Except in social prestige he is surrounded by peers, and at best his realm includes but a few hundred souls: the total population of about

¹ From Robert H. Lowie, "American Indian Cultures," *American Mercury*, vol. 20, pp. 363-364, July, 1930. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

two thousand is sprinkled over a number of villages jealously maintaining their autonomy. This separatism is all the more remarkable because considerably simpler tribes, such as the Iroquois of New York, showed a certain capacity for political organization.

In religion, too, there is a distinctive quality: the Hopi are ritual-mad. There are eight-day festivals such as the famous Snake Dance, conceived generally as prayers for rain. There are conclaves of secret fraternities in subterranean chambers. Boys are initiated into adult status by a rite of flagellation. There is an interminable manufacturing of feather offerings to be deposited in shrines, there is a constant ceremonial smoking, a sprinkling of corn meal, an erection of altars, a preparation of sand-paintings. There are formal processions, dances, dramatic performances, ceremonial buffoonery. Part of the year mummers impersonate ancestral spirits, and at all times ritual is made to serve as fertility magic. Only one thing seems lacking—the quickening breath of a personal relation with the supernatural.

To pass from these Southwesterners to the tribes along the coast of British Columbia is like stepping into another universe. Like the Hopi, the Kwakiutl and Tlingit lived in villages, but their sedentary habits implied neither farming nor pottery. Material life revolved about salmon and giant trees: these Indians were fishermen and exploited the red and yellow cedar. From the bark of trees they manufactured mats, baskets, rope, and blankets. As master carpenters they split off planks from live trunks and built of them large gable houses. All kinds of boxes were made of such planks, which were bent by steaming them. Even food was cooked in such containers, which were filled with water boiled by means of red-hot rocks. . . .

At least as distinctive as this industrial activity of the Coast Indians is the associated art style. It is like nothing else in the world—a medley of conventionalization and realism such as no philosopher of æsthetics could ever have divined as a possibility. Eyes abound in the decorative carving, but for the most part they stand, not for eyes, but for the ball-and-socket joints of the body. A beaver will be depicted realistically but fragmentarily by a cross-hatched tail. Whole animals are distorted *ad libitum* to fit the available space. Often they are split in two, and each half is spread out separately. Yet Professor Boas has shown that all this indicates no lack of skill; when for some special reason the natives wanted true realism they attained it without difficulty.

Equally remarkable was their social organization. In contrast to almost all the other aborigines of the continent the Northwesterners were steeped in the idea of caste. They had nobles, commoners and slaves. The chiefs, of course, were of the aristocratic class, but as elsewhere on the continent they were rarely autocrats and at best ruled over a small number of people. That is, political power was of minor importance. All the more strongly developed was social prestige. No distinctions were drawn between one plebeian and another, but every nobleman tried to outshine his rivals. Each inherited such and such privileges and took precedence accordingly; each was inflamed with an incredible eagerness to eclipse his competitors by giving them lavish presents, which custom required to be repaid at 100 per cent interest, any remissness at once leading to loss of face. The exploits of a chief at the public festivals known as potlatches were indeed enough to eliminate all theories of man as an economic being. The most valuable property, say, a canoe, might be wantonly destroyed, or a slave deliberately killed merely to show that the master was so great a man that such losses were of no account.

In such privilege-mad societies even religion is saturated with the notion of hereditary prerogative. The mysterious universe is coped with by amulets and sacred rituals, but these are not used by the general public; they are carefully guarded trade secrets, which a man on his death-bed may divulge to his eldest son but which he certainly would never share with a stranger. In the great Winter festival all important offices are held by men who have inherited them by rigid rules of descent. To play the part of particular spirits, to chant certain songs, to capture novices—all these are not trivial details but honorific acts attempted only by the legal owners of these patented privileges. Even revelations by supernatural beings are hedged about by such notions: each family or clan has the right to be blessed by certain spirits and these only.

If we now turn from either the Kwakiutl or the Hopi to the Crow of Montana, a violent readjustment is imperative. We no more find among the Plains tribes the Northwestern or Pueblo outlook on life than we find mid-Victorian standards in Dostoyevski's novels. I remember once telling some Crow friends about the Hopi: they listened intently but without the least sense of psychic affinity: I might have been describing adventures in Laputa or with the Man in the Moon.

WHAT IS CULTURE?

Many elements in these brief accounts of the life of the Hopi and the Kwakiutl will seem strange and exotic to American readers, just as the author reports they did to a third Indian tribe, the Crow. The major economic activities of fishing, hunting, and carpentry; the weird and colorful "totem-pole art"; the competition in property destruction, the ownership of special rights to heavenly protection—these and many other elements fill out a pattern of existence for the Kwakiutl which is in almost sensational contrast to that characterizing the inhabitants of a modern American metropolis. The American pattern, equally strange to the Kwakiutl or Hopi, would include such diverse elements as factory production; the use of steam and electricity; the automobile as a means of transportation and an apparently vital adjunct in young people's courting; baseball, comic strips, movies and hitch hiking as major forms of relaxation; the subway rush as an almost inevitable incident in the process that is called "getting to one's work." To complete either the Kwakiutl or the American pattern we should of course have to go on for pages. The Kwakiutl and the American are both members of the same biological species, *homo sapiens*, but they have acquired widely different ways of life.

To study and compare the customs of primitive and of modern civilizations is one of the tasks of the ethnologist. He is engaged in an examination of the "patterns of existence" of various folk the world over, or, to use his own phrase, he is studying different *cultures*. This term, *culture*, has come to have such wide usage and is so fundamental to both ethnology and sociology that we must make certain that we understand its full meaning.

Let us begin by distinguishing culture from race. As was pointed out above, both Kwakiutls and Americans are members of the human species, although they differ in certain physical traits such as skin color, the shape of the nose, the color of the hair, and general facial expression. These physical characteristics are passed down from one generation to another through the mechanism of biological inheritance. They constitute the marks of what we call "race." The Kwakiutl are of a different race from the Americans because some of the physical traits of the two peoples differ quite markedly, or more broadly, because they have a different biological inheritance.

But Hopis and Kwakiutls and Americans differ also in non-physical traits. Some of these differences in economic and social organization, in religion and art, have already been listed. Others involve language, mythology, the methods of keeping peace or making war. The Hopi youngster does not acquire his mother tongue or his reverence for the secrets of the subterranean ceremonial chamber or *kiva* by biological inheritance; one might better say that they were *socially* inherited, passed down from his elders by instruction and example. It is this idea of social inheritance that is basic in the ethnologist's concept of culture. Culture includes all those ways of behaving which the individual learns as a member of a society. The culture of a people is their *social heritage*, a "complex whole" which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, tools, and modes of communication.

Certain inferences may be drawn from this definition. First, one may say that, speaking sociologically, everyone except a newborn babe "has culture," is to some degree, as we say, "cultured." The sociologist does not restrict the attribute solely to "people of refinement," to good dinner-table conversationalists, to holders of the A.B. degree, or to those especially interested in the esthetic arts. Such people have perhaps been fortunate enough to taste of the finest fruits of the culture in which they have been brought up—that is a matter of opinion—but the garage mechanic who can tame a balky engine, although he may never have heard of Goethe, Beethoven, or Galileo, is "cultured" too. He knows the inner workings of one of man's most complicated products; he knows also the rules of the road to be observed when he takes it for a trial spin, and the ways of the police who will arrest him if he violates these rules. He knows how much he should be paid for his labors (sometimes too well!) and how to spend the strange slips of paper and round tokens he receives. He gets along in the social world in which he lives; that is to say, he adjusts to its culture. The same could be said of the Kwakiutl fisherman, only it is to a different culture that he has to fit his activities and his aspirations.

A second conclusion appears at this point. Our American mechanic, "cultured" as he is, is really little aware of the fact. He hardly realizes that he is living in a very special type of man-made world, quite different from that of his Kwakiutl or his Eskimo or even his English brother. Now and then he may hear tales about cannibalistic practices on the Northwest Coast or the

blubber diet of the Eskimos. If he thinks at all about these matters it is simply to wonder at or pity the heathen savages. He may even adopt very much the same attitude toward such "civilized" peoples as the English, who genuflect to royalty, play a crazy game called cricket, and speak his own language in a stilted and absurd fashion. The English view of American culture is, except on the part of the sophisticated classes, likely to be equally unfavorable and ill-informed.

This provincial attitude is called *ethnocentrism*. It involves suspicion, distrust, and ignorance of other cultures; it is based on a complete lack of objectivity toward cultures in general, and particularly toward one's own. Growing up in America, as we do, we accept American works and ways. We acquire culture almost unconsciously. Having learned one way of worshiping God, namely in a building called a church, and on a seventh day called Sunday, it seldom enters our minds that other ways might serve us just as well. We use the mother tongue for years before we laboriously discover, in seventh grade perhaps, that it has a basic grammatical structure. We feel our culture as a part of ourselves; we "take it for granted"; we seldom try to appraise or analyze it.

But in this book we do want to try to hold the mirror up to the social heritage. We want to try, difficult as it is, to get outside our culture, and all cultures, and view them as wholes, dispassionately, objectively, and analytically. Only by such a procedure can we really understand the life of man. We abandon, therefore, all interest in claims for the superiority of this or that type of culture. We ask ourselves merely, how did culture begin, how did it develop, and how do cultures differ over the world today. Later on we shall ask the why of these things, and the student may, if he wishes, go on to appraise their rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, in terms of his own theory as to what constitutes welfare and progress for mankind. Description precedes understanding, however, and understanding, evaluation. For the time being, let us be content to describe, in the hope that we may come better to understand man's cultural heritage.

ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL CONTENT

If we are to examine into the origins of culture and discuss the similarities and differences between the culture of different peoples,

we need to have a little more conceptual equipment, a few more intellectual tools of analysis. Culture in its manifestations among any but the most primitive group of "dawn-men" is so many-sided, of such sheer bulk and sprawling complexity, that it almost defies orderly description. We need to reduce the *content* of a given culture to categories in order properly to grasp its essential characteristics; we must have some "pigeon holes" into which to classify some of culture's multifarious details. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to outlining a few of the classification concepts that are now almost indispensable to anthropologists and sociologists.

Material and immaterial culture. We may begin by making a distinction between *material* and *immaterial* culture. (The material elements of culture are, as the term suggests, those that have material substance. Included are all tools to be used by the human hand and machinery for substituting nature-power for hand-power, and all the visible, touchable products of the use of these tools and machinery.) Strictly speaking, of course, the fabrications are not themselves parts of culture; it is the art of manufacturing them and using them that belongs to the social heritage. But while material culture really comprises only the psychic aspects of human artifacts, no great error will result from enumerating as a part of material culture the artifacts themselves. A miscellaneous list of such artifacts might include bungalows and skyscrapers, concrete roads and traffic lights, fountain pens and tennis rackets, dress suits and high-heeled shoes, lap-dogs (for a domesticated animal is a "processed" article), necklaces, radios, plows, saltines, and soda water. Some of these elements in the material culture are more perishable than others, but, taking them all together, they constitute an impressive bequest made by their respective creators to succeeding generations of mankind.

The term "immaterial culture" stands for what have sometimes been called man's "spiritual" achievements. Books are a part of material culture, but not the ideas conveyed to the reader who can interpret the ink-clusters (or word-symbols) they contain. Weapons are hand or machine fabricated products; not so the cult of war. Man deals with objects as objects; but around them he builds codes interpreting their meaning and significance and regulating their use. These "codes" are systems of group habits, usages, beliefs; together they constitute the immaterial culture of the group. Of the systems, language is perhaps the most basic and important, for most

of the rest of immaterial culture is embodied in symbols and transmitted through them. To these other systems we give such names as "Religion," "Philosophy," "Morals," "Social Organization," and "Art."

It has been said that nine carefully selected men from the different departments of one of our great universities could, ". . . if set down on a virgin and uninhabited island, rebuild a civilization among them, piecing together all of the essential knowledge underlying the vast fabric of modern life."² While this statement involves a rather obvious biological fallacy and is also undoubtedly a large-sized exaggeration, it does serve to emphasize the essentially psychic character of the social heritage, the importance of the immaterial culture in human life.

Folkways, mores, institutions. *Folkways as group habits.* The immaterial culture was just described as comprising group habits, usages, customs. We might better have used the term made famous by the sociologist, William Graham Sumner, and have said that it was made up of folkways. Sumner's analysis³ of the content of the immaterial culture in terms of folkways, mores, and institutions has become one of the accepted sociological classics. Even elementary students in the field should acquire some familiarity with Sumner's basic ideas.

Sumner sets forth his conception of the folkways thus:

The folkways . . . are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of the animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, . . . only the topmost layers of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion. We are told of savages that "It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a

² Cf. Erville B. Woods, *The Social Group*, pp. v-9, Mimeographed, Hanover, N. H., 1925. Woods does not himself support the accuracy of this claim.

³ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906.

savage people.) Custom regulates the whole of a man's action,—his bathing, washing, the cutting of his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally and spiritually." All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation.⁴

It is important to emphasize that for Sumner the folkways are seldom the results of reflection or of rational planning:

Men, each struggling to carry on existence, unconsciously co-operate to build up associations, organizations, customs, and institutions which, after a time, appear full grown and actual, although no one intended, or planned, or understood them in advance. They stand there as produced by "ancestors."⁵

We shall have to consider later⁶ whether this is too extreme a view; the process of custom-making may not always be so blindly unpremeditated as Sumner implies. But certainly a very large proportion of our current folkways can hardly be said to have had a rational origin, except in the sense that they seemed to individuals at the time to be handy solutions to problems with which they were immediately faced. Someone had to start such rules as driving on the right-hand side of the street, hand-shaking to greet a friend, saluting the flag, or wearing a dinner coat to a dance instead of a bathing suit or no suit at all. The originators of these customs are and will continue to remain anonymous. The point is, however, that equally anonymous innovators might have led our ancestors to pass by on the left side (as they do in England), lock forefingers as a mode of greeting (the vogue in the Banks Islands), and wear a grass skirt on formal occasions. Since the origins of most folkways are, to use Sumner's phrase, "lost in mystery," we cannot be certain that the creators of the dance-skirt of pandanus leaf in the Trobriands was not a wise man (or woman) deliberately and foresightedly planning for his people's welfare. But the chances are thousands to one that he was not so motivated; he had a bright

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4. Reprinted by permission of Ginn and Company, publishers.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34. Reprinted by permission of Ginn and Company, publishers.

⁶ In chapter 28.

idea which seemed good to him (and then to his imitators) at the time. A hot day and a sudden access of courage led some unknown Englishman to make a tournament appearance wearing shorts for tennis. This may soon, if it has not already, become a folkway, too.

Mores. While we would all agree that some rule of the road and some standard method of greeting a newcomer are almost indispensable we would probably not want to argue too vigorously that our practices in these regards are far superior to any possible substitutes. The English do seem to get along fairly well with the right-hand drive automobile, and we ourselves do not always feel compelled to shake hands when we meet. When, however, the "birthday suit" is suggested as a good public bathing costume or we propose to remain seated while the "Star Spangled Banner" goes by in a parade the situation is quite different. Now we verge on immorality, now we transgress against the rules of modesty and decency, of loyalty to the nation and respect for its symbols. Our canons of decency and patriotism *will* be defended as vital and the ways of conforming to them as superior by every "right-thinking" citizen. For these are moral issues. Folkways of this latter type belong, then, in a special realm.

Sumner called such folkways *mores*. All folkways are the "right" ways to do things in the sense that they are the habitual, expected practices, but sooner or later some of them come to have a more binding sanction. The group develops more general philosophies of welfare and in such terms as "the will of God," "the hope of salvation," "the propitiation of ghosts or demons," or "the progress of civilization," it comes to *justify* folk practices. Folkways, thus related to value systems, thus *defended*, enter the class of mores. The Sea Dyaks do not permit a man to pronounce the name of his mother-in-law or father-in-law lest he incur the wrath of the spirits.⁷ That the spirits must be propitiated at all costs is a fundamental tenet in the Dyak welfare philosophy. Similarly today a "good citizen" cannot do else than believe in America's glorious destiny, for a belief in American progress in past and future is in our current mores. The doubter, the critic, is generally disapproved of, is held to be no true American. Society sets great store by conformity to that class of folkways which are the mores. They constitute together its real code of morality.

⁷ Cf. J. C. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vol. 1, p. 249, The Macmillan Company, New York, two volume ed., 1922.

While the line between the folkway and the *mos*⁸ is perhaps not too difficult to draw in logic, in actual practice the distinction is likely to get somewhat blurred. "Welfare philosophies" are seldom clearly formulated by the folk who profess to live by them. Sumner says:

It is not to be understood that primitive men philosophize about their experience of life. That is our way; it was not theirs. They did not formulate any propositions about the causes, significance, or ultimate relations of things. . . . They feared pain and ill, and they produced folkways by their devices for warding off pain and ill. Those devices were acts of ritual which were planned upon their vague and crude faiths about ghosts and the other world. . . . The notion of societal welfare was not wanting, although it was never consciously put before themselves as their purpose.⁹

We are only slightly more formal and systematic in our notions of what constitutes societal welfare today. Ask a white man why he will not associate with a Negro. He will seldom give you a complete statement of the doctrine of white superiority and of white stewardship for the welfare of "inferior" races. He is more likely to say "No one else does," or "They are unpleasant to have around." Similarly, condemnation of promiscuous petting by college students is not often based on any complete view of ideal relations between the sexes. The underlying philosophies, while implicit in the attitudes of all persons, can be formulated systematically only by the few; yet anti-Negro attitudes and the tabu on certain matters relating to sex are clearly in the mores of the time. With customs like brushing the teeth, paying "dinner calls," and abandoning straw hats after Labor Day, the right to inclusion in the mores, while real, is somewhat less evident. A "case can be made" for each of these folkways; they all conduce to welfare in one or another of the senses in which for us the term has meaning, but the relation of customs like these to well-being is not one which grips our hearts.

The compulsive power of folkways and mores. It has already been implied that the folkways are *rules* of conduct. In modern as in primitive society there are right and wrong ways to do every-

⁸ *Mos* is the singular of *mores*.

⁹ Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Reprinted by permission of Ginn and Company, publishers.

thing. Those who try the wrong ways are subjected to the disapproval of their fellows, expressed in such forms as "eyebrow-lifting," ridicule, contempt, chastisement, banishment, and death. The right ways are the folkways. "From the time and manner of eating to the time and mode of worship, from the mode of dressing infants to the fashion of enshrouding the dead—all is prescribed in the local code, and departure from it is rare."¹⁰

Groups form standards of orthodoxy as to the "principles" which each member must profess and the ritual which each must practice. Dissent seems to imply a claim of superiority. It evokes hatred and persecution. Dissenters are rebels, traitors, and heretics. We see this in all kinds of sub-groups. Noble and patrician classes, merchants, artisans, religious and philosophical sects, political parties, academic and learned societies, punish by social penalties dissent from, or disobedience to, their code of group conduct. The modern trades union, in its treatment of a "scab," only presents another example.¹¹

The constraining power of the mores is perhaps best illustrated where group pressure continues to enforce a custom definitely harmful, in a realistic sense, to group welfare. After our definition of mores this statement may seem to involve a contradiction in terms. How can a *mos* be thought harmful? The answer is that it is not thought so by the large majority of the people who conform to it, only by "outsiders" who are in a position to take a larger view. Let us cite one of Sumner's examples. Many primitive tribes enforce the destruction of a man's property at his death; this is to ensure that he will have it to use in the other world to which he is going. The procedure is rationally justifiable on the premises and it conduces to welfare in the terms in which the tribe defines it. But to the outsider it seems to involve a great and unnecessary capital waste which a tribe living close to nature can ill afford. If the natives ever hesitated in the carrying out of the destruction, tempted to retain grandfather's fine blow-gun or his soft robe for mundane uses, they soon put the temptation behind them. For

¹⁰ William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. I, p. 30, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹¹ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 95-96. Reprinted by permission of Ginn and Company, publishers.

grandfather's ghost would be angered, and would wreak havoc with the transgressors. The *mos* carries with it a sanction sufficiently strong to enforce it against even the "natural cupidity" of man.

But while sanctions are available to enforce obedience to the mores they are not necessary to produce conformity by most of the folk most of the time. The mores are so much a part of the thinking and feeling of the people that the idea of violation or transgression would never enter their heads. The feeling for the "right and proper," for "the true, the beautiful, and the good" as defined in the mores, is strong enough alone to ensure uniformity in conduct and belief on the part of most of us.

Institutions and the mores. Institutions are produced out of the mores. Our current institutions of government, trade and commerce, education, and religion, all with their elaborate regulations and ritual systems, are at root only aggregations of folkways built together around central unifying concepts. Think of the usages that go to make up the business man's code for the extension of credit; there are included all sorts of prescriptions and constraints of human behavior, most of which have deep roots in the past. Again, when brought into relation with each other in the minds of two or more individuals, such behavior requirements as premarital chastity, affection between husband and wife, responsibility for rearing children, maintaining a common household, and "support" of the wife by the husband come to reinforce each other, come to produce a characteristic and consistent pattern of behavior. The result is a family institution, a continuing relationship between the members of a household in which the rights and obligations of each are ceremonially and ritually defined.¹²

Institution-patterns like the family are in Sumner's terms *creative*. They grow up by slow process of accretion and organization of mores into a more or less definite whole. They may have been generations in the making; they are in the making still. But there is another type of institution of apparently, although perhaps not fundamentally, more rapid growth. A college or university is such an institution. On such and such a day it was created by definite enactment; it was granted a charter by the state or organized by a committee; it began to be. The first student body appeared and

¹² For a fuller discussion of the nature of institutions see chapter 11, p. 281.

started to organize extra-curricular activities, to "create" traditions. The new faculty set about organizing courses and promulgating rules of discipline. The administration bought equipment and put it into operation. The institution functioned, that is to say, people—students, faculty, administrators—functioned. They functioned in ways that rapidly became habitual, became campus folkways to which the present generation conforms today.

Seemingly this system of folkways grew up over night. Problems were met with, solved in some way or other, and the solutions copied by successors of these founding fathers and ancient alumni. Actually institutional creation is never as sudden as the account just given would make it appear. No group of individuals, however intelligent, could create a complex institution like a college out of whole cloth; new ideas do not rush that rapidly into the brain of slow-witted man, and would be rejected as much too radical if ever they did. The people who founded X college had already some ideas about universities; the first students had ideas about how campus life should be lived. These ideas were already in the social tradition; the local pattern was merely a reweaving in a slightly new design of old fabrics. Even *enacted* institutions are thus seen to be always to some extent *crescive*. Unless institutions like banks, corporations, hospitals, and constitutional governments have roots in the mores they will be too artificial, will appear too unreal and arbitrary, to survive.

Law and the mores. One of Sumner's most important generalizations deals with the relationship between the mores and the body of formally enacted rules, regulations, constitutions, charters, and by-laws which we sum up under the one term, "law." Laws have a rational and practical character which is lacking in mores. In the latter, according to Sumner, "the elements of sentiment and faith inhere." Laws, when compared with the mores, are also more definite, rigid, and inflexible. Law "enforcement" is in the hands of designated functionaries, such as policemen, sergeants-at-arms, courts, and tribunals, while the mores are obeyed through force of folk opinion. But this opinion may be a powerful deterrent to action, even when it remains formally unexpressed.

Laws grow up out of the mores. In primitive society all control of individuals is through custom and tabu; in more complex societies the tendency is to codify the mores and apply sanctions created by the politically organized state. Thus our common law

principles and rules of procedure are simply the more precisely formulated folk practices of our English forbears, and many of our rules of order for legislative bodies have evolved out of the folk-mote and town-meeting. New inventions, like the automobile, require new enactments, but even here legislatures try merely to extend the already established customs that are "the rules of the road." The parking space is, after all, only an extension of the hitching post, and similar rules of courtesy and respect for property apply to each.

Legislatures are wise when they do not try to oppose laws to mores, for the mores win out in the end. Where abstinence was in the local mores Prohibition actually prohibited, for John Smith would have been ashamed to have been seen coming home in a state of exhilarated inebriation. Where liquor drinking was a time-honored custom it continued in the face of the clear-cut tabu imposed by law. Americans have had a long experience with dead-letter legislation. Faith in law as a social instrument is in our mores; obedience to law as law is not.¹³ One judge has estimated that there are 1,900,000 laws on our statute books. "We are," says Raymond Fosdick,¹⁴ "of all people, not even excepting the Germans, pre-eminently addicted to the habit of standardizing by law the lives and morals of our citizens. . . . We like to pass laws to compel the individual to do as we think he ought to do for his own good." "This willingness with which we undertake to regulate by law the personal habits of private citizens is a source of perpetual astonishment to Europeans."¹⁵ The result in America is frequent nullification:

"I'm not that much of a fool!" snorts the sportsman when admonished by a friend that he must throw back a trout he has just caught, which is too unaccommodating to stretch the bare half inch necessary

¹³ "They [Americans] have created the largest body of laws and the most complex system of government now in existence as restraints and controls upon individual and social conducts, but every stage in their development has been characterized by a large and ever increasing degree of lawlessness and crime." —H. W. Anderson in the *Report on the Causes of Crime*, vol. 1, p. xli, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Washington, 1931.

¹⁴ *American Police Systems*, p. 48, The Century Company, New York, 1920.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

to become fair game. "If the legislature is as particular as all that, let it invent elastic trout."¹⁶

The proper field for law, for "stateways" as opposed to folkways, has long been a problem among political theorists. Professor Giddings has suggested one possible basis of compromise:

Out of trial and error a tradition of general consent grows up that a state shall use physical force to repel invasion, to put down rebellion, to repress organized violence and mob action, and to penalize crime. *No equally general consent is ever reached to the use of force by the state to repress vice and to correct negligence.* We are not without indications, however, of possible truce. When vice or negligence threatens social existence because folkways have failed to repress, or to meet urgent needs, action by the state is usually assented to; *but when folkways are presumably adequate to the occasion, objection to state interference and resentment against it, extend and deepen.*¹⁷

In deciding when folkways are "presumably adequate" legislators will need all their wisdom and an intimate knowledge of the social mind.

DESCRIBING AND COMPARING CULTURES

Culture traits and culture patterns. Culture, as we have seen, is made up of (1) things which are in some way used by man and (2) folkways. The anthropologist, when engaged in comparing the customs of one tribe or civilization with another, may refer to either a folkway or an artifact as a *culture trait*. The culture of any folk will be described by listing the traits observed by the ethnologist on the spot plus the traits he can learn of indirectly through folk history. The trait thus becomes the unit of cultural anthropology, just as the cell is for biology and as the atom used to be for physicists.

¹⁶ Ray E. Baber, "Factors in Law Enforcement," *Social Forces*, vol. 8, p. 200, Dec., 1929. Reprinted by permission of Williams and Wilkins Company, publishers. See also L. M. Hussey, "Twenty-Four Hours of a Law-breaker," *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 160, pp. 436-439, Mar., 1930. Mr. Hussey's imaginary hero innocently and unknowingly commits in one day offenses against commonly unenforced statutes for which the legal penalties total \$2,895 in fines and five years in jail.

¹⁷ From Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 195. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

Single culture traits in isolation mean little, however. The significance of a tool or a folk practice can hardly be interpreted without some relation to other traits of culture. Instead of relying on tea, as the British do, the native Samoans indulge in constant kava drinking. The fact that the natives prepare and consume this stimulating but non-alcoholic beverage is undoubtedly a trait of Samoan culture. But to be acquainted only with this simple fact is to know little of the real role which kava plays in Samoan life. One must understand the ritual of preparing and serving the beverage, the pouring out of the first cup as a libation to the gods, the ceremonial order of precedence in serving kava to the group assembled, the various occasions which call for kava drinking, and the mythological backgrounds of the ceremony, before one is in a position to interpret the trait's *meaning* in the culture in which it is found. Kava drinking ties in with many other aspects of Samoan life; there is a sort of *kava-complex*, a whole set of culture traits that "cluster" together in a meaningful interrelationship.

One can find many examples of culture-complexes in our own as well as in primitive societies. Willey, for instance, has described the traits which go to make up what he calls the "football complex":

Each item used in the playing of the game is a trait: the football itself, the goal posts, the stadium, the uniforms, the special shoes, the helmets, the benches, the scoreboard, the referee's whistle. . . . But these are only a few of the traits combining to make a football game. The rules themselves—the game—are a combination of traits. Then there is the band, the cheer leaders, the mascot, the pennants, the flags, the score cards, the season tickets, systems of reserved seats, the college songs, the blankets, the press box, to say nothing of the bottled soda and peanuts, without which no game would be complete. . . . Elaborate accounts of the game in the newspapers must be taken as part of the system. In many colleges an athletic holiday is granted for the big games. . . . There is incidental celebration—fair guests are entertained, fraternity houses are filled with the wailing of saxophones as the festive members dance. . . . It all centers in a game of football. The sum total of this grand cluster of traits is the football complex.¹⁸

¹⁸ M. M. Willey in Davis, Barnes, et al., *An Introduction to Sociology*, p. 524. Reprinted by special permission of D. C. Heath and Company, publishers.

The next higher unit in a culture trait synthesis, the *culture pattern*, is a grouping of trait complexes into a sort of generalized picture of the culture as a whole. The pattern of Kwakiutl culture is that of a simple hunting and fishing people who are almost neurotically sensitive to shame and insult and who therefore have developed an extensive system of ways for "wiping out" an affront.¹⁹ The American Plains Indian culture pattern emphasizes individual exploit aided by the personal guardian spirit and an elaboration of prestige-giving ceremonial societies. The spirit of modern American culture is perhaps found in our concern with machinery and its material products, our puritanical religion and morality, and our ability to assimilate diverse ethnic groups. Such summary interpretations are always individual ones; it is hard to characterize the world-view of a people in a sentence and get agreement. The point to be made here, however, is that there is a patterning of culture; a unifying of diverse elements around central principles; perhaps what Sumner called a "strain toward consistency." Culture patterns, once formed, persist, and, as we shall see later, they set limits to the direction of social change.

Culture areas. There is a geographical aspect of culture which remains to be considered. While the culture of each tribe or people is a unique combination of culture traits, never exactly repeated elsewhere, there will be a good many elements of any culture that are found approximately duplicated in the cultures of neighboring tribes. The tipi, or conical tent covered usually with buffalo hides, is the characteristic pre-Columbian dwelling of the Cheyenne Indians; it is also employed by a number of other tribes in the western plains, among them the Comanche, the Gros Ventre, and the Arapaho. One can in fact plot the area of distribution of this particular trait;²⁰ and the same thing can be done for other elements in the Cheyenne culture, such as the sun-dance ceremony, the camp-circle organization, and the fundamental dependence on the buffalo.

The fact that a number of these plotted areas of distribution, when superimposed on one another, show a tendency to coincide gives rise to the anthropological concept of the *culture area*, "a

¹⁹ Cf. Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, pp. 173-222, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934.

²⁰ It has been done by Clark Wissler in his *The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America*, p. 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 1926.

geographical region in which reside a considerable number of relatively independent tribes with similar culture." It is important to realize that this similarity must lie not in the common possession of a few isolated traits of culture; there must be "a core of important culture complexes held in common."²¹ The anthropologist can speak of the culture area of the American plains because the general pattern of existence is basically the same in the whole region, although local variations are frequent and marked.

A culture area does not have the clear-cut boundaries that the term perhaps suggests. Tribes near the "edge" of the area will show affinities with the contiguous area as well as with the one of which, all things considered, they form a part. The characteristic pattern of culture area A is found in its "purest" form at the culture "center"; it will be most attenuated on the peripheries remote from this center, where the tribes will be marginal to both areas A and B. The area itself will have no characteristic size and shape since its extent and configuration will be determined by the natural barriers to communication within and without; by the distribution of culturally significant fauna (the Plains area is closely related to the range of the American buffalo) and flora; by the means of transportation possessed by the individual groups; and by a host of other factors. The culture areas, as the anthropologist locates them, may not even be continuous. Tribes originally in contact with area A may have become separated from their cultural cousins by the accidents of war or migration, and come to form a sort of island of A affiliates surrounded by tribes whose primary relations are with area B.²²

Cultural areas in pre-Columbian America. The culture area concept has found its most useful application in pre-Columbian America. As the result of the vast amount of field work done by American ethnographers and archeologists a picture of the red man's civilization, accurate at least in general geographical outlines, is available. While there are differences among anthropologists with respect to details there is general agreement on delimitation of pre-Columbian culture areas. The North American areas are designated as follows: (1) Arctic or Eskimo,

²¹ Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, p. 345, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929.

²² For an example see Leslie Spier, "Problems Arising from the Cultural Position of the Havasupai," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 31, pp. 213-222.

(2) Northwest or North Pacific Coast (the Kwakiutl are in this area), (3) California, (4) Plateau, (5) Mackenzie-Yukon, (6) Plains (the Crow belong here), (7) Northeast or Northern Woodland, (8) Southeast or Southern Woodland, (9) Southwest (the Hopi are a typical Southwest culture), (10) Mexico. The California area has been divided into four sub-areas by Kroeber.²³ Culture areas have also been tentatively delimited for Africa by Herskovits,²⁴ and a similar but not identical concept of the *Kulturkreis* has been used extensively by anthropologists abroad.²⁵

Culture areas in the world today. The plotting of culture areas in pre-industrial times is of course hampered often by lack of historical data, but it is on the other hand facilitated by the relatively greater cultural stability in primitive life. The difference between modern and ancient communication systems is a vital factor in accounting for the greater regional homogeneity characterizing American Indian culture when contrasted with American culture today. Natural barriers, long distances, and inter-tribal hostility all hindered the pre-Columbian folk-to-folk transmission of ideas. Now California copies New York, and New York, Hollywood, with almost no time interval, and ideas cradled in London and Paris are soon the subject of comment in many an American home.

To secure culture areas of the same degree of homogeneity and distinctiveness as the Plains Indian area previously mentioned, it is now necessary to include a much larger territory. Wissler speaks²⁶ of "Euro-American culture" and "Oriental culture" as the only two clear-cut modern type-forms; with the first of these having inter-continental distribution. The pattern of Euro-American culture, with its emphasis on power and machinery, on rapid transportation and communication, on Christianity, and paradoxically, on militarism, is spreading all over the world. Possibly we are headed toward a single world-culture, a "Great Society" to use Wallas'

²³ A. L. Kroeber, "California Culture Provinces," *University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology*, vol. 17, 1920, pp. 151-169.

²⁴ Melville J. Herskovits, "A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 26, pp. 50-64, Jan.-Mar., 1924.

²⁵ For one of many critical reviews of the German *Kulturkreis* doctrine see Russell Gordon Smith, "The Culture Area Concept," in his *Fugitive Papers*, pp. 42-70, Columbia University Press, New York, 1930.

²⁶ Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 21-33, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1923.

term.²⁷ Anthropologists, seeing this process well along, are already questioning the utility of the culture area concept, when it is applied to our unstable cultural order.²⁸ It has been pointed out by Willey²⁹ that cultural differences between social classes in a single society are often more significant than the differences in folkways of widely separated geographical regions. The neighborhood and its surrounding area no longer comprise the individual's social world.

From time to time, however, the culture area concept, in modified form to be sure, does prove useful to sociologists. America still has surviving bits of folk culture tucked away in odd corners of the country, and constituting perhaps culture areas or sub-areas in miniature.³⁰ One can also speak of "New England culture" as contrasted with the "culture of the South" and the terms have meaning even though with the industrialization of the South the basis of much of Southern culture's individuality is breaking down. E. C. Hughes maintains that "French Canada is a 'culture area' in a more real sense than any other part of America north of the Rio Grande."³¹ He describes the pattern of French-Canadian culture as "local and personal" in contrast to that of the English-Canadian, which is expansive and impersonal. The French-Canadians have their own language, a specialized form of Catholicism as a religion, a cherished tradition, and in general (even when living in the city) a "rural mode of life."

We have now acquired some of the mental tools necessary for a study of human culture and are ready to apply these concepts in a discussion of the origins and development of man's social heritage. This discussion will occupy the two succeeding chapters.

²⁷ Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921.

²⁸ Cf. Robert Redfield, "The Regional Aspect of Culture," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 24, pp. 31-41, May, 1930. See also Malcolm M. Willey, "Some Limitations of the Culture Area Concept," *Social Forces*, vol. 10, pp. 28-31, Oct., 1931.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ As, for instance, in the southern Piedmont, in the Ozarks, or on St. Helena Island. Cf. Howard W. Odum, "Notes on the Study of Regional and Folk Society," *Social Forces*, vol. 10, pp. 164-175, Dec., 1931.

³¹ "The French-English Margin in Canada," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 39, pp. 1-11, July, 1933.

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Chapter 3

THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE

WHY AND HOW WE STUDY CULTURAL ORIGINS

THE ORIGIN OF THE POTAWATOMI¹

THE POTAWATOMI PEOPLE came from above, and were placed on the earth by the Great Spirit. The first person whom they encountered after their arrival was a man whom they found sitting beside a fire. He spoke to them, saying: "Hau, my friends, my brothers! Sit here and warm yourselves."

The Potawatomi gathered round the fire and talked to him. They told him that the Great Spirit had placed them on this island, the earth, but he said that he was the one who had called them there. He said that he had made the earth and all that they could see there growing was his creation. He said that he was glad that they had come, and that, in order to live, they must hunt and kill game. For this purpose he told them they must have bows and arrows, and he showed them how these were made and used.

This being who seemed human was Wi'sakä. He was the first person that the Potawatomi met on earth. In those days the deer were gentle and one could make himself a bow and arrow, shoot down, skin, and butcher a deer while the rest of the herd looked on without fleeing.

The Potawatomi learned fast to make a better and better living. Wi'sakä taught them to make pots of earth and burn them hard in the fire. He taught them to take a deer's paunch, clean it, tie up the top with a bark string and place a wooden cross piece to hold it open. This they could fill with water and hang over the fire and it would cook meat as well as any other vessel. Besides it slowly cooked itself

¹ Alanson Skinner, "The Mascoutens or Prairie Potawatomi Indians," *Bulletin of the Public Museum of the City of Milwaukee*, vol. 6, pp. 334-335, Jan. 22, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

as it was used. The Potawatomi learned to use animal paunches first, before Wi'sakä showed them how to make earthen kettles.

Wi'sakä showed them how to make axes of stone, and knives that they chipped out of flint with blows of other stones. The axes were really sharp enough to cut wood. He showed them how to dig in the ground by using a three-cornered stone tied at right angles to the end of a wooden handle.

After they had lived at their place of arrival on the earth for some time, Wi'sakä left them, promising to return. When the time was up, he did indeed come back. He told them that it was plain that they were doing well, but that now they needed a chief.

"Not so," they replied, "We have one already, and that is the Great Spirit."

Wi'sakä laughed, "Don't you think I am the Great Spirit?" he asked. "Where is your Great Spirit? I can do anything. I want you to be noted in the world, so you must have a chief to rule you."

On this account the Potawatomi appointed a man from the Fish clan to be chief. Wi'sakä told him how to give orders, and helped him. After a while Wi'sakä again went to the people and said: "You are going to have troubles with other nations from time to time, so I am going to give you a *pextcigosan* or sacred bundle to help you. You will worship and rely on it and call on it for help when you are in danger."

So Wi'sakä made the first sacred bundle for the tribe. He showed them how to use it. He placed a rattle in it and ordered them to kill deer and other game to feast it. He said that they must feast it four times a year, in the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter, and that the principal meat they were to use for the feasts was to be the flesh of a dog. The Potawatomi had thought, up to that time, that the dog was given them only for company.

Man's curiosity about his past. "No man can escape the important question, whence am I?"² In terms of their limited knowledge and experience men in all ages and civilizations have sought somehow to get at this question of beginnings and to find an explanation of how their ancestors came to be. The collective results of all these searchings are the tribal myths of origins, tales

² Daniel G. Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, p. 222, Leypoldt and Holt, New York, 1868.

like the one just quoted, which recount the actions of creator-gods back when the world was young.

Almost every people has its origin story. Crude, naive, and simple as many of them seem to us today, for the folk who have heard them told over and over from childhood they come to be the essence of the beautiful, the sacred, and the true. Belief in them is in the mores, and woe betide the skeptic who casts doubt on or fails to reverence this vital portion of the tribal lore.

Belief in our own traditional story of the creation was once sanctioned with terrible sternness by the Inquisition. We have lived, however, to see the biblical account challenged in its literal interpretation by a new and strange cult called "science." A whole series of new and exciting facts have been uncovered by scientific students, and these give man a much longer earthly history and place the whole matter of his origins in a quite different light. The scientific discoveries were greeted at first by skepticism and sometimes by the bitterest of opposition, since they seemed to strike at the base of revealed religion. Today we no longer believe this. The biblical story can now be taken for what it is, the work of the creative imagination of a gifted but pre-scientific people, without destroying its value as a part of a revered religious tradition. We can continue the search for even more facts about man's earliest history without fearing that these facts, when uncovered, will do more than temporarily unsettle any vital religious belief which we profess today.

The current interest in the origins of man and his culture is not mere idle curiosity. It is in part a renewal of the ancient quest, the desire to know the past for its own sake. It is in part also born of the desire to learn "lessons" from the past to apply in solving the problems of today. If, for instance, we knew why and how men first formed family groups we could perhaps better assay the importance of that institution in modern times. But, above all, a study of the early history of our own and of other cultures is useful because it gives us *perspective* on contemporary civilization. We see our own culture more clearly when we see it against the background of other cultures. We study the mores of other peoples and gradually we come to realize that our own most cherished principles of right and wrong, of decency and indecency, of truth and error are seldom as universally valid as we like to think them. They are, after all, the customs of one particular civilization, to be

compared open-mindedly with customs of other civilizations before (and not after) they are set up as the only and essential truth.

The hopeless quest for real cultural origins. History and anthropology have provided a great fund of information about the artifacts and folkways of the world's ancient inhabitants and we shall draw on this store many times. When, however, we ask science to provide us with the authenticated account of origins, of the actual beginnings of man's social life and the invention of his first tools and weapons, we get a reply which at first seems wholly unsatisfactory. For these origins, it turns out, are in Sumner's terms, "lost in mystery."³ The naive folk penetrate the "veil of mystery" with what the scientists call *myths* of creation; the scientist, with his more rigorous critical methods, finds himself balked.

There are good reasons for the present lack of success of the scientists. In the first place their search has been really under way for only two generations and has in that brief period met with bitter resistance from adherents of older accounts and explanations of origins. This resistance has now at last largely broken down, but there are other obstacles more irreducible. One is the fact that the beginnings of things were so very long ago. The origins of the species *homo sapiens* are now placed at least as far back as the early Pleistocene; that is to say, true man is now at least 200,000 years old. He is probably very much older, but even this conservative estimate of his antiquity raises serious problems for the student who wants to know "how it all began." When it is considered that the origins of language, social life, the family, the use of tools, are almost certainly prehuman⁴ the problem is further complicated. Culture antedates written records by hundreds of thousands of years. As a matter of fact it antedates all *records* now available or likely to be available. As Sumner says:

We go up the stream of history to the utmost point for which we have evidence of its course. Then we are forced to reach out into the darkness upon the line of direction marked by the remotest course of the historic stream. This is the way in which we have to act in regard to the origin of capital, language, the family, the state, religion, and

³ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 7, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906.

⁴ H. P. Fairchild makes much of this point in his *General Sociology*, pp. 45-53, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1934.

rights. We can never hope to see the beginning of any one of these things. . . . It is only by analysis and inference that we can form any conception of the "beginning" which we are always so eager to find.⁵

In fact the whole concept of "beginning" has been challenged. Can any culture trait be said to have a definite origin, a moment when it commenced to be? Paradoxical as it may seem, "there was a time when there was no state, and yet the state has no beginning in time, no point of origin."⁶ Nearly always there are necessary antecedent conditions out of which the new idea "emerges." Just when you can say that it "is" depends upon your definition. What is a state, a family, even an axe or a harpoon? Define them, arbitrarily as you must, and then ask as to their beginnings. What you find is not a beginning but a becoming, a "growing out of" something else; the state out of the authority of the headman or chieftain,⁷ the family perhaps, although this is uncertain, out of the temporary sex pairing, the axe out of the fist hatchet or *coup-de-poing*. The moment when one thing becomes the other is wholly arbitrary. Our cultures have evolved, apparently just as our earth and universe, slowly and continuously, not suddenly and cataclysmically. This at least is science's evolutionary view. As scientists discussing origins we do not deal, therefore, in sudden and unexpected stage appearances; we presume that all parts in the drama have been well rehearsed in advance.

But we have redefined the term "origins"; we have not abandoned it. When we now come to consider beginnings we, to use Lumley's phrase, "simply set out to dip our intellectual ladles into the social stream at points as remote as possible."⁸ We then describe what we have dipped out. This description will be our nearest approach to origins.

The data for theories of cultural origins. We can perhaps profitably carry Lumley's metaphor a little farther at this point, and ask ourselves what kinds of ladles the searcher after origins

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Reprinted by permission of Ginn and Company, publishers.

⁶ Robert M. MacIver, *Society, Its Structure and Changes*, p. 424, Ray Long and Richard Smith, Inc., New York, 1931.

⁷ Cf. Robert H. Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, pp. 2-6, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1927.

⁸ Frederick E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 448, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1928.

would use and what techniques he would employ in dipping. There are two main ladles available, and to get the best possible picture it will be necessary to employ both. They can be called by their scientific names, *archeology* and *ethnology*. What are the natures of these ladles and how may they be used?

Archeology. The archeologist is an excavator. He digs up relics of the material culture of civilizations now extinct and from these relics he draws inferences as to the way life was lived in the ancient days when the civilizations flourished. At the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago a unique exhibit portrayed graphically the archeologist's method. What visitors saw was a cross section, such as might perhaps have been made by excavation, of an artificial but none the less realistic metropolitan dump heap. Imbedded in a matrix of earth and powdered rubbish were all sorts of discarded artifacts, representing in effect many phases of twentieth century American life. There were oil cans, a battered bugle, a Doughboy's steel helmet, the remnants of an ancient Oliver typewriter, the radiator front of a model "T" Ford, a whiskey bottle or two, bits of discarded clothing, and other objects innumerable; in short, the typical assortment of cast-offs that end their careers as junk. The objects were exposed to view in such a way as to make clear their identity. One could imagine what a rich find they would be for an archeologist of the twenty-fifth century trying to reconstruct a picture of the strange dark age civilization of the nineteen hundreds. The same thrill comes to the contemporary excavator when he uncovers a pre-Columbian burial mound or a hearth with the split bones of animals upon which cave men once feasted.

One other feature of the junk heap exhibit must be noted, the fact that the more ancient objects, relics of the nineties and of the first decade of the twentieth century, are at the bottom and that the most recent cast-offs are at the top.⁹ This obvious fact of stratification of deposits is a fundamental one for the archeologist. The only clue to the age of a long-dead civilization may be the relation of the layer in which its remains are found to other layers of deposits above or below. If one knows the date of the

⁹ Actually the whole cross section in the exhibit had been so arranged that the older artifacts (1893) were at the left and the more recent ones (1933) at the right. This tilting of the whole stratigraphy through a right angle was an unfortunate flaw in what was otherwise a perfect exhibit.

culture represented by one stratum and can estimate the rate at which deposition takes place it may be possible to assign approximate dates to other strata in the series. The cultural remains of our prehistoric ancestors are, however, often buried so deeply that the geologist and the paleontologist must be called in to help with the chronology.¹⁰ The geologist may be able to identify the soil stratum in which the deposits occur and relate it to one of his own already developed stratigraphical series. The paleontologist may be able to date the artifacts through the bones of animals found with them. From independent sources he may already know when and for how long the animal species in question lived. Archaeological research thus proceeds by the correlation of known facts with unknown. Slowly and laboriously a pier is built from the mainland of recorded fact out into the vast ocean of prehistory.

Ethnology. The approach of the ethnologist, or, as he is sometimes called, the cultural anthropologist or the ethnographer, is quite different from that of the archeologist, for the ethnologist studies the "living past" rather than the dead. His data are derived from actual contact with current existing cultures or sometimes with the folklore of peoples whose civilizations are only very recently extinct. These peoples upon whom the ethnologist specializes have been termed "our contemporary ancestors." Living in general in areas remote from ordinary contact with the white man's civilization they have been less disturbed in the practice of their ancient ways. Change has taken place among them—no society can survive and remain completely static in a changing world—but the processes of innovation and alteration have gone on at a slow pace. The result is that these folk seem "primitive" in the light of our superior sophistication; we speak of them as "the simpler peoples," "nature folk," "aborigines," "savages." They live what appears to be a rude sort of existence, and we suppose, when we call them our contemporary ancestors, that their mode of life is roughly similar to that which our forbears led some thousands of years ago.

¹⁰ One of the most interesting achievements in American archeology has been the accurate dating of thousand year old Pueblo ruins in the Southwest with a chronological scale built on the annual growth rings of trees. Cf. A. E. Douglass, "Tree Growth and the Chronology of Pueblo Pre-history," in A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, pp. 177-187, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1931.

We must not be too much misled by the seeming simplicity of some of these savage cultures, for on examination the lives of Eskimos, Veddas, Bushmen, Australian aborigines, and Kwakiutls prove to be richer than one would think. Ethnological studies have revealed the ingenuity and inventiveness of these so-called primitive folk. Their tools are based often on surprisingly advanced principles of mechanics and may be also marvels of handiwork. Their art on occasion may measure up to European standards. They may exhibit a complete social organization, a rich pattern of ceremonialism, a real social philosophy cast in the form of "wise sayings" or proverbs. No single tribe is likely to possess all these cultured attributes, but the achievements of even the rudest folk are such as to command the respect of those who really know them.

Perhaps one therefore had better not count too much on the parallel between these possibly miscalled primitive cultures of to-day and the cultural level of one of our own Pleistocene ancestors. The recently extinct Tasmanians were a stone age people in the sense that they never got beyond flint tools, but stone ages may not be everywhere the same. The similarity in material culture (which is all that we can really check on) does not necessarily guarantee similarity in religion, in the control over sex relations, or in tribal organization. Perhaps "suggestive" is a better word to use than "similar" in describing the relation of Tasmanian culture to that of ice age Europe. Tasmanian culture, together with that of all our other contemporary ancestors, yields many fertile *suggestions* as to the mode of life lived by European, Asiatic, or African fossil man.

A word should perhaps be said at this point about the ethnologist's method, for ethnological data cannot be properly interpreted unless one knows how the facts were acquired. The first point to note is that in modern anthropological practice the data are secured not through the collection of hearsay reports from tourists and missionaries but by careful investigations made on the ground by experts. The ethnologist goes to the tribe, in whatever out-of-the-way-place it may be, and learns tribal life and lore by actual contact. He may live intimately with the folk for months, even years, learning their language and participating, as much as possible for an outsider, in the varied activities of the community life. Through his entire residence he is seeking to get not a miscel-

laneous array of bits of data, the "strange manners and customs" which attract the more casual and untrained visitor; he is trying instead to get at the essence of the culture, to learn to see the world as the primitive tribesman himself views it, to interpret the customs of the folk in terms of their local meaning and significance. For the civilized European or American this sort of field work is quite difficult, but an increasing number of studies which meet these high standards are becoming available.¹¹ From them we can get the comparative slant on our own culture of which we have spoken previously. With their aid, too, we can make conclusions about cultural origins with more assurance. While these conclusions will be extremely limited, at least, since they are based on reliable description, they are more likely to be sound.

THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF CULTURE

Man is today, in the modern view, the result of long ages of biological evolution. Over millions of years there have been slowly developing the physical characteristics which give the human species its present form. The story of this process of human evolution, so far as it has been reconstructed, is set forth in detail in many books by anthropologists and biologists¹² and it will not be dealt with here. In general we shall take biological man as we find him, and be content to leave questions as to his exact place in the animal kingdom, the identities of his immediate progenitors, and the time and place of his first emergence in other and more competent hands.

Our interest is in the origins of man's culture, the beginnings of his social rather than his biological heritage. Culture, however, has a biological base that cannot be neglected; it is the work of a special type of biological organism with culture-building powers and propensities. We cannot, therefore, escape biological factors altogether. We must analyze biological man as a being endowed

¹¹ A good brief discussion of the field techniques of modern ethnology, including a list of model studies, is to be found in Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, pp. 16-24, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929.

¹² See, for instance, Ernest A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931; H. H. Wilder, *The Pedigree of the Human Race*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1926; and Sir Arthur Keith, *Man*, Henry Holt and Company, Home University Library Series, New York.

with the power to create a tradition and see in what particular traits that power appears to lie.

Biological characteristics basic to the development of culture. The three biological traits which made it possible for man, through his culture, to assume a position of dominance in the animal kingdom are the prehensile hand, binocular vision, and the large brain.¹³ All of these traits are very old in man's ancestry, and their development to the point reached in *homo sapiens* has been long and gradual.

The hand is perhaps the most ancient of these protohuman characters. Apparently it dates back to the primitive insect-eating mammal who we may suppose developed a liking for a fruit diet, moved into the trees, and sired the order of primates from which, in a few million years, man sprung. In arboreal life the hand was necessary for hanging on (it took the place of claws) and for swinging from branch to branch, as some of our anthropoidal cousins can be seen to do in zoos. The hand was useful also for plucking fruit and eating, for lice hunting in one's own or in one's neighbor's furry or hairy coat, for caressing mates, for fumbling with all sorts of objects and manipulating them. Sitting on his haunches in the trees man's ancestor used the marvelously adaptable hand in ways impossible for paw or hoof or claw. Then pre-man graduated from his arboreal school¹⁴ and came back to earth again to walk erect, his hands freed for more grasping of things, for more manual activities. The stage was set for the development of tools and weapons as an extension of the powers of this by then near-human hand.

The primacy of the sense of vision is supposed to have developed early in primate history and to have been also the result

¹³ Erect posture is often included in this list, and of course other traits may be added as well. The whole human anatomy and physiology was in one sense adapted for culture creation. Later it became modified to some extent in adaptation to the new mode of life which culture brought about.

¹⁴ This is Hooton's metaphor. See his *Up from the Ape*, p. 14. The whole question as to the importance of the arboreal period in the development of human characteristics is much in dispute. While a majority opinion among experts recognizes arboreal life as a vital factor in developing hand and brain there are dissenters. See Frederick Wood-Jones, *Man's Place Among the Mammals*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1929, and *Arboreal Man*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1916; H. F. Osborn, *Man Rises to Parnassus*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1927; and Ernest A. Hooton, "Doubts and Suspensions Concerning Certain Functional Theories of Primate Evolution," *Human Biology*, vol. 2, pp. 223-249.

of adaptation to life in the trees. Here quickness of eye in seeing the next branch to leap to and nice estimation of distance were all-important, much more vital than a nose for scents or even an ear for sounds. In the spectral tarsier of Eocene times (two to five million years ago) we have a primate whose dog-like snout was almost missing, who could focus both eyes on the same spot, and if necessary turn his head in all directions to look for enemies. Vision became the primary means of "taking in" situations, of becoming aware of what was going on in the immediate environment. The increasing dependence on this perceptual faculty served to mark man's ancestors off conspicuously from the other animal species which depend much more on olfactory impressions. Today one might almost imagine a dog saying, "I smell what you are getting at," but man would say, "I see."

The large brain developed along with improved vision and the use of the hand for manipulation. Presumably the three traits influenced and were influenced by the other modifications in physical structure that were going on. In its details the story may never be unraveled. All we know for certain is that brain size increases as we come down the evolutionary line to man, and that brain structure grows more complex. The increased size and complexity of the nervous system made possible better and more rapid solutions to life problems. It made it possible to see the significance of chance relationships, to make real discoveries. In fact the new brain development, more than any other one factor, made culture possible, and thus the "ascent of man."

The more this development of man's culture-building powers is examined, the more astounding and at the same time mystifying the whole process seems. Man's advent as the real "king of beasts" was not heralded in advance by the achievements of his primate ancestors. Through its long history the primate order has remained in the background, overshadowed by much more imposing and one would say more successful mammalian types. A Pliocene, even a Pleistocene, observer gifted with a god's eye view of all the then existing animal species would hardly have prophesied a bright future for the creature soon (in a few more thousand years or so) to be called man. A puny two-legged animal this, with a certain rude cunning, doubtless, but with no weapons of offense like the tusks of the mammoth or the sabre-tooth tiger, no protective covering like that of the rhinoceros, and without the fleetness of the

rabbit or the reindeer. Unfortunately the record of the crucial stages in the rise from biological nobody to somebody is still missing. We have a series of primate forms becoming slowly more man-like, then a big gap, and man. True, the gap is being narrowed by projecting back into prehistory on a bridge of fossil types (*Pithecanthropus*, *Sinanthropus*, and the rest) but there are "missing links" still missing. And since it now appears that nearly all of the extant fossils represent species of men with at least some rude culture¹⁵ the seeds of man's cultural tradition also must be sought further back in an epoch as yet undated. There is a gap in the cultural records too.

The culture of prehuman species. There is, however, one other hope for the cultural origins seeker. Culture may antedate not only man but also all near human species. It may have been the original creation of animals less highly evolved than the higher primates. To find out whether this is actually the case we may fall back on the same type of logic as that used by ethnology. We may ask whether any currently existing animals, other than man, have culture. If evidences of social tradition among animals are found we can then cautiously infer that the ancestors of these species had culture also, and perhaps handed rudiments of it on to the primates when that order of mammals finally made its appearance on the stage. Such reasoning would be highly speculative, and of course conclusions based on it must be taken with many grains of salt. All that we could hope for would be, first, a further hint as to the antiquity of culture—the stage in biological evolution at which it made its appearance—and, second, a few more sug-

¹⁵ No cultural artifacts have yet been found associated with the fossil remains of *Pithecanthropus erectus*, although some eolithic-type flints have been uncovered in other Javan excavations at the same level. See P. V. Van Stein Callenfels, "New and Unexpected Light on the Java Ape Man," *Illustrated London News*, vol. 188, pp. 624-625, Apr. 11, 1936. As to the cultures associated with other early Pleistocene humanoid types see Davidson Black, "Evidence of the Use of Fire by *Sinanthropus*," *Bulletin of the Geological Society of China*, vol. 11, pp. 107-108, 1932; P. Teilhard de Chardin and W. C. Pei, "The Lithic Industry of the *Sinanthropus* Deposits in Choukoutien," *Bulletin of the Geological Society of China*, vol. 11, pp. 315-365, 1932; M. C. Burkitt, *The Old Stone Age, A Study of Paleolithic Times*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1933; Lewis B. Leakey, *Adam's Ancestors*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1934. See also A. H. Sayce, "The Antiquity of Civilized Man," *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1931, pp. 515-529; J. G. Anderson, "Civilization Is Older Than Man," *Forum*, vol. 90, pp. 177-179, Sept., 1933.

gestions useful in answering the question, "What were the very first cultural achievements really like?"

We can best approach the problem of determining whether animals have culture by breaking it into three. Since culture involves the social transmission of a tradition three things are implied: (1) a tradition worth transmitting, (2) someone to whom to transmit it, and (3) a mode or mechanism for passing the ideas along. In other words culture involves (1) new and useful ideas or inventions, (2) individuals in contact (group life), and (3) a means of communication. Do we find these three conditions present in the animal kingdom generally, and how early do all three appear in man's family tree?

Social life is not a characteristic of the lower orders of the animal kingdom,¹⁶ but there are a number of the higher orders that are social besides the species man. The herding propensities of buffalo, antelope, and reindeer are well known, as are the wolf-pack and the flock of birds. Prairie dog villages and beaver colonies are also examples of communal life. Among our living primate cousins most of the monkeys and two of the three species of great ape (chimpanzee and gorilla) are gregarious to an as yet unknown but apparently fairly high degree.¹⁷ For the most thoroughgoing examples of societal life apart from man one must, however, turn to the insects.¹⁸ What Alverdes calls the "insect states" of the bees, ants, and termites are truly marvelous examples of mutual interdependence and cooperation. Ant societies are organized on a caste basis with a high degree of division of labor between and within the different groups. Organized war is made on

¹⁶ Animals often associate without forming a real society. Cf. Fr. Alverdes, *Social Life in the Animal World*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1927; and W. C. Allee, *Animal Aggregations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

¹⁷ Cf. R. M. and Ada W. Yerkes, *The Great Apes*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929; Solly Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1932; and R. M. and Ada W. Yerkes, "Social Behavior in Infrahuman Primates," in Clark Murchison, ed., *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, pp. 973-1033, Clark University Press, Worcester, 1935.

¹⁸ Cf. W. M. Wheeler, *Social Life Among the Insects*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1923; Alverdes, *op. cit.*; Maurice Maeterlinck, *The Life of the Bee*, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1927; Auguste Forel, *The Social World of the Ants Compared with That of Men*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1928; and O. E. Plath, "Insect Societies," in Murchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-141.

other ant-hills; in the tending of a certain fungus there is a parallel to human agriculture; aphids are domesticated and kept like cattle for the secretion ("milk") they supply as food; nests are kept clean and sanitary by a special corps of "white wings"; larvæ are stolen from other ant communities and "enslaved" to replenish labor force and population; small larvæ are held in the ants' jaws and used as "tools" in weaving; in these and in countless other respects the world of the social insects resembles that of man.

One might think that all these striking instances of communal activity were true evidences of the existence of an ant culture; but such is not the case. They are not arts passed on as a tradition from generation to generation in the ant-hill. They are biologically transmitted and are phenomena we call instinct. Blot out all traditional attitudes from the minds of human beings and destroy all existing human artifacts—the result would be a return to stone age life. The reproduction of present-day modes of living would be again the work of countless generations. Blot out not only the supposed ant culture but all the ants themselves, save two—the pair in a favorable environment will recreate the society of the ant-hill just as it was before, and it will take but one generation.¹⁹ Each individual ant is born with a complex set of instinctive predispositions which tell him what to do under nearly all circumstances. He simply acts like an ant, and soon the ant-hill is built again.

Ants, bees, wasps, and beavers live communally but have only a pseudo-civilization based on instinct. Do not, then, the animals pass on any true social heritage at all? There are only a few minor and still somewhat disputed instances of the passing down from animal to animal of fragments of a tradition.²⁰ Young nightingales apparently learn to sing better when brought up in areas where adult and practiced singers are warbling nightly. Sparrows learn to sing like canaries when the canary is the only bird they hear. Flight routines of migratory bird flocks may also have a traditional element. These instances involve social transmission of animal created "culture"; there are others in which the animal takes over to

¹⁹ This is a paraphrase of a comparison made by A. A. Tozzer in his *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 12-13, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926.

²⁰ Cf. Hornell Hart and Adele Pantzer, "Have Subhuman Animals Culture?" *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 30, pp. 703-709, May, 1925; C. M. Case, "Culture as a Distinctive Human Trait," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 906-920, May, 1927; Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-190.

a slight degree some element of human culture. The fire-engine horse responds to the ringing of the alarm although he does not grasp its full meaning. Dogs learn tricks at the behest of human masters; they can be taught to bring in the daily paper, to put sheep through a man-devised routine, to "point" at the sight or smell of game. One writer²¹ suggests that a dog can acquire anti-Negro race prejudice; he reports a tendency to bark at and worry Negroes on the part of dogs of white masters in the South.

These examples, and many others of the same sort which might be given, serve little more than to illustrate the real paucity of culture among all animals but man. As we shall see, authorities do not credit even the apes with the ability to communicate by vocal sounds and gestures anything more than general attitudes and emotional states, and, in the absence of true language, learning from others must proceed by imitation only. If man could learn from other men only by watching them do things, without the usual running fire of explanatory comment, it seems obvious that his culture would be rudimentary too. Since the powers of imitative learning in animals, even the higher sub-human primates, are much more limited than in man,²² animals are much more handicapped in culture acquisition than even our wordless, gestureless man would be.

To all intents and purposes, then, culture is an attribute solely of humans and near humans. In Wissler's phrase, "man is the only self domesticated animal."²³ There is a flood of evidence to prove that animals have the "new and useful ideas" which form the basis of culture; that is to say, they exhibit intelligent adaptation in solving individual problems.²⁴ As we have seen, some animals meet the second requirement of group life. But no animals but man and his immediate forerunners can communicate their bright ideas by symbolic description to their group fellows. Our hope of finding cultural origins back of the gap in the archeological record has proved a vain one. The beginnings of culture

²¹ Read Bain, "The Culture of Canines," *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 13, p. 556.

²² Cf. Alverdes, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-179; and Margaret Washburn, *The Animal Mind*, chap. XI, The Macmillan Company, New York, third edition, 1926.

²³ *Man and Culture*, p. 305, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1923.

²⁴ Cf. Samuel J. Holmes, *The Evolution of Animal Intelligence*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1911; R. W. G. Hingston, "Instincts and Intelligence," *Book League Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 6, Apr., 1921; and Washburn, *op. cit.*

do not coincide in time with the appearance of a human physical type, but they do belong perhaps not so very much farther back in the period of sub-human life.

HUMAN CULTURAL BEGINNINGS

We should now be clear as to these points: (1) Culture is prehuman in origin but it is confined to the humanoid stem of the higher primates. (2) Its beginnings were probably in the late tertiary period, from which we have only some doubtful flints (later to be described) as direct evidences. (3) An individual culture trait has no single "moment of origin," but through archeology and ethnology we are often able to supply a rough description of it in a very early stage of its development.

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to describing as best we can on the basis of the evidence the "earliest" stages in three basic realms of cultural development. They are social organization, language, and material culture.

The primal human group. There has been much speculation as to the type of the first human grouping. How were the sexes represented in it and did it include all ages? What was the nature of the bond which held its members together? Data bearing on the answers to these questions have come in the main from three different sources: (1) analysis (based on the reports of ethnologists) of the simplest human societies now extant; (2) study of the social habits of the existing higher primates; and (3) an analysis of the human psyche, with conclusions drawn as to the motives which might have led individuals to come together and live a social life. However, even when all three of these approaches have been exploited to the fullest extent possible we remain in doubt. There are still a number of theories of group beginnings; there is no established fact. Here we have space only to present the theory which seems to command widest support from specialists at the present. The student must remember that new facts discovered next year, or ten years from now, may put this theory in an entirely different light.

Either the pristine type of human grouping is the family or else it is a band of individuals of both sexes called a horde. Both types of groupings are found among apes and monkeys; both appear in the most primitive tribes visited by ethnologists. As we shall see,

both are based upon fundamental needs of individuals and species. The question at first seems to present a simple alternative; either the family or the horde came first, the other followed after. Unfortunately it proves not to be so simple, for there are a number of forms of family and at least two different types of horde. One form of horde has no permanent sex ties among its members; another is simply a group of families which have joined forces. That the latter type is the much more common among men and their immediate ancestors and that in a study of group origins it is the more significant are postulated by the theory we are presenting. Primacy is thus given to the family instead of to the horde.

The family is based upon the attraction between the sexes, but if the sex drive alone were relied on the sex pairings might be highly impermanent, perhaps little more than temporary liaisons, perhaps even so temporary as to amount virtually to promiscuity. Promiscuity, however, it is generally agreed among ethnologists, is never found in contemporary primitive societies.²⁵ What evidence we have indicates that it is not found among the great apes as well.²⁶ Where sex activity is almost continuous, as among some of the monkey groups studied by the zoologist, Zuckerman,²⁷ sexual partnerships may tend toward a high degree of instability, but even here the factor of male possessiveness enters in to ensure at least some degree of permanence in the relations. The strong males gather around them "harems" of females who engage in sex relations with the "overlord" at his pleasure and indulge in "adulterous" practices only with his tolerance or when his back is turned. The baboon family, on this arrangement, consists of the adult male and as many sexually mature females as he can attach to his person and defend against aggressors, the immature children of these

²⁵ "Sexual communism as a condition taking the place of the individual family exists nowhere at the present time; and the arguments for its former existence must be rejected as unsatisfactory."—Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 62, Liveright Publishing Company, New York, 1920. See also Edward Westermarck, *A Short History of Marriage*, pp. 7-18, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926.

²⁶ Gorilla sexual partnerships may exhibit a high degree of stability. The same is true, although to a lesser degree, of the chimpanzee. About the mating habits of the orang in his natural state very little is known. See R. M. and Ada W. Yerkes, *op. cit.* It should be noted that there are many possible "degrees of stability" in sex unions. To say that the gorilla is not promiscuous is far from saying that his sex relationships are based on permanent monogamy.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*

females, and possibly as hangers-on one or more young bachelors or a weak and aged male.²⁸ That this form of semi-permanent grouping is the prototype of the human family cannot be proved, but it seems quite possible in view of the many psychological similarities that are exhibited by men and apes.

The type of family relationship just outlined postulates no fatherly care and protection of the children, except as incidental to the defence of wives. Maternal tendencies are, however, strong in nearly all primate mothers; and since the primate infant is helpless and unable to care for himself for a relatively long period, the mother-child relationship becomes fundamental in group life. Through the close and long-continuing contact with the mother and the more casual and less permanent but none the less important relationship with the mother's consort at the time, the child grows up used to and dependent upon intimacy with his fellows. He develops the gregariousness which supplements sex and parental tendencies in promoting social life.

Impelled perhaps by this gregariousness nurtured in the family and motivated also no doubt by the desire to secure better protection from enemies and better to prosecute the quest for food, family groups aggregated themselves into societies.²⁹ These social units were seldom the human wolf-ape packs of which Carveth Read³⁰ speaks, since man was probably always more of a fruit eater and a berry picker than a carnivore. Cooperative hunting became an early human culture trait, however, and the group of families developed into the game pursuing as well as fruit and root collecting horde. Horde life, a species-way of living but not an instinct as among the insects, persists because it has survival value, because it betters the life-chances of individual horde members. Persisting and developing it makes possible the development of language and the flowering of culture. It makes possible the specifically *human* way of life.

The origins of language. *What is language?* Language is an artificial system of symbols used in communicating the intangible, imperceptible somethings called "ideas" from the "mind" of one individual to that of another. Why is such a complicated and

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

²⁹ Apes and monkeys often form troops or hordes, also.

³⁰ *The Origin of Man*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, second edition, 1925.

standardized system necessary? Why can we not rely on simpler and more informal means of idea transmission? We cannot and remain civilized, for we require a complex language to live in a complex culture.

Of course, not all transmission of ideas depends on words—far from it. Sometimes without a word being spoken I can arrive at a good guess as to what you are thinking; I may surprise and embarrass you with my “insight” and “intuition.” But I am quite likely to be wrong, or at least inaccurate, for I can neither see, hear, touch, smell, nor taste your thoughts direct. I may have a telepathic “sixth sense,” but if so it is not yet functional. If your idea really remains in your mind *unexpressed* I cannot grasp it; when I do grasp it against your will for me to do so it because you have expressed it, or part of it, unawares. You have given yourself away, as the saying is, through some unintentional movements of the facial muscles, some sound or gesture. Expression is the keynote in idea transmission; you do something which indicates what you are thinking, stands for your idea, *symbolizes* it. Because your actions have come through experience to have meaning for me I can interpret them, reconstructing out of symbolic elements such as a smile, a lift of the eyebrows, a “fleeting expression of affection,” or a wave of the hand a thought-pattern copy of your idea. If I am a keen observer, if I “notice little things” (as women are supposed to do so thoroughly) the copy may not be just a rough outline, an inkling of what you have in mind. It may be an accurate enough picture of what you are thinking to enable me to act adaptively even though you had not planned to tell me anything. Perhaps I take my leave; perhaps I propose marriage, depending on the idea of me I infer in you. But I do not say out of a clear sky, “Yes, I think too that you look well in the blue dress with white polka dots you wore last evening.” The “language of the eyes” and of facial expression and gesture will not carry rapport that far.

Animals transmit ideas on a basis of cries, grunts, and postures not so very different from the type of human communication just described. There is less often deliberate intent to communicate, however, and almost never is the idea transmitted anything more than an emotional state. The dog will bark from excitement at the return of his master, a spontaneous expression of what we call delight. A second dog, hearing the sound of the other's barking, may bark too, because he knows that dog number one's noise mak-

ing has some good canine reason for it. But this is the limit of the rapport obtained, and even this is accidental from the first dog's point of view. He didn't intend to communicate; but even if he had he could not have transmitted an idea of what he was excited at. He could not have told dog number two: "Get up, you lazy canine, and rejoice, the master is at last come home."

Symbolic indices of thought patterns must become much more standardized before we can say that true language has arrived. Specific bits of behavior of one individual must come to stand not only in his mind but in the minds of others for definite attitudes, and later for objects, numbers, materials, directions, colors. Doubtless the first true language symbols were mere gestures. A wave of the hand meant to all members of the group, "I am leaving," a pointing of the finger meant, "Look there." Quite an elaborate system of communication can be built up on the basis of significant arm movements, as witness the so-called deaf and dumb manual and the gesture languages of some of the primitive tribes.³¹ But a spoken language is much better. The number of possible symbol combinations is greater; the flexibility of the speech apparatus makes possible more delicacy of shading; the sounds can be heard in darkness; and the eye and hand are freed for other activities while communication of ideas goes on. Vocal language did not suddenly replace gesture, but as more and more specialized words were invented and included in the vocabulary the necessity for supplementary gestures to clear up the exact meaning became less and less. Gestures today are still recognized as indispensable in some connections, but a person can transmit most of his ideas, if he is not too lazy to express them, solely through the agency of the voice.

Origins of speech. Animals have a rudimentary language, but man is the one animal who can combine sound symbols into sentences, who can communicate by putting words *together*. In other words, man is the only animal with *speech*. Why the other animals, and particularly the apes, cannot, as we say, really talk to one another and why man can and does do so is a fact for which there is no completely satisfactory explanation. Of man's power of speech Ernest Hooton says:

³¹ The Plains Indian tribes of North America had at one time a sort of "international gesture language" for communication between tribes who could not understand one another's spoken dialect.

Physiologically it is related to the enormous size and complication of the human brain and of the entire nervous system. Yet no anatomist or physiologist can designate a single specific anatomical feature of man the absence of which determines the lack of language in the great apes. Even the so-called speech area, the third inferior frontal convolution of Broca, is distinguishable in the brains of chimpanzees and gorillas.³²

Human speech is evidently one of man's inventions, perhaps one should say his great invention except for the fact that language is not the result of the single flash of genius the use of such a phrase implies. The system of folkways we call language is the work of hundreds of thousands of forgotten innovators. Speech is crecive in the same way as are many social institutions, and like them it has had a multiple parenthood and a slow, almost imperceptible growth.

Of course there are theories as to how speech originated. But today they are taken more as interesting conjectures than as scientific hypotheses eventually susceptible of proof or disproof by fact. The onomatopœic theory (better known perhaps as the "bow-wow" theory) postulates the origin of word-forms through imitation by man's vocal apparatus of the sounds in nature. Such words as "splash," "patter," "bleat," "whiz," and "roar" are illustrations of man's supposed vocal mimicry; they conventionalize common auditory experiences in the life of primitive as well as modern folk. When the lion comes to be called "Roar" or "Roarer" and rain, "Patter," vocabulary building is really under way. But there are many words that cannot conceivably have had an onomatopœic origin. The theory goes only part way.

The interjectional or "pooh-pooh" theory represents another attempt to explain word-origins, this time as inborn parts of emotional expression. I say "Ouch!" when I am hurt; so presumably did my primitive ancestor; so did the sub-man before him. "Ouch," "Ow," "Oh," and similar utterances are naive and immediate responses to sudden pain. Some great ancestral sufferer made "Ouch" conventional for the English, and so that is at least one of the things we say when we bump our shins today. We don't call shin bumping "ouching," or headsmen "offcal

³² From Ernest A. Hooton, "Language," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, p. 72. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

ouchers," although we might well do so. For the theory holds that we got our verbs and nouns that way.

The "pooh-pooh" theory in the form just presented is also inadequate to explain more than a part of speech vocabulary. As a theory, however, it has at least the merit of being based, not upon the tendency to imitate, which is of doubtful universality, but upon the phenomenon of vocal expression of emotions which, in the form of cries or calls, is a characteristic response pattern among birds and mammals. These cries and calls may be important signals to others as well as emotional outlets for those who utter them. The bellow of the herd leader may express only his fear of the approaching enemy, but the fact that other herd members take fright when they hear it gives such sound-making great significance. It leads to group action, in this case perhaps only to a stampede, which is but a low form of common activity. But some kinds of herds will, when warned, turn together to fight off the invader. Here the cry has set off cooperative activity; it has become a rudimentary instrument of group contact.

The utility of cooperative activity to an animal like man is patent. Perhaps in the trees his ancestors were sure of food and secure from enemies, but on the ground no man was safe. Cries that mobilized a group of men, that tied families together into temporary hordes to hunt and fight, would have the greatest group and individual utility. See how emotional outbursts of vocalization come to bring men together. The cry meaning "I am frightened," frequently heard by others, comes to have the social meaning "Danger." Then degrees of danger are discriminated in terms of the intensity of the fearful roar or screech put up. There is "Little Danger" and "Big Danger," and one reacts differently to the two signals. "Little Danger," as group hunting techniques got better and confidence increased, might next in slightly different inflection mean, "I see fair game." The horde might then go forth to slay the sighted reindeer. Because one man was surprised into an ejaculation the whole group feasts.

This must suffice as a sketchy picture of how man learned to talk. Not much more, in fact, is known. Even the approximate date when speech was having its beginnings we can only guess at. All human languages so far studied, even those of tribes with the most primitive of cultures, are complex and bear signs of being very old. On the other hand, language among the other

existing primates is extremely elementary. One student of chimpanzee language thinks she has distinguished a solely interjectional vocabulary of thirty-two words.³³ True speech is wholly lacking. Kroeber says:

All in all the data at hand are unanimous to the effect that the speech faculty of the apes is substantially on a par with that of a six-months-old human infant: namely nil.³⁴

Here, therefore, as in other phases of culture, there is between the apes and man a gap as yet unbridged.

The first great material culture inventions. *Tools.* Tool-using goes back to the earliest life of man's ancestors after their descent from the trees. In competition with stronger and swifter ground-living mammals, often armed with special weapons (horns, teeth, claws) for offense, man would have had little chance if he had depended on the unaided hand alone. He had to learn to grasp and use objects as supplements or reinforcements of the hand if he was to survive. According to de Laguna we must therefore

. . . picture our Pliocene ancestor with a club. With it in his hands he was a formidable antagonist, easily holding at a distance any but the largest carnivora and maiming and killing the grazing animals which he stalked. Or we should picture him with a stone in his hands; and if we are inclined to doubt its effectiveness as a weapon, we may recall that as late as the Homeric Age warriors, whose artificial weapons had failed them in their need, had resort, not in vain, to the stones that lay upon the field of battle.³⁵

Man's first tools were objects found lying at hand; he threw stones and beat about with branches. In time, however he began

³³ R. M. Yerkes and Blanche W. Learned, *Chimpanzee Intelligence and Its Vocal Expression*, Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1925.

³⁴ A. L. Kroeber, "Sub-human Culture Beginnings," in Kroeber and T. T. Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, p. 474, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. See also R. M. Yerkes, "Mental Evolution in the Primates," in E. V. Cowdry, *Human Biology and Racial Welfare*, pp. 131-135, Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., New York, 1930.

³⁵ Theodore de Laguna, *The Factors of Social Evolution*, p. 172, F. S. Crofts and Company, New York, 1926. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

to select different kinds of stones for different purposes, small stones to wound enemies and grazing animals like the deer, sharp stones for stabbing to finish off the helpless. He came to know the best places to find stones of different types and he learned to save and use over and over again the stones he used in cutting up the slaughtered game. Clubs, still unfashioned, were retained for their nice balance and perhaps because they were held to possess luck magic, having brought good hunting in the past.

It is a long step from this tool collection and conservation to actual tool *fabrication*, to the deliberate shaping of objects for use by the hand. Individual geniuses may have learned early to use two instead of one log as aids in floating and thus have the rudiments of a raft, or to smash a boulder in order to use the sharp-edged fragments. Even apes can make tools on occasion, but apes do not make tool fabrication techniques a part of the group tradition.³⁶ It took millions of years for man's ancestors to develop a real tool-making and tool-using culture. Only when that step was taken did real improvements in implements and weapons become possible. Inventions then became accumulative and one generation began to build upon the work of another. Thus while tool-using very likely antedates group life, it is only through the continuity made possible in a human *society* that man's inventive faculties can bear full fruit.

It is impossible to date accurately the steps in the development of a material culture just outlined. The first tangible evidences of human tool fabrication are the so-called *eoliths*, extremely crude flint implements supposed to have been used for cutting, cleaving, and scraping, and bearing evidences of chipping to improve the point or edge. Eoliths are found in large numbers in Pliocene and Pleistocene gravels in Europe,³⁷ leading to the inference that man's ancestors in the late Tertiary were already beginning to develop the flint industry that is such a feature of the archeology of mid-Pleistocene times. There are, however, difficulties in the way of such a conclusion. Objects similar to these eoliths have been found in Miocene, Oligocene, and even Eocene strata as well,

³⁶ Cf. Wolfgang Kohler, *The Mentality of Apes*, pp. 103-138, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1927; and Kroeber and Waterman, *op. cit.*, page 477.

³⁷ For a chronological table showing the position and duration of the Pleistocene, Miocene, etc. epochs, see Table II, opposite p. 68.

showing that like forms existed long before there was even a prehuman hand to grasp them. Flint nodules put through a chalk mill also develop eolith-like characteristics, raising the question as to whether the supposed products of human artifice are not after all the results of natural processes of abrasion in river beds or cracking due to change in temperature. We cannot go in detail into the controversy over the reality of eoliths as artifacts. Perhaps the strongest argument in their favor is a purely logical one, that there must have been a long period of slow development of flint industry before the advent of the skillfully made "paleolithic" implements of the mid-Pleistocene. The sudden appearance of the high degree of technical proficiency implied in the paleoliths is unthinkable; it must have been a gradual growth. A long pre-paleolithic period is thus postulated and into this epoch the eoliths fit nicely. But in view of the wide geographical and chronological distribution of pseudo-eoliths we cannot tell where and when the period of the eoliths began.

The eolith question is far from settled, and further evidence is awaited eagerly.³⁸ But in spite of some doubts as yet not cleared up there is a growing tendency among archeologists to regard at least some of the Pleistocene and Pliocene eoliths as real although rude human artifacts.³⁹ This attributes a tool-fabricating culture to late Tertiary man.

Fire. Wi'sakä, according to the story at the beginning of the chapter, brought fire to the Potawatomis. Prometheus is supposed to have stolen fire from the Greek gods and given it to the Greeks. Nearly every folk has a fire-origin myth accompanying the story of creation, for fire is a powerful but mysterious force whose control by weak man demands some explanation. How did it

³⁸ "As for instance, the discovery of eoliths of flint or other material where they could not have originated naturally or been deposited by mechanical forces. . . . The matter would be sufficiently demonstrated if remains of kitchen refuse, fire hearths, or human skeletons were found in conjunction with eoliths."—H. Obermaier, *Fossil Man in Spain*, p. 18, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. See also Obermaier's bibliography on eoliths, *ibid.*, pp. 373-375.

³⁹ Cf. A. L. Kroeber, "Archæology," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, p. 164, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932. The discovery of undoubted human artifacts associated with the early Pleistocene remains of *Sinanthropus* has perhaps served to strengthen the case for the eoliths. The *Sinanthropus* implements are as rude in their manufacture as the eoliths. Cf. De Chardin and Pei, *op. cit.*

happen that the great genie appearing in the flame came under man's spell, to be called forth when needed? How did this wild spirit come to be domesticated and to make the hearth its home?

Again, if we do not believe the folk-tales, we can only speculate, since fire was tamed by man so long ago. It is possible that just as man collected his first food and his first missile-weapons, taking them where he found them, so he "collected" fire too, from volcanoes or from burning trees struck by lightning. He could have carried it home and conserved it, tending the sacred hearth fire night and day. But fire does not occur frequently in nature and is likely to be awesome and frightening in its majesty when it does. Man would perhaps run from it rather than appropriate it. A second and more plausible story, therefore, makes man a creator rather than a collector of fire from the very first. The accidental striking of two hard stones together, perhaps in tool making, may have ignited some moss or a dry leaf. The boring of holes with a rotating pointed stick or sawing with a jagged piece of stone may have generated enough heat for dust combustion. On one or the other of these principles primitive peoples make fire today,⁴⁰ and possibly all fire-users except us moderns have done likewise. This is at least as good a guess as any; if we could hope for new and convincing evidence on the matter we might dignify it by the title of hypothesis. But it seems impossible to submit the hypothesis to test.

Once the art of fire making was mastered, man acquired a new means of security against enemies, a new aid in withstanding the rigors of climate, a new way of improving the palatability of food. It is doubtful, however, if the first fire-tenders were fully conscious of the utilitarian value of their new invention. They were more concerned with its magico-religious significance. It was a new god who lived in wood and who, when coaxed out, turned and consumed his dwelling place. It represented a new Power who could be appeased only by being fed.

The fact that if it was fed the Fire would warm its worshipers and keep away dangerous animals may have been a sort of secondary conclusion. Perhaps it was a long time before it was even that; on the other hand, perhaps the comfort and safety values were apparent from the beginning. The origin of cooking is

⁴⁰ There are some tribes who use the more complicated fire piston.

equally uncertain. When Smart-one fished a charred bit of meat out of the fire edge and found he liked its strange singed taste he may have wondered at first whether Fire was rewarding or poisoning him. But perhaps because he was as clever as his appellation indicated, perhaps because he was merely so gluttonous as to put aside consequences, he began to singe meat deliberately. He became the first chef of the Paleolithic. Did the other members of the group at the cave-mouth copy his invention? If they did not it may have been because they feared to do so. But since Smart-one survived, Fire must not have been punishing him; instead it was conferring on him a special favor. Through Smart-one's mediation his fellow hordesmen might also safely taste the delicacy, but through that mediation only. So the inventor became community cook and medicine man together. And so we cook and (sometimes) bless our food today.

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Chapter 4

CULTURAL ACCUMULATION

THE TENDENCY OF CULTURE TO ACCUMULATE

A MILLION YEARS OF EVOLUTION IN CUTTING TOOLS¹

IN THE ATTEMPT to measure past changes in human culture the longest and most complete series of data available consists in the tools with which man has cut and shaped his materials. This series extends in unbroken line over immense stretches of time. Flints chipped by human hands into crude cutting blades have recently been shown to belong to geological strata laid down in England about 1,000,000 B.C. Between these oldest of man-made blades and the most modern cutting devices of Pittsburgh machine shops there is available a practically unbroken series of cutting tools, dated with sufficient accuracy to permit an objective analysis of the relative rates of progress in their efficiency at various points in this tremendous sweep of time.

If a quantitative statement of progress in cutting tools is to be made, the first problem is to arrive at the nearest feasible approximation to an objective scale of points by which to rate such tools. Analysis indicates that at least five variables enter into the efficiency of man's cutting tools: (1) Keeness and durability of the cutting edge; (2) differentiation and specialization; (3) effectiveness of mechanisms employed to apply the blade to the materials to be cut; (4) utilization of auxiliary power; and (5) mastery displayed in the technique of manufacture.

Keeness and durability of cutting edge may be represented on a performance scale of which three levels may be defined and dated with fair accuracy. The lowest test is flaying the skin from a dead

¹ From Mildred Fairchild and Hornell Hart, "A Million Years of Evolution in Tools," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 28, pp. 71-79, Jan., 1929. By permission of the authors and the Science Press.

animal, for which two points out of a possible 20 may be allowed. For blades capable of chopping down trees, five points may be allowed. The highest degree of keenness-durability thus far attained is fairly well represented by the capacity of the cutting blades in a modern machine tool to cut cold steel, or, taking the extreme of strength, the capacity of a modern microtome to slice off cross-sections one twenty-five thousandth of an inch thick for microscopic slides. These degrees of attainment may conservatively be rated at twenty points.

The application of this scale to the series of blades from earliest prehistoric times down to the present produces the ratings in column 3 of Table I. Before Acheulean times flint blades had the crudest sort of rough cutting edges, very easily dulled by use even against hard wood. Acheulean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, and Solutrean² blades progressively developed more and more accurate "retouching," whereby the cutting edge was made keener and keener by taking off small chips from the margin. The Magdalenian blade produced a fragile but sharp edge at one stroke. The Epipaleolithic Tranchet, or flint axe, with its edge sharpened by grinding, gave craftsmen for the first time a tool capable of felling a tree and of hewing out a log canoe. Further developments of this grinding process in Neolithic times made possible the use of harder stones and the production of keener and more permanent cutting edges. Copper working introduced for the first time metal blades, and the development of bronze made available a more durable and keener edge. Iron and steel brought cutting power which was for centuries regarded as magical. Modern methods of alloying, hardening and sharpening have produced the supremely strong and delicate edged blades of to-day. . . .

[By a similar method of analysis one can derive rating scales of progress for the other four variables listed above. Reducing all these facts] to a numerical basis, in ratings which severally run from 0 to 20 and which in total run theoretically from 0 to 100, the measures of progress presented in Table I are obtained. It is not, of course, asserted that these ratings have absolute objective validity; it is argued, however, that any intelligent student of the data will come to results so closely approximating these that the practical deductions will not be materially affected. It is suggested that the reader try

² These are names of prehistoric cultural epochs. For their place in the cultural sequence see Table II, opposite p. 68.

TABLE I

RATINGS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF CUTTING TOOLS AT VARIOUS
CULTURE EPOCHS, FROM EOLITHIC TIMES TO THE
MACHINE AGE

Period	Date	Keenness	Specialization	Mechanisms	Power	Technique in Manufacture	Total Rating
Machine Age	1915 A.D.	20	20	20	20	20	100
Iron	500 B.C.	16	15	7	8	14	60
Bronze	2000 B.C.	12	13	6	5	13	49
Copper (Chalcolithic)	4000 B.C.	9	12	4	2	12	39
Neolithic	6000 B.C.	7	10	4	2	11	34
Epipaleolithic or Mesolithic.....	9000 B.C.	5	8	4	2	9	28
Magdalenian	12,000 B.C.	4	7	2	2	8	23
Solutrean	18,000 B.C.	4	6	2	2	7	21
Aurignacian	25,000 B.C.	3	6	2	2	5	18
Mousterian	50,000 B.C.	3	2	2	1	4	12
Acheulean	80,000 B.C.	3	2	1	0	3	9
Chellean	150,000 B.C.	2	2	1	0	1	6
Cromerian	250,000 B.C.	2	1	1	0	1	5
Foxhallian	400,000 B.C.	2	1	0	0	1	4
Sub-Red Crag	500,000 -- 1,000,000 B.C.	2	1	0	0	1	4

the experiment of making his own independent ratings of the cutting tools of the different culture epochs.

The ratings presented in Table I reflect a rising curve of progress; for hundreds of thousands of years the gains are scarcely perceptible; then tens of thousands, and later thousands of years showed marked improvements. Now we no longer deal in centuries but find each decade or each year taking swift steps forward. The more and more rapid acquisition of new elements is not due to our lack of knowledge of early portions of the series; the increasing speed of invention is an unmistakable feature of the series itself. Except for temporary fluctuations, man's power to cut and shape materials has increased during the past million years at accelerating speed.

Accumulation in material culture. One must remember that the dates in Table I refer only to Europe and that they are only rough approximations. A similar series for another area, as for instance North Africa, would have different dates but a similar sequence. Of course not only the dates but the whole table is an approximation. One cannot rate the various factors in cutting efficiency except in arbitrary terms. But Fairchild and Hart's study is accurate enough to illustrate the general tendency of material culture to *accumulate*. Our material culture began when early man commenced to use sticks and stones as tools and weapons. The number, variety, and perfection of artifacts has been steadily increasing since then. Material culture grows increasingly *complex* all the time.

Furthermore the rate of increase accelerates. This fact has already been illustrated in connection with cutting tools. Similar studies have been made of the development of means of transportation and communication, the development of weapons for killing enemies, the increase in the complexity of structures in which people live.³ The curve of accumulation has been likened to the compound interest curve;⁴ it starts to rise very slowly but becomes almost vertical at the end.

The reader will have questions to ask concerning this generalization. One will be: In this process of accelerating culture accumulation is nothing discarded? Are cultural elements never

³ Cf. Hornell Hart, *The Technique of Social Progress*, pp. 68-81, 144, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1931.

⁴ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, p. 105, The Viking Press, New York, 1922.

lost? One must reply that some cultural traits are undoubtedly lost when superseded by better ones. As Ogburn says, cultural change is "*selectively* accumulative." "New forms of material culture are added and some old ones discarded . . . [but] the additions have exceeded the discards, so that the stream of material culture of a particular people has widened with time."⁵ But perhaps we are evading the question a bit. Are not whole crafts lost on occasion, perhaps owing to revolution or to barbarian invasion, to be succeeded by nothing at all, or at least by inferior technologies? A few undoubted cases of this sort have been collected. There is evidence that certain tribes in Oceania once possessed the outrigger canoe but now rely solely on the much clumsier raft. Other tribes in the same general area once possessed but no longer use pottery.⁶

There are perhaps Dark Age periods, too, when cultural development stagnates, even in some respects retrogresses. Cultural change, as Chapin⁷ points out, is "wave like, oscillatory, rhythmical or cyclical," but for our present purposes we can afford to neglect these fluctuations. We are dealing here with a secular trend line of development stretching over centuries and are not concerned either with the particular tribe which carries on the torch of material progress or with the decade to decade changes in a local area. Cyclical variations around the general trend will be discussed in chapter 28. Here we can consider culture as "whirling through time, gaining size and velocity as it goes."⁸

Another question which may be asked at this point by the critical reader is: Can this acceleration in the development of material culture continue indefinitely? Can the "compound interest curve" continue to rise even more steeply toward infinity? If we had to give a categorical answer to this question we would reply with a negative. After all, there is presumably some limit to the complexity of problems which are capable of solution by

⁵ From *Social Change*, pp. 76 f., by William Fielding Ogburn. Copyright 1922. Published by The Viking Press, Inc., New York.

⁶ W. H. R. Rivers, "The Disappearance of Useful Arts," in A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, pp. 524-527, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1931.

⁷ F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change*, p. 204, The Century Company, New York, 1928.

⁸ W. F. Ogburn, "The Future of Man in the Light of His Past," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 32, p. 296, Apr., 1931.

any given organism's intelligence. Man is an organism and can hardly be an exception to the general rule. And while the human animal can perhaps develop new powers to cope with increasingly difficult problems, the emergence of these new capacities through the slow process of biological evolution would be a matter of hundreds of centuries. Meanwhile man's present inventive ability has been sufficient to produce a cultural snowball which, now that it has gathered momentum, is increasing greatly in size each decade.

Essentially the problem of overproduction of culture is one of organization, of integration of an increasing number of material culture elements into a pattern of social life which for the individual is comprehensible and livable. How complex may that pattern be, with man's powers remaining much as at present? That is the real question. How much cultural accumulation can man stand?

Unfortunately, it is one thing to point out that there are limits to the dosage of material culture which *homo sapiens* can take without fatal consequences and another carefully to define these limits. Could doctors tell in advance exactly how much of a given medicine it would take to produce a fatality if they had never killed any patients at all from over-dosage? Material culture in small amounts was good for man; it kept him alive when many other animals succumbed to the ice ages or to other changes in life conditions. He has been able to tolerate increasing amounts of the stimulant with effects seemingly beneficial, but sooner or later he will show pathological signs of what might be termed "artifact-addiction." Some social scientists think he is entering this stage already, and point to the rising insanity rate,⁹ the widespread signs of social disorganization, the danger of a war with our now tremendously destructive weapons, as evidences. Others regard our current dilemma as simply another cyclic fluctuation and feel that man has not begun to strain his material culture absorptive powers.

⁹ The rise is probably more apparent than real, although it is difficult to prove the matter one way or the other. Cf. W. F. Ogburn and Ellen Winston, "The Frequency and Probability of Insanity," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 34, pp. 822-831, Mar., 1929; and Ellen Winston, "The Assumed Increase of Mental Disease," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 427-439, Jan., 1935.

Accumulation in immaterial culture. Material culture, up to the present at least, has been cumulative. Can the same statement be made of immaterial culture? Does immaterial culture also grow ever more complex, taxing man's ability to comprehend and organize it? The answer that so often has to be given in relation to century-spanning generalizations like this one, is yes and no.

That knowledge, information about the world in which man lives, has increased and is still increasing is indubitable. Man has learned fairly recently in his long history to store away vast accumulations of information in libraries and archives. Not all of this is actually used by any single generation, but the amount of factual knowledge an individual needs to have near his finger tips to get along in modern civilized society is much greater than that necessary even a few hundreds of years ago. The constant expansion of formal educational machinery bears testimony to this fact.

Language has expanded too, but not all parts of language. Grammar and syntax, the framework in which words are used, is probably growing no more complex. At least there are primitive speech families (better termed speech families of peoples with much simpler material culture) whose basic language structure is more complex than ours.¹⁰ But our accumulating material culture has made it necessary to have more names for objects, and our increasing scientific knowledge has come to require additions to our list of abstract nouns. In other words, there has been a rapid increase in vocabulary. Unabridged dictionaries grow heavier or run into more and more volumes all the time.

But when we come to examine trends in the accumulation of other folkways we run up against difficulties. It seems clear that there are more rules of government, laws and administrative regulations; more specializations in function between individuals and between groups; more prescriptions of convention and etiquette to tell us when and how to use our increased wardrobe, our greater household equipment, our new leisure time; more recognized and socially sanctioned rules of public health. On the other hand, however, are there more rites to be observed in courtship, mating, marriage; more religious ritual; more different and accepted art

¹⁰ Cf. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 113, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1923.

forms? Perhaps not. The whole question is one in which definition of terms is so difficult as to make conclusions hazardous. While one may perhaps sum up the kinds of artifacts and the varieties of technologies found in a given society, a similar attempt mechanically to total up folkways, so many rules of parliamentary procedure, so many accepted forms of salutation, would give results that are meaningless. After all, it is not the gross number of different group ways of behaving, even supposing one could agree on units of enumeration, that is really significant. As we have already seen, single folkways cohere in complexes, and complexes in turn fit into a sort of general cultural pattern. This pattern may be analyzed into its elements by the sociologist, but individuals in general cannot afford to indulge in too much fragmentation; they must see the pattern as a harmonious entity, as an intelligible and unified way of life. In many primitive societies there is this sense of balance and harmony. The anthropologist, Sapir, says:

[One] cannot but admire the well-rounded life of the average participant in the civilization of a typical American Indian tribe; the firmness with which every part of that life—economic, social, religious, and æsthetic—is bound together into a significant whole in respect to which he is far from a passive pawn; above all, the molding role, oftentimes definitely creative, that he plays in the mechanism of his culture. When the political integrity of his tribe is destroyed by contact with the whites and the old cultural values cease to have the atmosphere needed for their continued vitality, the Indian finds himself in a state of bewildered vacuity. Even if he succeeds in making a fairly satisfactory compromise with his new environment, in making what his well-wishers consider great progress toward enlightenment he is apt to retain an uneasy sense of the loss of some vague and great good, some state of mind that he would be hard put to it to define, but which gave him a courage and joy that latter-day prosperity never quite seems to have regained for him. What has happened is that he has slipped out of the warm embrace of a culture into the cold air of fragmentary existence.¹¹

¹¹ E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine or Spurious," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 29, p. 414, Jan., 1924. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

Contemporary culture is more complex than that of an American Indian tribe and less unified. In modern society "the remoter ends tend to split off altogether from the immediate ones and to assume the form of a spiritual escape or refuge from the pursuit of the latter."¹² The routine operations of the automobile factory laborer have little meaning to him in relation to the finished article he drives to the movies when his day's stint is done. In his work he has no sense of creation, of participation in an enterprise that "makes sense," except in terms of a pay envelope. He is not, as is the primitive, playing consciously a useful role in a civilization he can understand.

This lack of unity may be an inevitable concomitant of an increasing cultural complexity; if so it will grow worse with further material culture accumulation. On the other hand it may be merely a cyclic fluctuation, a temporary stage in cultural evolution, through which we shall pass to new integration. The possibilities of reweaving the fabric so as to restore to the individual the "sense of inner satisfaction" and feeling of "spiritual mastery" which are for Sapir criteria of a healthy civilization will be discussed in a later chapter.¹³

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRESENT-DAY CULTURES

The uses of culture history to sociology. So far in this chapter we have been content to show that the social heritage, in most of its categories at least, tends to increase in bulk and complexity and perhaps at the same time becomes more a thing of shreds and patches, less a unified whole. Except for a few illustrative sequences of material culture development we have not so far concerned ourselves with the order in which various cultural traits have been added to the general store, with what is often called culture *history*.

Perhaps from some points of view it is enough to know that there has been a history, without trying to write it, but the sociologist cannot escape having a historical interest. Even in his most practical moods, when he is trying to "solve" some current and pressing social problem, he is conscious of the fact that the situation

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 415 f.

¹³ *Cf. infra*, chapter 27.

under investigation has a historical past of which he must know something if he is really to understand and to deal with the problem in question. Knowledge of the past, as has already been noted,¹⁴ gives perspective on the present. This perspective is necessary if one is not to mistake single trees for forests, minor and perhaps evanescent phenomena for basic and unchanging facts. There are other uses of history than to supply perspective; history reading is perhaps first of all an interesting, sometimes fascinating pastime and it is often, too, a means of inflating racial, national, family egos by connecting groups with a heroic past. But it is because history orients individuals, aiding them to see around problems and giving them faith in the ability of the race to solve them as it has others, that we accord it a primary place in our school curriculum. Perspective born of historical study is a mark of the educated man.

Most school history confines itself (1) to the period for which written records are available and (2) to the history of our own Euro-American civilization. One can assume that students approach the study of sociology with some background in the history of our own ancestors, at least since the time when those ancestors became literate. When it comes to a knowledge of the tradition of races other than our own, however, the person educated in American schools and colleges is likely to be much less well informed. His information is likely also to be limited concerning the immensely long chapter in the history of all peoples before record-keeping began.

If one is to acquire a true perspective on human civilization and its current problems the gaps in historical knowledge just mentioned need to be filled. The relatively short, albeit glorious, period of recorded history needs to be seen in its proper proportion as a sort of brief appendage to an age-long epoch of preliteracy. The cultural achievements of white Europeans must, to avoid provincialism, be compared with the less well known but in many respects equally impressive achievements of darker skinned peoples. All this cannot adequately be done in a dozen volumes, much less in a single chapter. Only the bold outlines can be sketched in

¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, chapter 2.

the following sections, but these will at least provide a framework into which additional facts may be fitted as they are later acquired. Three general topics will be dealt with: (1) the history of cultural accumulation by our preliterate ancestors in Europe; (2) a similar sketch, for contrast, of cultural sequence in pre-Columbian America. Both (1) and (2) will deal largely with material culture and rely chiefly on the work of archeologists. In chapters 5 and 6 there will be (3) a discussion of some of the early stages in the development of social institutions. Material there will be drawn from ethnology as well as archeology, and from various parts of the world.

The preliterate period in Europe. Table II presents an outline of the history of Europe before the dawn of written records. It is a composite from the work of a large number of students of prehistory, some of whom are referred to in the chapter bibliography.

It is perhaps best to approach a study of this table with an attempt to realize concretely some of its limitations, for it would be a gross error to assume that there is available today any such complete and reliable account of the early stages of man's development in Europe as the table seems at first glance to imply. In the first place many of the entries represent not finally attested fact but simply the most up-to-date guesses. New data are being uncovered by archeologists so rapidly today that the prevailing hypotheses are being modified constantly. Accounts of prehistory get out-of-date at a rate disconcerting to textbook writers, however encouraging the new discoveries may be to the research scholars who made them.

Second, it is an extremely difficult problem to decide among the variety of current hypotheses which the best and most really up-to-date guesses are. Prehistoric chronology of the last twenty-five thousand years or so is fairly well agreed upon, although a difference of five hundred years in the dating of a given Bronze Age culture, or of five thousand years in estimating the antiquity of the Aurignacian is perhaps sufficiently serious to cause brow scratching. But when one attempts to decide on a proper time scale for the Lower Paleolithic about all that can be done is to take a rough average of estimates which vary over a range of a half a million years. The beginning of the Paleolithic epoch is

fixed at 600,000 B. C. by one writer,¹⁵ at 200,000 B. C. by another.¹⁶ In the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to say that either of these extremes cannot be right.

The chronology of the Paleolithic culture developments is necessarily keyed to the rhythm of advance and recession in glacial ice, which is the most conspicuous characteristic of the Pleistocene. But this rhythm has not yet been completely plotted by geologists. There is still uncertainty as to the real extent and severity of the first (Günz) glaciation and as to the number and importance of the minor advances and retreats of the ice in the Post-glacial period subsequent to the great Würm glaciation. All this makes correlation of cultural and geological time scales difficult. The artifacts identified as the Chellean culture are found associated with fossil relics of animals that thrive in only a relatively warm climate. This is a reason for locating the Chellean period in an interglacial rather than a glacial epoch, but in which interglacial, the second (Mindel-Riss) or the third (Riss-Würm) is still a matter of dispute. Yet this decision has fundamental implications for the whole Paleolithic culture chronology. While the order of appearance of the cultures as indicated in the table is fairly definitely determined because of the discovery of stratigraphical series where the remains of one culture are found beneath those of another, the dating of the strata themselves is often at least a partially unsolved problem.

The reader is warned against two other false conclusions which may inadvertently be drawn from the table as it stands. While the last column is headed "Achievements in Material Culture," because our definite knowledge of European prehistory is based chiefly upon the excavation of artifacts, it must not be forgotten that even the earliest Paleolithic peoples must have had some form of language and many other elements of immaterial culture as well. Their skill in the making of tools was greater than could have resulted from the efforts of single isolated individuals. There must have been a passing on of skills and gradual improvement of them

¹⁵ H. F. Osborn, *Man Rises to Parnassus*, p. 24, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1928; H. F. Osborn, "New Estimates of the Length of Pleistocene Time and Means of Dating the Stone Age Man by the Elephant-Enamel Method," *Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1931, pp. 372 ff.

¹⁶ Sir Arthur Keith, *New Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man*, p. 35, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1932.

by succeeding generations. This alone implies the folkways of cooperation and social control which are necessary in group life.

Neither must one be led to assume because the different artifacts in the last column are listed as "achievements" that they are necessarily the original inventions of Europeans or were "achieved" first on European soil. Probably in most cases, certainly in many, they were not. As far as the early stages of tool fabrication are concerned no one yet knows which area of the world's surface provided the original inventive genius. It may have been Europe but it is more likely to have been Asia Minor or Africa. As a result of the recent discoveries of Mr. Leakey in Kenya, Africa is now gaining ground as the supposed cradle of Paleolithic culture,¹⁷ but there was a possibly contemporaneous Paleolithic-type culture in China whose origins also remain to be accounted for. At any event it is clear that the Neolithic and subsequent prehistoric cultural developments in Europe were only native to a slight degree. Most of the inventions were made in Asia Minor or North Africa and reached Europe by slow diffusion from tribe to tribe. Our European ancestors were barbarians for long centuries after civilization had developed in the "Fertile Crescent" and along the Nile.

The Paleolithic period. The colithic problem has been discussed in the preceding chapter. With the appearance of the so-called "Chellean pick," sometimes called a *coup-de-poing*, hand-axe, or fist hatchet, we have the beginning of the long Paleolithic period, the Old Stone Age, which endured in Europe perhaps 300,000 years. The Chellean and Acheulean cultures were the work of an as yet unidentified race of humanoids; the fist hatchets and scrapers are found without fossil bones of anything except animals, and their attribution to either a descendant of Piltdown man or to a being endowed with a jaw like that found at Mauer, near Heidelberg, is as yet mere conjecture. The Mousterian culture, on the other hand, is definitely the work of the heavy-browed, prognathous, short-statured Neandertal species. Fossil remains of Neandertal man and relics of his culture are found in many parts of Europe and even in Palestine and the Crimea. During the third interglacial and the first phases of the last

¹⁷ Cf. L. S. B. Leakey, *The Stone Age Races of Kenya*, Oxford University Press, London, 1935. See also Ernest A. Hooton's critical review of this book in *American Anthropologist*, vol. 37, pp. 681-685, Oct.-Dec., 1935.

(Würm) glaciation, the Neandertalers are the only authenticated inhabitants of Europe.¹⁸ Then, before the end of the last ice age, all traces of Neandertal man disappear. He is succeeded by races of a definitely modern cast whose advent ushers in the Upper Paleolithic.

Much ink has been spilled in attempts to explain this "sudden" shift (perhaps it took 10,000 years) in European population. What became of the Neandertalers? Was the cold too severe, was there a pestilence, or were they gradually exterminated by or absorbed into the racial stock of the larger-brained newcomers? Doubtless we shall some day have the answer to this question as well as to the one, "From whence did these invaders come?" The recent discovery of allegedly Pleistocene artifacts of Aurignacian type in Kenya, East Africa, may point to an answer to the latter query.

The chief features of Upper Paleolithic culture are now generally well known. The polychrome frescoes on cave walls which characterize the Magdalenian period have been widely reproduced as illustrations of the astonishing artistic feeling and skill of our twenty-thousand year old ancestors. Engraving on bone or ivory was also practiced. There was a remarkable improvement over Acheulean flint work, of which the Solutrean laurel leaf point is one illustration. Work with bone and horn was well developed; indeed the Magdalenian epoch is often termed the Reindeer Age because of the great use made of the horns of that animal for harpoon points, needles, awls, whistles, sculptured figurines, and so-called "batons-of-command." Late Paleolithic man lived in caves, rock shelters, or possibly rough lean-tos of brush; he wore tailored skin clothing, kindled fire for warmth and to ward off animals, lived by gathering roots, fruits, and berries and by the chase. A tribe now extinct lived a quite similar sort of existence only a hundred years ago in Tasmania, and there are a few backwoods tribes in southern Asia and in Australia who live pretty much the life of the Paleolithic European even today.

¹⁸ Leakey has put forward the hypothesis that there was a much more human contemporary of Neandertal man in Europe at this time, the creator of the Levalloisian culture which he distinguishes from true Mousterian. Local fossil evidence does not clearly and unmistakably support this view as yet. Cf. L. S. B. Leakey, *Adam's Ancestors*, pp. 78-80, Methuen and Company, Ltd., London, 1934.

The Neolithic period. After perhaps an eight or ten thousand year interim period known as the Epipaleolithic, in which very little apparently was added to the material culture store, cultural development accelerates with the advent of the Neolithic or New Stone Age. New inventions began to reach Europe from the east and south. One of the earliest and most important of these was the art of making pottery. The first use of the bow and arrow can also, in all probability, be attributed to the early Neolithic, and so can the domestication of man's first animal friend, the dog. The population in Europe was increasing and life was becoming more sedentary. The bow and arrow made possible the hunting of the smaller food animals, and pottery helped in the storage of grains, fruits, and nuts, as well as in their preparation by boiling over a fire. Finally about 5000 B.C. came the first beginnings of agriculture and the domestication of food and draft animals, cattle, swine, goats, and sheep. Men now had fixed abodes; husbandry in part replaced the chase. In terms of a familiar although now somewhat discredited classification, Neolithic Europeans were no longer *savages*, but *barbarians*.

There are many other achievements of the Neolithic, only a few of which are listed in Table II. The stone industry was improved by the development of a technique for grinding and polishing, although many stone artifacts remained rough chipped or flaked throughout the entire period. There is extensive evidence of the development of a religious cult in the elaborate chambered tombs, or *dolmens*, found all over western Europe, and in the megalithic monuments of which the most conspicuous and well known is at Stonehenge, England.¹⁹ The Great Trilithon at Stonehenge consisted of a fifteen foot monolith raised twenty feet off the ground on two vertical single stone pillars. The whole weighed perhaps one hundred tons. Certainly the engineering problems involved in dressing these huge stones and setting them in place are not inconsiderable.

Loom weaving is another Neolithic development, as is the use

¹⁹ Stonehenge has been variously dated but a reasonable average estimate would be 1800 B.C. This would be at the very end of the Neolithic and the beginning of the Bronze Age. Cf. H. F. Osborn, *Man Rises to Parnassus*, p. 176; C. C. Clay, "Stonehenge," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14 ed., vol. 21, pp. 438-439; G. G. McCurdy, *Human Origins*, vol. 2, pp. 125-128, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1924.

of solid wheeled carts. Trepanning of skulls was done skillfully with stone tools by Neolithic medicine men, perhaps in order to provide a means of exit for some evil spirit that had been causing physical pain or bad luck. The dug-out canoe was used on lakes in Switzerland together with, in all probability, the raft. Summing up, one can say that Neolithic man in Europe had made a good start toward civilization. He was about as far along the road as were most of the red Indians within the border of what is now the United States when the white man "discovered" them about four hundred years ago.

The metal ages. There is no clear break between the Neolithic and the Bronze Age which succeeded it. Culture traits were gradually spreading into Europe from the great Egyptian and Sumerian developments, slowly changing the character of the Neolithic husbandmen's life. In this process of borrowing ideas from Africa and Asia Minor the maritime civilization of Minoan Crete served as a mediating and transmitting agent. Cretan and other Ægean navigators carried the Bronze Age arts to Italy, Sicily, and Spain, from whence they diffused by land and by sea into northern Europe. The art of smelting and casting copper and the copper-tin alloy, bronze, was known in Sumer and Egypt²⁰ by 3500 B.C.; it reached Denmark about 1600 B.C. By the latter date iron, which was largely to succeed bronze as the chief worked metal, was perhaps just coming into use by the first iron fabricators in Syria. Iron reached Europe around 900 B.C., having made a much "faster" journey north than bronze.

The extensive use of metals for tools, weapons, and ornaments implies a great change in many aspects of culture. Metallic ores, unlike flint, wood, bone, and potter's clay, are not so often available fairly near at hand. Tin, for bronze, is especially limited, and long expeditions to Spain, Bohemia, or Cornwall were necessary to secure supplies for local smithies. Commerce and trade thus inevitably grew up, primarily for metals but also for salt, amber, and the artifacts produced by unusually skilled workmen. The self-contained Neolithic community became dependent on the outside world; it developed its own special crafts and exchanged its

²⁰ In which of the two culture areas the invention was first made is not yet settled. It seems unlikely that it was independently made in each area. Cf. V. Gordon Childe, *The Bronze Age*, pp. 26 ff., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1930.

products with those of neighboring villages, and they in turn with others. Such metal artifacts as swords, shields, helmets, scissors, safety pins and brooches, celts (hatchets), trumpets, and plowshares came in to enrich the material culture of Bronze and Iron Age Europe. Glass manufacture, the spoked wheel chariot, the potter's wheel, the use of metallic money, the fortified town, the corbelled arch also made their first appearances in Europe during this period. The art of writing, in crude pictographic form, was apparently developed in Egypt by 4000 B.C., in Mesopotamia not much if any later, and by 2500 B.C. in Minoan Crete. About 1100 B.C. some people in Asia Minor, perhaps the Phœnicians, invented the phonetic alphabet from which all alphabets of modern times are directly or indirectly derived. By 700 B.C. southern Europe had alphabetic writing which went north with the legions of Cæsar just before the beginning of the Christian era.²¹ Slowly archeological data came to be supplemented by written records as the historic period in Europe began.

Pre-Columbian America. *Origins of American culture.* The perspective on American culture origins has been changing so rapidly in the last few years that it is difficult to find any orthodox or "accepted" view for presentation to the interested but non-expert student of prehistory. There have been only recently a number of archeological "finds"²² which point to a much greater age for man in America than experts were willing to concede a few years ago, but these discoveries are not yet fully reported on and their evaluation for the pre-Columbian history of the Americas cannot yet be safely made. All that can be done is to present such a hypothetical account of American culture origins as appears to be in accord with conservative expert opinion today, recognizing that the story may be changed in some of its details as new evidence accumulates and is tested.

²¹ The Runic script, independently derived from Greece or Etruria, was extant among the Kelts of northern Europe as early as 400 A.D. and possibly earlier. In some areas Runic undoubtedly antedated Latin but not in all. Cf. Otto V. Friesen, "Runes," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th ed., vol. 19, p. 659.

²² For a summary account and evaluation of the recent discoveries see M. R. Harrington, "Gypsum Cave, Nevada," *Southwest Museum Papers*, no. 8, pp. 164-191, 1933; and Edgar B. Howard, "An Outline of the Problem of Man's Antiquity in North America," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 38, pp. 394-412, July-Sept., 1936.

There are no evidences whatever of man, his immediate progenitors, or his anthropoidal great ape cousins in America previous to the Pleistocene epoch.²³ Remains that are clearly attributable to the early Pleistocene are also lacking. As to the late Pleistocene, the last interglacial and glacial epochs, the evidence is now in dispute, but the probability of the existence of a late Paleolithic type culture in America at or near the beginning of the last glacial retreat is rapidly increasing. It seems likely that this culture was brought to the American continents by migrants from Asia who crossed from Siberia to Alaska at the narrow Bering Strait or perhaps on the Aleutian Island chain. Slowly they spread southward, hunting a now extinct species of bison, the mammoth, and other "Pleistocene fauna"²⁴ with the aid of stone-tipped darts²⁵ and the throwing-stick or *atlatl*, which in modified form is still in use among some American tribes today.

This was perhaps twenty thousand years ago, possibly even earlier. In the years succeeding the first migration there have been many others from the same source in northeastern Asia. The later waves of invaders doubtless helped to push the earlier migrants farther and farther south. Gradually there was a spread even into and down the continent of South America so that the Yahgans, the present inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, are believed to be descendants of one of the earlier groups who "discovered" Alaska and moved to it twenty millenia ago.

It is probable that the Amerinds brought only a late Paleolithic culture with them from Asia. They chipped flints, possibly had begun to grind and polish them; they had already domesticated the dog and brought Old World breeds with them; they made baskets, used the dart-thrower, the harpoon, the fire-drill; later entrants brought along the bow. On this simple base a native American

²³ Cf. Alès Hrdlicka, "Skeletal Remains Suggesting or Attributed to Early Man in America," *U. S. Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin*, nos. 52, 53, 1907; Alès Hrdlicka, "Recent Discoveries Attributed to Early Man in America," *U. S. Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin*, no. 66, 1918.

²⁴ Including the ground sloth and a species of camel. Whether these animals became extinct in America before the end of the last glacial epoch or lingered well into the Post-glacial period is still uncertain, but opinion generally inclines toward the latter view.

²⁵ Dart points chipped and pressure-flaked with a technique similar to the Solutrean of Europe have been found at Folsom, New Mexico (which gives its name to the so-called "Folsom culture"), and in Nevada, Colorado, Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska. Cf. Harrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-177.

culture was developed, in all likelihood independent of further important Asiatic, European, or African influences. Suggestions have not been lacking concerning migrations across the Atlantic and the Pacific which supposedly contributed traits to American culture, but the majority of experts discount heavily these possibilities. The Eskimo may, as some believe, have come from Greenland, and there may have been a few hardy Polynesians who landed on the South American coast, but almost certainly if visitors from abroad did appear before the Norsemen or Columbus they found the basic characteristics of native civilization already laid down; they came too late to do more than modify them in minor detail. Essentially the American Indian culture is the work of a relatively homogenous red-brown skinned people of Mongoloid racial affiliations, working out alone and unaided their destinies in the New World.²⁶

The Archaic period in American cultural development. If one cultural trait had to be singled out as most fundamental in the development of Amerindian civilization the choice would undoubtedly fall on the cultivation of Indian corn or, more correctly, *maize*. Where the first deliberate planting and reaping of maize took place is not known, although the highlands of Mexico seems as likely a place as any.²⁷ *Teocentli*, a primitive form of the maize plant, still grows wild in that area, but there is no record of the many intermediate stages through which *teocentli*, or some similar wild grass, must have gone in the process of domestication. The Indians developed not one species of maize for cultivation, but many, each adapted for special climatic and soil conditions or for special purposes. Consequently it was only in the moist lowland areas of the Amazon drainage, where manioc (cassava, tapioca) was the agri-

²⁶ For more detailed hypotheses concerning the origins of American Indian culture see Franz Boas, "Migration of Asiatic Races and Cultures to North America," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 28, pp. 110-117, Feb., 1929; Roland B. Dixon, "Primitive Migrations," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, pp. 420-425, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933; T. Griffith Taylor, *Environment and Race*, pp. 196-211, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1927; Clark Wissler, *The American Indian*, pp. 389-400, Oxford University Press, New York, 1922.

²⁷ Cf. G. N. Collins, "The Phylogeny of Maize," *Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club*, vol. 57, pp. 199-210, Jan. 15, 1931; James H. Kempton, "Maize, the Plant Breeding Achievement of the American Indian," *Smithsonian Institution Series, Old and New Plant Lore*, vol. 2, part 7, 1931; James H. Kempton, "Maize and Man," *Journal of Heredity*, vol. 17, pp. 32-51, 1926.

cultural staple, and in some of the higher altitudes of the Andean chain, where only quinoa was grown, that maize was superseded as the basic food product. Practically every variety of corn grown by modern American farmers comes down to us from pre-Columbian times.

Maize was cultivated in hills with the aid of the hoe and the digging stick. Often in the same hills would be planted beans and squashes. This horticultural complex spread over half of North and South America before the time of Columbus.²⁸ With pottery making and loom weaving it forms the nucleus of what is usually termed the American Archaic culture, a development in many respects on a par with the European Neolithic already described. Not all American tribes, however, had attained the Archaic level when recorded history commenced in the New World.

Not very much is yet known about the origin and spread of the Archaic culture pattern. A possible date for its first appearance is 4000 B.C., with the most probable center of dispersion some place between central Mexico and Colombia or Peru. The only now available cultural sequence²⁹ stretching back into such early times is not, however, within this area, but farther north in Arizona and New Mexico. The Basket Makers³⁰ of the American Southwest were an early Archaic people but they did not make pottery and probably did not originate the maize horticulture they practiced. But in the Southwest, as in a few other areas in North and South America, the Archaic stage, once arrived at, proved but a spring-board from which to leap to much higher cultural levels. We must now consider some of these localized post-Archaic achievements in the realm of high civilization.

²⁸ Cf. Herbert J. Spinden, "The Invention and Spread of Agriculture in America," *American Museum Journal*, vol. 17, pp. 181-188, Mar., 1917.

²⁹ The sequence in the Valley of Mexico has been pushed back a long distance in recent years, but the oldest cultural remains as yet uncovered are those of people with an already developed sedentary culture. Cf. George C. Vaillant, "Excavations at Zacatenco," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, vol. 32, part II, pp. 9-18, 66-77; George C. and Suzannah B. Vaillant, "Excavations at Gualupita," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, vol. 35, part I, pp. 110-127; and George C. Vaillant, "The History of the Valley of Mexico," *Natural History*, vol. 38, pp. 324-328, Nov., 1936.

³⁰ This is Basket Maker II, according to the Pecos chronology. See A. V. Kidder, *An Introduction to the Study of Southwestern Archaeology*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1924; Frank H. Roberts, Jr., "A Survey of Southwestern Archaeology," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 37, pp. 1-36, Jan.-Mar., 1935.

The Mayan civilization. Whether the Mayan cultural development in Central America and Yucatan was the work of Archaic tribes who had long inhabited these areas or of invaders from the Vera Cruz district in Mexico who brought the beginnings of Mayan civilization with them is still conjectural. In either event by about 200 A.D.³¹ the first of the two great creative epochs, represented by the wonderful remains of great cities like Copan and Palenque found in the midst of the Central American jungle, was well under way. About 600 A.D. for some reason as yet unexplained the Mayans abandoned Guatemala and Honduras and moved north into the peninsula of Yucatan. Here a second efflorescence of civilization occurred between 800 and 1200 A.D. After 1200 there are marked evidences of influence from the Toltecan development in the Valley of Mexico, and increasing decadence. The Mayans were in a definite period of decline when the Spaniards arrived in Yucatan in 1511.

We are only just beginning to appreciate the full measure of Mayan achievement; certainly the civilization at its height must rank as the equal of any pre-Iron Age civilization of the Old World. Probably the phase of Mayan civilization with which the average American is most familiar is the massive temple and public building architecture. The structures of sometimes two and three "set-back" stories were mounted on the flat tops of huge stone-faced pyramids and were decorated with painted sculpture in both high and low relief. The building walls were of rubble with a cut limestone facing. Mortar was used to hold the loose core and the stone veneer together, so that the construction can perhaps best be termed a faced concrete. Wooden beams and stone lintels held up roof and ceiling and there was much use of the corbelled or stepped arch which, since it requires thick walls as a counterweight, helps to give Mayan architecture its massive and unwieldy character. In the typical Mayan city the large buildings were grouped together to form a sort of civic center, and it is this portion of the city which has remained to be discovered by archeologists. The dwell-

³¹ There are two correlations of Mayan dates with our own chronology, each the work of an acknowledged expert on Mayan glyph writing. The two correlations differ uniformly by 260 years. If the Goodman instead of the Spinden correlation is used, the date above should be 460 A.D. Cf. Lawrence Roys, "The Maya Correlation Problem Today," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 35, pp. 403-417, July-Sept., 1933.

ing places of the common citizen were much simpler and more perishable structures with stone walls and a thatched roof.

The Mayans are frequently termed the "Greeks of America" because of their great intellectual achievements and their art. The Mayan ideographic glyph writing, still in large part undecipherable by modern students, is the most advanced system in native America. The vigesimal method of counting (by twenties instead of by tens) used by the Mayans is somewhat less convenient than our decimal system but was adequate for the purposes of a surprisingly complex and astronomically accurate calendrical scheme. Mayan leap-year correction was more accurate than that of the invading Spaniards, and Mayan knowledge of the movements of the moon and the planets, considering that it was gained without the use of the telescope, was also remarkable. The results of their mathematical calculations were recorded by Mayan astronomer-priests in books or codices, but unfortunately, due to the Spanish zeal for burning pagan manuscripts, we have only three of these books available for study today.

Mayan art is bound up very closely with religion, and the often fantastic and distorted figures of the gods were principal subjects for the mural painter, the sculptor, the potter, and the worker in jade, copper, and gold. In spite of this attention to what may seem to us to be the grotesque and trivial, the high quality of Mayan design and composition must be recognized and the artistic creations of the native American accorded a place alongside of those of Greece. Mayan art profoundly influenced later North American cultural development. The representation of the serpent (rattlesnake?) god of rain, a central figure in Mayan design, is found in modified forms virtually all over the continent.

So far as we can tell today neither the so-called "Early Empire" Mayan civilization in Central America nor the "Late Empire" in Yucatan were empires at all, in the sense of being ruled by a single sovereign or supreme monarch. That there was some degree of centralized control over the great municipal centers of the early period seems likely, but the evidence points to their increasing independence as time went on. In the Yucatan period the political organization was apparently a sort of confederation of city-states and even this, the famous League of Mayapan, broke up eventually from internal dissension. Until the last two or three centuries, however, Mayan civilization seems to have been largely marked by

peace both within and without. Perhaps the trading rights and economic "spheres of influence" over which nations wage war today were in Mayan society apportioned among the cities equitably. The common men, tillers of the maize fields, were conscripted for labor on the public works doubtless, but they were not forced to kill each other in order to settle commercial rivalries of the merchant nobility. That is an achievement in human social organization of which to be proud.

The Mexican civilizations. Sparks from the Mayan civilization spread far and wide. Some of them caught fire among wild tribes of the Mexican highlands and several new centers of cultural achievement blazed up. Influences from these new cultures reacted on the Maya as well as upon other peoples to the north and south. As yet the facts about some of these Mexican cultures are still meager, and their rankings in the scale of achievement will doubtless be changed as new discoveries, like those at Monte Alban for instance, are reported. While the Zapotecs, who were responsible for the Monte Alban marvels, the Totonacs, the Toltecs, and others deserve consideration, there is space here for only a brief description of what is at present the best known (both to the expert and the laity) of the Mexican civilizations, namely that attributed to a tribe known as the Aztecs.

The Aztecs were the last of a group of barbarian tribes who came into the Valley of Mexico from the north in the period between 800 and 1200 A.D. During this period the Toltec civilization is supposed to have been in full flower, but under repeated blows from the invaders it gradually succumbed—not, however, without handing on much of its culture to the barbarians. By the time the Aztecs arrived central Mexico was in the hands of a number of different warring tribes. The Aztec bowmen had a hard time of it at first, but after founding their capital, Tenochtitlan, in 1324 A.D. on the site of what is now Mexico City, they began their rise to power. By shrewd alliances and by successful warfare the Aztecs gradually acquired hegemony over a large area extending from coast to coast. Their imperial adventure was at its height when Cortez arrived to begin his dramatic conquest in 1519.

The Aztec civilization, like the Mayan, was based fundamentally on the cultivation of maize, although a variety of other plants were grown to supplement the diet. The methods of husbandry employed by the Aztecs are still in use with slight modifications all

over Mexico, and the Aztec maize cake (*tortilla*) is still the staple article in the Mexican's diet.

If the Mayans were the Greeks of America, the Aztecs are certainly entitled to be called the Romans. They combined a sort of early Roman Puritanism with a genius for administration and a harsh and cruel militarism. The military virtues were all-important in Aztec society, and both education and religion were tied up with the cult of war. Perhaps because of this stress laid on regimentation and discipline the Aztec achievement in the arts was in general inferior to that of their Toltec predecessors and far below that of the Mayans. On this point Gregory Mason says:

They [the Aztecs] were not great artists at all, but they pretended to be. They kept alive the pottery of Cholula, the textiles of the Toltecs, and the architecture of the Mayas in the same way that we Americans keep alive the artistic impetus of Greece in the columns that you may find before almost any American bank in northern New York or eastern Iowa. Like the English . . . the Aztecs were much greater in literature than they were in any other art.³²

Nevertheless the Aztecs were not without some claims to creative achievement. Their feather mosaics are justly famous, and their work with jade, gold, and turquoise is very fine. In the realm of social organization their codified ceremonial law and their extensive commercial relations are worthy of mention. Finally, one must not fail to note, although perhaps not with approval, their elaborate festival and ceremonial system, shot through with ritual cannibalism and human sacrifice, but also not without much beauty and dramatic power. A brief description of one episode of the Toxcatl ceremony, a rite performed annually on April 23 in honor of the god Tezcatlipoca, will serve to illustrate graphically the strange ritual complex of the Aztecs:³³

A captive youth, selected for his bravery, physical perfection, and musical accomplishments, was chosen a year in advance to impersonate Tezcatlipoca. Clad in costly garments and wreathed with

³² Gregory Mason, *Columbus Came Late*, pp. 250-251, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³³ From George P. Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, pp. 399 ff. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

flowers, he lived in regal splendor at the temple of the god with four priests and four warriors as attendants. Enjoying the freedom of the city, he wandered as he listed. Wherever he went, people prostrated themselves before him, showered him with flowers, and offered incense and sacrifices to him. Even the king bowed before the incarnation of the god. A month before the ceremony he was married to four beautiful maidens, who bore the names of goddesses. For twenty days his brides ministered to his every desire, the great lords vied in giving feasts and dances in his honor, and every joy of earth was placed at his disposal. On the morning of the twentieth day, however, he boarded a canoe, bade farewell to his brides, and was rowed across Lake Tezcucu. Accompanied only by his eight attendants, he followed a desert trail to a small ruined temple. Stripped of his costly raiment and jewels, and clad only in a necklace of flutes, he slowly ascended the pyramid, breaking a flute at each step. Exactly at midnight, as his successor was being chosen and acclaimed in Mexico, his heart was wrenched out and offered to the god whom he had impersonated.

The Peruvian civilizations. The history of the people who created the great Inca empire in Peru parallels in its broad outlines the story of the Aztecs. Like the Aztecs the Inca were a relatively unimportant tribe of no great culture who through military prowess and administrative genius made themselves masters of peoples with a much higher civilization than their own. The Inca built up a vast imperial domain in which lived more than ten million subjects and which stretched 2,500 miles along the South American coast line. Then just as signs of decadence were appearing there arrived the conquering Spaniards under Pizarro. Far from leading to a cultural renaissance under new leaders the advent of the "superior" white man served only to accelerate the rate of decay.

Space does not permit discussions of the pre-Incaic cultures of Chimú, Nazca, Tiahuanaco, nor of the Chibchan development in Colombia.³⁴ Suffice it to say that Nazca textiles are the world's finest, surpassing even the Gobelin tapestries, and that the megalithic stone construction of Tiahuanaco is the best example of the stone

³⁴ The Chibchan civilization was approximately contemporaneous with the Inca.

mason's art, of cutting and fitting, to be found in the America of pre-Columbian times. How old these pre-Incaic cultures are is uncertain, although Means⁸⁵ believes that they began to develop out of the Archaic horizon around the beginning of the Christian era. The Inca conquests did not begin until 1100 A.D. and the Inca great period was from 1400 to 1530, when Pizarro arrived to put an end to native rule.

The Inca empire at its height is frequently pointed to as one of the world's successful experiments with state socialism. While the system of land tenure was not strictly communistic, since titles were held by individual citizens, redistribution of the land to give each able-bodied person a share sufficient to take care of himself and his dependents was made frequently. The Peruvian could not rise above his fixed station in society but he was guaranteed security from want in illness and old age and he was free from the danger of unemployment. An elaborate administrative system, with captains or supervisors over each ten able-bodied male householders, over each hundred, and each thousand, saw to it that each man performed his allotted tasks for the state. Tithes of the goods produced were collected in state warehouses and dispensed to the nobles and priests, to the conscript army, and also, whenever there was need, to the common people who produced them. As the upper part of the administrative pyramid there were the governors of provinces (rulers over forty thousand able-bodied male citizens), the four *apucuna* who held sway over the four quarters of the kingdom, and finally with supreme powers over the entire realm, revered as temporal ruler and worshiped as a god, the Sapa Inca himself.

Strangely enough, for all their high civilization the Peruvians never developed a written language. The elaborate system of records made necessary by the centralized control over economic life was dependent on the memories of the individual administrators, aided only by a knotted string counting device, known as the *quipu*. Quipus could be used to record, for example, the number of measures of grain in a given storehouse, but someone had to remember which quipu referred to which storehouse, and to which class of goods therein. The use of the quipu, together with the arts of the administrator, the sacred Inca traditions and religious rituals, and the engineering sciences were taught to the young members of the

⁸⁵ Philip A. Means, *Ancient Civilizations of the Andes*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1931.

aristocracy in the national college at Cuzco. The "professors" at this college, which incidentally had a four-year curriculum, were the wise men of the empire, a sort of "brain trust" supplying not only education to the future generation of administrators but also advice on matters of policy and ritual to the then ruling group in the Inca state.

Next to their achievements in statecraft and diplomacy must rank the Peruvians' triumphs in the field of engineering. The Inca system of national roads, or rather footways, over which passed runners with messages, armies on the march, and the litters of traveling nobility were essential in binding the vast empire together. The great North Road of the Incas was more than two thousand miles long. It spanned gorges, traversed swamps on causeways, proceeding in as near a straight line as possible. Because this road and the others which comprised the Inca communications system were not kept up by the Spaniards, travel in Peru is much slower and more inconvenient now than it was in pre-Columbian days.

Peruvian textiles, made of cotton or the wool of the llama, alpaca, and vicuna, were outstanding. Peruvian metallurgy was the farthest advanced of any in native America, and the Inca empire may be said to be the only pre-Columbian culture which really entered the Bronze Age. Finally, one must not conclude the catalog of Inca achievements without mention of the work of the native surgeons, who were the first to employ anesthetics to relieve pain in operations, and whose skull trepanning with crude stone or metal tools is a marvel to scientists today. So while the Mayans probably deserve first rank as culture creators, the peoples of the Andes must be accorded a position as close second. Whether the two civilizations developed independently from a common Archaic culture base or whether in the early stages they influenced each other is still in the realm of speculation.³⁶ It would perhaps not be too wild a flight of fancy to imagine a Mayan Marco Polo exchanging ideas and bartering turquoise with the merchants of Chan-Chan, the Chimu capital, then returning to tell in Tikal or Copan of the great city so far away to the south.

Pre-Columbian cultures of the United States area. No native cultural development in the area which now comprises the United

³⁶ Cf. A. L. Kroeber, "Cultural Relations Between North and South America," *Proceedings of the 23rd International Congress of Americanists*, pp. 5-22, New York, 1928.

States compares with the Mayan, Inca, Zapotec, Toltec, Aztec, Chibcha, and other civilizations farther south. At the beginning of white colonization America north of the Rio Grande and the Gulf of California was occupied by perhaps a million Amerinds³⁷ who were scattered over the country in relatively small and independent tribal groups. East of the Mississippi there were both hunting and agriculture, and the cultural level was approximately that of the Archaic.³⁸ The area of the great western plains was the range of nomadic tribesmen, who had little pottery or agriculture and who lived largely by hunting buffalo. In California the population was denser but the culture, if anything, lower. Along the northwest coast and the nearby Vancouver and Queen Charlotte Islands there were salmon fishing tribes, among them our friends the Kwakiutl, with a unique art and great skill in working wood. Only in the Southwest, on the mesas of Arizona and New Mexico, was there at the time anything which could be called civilization. This so-called Pueblo culture had declined somewhat from its great period around 1100 A.D. but it was still vigorous in 1500. Its archeology goes back before 1100 A.D. farther than that of any other American culture. This is partly due to the good fortune of searchers in this region; partly the result of the dry climate which slows up decay.

The Pueblo culture derives much from the Toltec-Aztec, but the ideas from the south have been worked over and modified to suit local conditions. Instead of rubble and cut stone the Pueblos employed sun-dried brick (adobe) as a building material. For protection the community built all its dwellings in one huge "apartment house" unit, with several set-back stories and sometimes as many as five hundred separate rooms. These *pueblos* were sometimes built on top of almost inaccessible mesas or in caves half way up perpendicular cliff walls. Near-by in the valley or atop the mesa would be fields of maize and other crops, often watered by elaborate irrigation systems. Each clan had its *kiva*, a subterranean ceremonial chamber, in which rites took place whose secrets are jealously guarded from the white man even today.

The Pueblos were apparently peaceable folk. Under the attacks of nomad barbarians (of which the Utes, Apaches, and Navajos are probably modern representatives) they were forced to abandon

³⁷ A. L. Kroeber, "Native American Population," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 36, pp. 1-25, Jan.-Mar., 1934.

³⁸ See the list of native American culture areas in chapter 2, pp. 27-28.

one after another of their towns. Then the Spaniards came, and while not so destructive as the conquistadores of Mexico and Peru, they did the natives little good. Finally the Indian agents of the United States, in the guise of bearers of benefits of superior white civilization, further broke down the native culture. Attempts have been made in very recent years to revive Pueblo arts and crafts, especially pottery making, in which they once far excelled all tribes of the United States area. Their rich and beautiful dramatic dance festivals are now also coming to be appreciated as the finest of religious art instead of merely as pagan and sometimes, to white eyes, immoral ceremonies. Unfortunately the dances have also to some extent become commercialized; tourists go far to see the "show" of whose deep religious significance they are ignorant. While religious liberty has been a part of our cherished tradition it has too often been liberty for the white man only. Tolerance for and understanding of native rites of worship have usually been lacking.

One other culture, or group of cultures, in pre-Columbian United States attained a level approaching that of the Southwest. To the group of tribes responsible for this development the name Mound-builders has been given. They apparently were Indians whose descendants were still in America at the time of Columbus, but their culture had declined greatly by that day. The remains found in huge burial mounds scattered all over the central section of the country but concentrated especially in Illinois and Ohio are the chief source of information on Mound-builder culture. There was much use of hammered copper brought from the Lake Superior region and of shell from the Gulf of Mexico, arguing extensive commerce. There were many necklaces made of fresh-water pearls. The mounds and other earthworks are, however, the outstanding achievement. The great Cahokia mound near St. Louis is one hundred feet in height and covers sixteen acres; it was built without the aid of any draft animals, simply by porters carrying baskets of earth. What happened to the Mound-builder culture is still an archeologists' puzzle. It may have been the old story of barbarian invasion, and perhaps the Iroquois were the raiders and despoilers. It may have been simply internal dissolution. Probably there was some of both.

Perspective on native American culture. Enough has been said to give a general perspective on the cultural achievements of the American Indian. From the early days of the Bering migrations

down to the advent of men from Europe it is a story of independent cultural accumulation. The white colonists took over many elements of this culture, as Table III indicates, suppressed some,

TABLE III³⁹

SOME CULTURE TRAITS APPARENTLY DEVELOPED FIRST
IN PRE-COLUMBIAN AMERICA

<i>Foods</i>	<i>Drugs, Medicines</i>
maize	cinchona (quinine)
manioc (cassava, tapioca)	cascara sagrada
potato	tobacco
sweet potato	peyote
lima bean	ipécac
kidney bean	coca (cocaine)
cacao (cocoa, chocolate)	balsam of copaiba
peanut	maté
tomato	curare
pineapple	
guava	<i>Miscellaneous</i>
pumpkin	rubber
squash	copper welding
Jerusalem artichoke	hammock
alligator pear	henequen (sisal)
quinoa	birch bark canoe
	enema syringe
<i>Domesticated animals</i>	chicle
llama	
alpaca	
guinea pig	
turkey	
curassow	

and tolerated the survival of others among the conquered descendants of the Maya, the Aztec, the Inca, the Algonkin, and the Pueblos. That the creative period of the native Americans ended to all intents and purposes around 1530 was a historical accident, perhaps a sad one for the world as a whole. Left alone to con-

³⁹ The table was compiled with the aid of the following: Clark Wissler, *The American Indian*, pp. 1-140, Oxford University Press, New York, 1922; Erland Nordenskiöld, "The American Indian as an Inventor," in Kroeber and Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, pp. 489-505, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1931; and Gregory Mason, *Columbus Came Late*, p. 129, The Century Company, New York, 1931.

tinue their development for another five hundred years the red men might have been in a position to meet the white on an equal footing in the arts of warfare and engineering, as they already were able to do in the realm of the esthetic and spiritual at the time of the conquest. It is idle to speculate on the fusion and synthesis of the genius of the two worlds which might then have resulted. It is well to remember, however, when we view the somewhat lowly state of the Indian today, that the evidence from his past if not from his present indicates that he, as well as the white man, is endowed with the capacity for creating high civilization.

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Chapter 5

CULTURAL VARIABILITY

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY AMONG (1) THE VEDDAS OF CEYLON AND (2) THE CROW INDIANS

AMONG THE VEDDAS the family is the basic social unit. It consists of parents and unmarried children, married daughters and sons-in-law receives some personal property and land as gifts from his real homes of the Veddas. . . .

The Vedda family is strictly monogamous. The women are treated as the equals of men, sharing the same food and in many cases receiving their share first. They are jealously guarded from strangers. The children are treated affectionately and indulgently. They go naked until six or seven years of age, when the boy assumes the rag loin cloth and the girl the *sarong* skirt, which form their only clothing even when grown up. The women take the little girls with them when they dig yams in order to teach them. The boys are taken out hunting when ten years old.

When a girl marries, her husband usually comes to her father's home to live and he becomes a member of her family. The son-in-law receives some personal property and land as gifts from his father-in-law. In the division of the father's property, which is usually arranged before death so that few direct rules of inheritance prevail, all children share equally, regardless of sex. But it is understood that the property given the son-in-law upon marriage is part of the daughter's share of the family property.

The father and mother share in general family authority, the father assuming the natural leadership which results from his economic place as the chief family provider.

Every Vedda belongs to a *waruge* or clan, of which there are seven or eight. In some sections of the Vedda country the clans are strictly exogamous with descent in the maternal line, but in other regions no rules of exogamy or endogamy are apparent. Although

no universal rule exists there is, to a considerable degree, a preference for the cross-cousin marriage, that is, the marriage of the children of brother and sister, and an avoidance of closer kin, which includes parallel cousins, namely, children of two sisters and two brothers.

Marriage usually takes place at an early age. The boy or man goes to his future father-in-law with a present of honey, yams, grain or dried deer's flesh. He usually selects the girl himself. If he is kindly received and the alliance accepted, the father calls his daughter, who brings a cord of her own twisting, which is tied around the bridegroom's waist, and they are man and wife.¹

In Crow Indian Society exogamy is the rule, marriage within the clan being regarded as highly improper. Girls usually marry before they attain puberty; indeed they are ridiculed if they do not. A young man, on the other hand, must wait until he is twenty-five, unless he has previously distinguished himself in war. In the meantime, however, he has plenty of opportunities for philandering. The young men frequently accompany their sweethearts on expeditions after roots, berries and lodge poles, or take them along on buffalo hunts to care for their spare horses. These *liaisons* often ripen into permanent unions without further ceremony; the girl simply accompanies her lover to her parent's tipi. Sometimes a man makes a woman a fine present and induces her to elope with him. The Crows often marry women captured from hostile tribes, and under certain circumstances the stealing of women is permitted even within the tribe. The approved mode of marriage, however, is by purchase. The man presents meat to the girl's mother and makes valuable gifts, such as horses, to her brothers. The bride usually joins the camp group of her husband and receives presents from his clanswomen. The purchase of a woman gives the man the right to marry her younger sisters without additional payment, for the Crows are polygynous. All the wives of a man live together, whether or not they are sisters.

Marriages are easily terminated. A woman may desert a husband whom she dislikes, and a man may send away his wife for infidelity or incompatibility, or even for being "cranky." A man, it is said, even subjects himself to ridicule if he lives too long with one woman,

¹ From Paul Radin, *Social Anthropology*, pp. 42-43, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

and it is considered positively disgraceful to take back a divorced wife. When the parents separate, the younger children go with their mother; the girls remain with her, but the sons return to their father when older. A man generally marries the younger sister of his divorced wife and a widow frequently weds the brother of her deceased husband. In theory, a double standard of morality prevails. Public opinion condones, and even expects, a measure of irregularity in the conduct of men, but it sets before the women a high ideal of virtue. Nevertheless practice conflicts with theory. In spite of outward observance of the rules of property, sexual laxity is widely prevalent, and despite severe theoretical penalties for infidelity, a woman may even become notorious for her immorality without losing social standing.²

WHY WE STUDY PRIMITIVE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

These two sketches describe in highly condensed form the marriage and family "systems" of two tribes of "contemporaneous ancestors," namely the Veddas of Ceylon and the Crow Indians of our western plains. Both sets of folkways were developed before the days of white contact and they represent to all intents and purposes independent attempts to solve the inevitable social problems of regulating human sex expression, of providing for the next generation, and of creating a basic unit of social organization. To these descriptions of the sex-marriage-family pattern in two primitive cultures a hundred accounts dealing with other primitive groups could be added. These would show some similarities each with the others, and many differences, but altogether they would provide what almost might be considered a catalog of the possible modes of approach to the problems in question. For in the one hundred different social experiments that these tribes would represent, nearly everything that is at all feasible would have at least been given a trial.

How we would use such a catalog once we had it has already been intimated in the preceding chapters.³ Immediately it would give us the thing we have called "perspective." We would perhaps for the first time be able to see our own marriage and family

² From George P. Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, pp. 273-274. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

³ Cf. *supra*, chapter 3, p. 33, chapter 4, p. 67.

system against a background; we would be aided to free ourselves from our prejudices in favor of the rules and regulations we have grown up under, to "get outside" them and have a good look at them. After such a look we might still think ours the best of all these possible worlds, our code the most satisfactory, the most truly moral. If so we would at least know "what it was better than," and that is something. If not, then we might get from our study of primitive societies certain suggestions for our own system's improvement.

But, someone will ask, how can we, a civilized people, learn anything from savages? Study other civilizations on a par with our own by all means and get what light from them we can; ancient China or Peru, Italy of the Renaissance, modern Japan were all successful essays in culture building, and success is always worth study and emulation. But the Veddas, the Crow, the Eskimo, and the Kwakiutl are primitives, in a sense failures as culture creators. What can they teach? Of what importance are their family and sex customs except as curiosities?

If success in culture building means highly developed tools and weapons, rapid transportation, large scale industry, then the primitives are undoubtedly laggards. Their material culture shows ingenuity, but it is rudimentary compared to ours. Neither can their experience with problems of administration qualify them to instruct on public finance, international trade, political administration. They lived in relatively simple communities and dealt with such matters only on a small scale. Not all *our* problems are large scale problems, however. We too live in communities and our person-to-person relations in small groups are often more important to our immediate happiness than our relations in larger ones. Babies are still produced by small social units, not by factories, although Aldous Huxley has prophesied the coming of the latter.⁴ Divorce still concerns most the two people whose marital bonds are severed. The labor union and the corporation have not replaced the family as the basic unit in modern social organization.

Comparisons can therefore usefully be made between primitive and modern marriage and family institutions. The same statement is true of some of the simpler forms of political organ-

⁴ The prophecy is a bit satirical. See *Brave New World*, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City, N. Y., 1932.

ization found in the community and neighborhood and of basic economic institutions like ownership, rent, partnership, the wage for services rendered, and barter. There is not space in this and the succeeding chapter to provide catalogs of all the extant type-forms of these various institutions. The aim is simply to describe a few of the more important variations of the institution-patterns found in primitive society so as to give the needed background for later study⁵ of the social institutions in contemporary life.

Before entering upon such description one caution is necessary. Just because we have used the word "catalog" in connection with the comparison of primitive societies with the modern it does not follow that, like the amateur gardener with a seed catalog, we can select some particular phase of family organization, from, say, the page devoted to marriage among the Bushmen, and by sowing a few seeds of exhortation and personal example reproduce the Bushman custom in modern society. We must not forget that customs, like plants, can be grown only in certain kinds of soil. Free and easy divorce, to take an example, works well enough in Crow Indian culture where it fits into the whole pattern of life in a society of buffalo hunters who are constantly on the roam. It ties in with the Crow attitude toward sex generally, with the status of women and the accepted forms of division of labor between the sexes, with the canons of exploit, and with the informal system of tribal government. Easy divorce is a trait well integrated with the whole Crow Indian life-pattern, but the situation would be quite otherwise if it were suddenly introduced into our own culture by some reformer-dictator.⁶ We have traditions of stable family life coming down from the days when the household composed of man, wife, and children produced most of the goods for its own consumption, joined in common worship and recreation, and regarded anything approaching the free exercise of the sex impulse as unholy. Easier divorce is apparently coming in America but not as an isolated reform brought about immediately on its agita-

⁵ Cf. *infra*, chapters 15-21.

⁶ It was precisely thus introduced into Russia by the Soviets in 1921. The immediate result was a disorganization of family life and freedom of sex relations amounting almost to promiscuity. Now marriage and the family in Russia are adjusting to the new divorce code, and stability in relations between the sexes and between parents and children is to a considerable degree returning. Cf. Fannina Halle, *Women in Soviet Russia*, pp. 109-126, 168-175, The Viking Press, New York, 1933.

tion. The whole sex-marriage-family system is gradually changing, divorce customs along with others, and it may be that we shall eventually adopt regulations concerning the severance of the marriage tie that have been tried out earlier in Crow or Bushman society or elsewhere. The point is that these expedients cannot be considered as simple units to be added to or subtracted from a given culture; they must be grafted on to or excised from a living organism. They acquire real meaning only when viewed in relation to the whole pattern of tribal or community life.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

Definition of the terms "marriage," and "family." What do we mean by the terms "marriage" and "family"? Everyone knows in general what a marriage means in our society, but we are going to examine marriage customs of other societies and we need a definition which will cover all the different forms of the institution, not just our own. The same is true of "family"; what characteristics have the Eskimo and Hottentot and Chuckchi families in common that enable us to identify in each tribe the folkways that are *family* customs from those that are not?

It is hard to construct such definitions, for the differences from tribe to tribe are very great. We can begin with a preliminary distinction. Marriage is a special type of person-to-person *relationship*, involving mutual rights and duties. The family is a kind of social *grouping*, made up of a number of people who stand toward one another in certain relationships. There is usually, but not always, at least one marital relationship in each family. On the other hand not every marriage results in the formation of a family group.

If these last two statements are to be clear it is necessary to delve deeper into the nature of marriage and the family. How distinguish the family group from other groups in society? What kinds of person-to-person relationship deserve to be called marital? Let us answer the latter question first. The marital relationship obtains between two individuals of opposite sex who have, in effect, made a contract between them that they shall henceforth, or until the contract is abrogated, fulfill toward each other certain obligations. The particular obligations which they assume will depend on the folkways of the tribe in question, but each tribe

will have a more or less standard set of prescriptions concerning marital conduct which it will enforce upon those of its members who enter wedlock. The most common requirement is of course that of mutual cohabitation, and marriage is often regarded primarily as a means of regularizing sex relations. Other marital duties are concerned with child bearing and child rearing, economic support, and exchange of affection.

One must define the family primarily in terms of the different individuals who make it up, but the personnel varies so from society to society that to compile an everywhere applicable list of persons who compose the family is impossible. There are exceptions to any generalization and one can only speak of what is usual, not of what is universal. The family group includes at least one adult female, one adult male who is ordinarily but not always married to the female, and at least one dependent offspring who may be the natural child of both man and woman, of one of them, or of neither. These three individuals constitute the family nucleus. In the absence of the child the group may be called an *arrested family*⁷ or, where child bearing is deliberately avoided, a *companionate*. In the absence of one of the adults we speak of the family as being "broken" or "incomplete."

More often than not the family group is larger than three persons. There are additional children, additional wives or husbands, relatives, guests, servants, or concubines. The so-called great family group may include members of three or even four generations. Membership in a family group implies usually a definite place of residence, often a part in a complex household economy, and always it gives the individual status in the larger society. The family is a recognized unit in the social organization of tribe or community. As we shall see later, it is also the most powerful determiner of the course of the individual's life.

Now that definitions of the institutions of marriage and the family have been given, the next step is to find out the range of variation which each definition actually includes. In other words we are ready to begin the process of "cataloging" marriage and family types. First, what of different kinds of matrimony?

Types of marriage relationship. The espousal of man and maid is hedged about with a wide variety of prescriptions. One

⁷ This is E. R. Groves' term. See his *Social Problems of the Family*, p. 90, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1927.

must first be eligible to contract matrimony; one must then actually go through the process of contracting in due form in accordance with the locally prescribed rites and ceremonies. The contract made, one may live to rejoice at the step taken or regret it. If the former, then there may be a lifetime of living up to the set obligations of matrimony in the tribe in question and enjoying its privileges and immunities. If the latter, retreat from the bad bargain can only take place along routes marked out by societal regulation. Eligibility to marry, accomplishing marriage, living up to marriage obligations, and escaping from marriage are, then, the aspects of the institution we must consider.

Eligibility for marriage. Each society interposes between the state of "single blessedness" and marriage what the lawyers today call *impediments*; one must "remove" these before nuptials can take place. Perhaps the most universal of these bars to marriage is *nonage*, or legal immaturity. Not much can be done about nonage except to wait until one grows up, but how old one must be to marry depends upon where the wedding is to take place. In general it is safe to say that girls in primitive society marry at an earlier age than in our own civilization, and the statement is usually true also of the men.⁸ But the range of variation from tribe to tribe is considerable. Among many of the tribes in India, girls are handed over to their husbands long before attaining puberty. In a large majority of cultures, however, while there may be infant betrothal the rule is not to marry until after puberty is attained. The puberty rites or initiation ceremonies signalize the "coming of age" of boys and girls, and marriage often follows in normal course shortly thereafter. Not always, though; higher age qualifications are in force in some areas. As we have seen, the Crow Indian brave remains single until he is twenty-five; among the Masai of Africa the man does not marry until he is twenty-eight or thirty.⁹

The dread of incest is widely prevalent in primitive society. Consanguinity within certain prescribed degrees is an irremovable impediment to matrimony, but the prohibited degrees are not everywhere the same. Marriages between parents and their natural children are universally disapproved of. Brother-sister matings are

⁸ Cf. Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, vol. 1, p. 344, Macmillan and Company, London, fifth edition, 1921.

⁹ Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 271, Liveright Publishing Company, New York, 1920.

also generally regarded as incestuous except where, as among the Incas and the Egyptians, the ruler must marry his sister in order to keep uncontaminated the divine blood of the royal line. Marriages with half-brothers and half-sisters, marriages between uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews, between first or even second cousins, are tabued in some tribes and tolerated in others. The distinction between parallel and cross cousins, which we have already seen is an important one to the Veddas, is also a basis for marriage eligibility distinctions in many other tribes. A man can marry the daughters of his father's sister or of his mother's brother for they are his cross cousins; indeed if it is at all possible he is expected to espouse one of these girls. They are the *preferred* mates for him. The daughters of the father's brother or the mother's sister belong, however, to a different category; they are parallel cousins and as such within, not without, the incest group. Marriage with them would be a sin.

But the incest group is often wider even than this in primitive society; it includes all members of the group variously termed in anthropological literature the *clan*, the *gens*, or the *sib*. It is hard to make clear the nature of the *sib* group because there is no exact counterpart in our own society. The nearest parallel would be a collection of all the direct line descendants of one of our great national heroes, say the immortal George Washington. A convention of those *née* Washington (not those who acquired the name by marriage) would be roughly analogous as far as composition goes to such a group as the Thunderbird *sib* of the Winnebago Indians. Members of the latter group are supposed all to be male-line descendants of four god-like brothers created all at once back in the dim past by the Great Spirit, Earthmaker.¹⁰ Thunderbird *sib* members constitute a band of kindred in whose veins supposedly runs the blood of those revered hero-ancestors; in the same sense the Washington society assemblage are blood-kin to the peerless George. Here the parallel ends, however. While the Washingtons would be only a temporary group of lineage-conscious patriots the Thunderbirds are a closely knit and highly functional grouping in Winnebago society. There are eleven other similar *sibs* among the Winnebago, and each has certain special

¹⁰ For a brief description of Winnebago social organization see Radin, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-65.

rights and privileges and certain duties to perform for the tribe as a whole. All twelve sibs are, as we say, *exogamous*; members of the same sib cannot intermarry even though they are as far apart as fifth cousins. Indeed the rule of exogamy sometimes operates to prevent marriage between individuals who are sib-mates by adoption only, and not real blood kin at all. In contrast we may note that in our society the group calling itself Washington is not exogamous. A Mr. and a Miss Washington may marry if they are no closer than second (in some states, first) cousins. We do not feel that there is a mythical bond uniting people of the same name and totem into a blood brotherhood, biologically fictional perhaps, but sociologically real. Many primitive groups do have this feeling and quite logically, therefore, a conviction that intermarriage between sib-mates is incestuous. Rules of sib exogamy result.

With twelve exogamous sibs in Winnebago society, the young man and woman would theoretically have approximately eleven twelfths of the tribe from which to choose a mate. Actually, the range of choice is more limited, for the sibs themselves are divided into two exogamous groups, or *phratries*. Four of the sibs compose the unit called *Wangeregi* or *Those-who-are-above*; the other eight make up the *Manegi* or *Those-who-are-on-earth*. A member of the first or Upper division can marry only a member of the second or Lower, and vice versa. Sib exogamy in Winnebago society is thus seen to be only a consequence of phratry exogamy; the individual does not have eleven twelfths of the tribe to choose a mate from, but at best only two thirds. In the Australian tribes this limitation of the group of marriage eligibles is carried still further, to lengths that seem absurd. Among the Warramunga, for instance, the tribe is divided into eight marriage classes and a man in any one can marry a woman in only a specified one of the seven others. The result is to limit the choice to *one eighth* of the otherwise eligible women of the tribe. Arranging marriage under such a system becomes a sort of game for genealogists.

Another type of eligibility requirement for matrimony is concerned with the question of whether the would-be wife or husband already has another marriage contract that is still in effect. Our own society is monogamous and we do not permit a man to have two wives at the same time, or a woman two husbands. In perhaps a majority of primitive tribes one or the

other of these regulations is absent.¹¹ The marriage system may be *polygynous* and tolerate a plurality of wives for a single husband, or it may be *polyandrian* and permit one woman to be the wife of several men at the same time. Theoretically there may even be *group marriage*, two or more women married to the same two or more men, but this arrangement is very rare. Usually what is mistaken for group marriage is monogamy, polygyny, or polyandry plus concubinage, sexual hospitality, or socially tolerated adultery.

Polygyny is widespread among primitive tribes but is often confined simply to the wealthier classes who can afford to buy more than one wife in the open market. Since under normal biological conditions there are about as many men in a tribe as women something must happen to upset the sex ratio before polygyny becomes possible for all males of the tribe. Ordinarily more wives for the well-to-do or powerful means no wives at all for the indigent, and the young men whose fortunes are still in the making may have to content themselves with temporary liaisons with young unmarried girls or secret and hazardous conquests among married women.¹² The norm for the middle classes even in the so-called polygynous society is likely to be one wife for each husband, and it is in this sense that we say that monogamous marriage is the most common form the world over. Polygyny is frequently a perfectly legal arrangement but at the same time a luxury not many can afford.

Polyandry is much less common than polygyny. Where it exists there is usually counterbalancing polygyny in some other stratum of society, or else the normal one-to-one ratio is in some way modified. Among the Todas of India female infanticide was practiced before the days of British influence; this led to a surplus of males and, logically enough, to polyandry. In the polyandrian tribes of Tibet, however, female infanticide is apparently not practiced, yet here also there is an excess of men over women. What biological or social factor is operating to produce this excess we do not know.¹³

Lack of parental consent is another impediment to marriage

¹¹ Cf. Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, p. 194-195, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929.

¹² Cf. Robert H. Lowie, "Marriage," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, p. 149, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933.

¹³ Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 46.

that needs considering, since it plays a vital role in mate-choice in many cultures. In modern society young people are increasingly able to marry with little or no parental interference. This is because we hold a sentimental view of the marriage institution and believe that while the economic and social qualifications that parents set much store by are important they are less so than "true-love" or romance. In the view toward marriage taken by most peoples other than ourselves the elements are weighted differently. As Lowie points out:¹⁴

Marriage until the most recent period has never been primarily directed toward the sentimental gratification of the spouses, a notion that is even now limited to a small section of the population of several occidental countries. The human norm is more nearly represented by two wealthy European peasants on friendly terms with each other and desiring to consolidate their estates. . . . Savage matrimony is preponderantly a means for cementing group alliances between families and clans.

Marriages in primitive society are arranged most often by the parents, sometimes with, sometimes without, their children's consent. Romance may be present and there are some tribes where it is an important consideration, but the typical form of mating is the *mariage de convenance*. Under the patriarchal system of the Chinese, Japanese, and Greeks, and in Rome up to the time of Justinian, the house father arranged marriages for his children with or without their consent. A Chinese bride might never have seen her husband until the wedding; she was still expected to be a dutiful and loving wife. The system of patriarchally arranged marriages finds its apotheosis, as Floyd Dell points out, among the primitive tribes of Central Australia. Let us suppose that Father A has a marriageable son:

He contracts with Father B to the effect that when B's daughter (a mere infant, but already betrothed) is married, *and* bears a daughter, and that daughter becomes of marriageable age, she shall become the wife of A's son.¹⁵

¹⁴ From Robert H. Lowie, "Marriage," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 10, p. 147. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

¹⁵ Floyd Dell, *Love in the Machine Age*, p. 130, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1930. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Of course these are extreme examples of domination of the young by the old. In many tribes the parents arrange marriages, but the children may veto such arrangements by simply refusing to carry out parental wishes.

The economic factor is extremely important in most mating systems. In the "cementing of group alliances" referred to by Lowie, a good deal of property may change hands. A marriageable daughter is not only a useful pawn in a diplomatic game; she is often a large economic asset as well, for she must be *purchased* by the groom or his kinsmen, and the bride price is often considerable. Paying it may deplete his or their coffers, but there is return from the wife's labor; and then too the paying of a large sum for wives enhances a husband's prestige. There are all sorts of marriage transactions and ways of paying the bride price. Sometimes, as for instance among the Manus of the Admiralty Islands, a marriage is simply made the occasion for a big exchange of property within the tribe, accompanied by much haggling and dickering. Payments are made in dog's teeth and shell money at the time of the boy's betrothal by his relatives and backers; later there is a carefully stipulated return payment from the girl's side in pigs and oil.¹⁶ In some tribes the bride price is paid partly in goods and partly in service. One recalls that Jacob served Laban seven years before he was allowed to espouse Rachel.¹⁷ Similarly a Semang bridegroom works one or two years for his father-in-law before he is free to return with his wife to his own band.¹⁸ Often the service period is regarded as a sort of probation during which the young man must prove himself capable and willing to support a household. Thus when the young Barama River Carib has chosen the girl with whom he wants to settle down he

. . . asks the father for her. The old man requires the suitor to clear and plant a field and to build a house in the settlement of the future father-in-law. These are feats which require several months, during which period the suitor occupies the house of his fiancée's

¹⁶ Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, p. 83, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1930.

¹⁷ Genesis, 29: 27-30.

¹⁸ Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

father and enjoys the favors of the girl while contributing his hunting spoils to the family larder.¹⁹

So much for the wife purchase system. Its virtual opposite, the dowry system, where the bridegroom gets paid instead of paying, is rare in primitive society. In the primitive household a pair of skilled hands is an asset, not a liability; why therefore should the bride's family give up a good worker for nothing, much less hand her over accompanied by expensive gifts? As we have seen, there is frequently an exchange of goods at marriage, but the balance of marriage payments is usually held equal or else it favors the bride's kin, not the husband's. Where the husband's family comes out ahead there must be a special reason. Perhaps the well-bred girl will no longer labor and a man must be paid to take upon himself the responsibility of supporting her. Perhaps her family simply want to subsidize the marriage so that she can be maintained "in the style to which she has been accustomed." Perhaps there are simply too many husband-seeking women and far too few marriageable males. Of course where the dowry system is in vogue every parent accumulates a marriage portion for each daughter if possible, without giving thought to the underlying reasons for so doing. Unthinking conformity to an established folkway is the rule here as elsewhere; deliberate innovation the exception.

There are other eligibility requirements for marriage, most of which can be mentioned in passing only. The couple may have to come from the same rank or caste in society; they may have to have leave of the chieftain or potentate; there may be requirements concerning freedom from disease, concerning sexual potency, and, in the woman, fertility. Often adolescent initiation ordeals must have been undergone with credit before the tribe will permit mating; sometimes the man must have scalps at his belt or have engaged in some other hunting or fighting exploit to prove his manhood. Finally, there is the question of virginity, of evidence as to premarital continence.

Shall proved premarital unchastity be a bar to matrimony? Only when couples are betrothed and married off in early

¹⁹ John Gillin, "Social Life of the Barama River Caribs," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 40, p. 229, Mar., 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

childhood²⁰ can a society escape some decision with respect to this age-old problem. A few illustrations will show best how various these societal "decisions" have actually been:

In the Trobriands²¹ and in many other areas no barrier is interposed to free sexual experimentation and at marriage no one is virgin. In Dahomey, on the other hand, virginity is expected in the bride at least. "If the young wife is found wanting in this respect, her whole family is put to shame and may even be required to return the bride price and compensate the groom for all the expenses he has incurred."²² "In order to preserve the virtues of their daughters, the Yakut employ a chastity girdle . . .; but when the bride price has been partly or fully paid the parents take no further interest in the matter. The Yakut are said to see nothing immoral in free love, provided only that nobody suffers material loss by it."²³ In Hopi society ". . . chastity prevails among the unmarried, but unchastity is condoned if marriage follows."²⁴ "Among the Santals a youth and a girl are allowed to look at but not to speak to each other. If they do, the youth is taken to the village council and asked if he wants to marry the girl; should he say no, he is beaten and fined, but should he say yes, he is only fined."²⁵

Some tribes, therefore, have prenuptial sex codes similar to the one we profess; some tribes have not. Feminine chastity tends to be prized higher than masculine, and where there is a difference in the amounts of premarriage freedom accorded the two sexes it is the woman who must refrain in the interests of marriage eligibility rather than the man.

Making the marriage contract. To acquire the status of a married person one must not only be eligible to contract matri-

²⁰ It must be *early* childhood because pre-pubertal sex intercourse is not at all uncommon in primitive society. For a list of such cases see Ernest Crawley, *Studies of Savages and Sex*, pp. 11-13, Methuen and Company, Ltd., London, 1929.

²¹ Cf. Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages*, Horace Liveright, New York, 1929.

²² Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 581.

²³ From Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, vol. 1, p. 142. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁴ Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

²⁵ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 143. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

mony; one must actually go through the set forms of procedure necessary to bring a valid marriage contract into effect. The rites and ceremonies differ greatly in the various cultures but their primary aim is to inform the community of the new status the young couple are assuming and perhaps to signalize and ratify the exchange of property involved. There are magico-religious aspects of the wedding ceremonial also, and a part of the ritual may be gone through as a means of avoiding the influence of the evil eye upon the marriage, of increasing the wife's fertility, or of gaining divine sanction for the union.

Marriage rites range from the simple to the complex. When wife capture or marriage by elopement are legal, as for instance among the Crow, no wedding ceremony at all is necessary. The couple simply start living together and the community regards them as man and wife. Even where marriage is the result of mutual agreement and advance arrangement, the actual solemnization may be nothing more than the eating of a meal together, sleeping together, or telling one's friends that a marriage has, in fact, taken place. Where the community participates in the nuptials they still may be quite informal and very brief. Among the Lillooet, for instance, betrothal and marriage both took place at a so-called "touching dance." Here a man who wished a certain girl went up to her and seized her belt or the loose end of her sash. If she did not pull away but instead danced with him they were considered betrothed. At the end of the dance the chief announced the names of the paired young people; "So and So holds So and So." If the girl did not then shake the man off they were considered husband and wife.²⁶

In other tribes the wedding is a much more ceremonious affair, involving long advance preparation, much feasting, and the carrying through of a detailed ritual, many parts of which are supposed to have magical significance. In addition to the rites at the wedding proper there is often a long sequence of tabus during the betrothal and even for a period after marriage. These are observed in order to conform to tribal ideas of what is modest and proper or to prevent bad luck or evil influences from wrecking the lives of the married couple. A Manus girl may be betrothed for as long as eight years, during which time she must carefully

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 290.

avoid being seen by her future husband, his father, uncles, or brothers. Whenever they appear in her village she must run and hide.²⁷ A belle in Uganda during the period between betrothal and wedding “. . . is anointed with butter to beautify her skin, is fed well to make her plump, and is visited by her future sister-in-law, who bathes her and examines her critically for any physical defect.”²⁸ After the wedding ceremony the Uganda bride remains veiled and secluded for a month.

The terms of the marriage contract. What are the marriage vows in primitive society? Each group has its own list which are by implication taken when the bride and bridegroom go through the wedding ceremony. First on most lists is the right and duty of marital cohabitation. By the marriage contract husbands are given prior and sometimes exclusive right to sex intercourse with their spouses. The wife's claims on the husband are in theory reciprocal, at least when the marriage is monogamous. Actually, however, the woman must please rather than be pleased; her sex status like her status in other phases of life is likely to be somewhat inferior to that of the man. Husbands are sometimes in a position to dispose of their wives' sexual favors for hire to fellow tribesmen, for hospitality, or in exchange for similar access to the wives of others. Wives, on the other hand, must usually entertain lovers clandestinely or not at all.

Of course as always there are exceptions to these statements. In Dobu an equality of status for man and wife is assured by a rule which requires the couple to live in alternate years in each other's home villages. During the year in the wife's village she commits adultery with impunity and there is little the husband can do about it. When they reside in the village of his near kinsmen she is an outsider and he can do as he pleases.²⁹ In Uganda after a proved adultery “. . . in some tribes the woman is beaten and the man let off; among others the man is beaten and the woman let off.”³⁰ Among some of the Tibetan tribes women who are married under the system of fraternal polyandry to a group

²⁷ Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 ff.

²⁸ Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 539.

²⁹ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 136, Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1934.

³⁰ William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. 4, p. 979, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928.

of brothers are allowed to take on an outside lover as an additional husband if they please.³¹ Finally, the custom of offering a wife as a sleeping partner for a guest is also not always solely to male advantage. Among the Merekedes, a tribe of the Yemen,

... custom requires that the stranger should pass the night with his host's wife whatever may be her age and condition. Should he render himself agreeable to the lady, he is honorably and hospitably treated; if not the lower part of his "abbi," or cloak, is cut off and he is driven away in disgrace.³²

In most, but again not in all marriages, there is an obligation on the couple jointly to create a family and maintain a household. Wives are often purchased because of their proven ability to bear children, and in many cultures a barren wife may be returned to her relatives and a refund of the bride price demanded. Care of the infant rests primarily on the mother, but the father may be expected to provide protection and some degree of economic support. Sometimes, however, these latter duties fall to the maternal relatives with the wife's brother playing the role conventionally expected of the father in our society.

The primitive is often ignorant of the cause of pregnancy and for this reason or because of promiscuity in sex relations the facts of biological paternity cannot be established. "Sociological paternity" takes its place quite adequately, however, and the child who knows not his blood parent is still assured of a father's care. There are various ways of fixing paternal responsibility. Among the polyandrian Todas one of the husbands goes through what is called a "bow and arrow" ceremony with the woman and thereby becomes the legal father of all her offspring, by whomsoever begotten, until with another man the ceremony is performed again.³³ Another variant on the biological pair family is provided in Samoa.³⁴ Here children after the first few years are in a position to choose for themselves in which of several households of relatives they will take

³¹ Robert M. Briffault, *The Mothers*, vol. 1, p. 664, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1927.

³² J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahabys*, quoted in Briffault, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 640.

³³ W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, The Macmillan Company, London, 1906.

³⁴ Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, p. 43, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1927.

up residence. Thus in effect they choose their own parents, at least for later childhood and adolescence. If they think themselves badly treated by one set of elders they simply exercise their right to move on to others.

Other marital obligations assumed by couples in some tribal cultures may be noted. Often there are religious rites to be performed, food tabus to be observed, acts to be avoided in the interests of the marriage partner. There is the general requirement of continuing to please a spouse who is sometimes in a position to get a divorce simply by declaring the relationship unsatisfactory. Finally there is the demand to be loved, to live in the warm atmosphere of husbandly or wifely affection.

Of course a *demand* to love defeats its own purpose; love cannot be coerced into being. But while it is difficult contractually to enforce attitudes of real affection there is usually a safe presumption of the existence of mutual respect and understanding between the married couple, if the relationship continues to exist. Institutions like child betrothal, wife purchase, patriarchal rule, concubinage, and prostitution may seem inimical to conjugal affection, and they do make marital friendships difficult. But if two people live together, cooperating in the daily routine of living, there tends gradually to come a recognition of mutual dependency and the growth of sympathy and understanding, even though there was no spark of romantic affection at the start.

Termination of the marriage contract. Few contracts are perpetual; some provisions are nearly always made for the termination of contractual obligations. The marriage contract is no exception. It is usually dissolved by the death of one of the main partners to it, the wife or husband, although there are some tribes where a sister or a brother steps in to take the place of the deceased and, in one sense at least, continue the old contract in effect. Many marriage contracts are terminated long before death intervenes, however, through an action which we call *divorce*.

Divorce is the publicly sanctioned abrogation of a marriage contract which otherwise would continue at least for the lifetime of one spouse. The abrogation is permitted because the terms of the contract have become apparently unfulfillable either through the inability or the unwillingness of one of the partners most concerned. In each culture there are certain socially accepted excuses or explanations for a divorce action, certain forms of breach of

contract which may appear to justify the casting off of a legal spouse. These are the *grounds* for divorce. Unless the caster-off or deserter can convince the community that his or her grievance is on the approved list of grounds, the action taken may not be regarded as a legal dissolution of the contract at all; instead, the couple will still be regarded as married though living separately. This last is a legalistic view, however, and savages are not as trained in hairsplitting as we are. More often in primitive society the refusal to live longer with a spouse terminates the contract, but in the absence of proper grounds, involves a penalty. The price paid for freedom may simply be a fine or the forfeit of the bride price and public disapproval. Sometimes, however, there are more severe penalties. According to the old Chinese law a man who repudiates his wife without her having furnished him with any of the eight justifying causes for divorce shall be punished by eighty lashes.³⁵

There may be no grounds at all for divorce in some societies. Marriage is indissoluble, for instance, among the Veddás. On the other hand, there may be so many and trivial grounds for dissolving a union as to make marriage highly unstable. Usually the man has an advantage over the woman in gaining the sanction of the community to a severance of marital ties. A Toda husband can divorce his wife if she is "lazy" or "a fool" or for no reason at all if he is willing to pay her family a single buffalo; it will cost the wife ten buffaloes to rid herself of an equally unwanted husband. There are all sorts of accepted reasons for divorce; almost every possible grievance that a married person can develop toward a spouse is a ground for divorce in some tribe or other. Adultery on the part of the wife and barrenness must head any list of divorce causes, after which, in no particular order, come mutual consent, adultery by the husband, ill temper, disobedience (in the wife), thievery, witchcraft, disease, impotence, old age, long absence from home, disrespect to parents, laziness, desertion, intoxication, and a myriad others. No tribe, of course, permits divorce for all these causes, unless indeed it permits marriages to be dissolved for any cause whatever. Primitives are in general as much concerned about marriage stability as we are. Because there is usually no formal governmental machinery for adjudicating and administering a

³⁵ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 302.

written divorce code it does not follow that they do not hold divorce in check. In the small primitive community, A's trouble with his wife B is usually well known among the neighbors. Gossip is quick to approve or disapprove of a divorce as conforming to or violating community standards. Tribal custom defines clearly when it is appropriate and when not, to cast off marital ties.

Types of family life. *The biological family.*

It does not matter whether marital relations are permanent or temporary; whether there is polygyny or polyandry or sexual license; whether conditions are complicated by the addition of members not included in *our* family circle: the one fact stands out beyond all others that everywhere the husband, wife, and immature children constitute a unit apart from the remainder of the community.³⁶

Lowie, the anthropologist, thus testifies to the universality of what may be called the biological family. The basic element in this mother-child-father relationship triangle is the tie between the mother and the offspring who needs care and protection for a relatively long period, but both mother and child need the support and protection of a male as well. The man may not necessarily be the child's blood father or indeed the woman's husband, although he usually is the latter, but he must assume responsibility in connection with the child's upbringing during its early years. In addition, and this is a sociological factor rather than a biological, the child needs the sense of security that comes from having a recognized father, the social status that results when there is a communally acknowledged bond between it and some particular adult male.³⁷

Economic factors in the organization of the family. Economic factors help to knit the biological family group together. The earliest division of labor was probably that between the sexes and was based on real biological differences in structure and function. In primitive society as we find it, however, the distinction between

³⁶ Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 66-67. Reprinted by permission of the Liveright Publishing Company.

³⁷ B. Malinowski calls this the "principle of legitimacy." See his essay, "Parenthood—The Basis of the Social Structure," in V. C. Calverton and S. D. Schmalhausen, *The New Generation*, pp. 113-168, The Macaulay Company, New York, 1930.

women's work and men's is largely conventional.³⁸ In one tribe such a task as the dressing of skins will be performed always by women; in a neighboring culture the work will fall universally on males. Children at various ages also have certain duties assigned to them, such as the gathering of roots and berries, running of errands, care of still younger children, and simple handicrafts. As a result of the dividing up of the activities of procuring and production in this way, the biological family group becomes a natural economic unit, the so-called *household*. In some tribes the household attaches to itself persons other than those comprising the simple family. There may be collateral relatives of the husband and wife, there may be slaves or hired servants, all carrying on diverse economic activities, living under a common roof and eating from a common kitchen. But these complex households as well as the by far more common simpler ones are seldom if ever completely self-sufficient. As Malinowski says, "In spite of repeated theoretical assertions as to the existence of the 'closed household economy' . . . we find in every community, however simple, a wider economic collaboration embracing all members and welding the various families into large co-operative units."³⁹ Thus we have the Crow Indian communal buffalo hunt, the Iroquois planting, cultivating, and harvesting bees, the whale-boat crew of the maritime Chuckchi, as examples of extra-familial economic activity. In many agricultural tribes the land is held by and worked in the name of the sib or of the whole village community with the family getting only its proportionate share of the fruits of labor organized by a larger and more inclusive social group.

Sociological factors in the organization of the family. The family is not only a biological and an economic unit; it is a highly important social unit as well. Simpler societies, like those of the Semang and Tasmanians, were little more than loose aggregations of families. In the more complex cultures, however, the educational, recreational, and ceremonial functions in society were shared between the family and groups like the men's club, the secret society, the group of neighbors, and especially the sib. The sib, where it exists, is likely to be the family's chief competitor for the loyalty

³⁸ Cf. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 74; Richard Thurnwald, *Economics in Primitive Communities*, p. 4, Oxford University Press, London, 1932.

³⁹ Bronislaw Malinowski, "Marriage," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th edition, vol. 14, p. 943. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

and support of the individual. Even today the married person may be more drawn to his or her own relatives than to a spouse, especially when the latter is surrounded by "in-laws" whose criticism and disapproval it is impossible to escape. The question of where the newly married couple are to reside is vitally important in this connection. In some primitive tribes, as well as in the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome, residence is what is termed *patri-local*, that is, the newlyweds join, for the time being at least, the household in which the husband grew up. Under this arrangement the wife is a stranger in the home in which she lives and labors; her own kin may be far away in another village and unable to support her against a husband who may think of his kin group first and of her welfare second. The situation is reversed where *matrilocal* residence prevails; now it is the husband who is at a disadvantage and the wife's relatives who are in a position to call the turn. In the Hopi system of maternal households the wife (or her mother or grandmother) is owner and head of the house and the husband almost a visitor therein. His real home is still his own mother's household; there and there only he has rights and wields some authority.

A third and probably the most common residence arrangement is the establishment of an independent household, free from control of the relatives of either husband or wife. In many tribes this occurs immediately upon marriage, which is often delayed until the new home is ready for occupancy; in other groups the husband must labor first in the bride's household until the bride price is "worked out" or paid. The independent household, where it can be established without too much sacrifice, undoubtedly makes for a stronger marriage tie, and family counselors today are wise in urging young couples to avoid living under parental roofs if possible. Nevertheless matrilocal and patrilocal systems, in varying forms and in differing degrees of stability and permanence, seem to work well enough in the societies that are used to them. If one has to get along with in-laws one usually can, with effort, do so. Sometimes they are a positive relief after the relatives in one's own ancestral home.

Who rules the family? Today we seem to be working toward what might be called a *democratic* system of family governance in which husband, wife, and even on some occasions the children participate in making decisions of concern to the group as a whole.

There is some degree of democratic control in the family system of every society, since even where absolute authority is vested in one member of the circle the others manage to make known their wishes and have them taken into account. Even within a given society there may be great variation from family to family in the amount of authority exercised by the nominal family head. The henpecked husband is found the world over and so is the spoiled and domineering offspring. In speaking of family systems as patriarchal or matriarchal and implying that the ruling prerogatives are vested in one person we must not forget, therefore, that there is often a power behind the throne.

As the term implies, the so-called *patriarchal* family is ruled by a male head, the patriarch, who has extensive powers over the property and persons of the wives, children, and other relatives who comprise the household group. Descent is reckoned in the male line, and property and authority pass on the death of the patriarch to one, usually the eldest, of his sons. The latter attempts so far as possible to keep the patrimony intact to pass on to still another generation. Daughters are sold as wives for the male offspring of other families; younger sons go out to seek their fortunes or remain at home as laborers, hoping perhaps that something will happen to the elder brother and that they will come to rule under the parental roof. This system is seldom found in complete form in primitive society but it flourished in the more complex civilizations of the ancient Hebrews, the Chinese, the Romans, and the Greeks. Many elements of the system are a part of our own inheritance,⁴⁰ and father's air of authority when doling out his wife's allowance is, although he perhaps does not know it, a patriarchal survival. So is the so-called Victorian "double standard" of sex morality, against the injustice of which women are complaining so loudly today.

Matriarchal rule in the family, while theoretically possible, turns out actually to be a very rare phenomenon. Margaret Mead reports of the Tchambuli, a tribe of New Guinea, that "it is the women . . . who have the real position of power in the society,"⁴¹ this in spite of the fact that the family is polygynous and the man pays for his wife. But the Tchambuli are almost the "exception

⁴⁰ Cf. Dell, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of the current survivals of the patriarchal family code.

⁴¹ Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament*, p. 253, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1935.

that proves the rule." There are other tribes, like the Hopi and the Iroquois, in which the woman owns the family dwelling place, and exercises therein much more than ordinary authority. However, final say on most matters in these societies rests with the men.⁴² Often it is the matron's brother who is the real head of the household; sometimes it is her husband. One may say, then, that women are as well off in a number of primitive tribes as they are in the America of the nineteen-thirties, and considering their status in most societies that is a real achievement. But the tales of the great kingdom of the Amazons where the men were all under female subjection are, alas, fictional. Except for perhaps a few little out-of-the-way paradises like Tchambuli the matriarchal society is not yet a reality. It remains to males a bad dream, to feminists a hope.

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⁴² Cf. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 191. Lowie states that "a genuine matriarchate is nowhere to be found," but this was before the study was made of the Tchambuli.

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Chapter 6

CULTURAL VARIABILITY (*Continued*)

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

THE RELIGION OF THE CROW INDIANS¹

I WENT ON THE MOUNTAIN, chopped off a finger joint, and gave it to Old-Woman's-Grandson, saying: "Old-Woman's-Grandson, this I give you, pray good give me." I cried out a great deal. I wanted some animal or something else to help me. . . . I cried, saying, "I am poor, give me a good horse. I want to strike one of the enemies and when I go on a good road I want to marry a good-natured woman. I want a tipi to live in that I shall own myself."

I fasted on the mountain near where Joliet now is. I slept one night, the next day I chopped off my finger, and on the second day, about this time of day, I did not know anything then, the blood running from my hand. Far in the night I came to again and looked around; it was night and cold. When I fainted, I held my hand on my breast on the side I had cut; half of my body was all covered with blood. When I got up, I went to my bed. My arm ached and I could not sleep. On the third day I got up and sat down. I was very thirsty, but thought I should stay there till the following night. On the night of the third day I went to bed and tried to sleep but could not because it was too cold. Sometimes I heard footsteps as if of a person coming toward me, but looking up I saw no one. After

¹ From Robert H. Lowie, "The Religion of the Crow Indians," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, vol. 25, part II, pp. 337-338. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. This and the following references were relied on for the account of Crow religion given in this chapter: Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*, pp. 3-32, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1924; Robert H. Lowie, *The Crow Indians*, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1935; Ruth Benedict, "The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America," *Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association*, no. 29, 1923.

a while I went to sleep. While asleep I heard a man clearing his throat; also the snort of a horse. I heard someone talking. "What are you doing? You wanted him to come. Now he has come." This is what I heard. My feet faced east and my head west. I heard some one coming toward me from the west and then standing on my right side. I saw men riding on horses, which were prancing round. I heard little bells. They got nearer to my side and I faced toward them and looked at them. They were not men on horses but shadows of these. One man was riding a bob-tailed horse and had painted his horse with a lightning mark on all four legs. His horse was like fire. There were six of them, the rest were riding grays and blacks. The shadows were black. The rider of the bob-tailed horse was like fire too. His rear braid reached the ground, the rest of his hair was clipped short. "I will show you what you want to see. You have been poor, so I'll give you what you want." The rider of the bob-tail said, "I am going to run." All the trees and everything growing around there then turned into men and began shooting at them. They just kept on going to the east and I continued watching till they were invisible. . . .

They came and stood in front of me. The rider of the bob-tail said to me: "If you want to fight all the people on the earth, do as I do and you will be able to fight for three or four days and yet not be shot." All the six horsemen started eastward. The rider of the bob-tail held a spear; it was like fire. They were shooting as before. This rider knocked the people down with his spear. The dust flew up to the sky. Then followed a hailstorm. The hailstones were as big as my fist and knocked down those shooting at the horsemen. I saw them riding around in the storm. This storm was the Thunder and helped the six riders; it was caused by a man with wings. When I went out with the soldiers against an Indian tribe up north and fought in battle I did just what I had seen in my dream. The fight started at about 8 a.m. I was not shot. They killed an enemy; I struck him first. I fasted in the spring when eighteen years old. Ever since then I have owned good and fast horses; even today I have one. I prayed for a good-natured and hard-working woman; my present wife to whom I have been married about thirty years is like that.

This story is reproduced as it was told to Dr. Lowie by a Crow Indian who bore the name of Scratches-Face. Sophisticated moderns would explain the vision as an hallucination induced by

hunger, pain, lack of sleep, and the subconscious influence on Scratches-Face of the fact that vision experiences were in the Crow tradition. He went seeking a vision; he put himself into a physical state in which the normal controls against hallucination were no longer operative, and he began seeing things that weren't there. What could be more simple?

But while this sort of critical analysis might be made by an outsider it could not emanate from a Crow Indian. To Scratches-Face the experience on the mountain must be taken for what it obviously was, a sacred and awe-inspiring revelation of the power of supernatural forces and a clear indication that they are to be arrayed on his side in the future. Had the visionary not experienced subsequently the predicted good fortune, he and his tribe-mates might have come to doubt the reality of this particular contact with the world of spirits, without however a question as to the general theory that all great success was attributable to supernatural intervention. As it was, Scratches-Face did distinguish himself in battle, did attain prosperity and domestic felicity; his "medicine" gained through the agency of the rider of the bob-tailed horse was thereby proved "good" and potent. The reality of the relation with the rider, Scratches-Face's personal god or "guardian spirit," was definitely established.

Since one could not succeed in Crow Society without the aid of the spirit world and since contact with that world could be had only through dreams and trances, each Indian became to some extent a would-be psychic, hopefully credulous toward all mental phenomena that were strange and unusual. Even an ordinary dream might be fraught with great significance, and many Indians thus painlessly obtained supernatural guidance without need to go through the ordeal of torture and fasting. However not all tribe members were taken under the protection of guardian spirits. Those who slept dreamlessly and whose minds remained unclouded after the ordeal seemingly were unable to travel the road to honor and riches. They remained unfortunate and unsuccessful. They had no medicine, no luck to bring their enterprises to full fruition. While there must have been strong temptation for these "non-psychics" to fake a vision in order to get tribal credit and perhaps to win out after all in spite of the gods' indifference, the evidence indicates that this seldom if ever happened. Acquiescence

in the general belief of the sacredness and reality of the vision experience was too complete.

Apart from the strong emphasis on supernatural control over the life of mortals and the belief in direct revelation, Crow Indian culture does not contain many of the elements that we associate with the term "religion." The Crow had tribal deities, chief of which were the Sun and a being known as Old-Woman's-Grandson, but while often invoked these gods seldom appeared in individual visions. The conceptions as to their natures and powers were vague, and there were conflicting tales as to the kind of influence they exerted on men. The hawks, eagles, bears, buffaloes, and humans who did appear in the dreams and trances became thereby personal deities for the individuals who "saw" them but not gods for the tribe as a whole.

Lacking any well-organized pantheon of supernatural beings there was no great necessity for ritual or for a priesthood. The Crow shamans or "medicine men" were simply individuals who had unusually strong aid from a guardian spirit and who on this account occupied a special position in the tribe. Shamans sometimes attempted to heal the sick, they forecast the outcome of various ventures and expeditions, they indulged in feats of legerdemain, but they did not minister to the gods in behalf of the people or to the people in the name of any but their own personal god. They were, then, individuals gifted with special and definitely limited powers of sorcery rather than what would properly be termed priests.

Like all peoples the Crow had a strong and fairly definite ethical code, but observance of the tribal rules of morality was apparently enforced almost entirely without the aid of any supernatural sanction. Guardian spirits often imposed certain tabus on the Indians they were protecting—Muskrat-woman was enjoined by the weasel who appeared to her in a dream not to let anyone bump against her²—but these prescriptions on conduct were individual rather than social. The Sun apparently showed little interest in how mortals behaved, while Old-Man-Coyote, with whom the Sun is frequently identified, commits incest with impunity and is constantly represented in mythology as violating others of the commonly observed Crow moral rules.

² Lowie, "The Religion of the Crow Indians," *op. cit.*, p. 340.

One is forced back to the revelation-vision as the central fact in the Crow religious complex. Crow religion is subjective and individualistic to a high degree, standing in vivid contrast to the much more dogmatic and socialized faiths that are found in contemporary Western civilization.

The religious pattern. The sketch of the religious folkways of the Crow will serve as a first illustration of the wide variability in religious beliefs and practices revealed when we begin to examine and compare different cultures. Other similar synopses would serve still further to exhibit the diversity of ways in which human beings have sought to gain some sense of security in an uncertain and capricious world of nature. Before proceeding, however, to fill in additional details in the world-wide picture we need here, just as we did in the last chapter when examining the family and marriage, to make some preliminary definitions. The term "religion" means many different things to different people. We must know at least approximately what it is going to mean for us throughout the discussion, lest we be led away from a comparison of basic religious institutions to an examination of exotic beliefs and practices that are on the borderline between religion and something else.

A common procedure is to define "religion" in terms of our own particular theological beliefs and our own rituals. Other peoples are then religious to the extent to which they share our gods and our modes of worship. Where they differ from us they remain heathen still. This is an understandable approach to the problem, but while we are in the mood to be sociologists we must avoid it. The sociologist has to lay aside for the time being all ultimate questions of truth and falsity of belief and efficacy of ritual. As a student of religious institutions in general, rather than his own in particular, he is interested in what all peoples think or have thought is sound doctrine or good method and, if possible, why and how they came to think so. The sociologist's "religious pattern" must give equal weight to the folkways of all cultures.

While it is true that even different sociologists will view the same set of cultures and abstract a different list of "universal" elements,³ it may at least be claimed that the "pattern" or definition now to be presented would gain as large a measure of support as

³ For a collection of widely differing definitions of religion see Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Religion in Human Affairs*, pp. 12-20, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1929.

any.⁴ This pattern contains three elements, representing the intellectual, emotional, and practical aspects of man's relation to the unknown world about him. In every culture of which we have knowledge⁵ there will be found:

1. A socially accepted distinction between the realm of the commonplace, ordinary, or natural and the realm of the unusual, extraordinary, or supernatural with a belief in the power of the latter order greatly to affect men's lives.
2. A strong emotional reaction on the part of individuals or groups to the sources and to the manifestations of supernatural influence.
3. Some traditional and more or less organized ways of controlling supernatural power in the interests of human welfare.

In other words, the folkways of belief and ritual concerned with (1) supernatural force, (2) the feelings its effects inspire in man, and (3) men's efforts to direct it into socially and individually beneficial channels may be said to be religious. Let us take up in order these three aspects of the religious pattern and see how variously the world of the supernatural is conceived and reacted to and how manifold have been the ways in which man has tried to exercise control over it.

Supernatural power. There is no clearly defined borderline between the natural or to-be-expected and the *unnatural*, unpredictable, unusual, extraordinary. Even in our own culture, where scientific research is so rapidly enlarging the realm in which known causes operate to produce results that may be forecast, there are still whole areas of life in which events seem to be the result of sheer chance or of the machinations of a capricious Luck Goddess. How many times do we complain that we are "jinxed," that "the breaks were against us," that we are hard luck victims! Science, of course, recognizes no such thing as "sheer chance" or "mere

⁴ Cf. Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, p. 19; Alexander Goldenweiser, *History, Psychology and Culture*, p. 382, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1933; and Lowie, *Primitive Religion*, p. xvi.

⁵ There are now and have been in the past purely naturalistic cults, but they are minority groups in cultures still generally pervaded by belief in some form of the supernatural. Whether naturalism in the U. S. S. R. will come to exclude all belief in gods or in magic or whether Lenin will eventually become a recognized divinity is interesting to speculate upon. But even people who are avowedly atheistic are often to some degree, as we say, superstitious.

coincidence"; there is a sufficient cause for everything and one consistent with the view of an orderly universe which the scientist adopts. But while we may be scientific in attitude when the pertinent facts are well established—we know there is something more than a jinx to blame for an attack of smallpox or a fall in securities—so many things happen to us for which there is yet only a partial explanation that we still fall back on cursing our luck in all sorts of situations. Even when we do recognize the existence of measurable and in a sense predictable factors of causation we often still feel called upon to include the aleatory or luck element as an added factor. We can roughly evaluate the skill of the different players in a bridge game, the degrees to which they are distracted from the play when dummy starts to retail local gossip, the ways in which their different bidding systems clash or coordinate, but we are not just being polite when at the end of the evening we console the loser with the familiar phrase about a "bad run of cards." In a million hands or so the differences in holdings among the four players would become negligible. We know that if we are equally skillful with the others a "good run of cards" will come and in turn give us the triumph. Yet how few of us are Olympian enough to wait even that long before lamenting unhappy fate.

In primitive society the aleatory factors loom much larger. As Sumner and Keller point out,

The savage is like the child: his knowledge, beyond the restricted sphere of immediate experience, is small; manifestly he is "taking a chance" on almost everything he does. . . . Add to this the fact that ill luck, even a little of it, is a vastly more serious matter to him than to civilized man, and the significance to his destiny of the luck element . . . is indefinitely enhanced. It forms for him one of the major conditions of life on earth.⁶

In almost everything the primitive man does—hunting, fishing, gardening, fighting, wooing, procreating—the factor of personal skill and application is recognized but so, often to a greater degree, is fortune, fate, or chance. A man must be both a skillful hunter *and* lucky if he is to keep the larder filled at home. A warrior may

⁶ William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. 2, p. 741, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

bravely and successfully fight all day and then be stricken low by a chance shaft just as the battle is won. Success, in other words, requires not only knowledge, ability, hard work, and in the case of courtship, possibly good looks and eloquence. In order to accomplish things one must have, as the Crow would put it, good medicine. Anthropologists have come to use the Melanesian term, *mana*. Without mana, then, one cannot succeed in life.

What is the nature of this lucky mana which is so useful to possess? While the concept has different shades of meaning in different cultures the following description applicable to the Polynesian culture area in the Pacific is fairly typical:

Mana was like an electrical fluid that could charge persons and things and be diverted from one to another. Any conspicuous success was due to mana, failure to its absence or loss. A Marquesan youth who could not memorize native traditions was said to lack mana; a master of such lore, if worsted in a contest of wits, had lost his mana. A warrior absorbed the mana of all enemies that he had killed and thus increased his own. Certain localities had this power, hence a fugitive had only to get there in order to be safe. Clubs had it if they had always been wielded in victory, and so did exceptional adzes. In short, good luck, efficiency, outstanding wisdom, were the outer signs of mana as the operative cause.⁷

This idea of the existence of two sorts of power or force in the world—(1) “natural” force wielded by even the unlucky individual in his everyday affairs, developed by training but limited to the physical capacities of the person in question, and (2) supernatural force which is transmissible from person to person, person to thing, or thing to person, and which supplements or, on the other hand, defeats man’s ordinary “natural” efforts—was very widespread in primitive culture. As we shall see later, sorcery, which is practiced the world over, is the art of manipulating mana through the use of spells and charms. The spiritual beings with which primitive man peopled the universe, the gods, demons, goblins, sprites, ghosts, fairies, and all the rest, were significant in man’s life because they exhibited extra-normal powers due to the possession of very strong

⁷ Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, p. 303, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

and special mana. So all-pervasive, in fact, is the role of the mana-idea in primitive explanations of why events happen that one may almost speak of supernaturalism as *the* world view of primitive man. If the rain comes down or doesn't come down, if the cream sours, the ox falls sick, the chief gets a toothache, his wife breaks a pot, the catastrophe is due to the working of supernatural forces, to evil mana of some sort. The source of the "bad luck" may be another tribesman who is casting spells or it may be an unfriendly god, ghost, or demon.

The inference that there is power in the world beyond man's ken is a natural and almost inescapable one for the savage beset on all sides by dangers he cannot ward off. The second inference that some of this power or mana resides in a class of *persons* different from himself does not, however, at first thought seem so logical and inevitable. How did man first get the idea of spiritual *beings*? The most satisfactory explanation was offered by the British anthropologist Tylor sixty-five years ago.⁸ Tylor's theory (we must remember that it is only a theory, probably true for many primitive cultures but not for all) may now be briefly outlined.

One of the most inexplicable and baffling phenomena which faces primitive man is the fact of death. The man who had previously been active and animated suddenly becomes still and expressionless; his body is the same and yet somehow it has changed. "Something has gone out of it." What is that something? is the question the primitive must have posed himself. Since the man no longer breathes it may be simply the breath, but this then must be more than merely air; it must have special *animating* properties to cause life and thought in the individual when present, to leave him without these attributes when it is absent. To this breath-like "vapour, film, or shadow, the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates"⁹ the name, the *soul* or the *spirit*, is usually given.

Thus arises the concept of a dualism of body and spirit. The soul inhabits the body in life and leaves it at death. Since the idea of a complete extinction of the personality is difficult to grasp and painful to think of, the soul becomes a ghost who goes to "another world" or, as some believe, hangs around the home

⁸ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. 1, pp. 417-502, Estes and Lauriat, Boston, "first American edition," 1874.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 429.

village to create mischief. Other phenomena like sleep, dreams, hallucinations, echoes, reflections of one's face in pools of water, one's shadow, all help to confirm the ghost-soul or double-self hypothesis and lead to further elaboration of it. When a man sleeps his spirit-self is free to wander; its adventures come to him perhaps in the form of dreams. His bodily self cannot have killed that ferocious tiger because his housemates swear he never left the hut all night; it must then have been his "double," his ghost-soul, who did the deed of which he has such a vivid recollection. As with the dream so with the hallucinations and the incoherent cries and mutterings of delirium. A man falls sick, writhes, utters strange words, apparently sees things the watchers cannot. His soul has left him and has been replaced by another; or perhaps his own ghost and some invading spirit are warring for supremacy. How natural, then, to attribute illness to "seizure" or "possession" by a demon and to attempt casting-out or exorcism as the only way to bring about a cure.

Having invented the idea of the spirit as an essential part of the human being, what would seem more obvious to primitive man, says Tylor, than that animals, birds, plants, and even inanimate objects have souls or spirits too? In fact, the world is full of spirits, most of them possessing mana whereby they are able to affect him for good and ill. There are spirits of the stream and of the wood, there are gods of the mountains and of the ocean, of the lightning and the thunder, there are pixies and fairies, gnomes and elves. There are also the great deities, creator gods who made the earth and who rule it.

Just how each culture acquired its own particular pantheon of spiritual beings it is of course impossible to say, although there have been plenty of theories and speculations. The origins of the great gods have come in for special attention from the evolutionists in anthropology, and Spencer¹⁰ and others have suggested that they were in the first instance ghosts of great tribal heroes, who as time passed gradually acquired divinity. The transition from grandpapa's shade to the All-Father doubtless seldom took place in exact accordance with the elaborate Spencerian scheme, and there are of course other theories of the origins of Deity, too, that must be considered. Psychologically, if not historically, however,

¹⁰ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. 1, pp. 285-422, D. Appleton and Company, New York, third edition, 1885.

the gods bear marks of their human origin. They are all-powerful and majestic, yet often full of human failings. Stories are told around the fire about their scandalous behavior in the days when the world was young. While some are uniformly kind to men now, others are cruel, and perhaps most are fickle and changeable. Perfect gods are long in coming because man is long in developing a concept of perfection. The primitive man's supreme beings are after all anthropomorphic deities, made by him in the only image available, himself.

The emotional factor in primitive religion. In the preceding paragraphs the relation between man and nature has been viewed as an intellectual problem, one of finding a theory of causation to account for the strange ways in which things are always happening to primitive man. The solution was supernaturalism. While modern science might regard the mana theory as merely a systematized confession of ignorance it served for the primitive, and when tied up with *animism*, or the belief in spiritual beings, it provided a world-view to which most of mankind in one form or another still adheres. But in our examination of religious behavior we would be led wholly astray if we assumed that the quest for an *explanation* was the only, or even the basic, factor in building up religious beliefs and practices. Few men in any society are, after all, abstract philosophers; and while the primitive man's mind was probably inherently just as good as the modern's,¹¹ his lack of knowledge kept him from developing any well-elaborated and internally consistent metaphysical scheme.

It was the *emotional* side of religion that bulked largest. Good and bad luck were things one got excited about, not merely tried to explain. Sometimes the nature of the events was such as to inspire uneasiness, fear, even panic; sometimes if a calamity was avoided through supernatural intervention individuals concerned would feel gratitude, exaltation, awe, and reverence. It seems clear that there neither was in primitive times nor is today any

¹¹ Spencer and Levy-Bruhl hold the opposite view. Cf. Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 75-93; Lucien Levy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, pp. 21-23, 442-447, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1923. For a truer appraisal of the minds of primitive men see Alexander Goldenweiser, *History, Psychology and Culture*, pp. 179-185; A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, pp. 239-241, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926; Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 95-123, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921.

single characteristically religious type of emotion. In varying moods people react to the extraordinary, to the supernatural, with almost any one in the whole gamut of human feeling states. Fear, or at least a tinge of uneasiness, is perhaps most common, but disgust, hate, avarice, self-assertion, reverence, sympathy, love, exaltation, and even sexual passion are called out in some circumstances. The native Australian *corrobbori*, a communal religious festival, starts out as a sacred ceremony for the initiation of youths into manhood, but in the course of the ceremonial the group works itself up into an emotional frenzy which often finds an outlet in a period of complete sexual license. In a milder degree the same thing takes place in some of the revivalistic religious cults today.¹²

Where contact with the supernatural was deliberately sought, the motive, while doubtless mixed, was likely to contain a large element of personal ambition as well as perhaps reverence and submission. The Crow Indian certainly went vision hunting in order to get ahead in the world, and when his guardian spirit did appear to him his natural reaction of awe and wonder soon gave way to jubilation. If he followed instructions his fortune was made; he could expect continued aid from the spirit world without further effort on his part. There remained a memory of a mysterious and exciting experience and a faith in the magical power that had been given him; but there was no worship, no continual straining to do well in the sight of the gods, no repeatedly whipped-up emotion. The revelation experience, thrilling as it had been, was over.

Other examples illustrating the variant characters of the emotion inspired by the supernatural might be given. Patriotic fervor is often supernaturally endorsed or commanded; hate for the infidel and sadistic persecution of the dissenter are found the world over. At the other extreme are the sentiments idealized in the so-called "higher religions" where the believers form a community, namely mutual sympathy, charity, and love.

All we can say, therefore, is that some release of some kind of emotion is an almost unailing accompaniment of the manifestation of mana. To this universal element in religion, heightened but unspecific emotional tone in the presence of the supernatural,

¹² Cf. Frederick Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, p. 81, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1905; Grover C. Loud, *Evangelized America*, pp. 108, 288, 355, Lincoln McVeagh-The Dial Press, New York, 1928.

Goldenweiser has given the name, the "religious thrill."¹³ Man cannot remain dispassionate about the unusual, the bizarre, the unpredictable; they excite him, they cause "thrills to run up and down his spine." What he does then, into what channels the emotional energy pours itself, is a matter of individual temperament and of culture. The ascetic mystic who withdraws from the world in order to get closer to the Saviour and the social crusader who is "fighting" to see "the Will of God done on earth" are at the opposite poles emotionally. Yet each in his way thrills to the mystery of uncertainty, to the fact of inexplicable but irresistible supernatural power.

Techniques for controlling supernatural power. We come now to the third element in the religious pattern, the attempt to control mana in the human interest. No animal is ever content to rest completely helpless in the face of calamity; all struggle in some way to avoid their fate. Man is exceptional only in that he uses more intelligence and that his techniques for warding off evil, once developed, are passed on to succeeding generations. There grows up in any human society a whole body of folkways concerned with man's effort to gain the aid and avoid the interference of the supernatural. In any given culture there come to be only certain right ways to manipulate mana and to deal with the ghosts and gods who possess it.

It is convenient to discuss these folkways under two general heads, that of *magic* and that of *propitiation*, although one must recognize at the outset that many—perhaps most—control techniques are magico-propitiatory in nature, that is, contain elements of both types of approach to the supernatural. Magic in its "pure" form, however, deals with "free" mana, operating on it in a more or less mechanical fashion by the use of charms or spells. Propitiatory approaches, on the other hand, are reserved for mana possessed by spiritual beings who have primarily to be cajoled into using it in a way beneficial if possible and in any event not harmful to man. A third category, *tabu*, or avoidance of things, persons, or ways of behaving which bring to bear unfavorable supernatural influence, lies in a position between magic and propitiation but somewhat nearer the former than the latter. Magic, *tabu*, and propitiation will be treated as separate topics in the following

¹³ Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

pages, but the reader must remember that they are not so nicely categorized in the mind of the primitive. They are all closely dovetailed parts of a general way of life that is based on a supernaturalistic view of the universe.

Magic. According to Sir James Frazer¹⁴ there are two main types or kinds of magic based on two different cause and effect principles. To one form he gives the name (1) homeopathic or imitative magic, to the other (2) contagious magic. We can add to these two forms two others which we call (3) repetitive magic and (4) will magic.¹⁵ Let us define and illustrate these four types.

1. Homeopathic magic proceeds on the principle that like produces like, that any effect may be produced by merely imitating it. Frazer's classic illustration of this principle is the magical method of getting rid of an enemy, used in various forms the world over. The Malay procedure is typical:

[It] is to make a corpse of wax from an empty bees' comb and of the length of a footstep; then pierce the eye of the image and your enemy is blind; pierce the stomach and he is sick; pierce the head, and his head aches; pierce the breast and his breast will suffer. If you would kill him outright, transfix the image from the head downwards; enshroud it as you would a corpse; pray over it as if you were praying over the dead; then bury it in the middle of the path where your victim will be sure to step over it. In order that his blood may not be on your head, you should say:

"It is not I who am burying him
It is Gabriel who is burying him."

Thus the guilt of the murder will be laid on the shoulders of the archangel Gabriel, who is a great deal better able to bear it than you are.¹⁶

Other illustrations may be found in the culture of almost any people. Among the Haida "an ordinary person can make the wind blow in a desired direction by erecting a drift log on the

¹⁴ Sir James Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vol. 1, p. 12, The Macmillan Company, New York, "special two volume edition," 1929.

¹⁵ This latter term is Kirkpatrick's. *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁶ From Sir James Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, vol. 1, p. 13. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

beach and building a fire on one side of the base so that the log will topple over like a forest tree uprooted by the wind."¹⁷ When their husbands had gone to war Haida women "would get up very early in the morning and pretend to make war by falling upon their children and feigning to take them for slaves. This was supposed to help their husbands go and do likewise."¹⁸ Our American Negro folklore is also full of imitative magic. In order to be a good writer you were told to "grease your arm with buzzard grease." This

" . . . makes yo' arm limber an' fixes you ter be a swif' an' sho' writer." Rabbit or coon brains eaten raw will make you a forceful speaker (" 'caze dese animals so smart"), or a small piece of licorice in the mouth "makes de tongue limber, jes' lak ilin' up er engine, so's you jes' slicks de words off."¹⁹

2. The principle underlying contagious magic is that "things which have once been conjoined must remain ever afterwards, even when quite dissevered from each other, in such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done to one similarly affects the other."²⁰ A good illustration of this law is the world-wide superstition that the hair, the teeth, the nail parings of an individual remain in such close relationship with the body even after they have been removed from it that any person who gets hold of them can work his will, at any distance, upon their original owner. Of course one must in addition know the proper spells, the correct formulæ for the incantations. But if you do, you can make the person fall in love with you, you can harm him physically, you can render him impotent to succeed in his endeavors. Another common belief of contagious magic that a weapon still continues to affect a wound even after being withdrawn from it accounts for all sorts of unscientific medical practice. According to the magical view the proper treatment is to anoint the weapon rather than the wound with healing ointment. On the other hand, if you want to make the

¹⁷ George P. Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, p. 259, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

¹⁸ Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁹ Newbell N. Puckett, "Negro Character as Revealed in Folk-Lore," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 21, May, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

²⁰ Frazer *op. cit.* p. 27.

wound fester let the blade which made it rust, or still better heat the weapon in a fire and thereby make the victim hot and feverish. Both contagious and imitative magic are involved in this last example; the two are closely intertwined in primitive thinking.

There are of course many survivals of the contagious magic idea in modern society. The widespread belief that a thoroughbred bitch, having once cohabited with a mongrel, can never thereafter produce pedigreed puppies is a case in point. The belief finds no support whatever from biological science but is held to be true by many who do not realize that they are really relying on the principle of contagious mana as a basis for their conclusion. Another example of the belief in contagious magic is found in the custom of collecting great men's autographs. Some of the hero's mana still clings to his pen scratches; especially is this true when the written symbols stand for such an intimate and inseparable part of his personality as his *name*. In some primitive tribes a person even takes great care to keep his real name secret so that mana cannot be drained away from him and so that evil sorcery cannot be practiced against him through the use of the name in incantations.²¹

3. The principle underlying *repetitive* magic is again a very simple one. It is that events which have been observed to occur simultaneously or in a certain sequence will recur ever after in exactly the same relationship. Thus Sumner tells the story of the party of Eskimos who went hunting but found no game:

One of them returned to their sledges and got the ham of a dog to eat. As he returned with the ham bone in his hand he met and killed a seal. Ever afterwards he carried a ham bone in his hand when hunting.²²

Of course if this incident had occurred one hundred times or so even a scientist would have been forced to conclude that there was some real relationship existing between the ham bone and the presence of game near the hunter. But a single instance like this one would be regarded as simply a coincidence, and not the result of a mystic bond uniting the ham-bone charm or fetish with the

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 244-248.

²² William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 25, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

seal. We would classify it as an example of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy and let it go at that.

It is surprising, however, how many magical beliefs and practices, indeed how many of all classes of folkways, are based on reasoning exactly like that just illustrated. Superstitions about unlucky and lucky days and numbers, bad omens like walking under a ladder or having a black cat cross one's path, the use of pocket pieces, rabbit's feet, and other amulets and fetish objects with supposed magical power, nearly all would be traceable, if we knew their history, back to one or two incidents in which the belief seemingly was proved "true" by events. Subsequent incidents in which the omen was false, the charm not lucky, are quickly forgotten or are explained in terms of counter magic. Then too, as Frazer points out, the desired event does not have to come immediately after its supposed cause in order to validate in the minds of the average man the theory as to their relation:

A ceremony intended to make the wind blow or the rain fall, or to work the death of an enemy will always be followed, sooner or later, by the occurrence it is meant to bring to pass; and primitive man may be excused for regarding the occurrence as a direct result of the ceremony, and the best possible proof of its efficacy. . . . "Can anything be plainer," he might say, "than that I light my twopenny candle on earth and that the sun then kindles his great fire in heaven? I should be glad to know whether, when I put on my green robe in the spring, the trees do not do the same. These are facts patent to everybody, and on them I take my stand. I am a plain practical man, not one of your theorists and splitters of hairs and choppers of logic."²³

Primitive man is of course not the only one who is "practical-minded" about these matters. Most of us have all we can do to resist the easy and seemingly obvious conclusions of *post hoc, propter hoc* type even though we know better. Our attitude is perhaps similar to that of one of Tozzer's freshmen at Harvard University who admits that he habitually "knocks on wood" to protect himself against ill fortune:

²³ Frazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

Though I am absolutely certain that knocking on wood is perfectly impotent to change the course of events, just as my statement that such and such things are powerless to affect the facts, there still remains in my mind a shadow of doubt. What if it really does make a difference. No, this is too vital to me to risk in any way. I'll knock wood and make sure and I blush to state, I do.²⁴

4. The fourth type of magic to be considered is based on the power of the will. If we concentrate intently enough on some end or object we may by some mysterious process "make our wish come true." If we hate an enemy hard enough will not the distilled essence of our venom affect him? If we ardently enough desire the love of a particular young woman will not that fact alone hypnotize her into yielding? It is easy to believe these things; the emotions move us so profoundly it is hard not to think that they will by some sort of magical telepathy affect others also.

Malinowski²⁵ and L. L. Bernard²⁶ have independently come to the conclusion that "power of will" magic is quite possibly the basic form of all magic. But the rite does not remain one of pure concentration for long. If only to blow off emotional "steam" the wisher utters some imprecation, supplication, or command, indulges in gestures symbolic of the end desired. When the aim is finally accomplished what was said and done become part of the magical cause which produced the desired effect, as well as what was merely felt and imaged. Next time the individual hates or loves to distraction he will not rely solely on his concentrated emotion to get results; on the principle of repetitive magic he will reproduce the whole pattern of behavior including the same words and gestures which had "worked" the time before. Fiat magic, magic based on will power alone, has now merged with formula-magic. The "spells" which the wisher casts in order to supplement

²⁴ Tozzer, *op. cit.*, p. 251. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁵ Bronislaw Malinowski, "Magic, Science and Religion," in Joseph Needham, ed., *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 75, The London Press, London, 1926.

²⁶ L. L. Bernard, "A Psycho-Sociological Interpretation of Magic," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 22, pp. 64-71, 1928. See also E. J. D. Radcliffe, *Magic and Mind*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932.

and reinforce his naked desire are imitated by others and become part of the tribal lore.

This explains why "will magic is seldom found in its pure form." While the consciousness of need remains strong in the mind of the individual he comes to place more reliance on the magical rite which accompanies it. Just being angry at an enemy will not harm him very much unless he is cursed in the proper form and with appropriate gestures. The same is true of love; if you would bewitch a girl into reciprocating the affection that is burning within you, you must employ the proper charm.

In spite of some loss of faith in the power of the unaided will to make dreams come true we must not be led to think that the old idea is completely absent from our thinking. While we know that the "He can who thinks he can" doctrine of the inspirational popular psychologist is only true in the sense that the self-confident man makes more effective use of his abilities than the one who is timid and uncertain, we still like to believe that there is more in it than that. As a nation we buy thousand of books²⁷ and listen to hundreds of lectures a year to convince ourselves that we can become "radiant personalities," exerting a sort of mystically compelling influence on at least the persons, if not the things, with which we come in contact. And it is only when our own will-magic seems not to be working well that we dream of "fairy wishing wands" or pray to the gods to support us in making the wish come true.

Shamanism. Beyond the stage of will-magic the control of mana is an art. As in other arts so in magic, knowledge and skill are necessary to get the best results. One must know the magical formulæ that have been discovered and are available for use and one must also know just the times and places when it is appropriate and efficacious to use them. Not everyone has the ability or the patience to acquire this information and not all individuals are equally endowed with personal mana to make their magical paraphernalia actually work. It is only natural, therefore, that there tends to grow up in most societies a special class of skilled magical craftsmen who stand in a professional relation to the rest of the

²⁷ See, for instance, Frank C. Haddock, *Power of Will, A Practical Handbook for Unfoldment of the Powers of Mind*, The Pelton Publishing Company, Meriden, Conn., "Two hundred and fifty-fifth edition," 1928; and Alexander Cannon, *Powers That Be*, E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1935.

community. These individuals, variously termed witch-doctors, medicine men, sorcerers, wizards, voodoo-men, conjurers, and shamans often exert a powerful influence on the lives of the other members of the tribal group. As a class they are worth at least, some brief consideration.

There are various ways of becoming a shaman. Perhaps one inherits the role together with a "practice" from some older relative. More often some special "call" is necessary—a vision, as among the Crow Indians, or "possession" by a *kelet* or spirit, as among the Chuckchi of Siberia. Nearly always some special psycho-physical abnormalities are present in those individuals who are shamanistic timber. Bodily deformation, albinism, blindness, sexual inversion, dwarfism, and especially neuroticism of the hysterical type are qualifications for shamanism in one tribe or another. Long training is usually also necessary. During the novitiate of a Chuckchi shaman

. . . his whole soul undergoes a strange and painful transformation. . . . He ceases to work, eats but little and without relishing his food, ceases to talk to people, and does not even answer their questions. The greater part of the time he spends in sleep. . . .

. . . As shamanistic performances [among the Chuckchi] require considerable physical exertions, shamanism is on the whole a young man's profession. . . . Even the beating of the drum, a constant accompaniment of every shamanistic performance, requires skill and physical endurance. The same applies to the capacity of passing rapidly from a state of frantic excitation to one of normal quiescence. All this can only be acquired through prolonged and persistent practice.²⁸

Contrast this with some of the things a budding witch-doctor must learn in West Africa:

He . . . is taught to howl in a professional way, and, by watching his professor, picks up his bedside manner. If he can acquire a showy way of having imitation epileptic fits so much the better. . . . He must know the dispositions, the financial position, the little scandals, in short the definite status of the inhabitants of the whole district, for

²⁸ Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 216, F. S. Crofts and Company, New York, 1926. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

these things are of undoubted use in divination and in the finding of witches, and, in addition, he must be able skillfully to dispense charms, and know what babies say before their mothers can. Then some day his professor and instructor dies, and upon the pupil descend his paraphernalia and his practice.²⁹

The functions of the shaman, once he is accepted by his tribe as a practitioner in full standing, are many and various. They include curing the sick (the modern medical quack and the medicine man are blood brothers); providing charms for success in battle, in economic pursuits, in love, in child bearing; determining the guilt or innocence of an accused person by magical means; divining the future; engaging as marriage broker and matchmaker; furnishing entertainment; and often exerting leadership over tribal political affairs. In addition to these generally beneficent functions the shaman may also exert a baleful influence. He may hire out his services to tribesmen who want to get rid of enemies; he may practice evil magic on his own account, charging a fee for immunity from his persecutions, a sort of magical racketeering. Not all these things are done by all shamans; there is wide variability in the culture pattern here as in other categories.

How does the shaman manage to perform the impossible tasks included in the foregoing list? He must fail often as a healer and a diviner at least, and repeated failure would lose him his social credit. Sometimes of course the tribe does lose faith in his powers, but a surprisingly large portion of the time he succeeds, if not in doing things we know to be scientifically impossible, at least in satisfying his clientele that he has done so. Of course the general social belief in magic is on his side and he can attribute failures, if he needs to, to counter sorcery or to the gods' influence. Through the use of sleight-of-hand, ventriloquism, seances, and the mumbo jumbo of petty trickery he can astonish and deceive the credulous. Finally, he is often an individual of really outstanding intelligence and ability who maintains his position through sheer force of his personality. By a skillful use of the techniques of the crowd orator and the ability to present himself dramatically to his following the shaman may become the real if not the nominal tribal ruler. Later

²⁹ Quoted from M. H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, p. 214, by John L. Maddox in his *The Medicine Man*, p. 31. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

in some societies he becomes especially skilled in the art of propitiating deities and interpreting their will to man. The shaman is then transformed into the priest.

Tabu. Tabu has often been termed negative magic. By the avoidance of some thing, person, or act you escape bad luck, safeguard yourself against the influence of evil mana. In a tribe of the Celebes a husband is prohibited from sitting cross-legged after his wife is five months pregnant lest delivery of the child be difficult on that account.³⁰ In many tribes it is tabu to pronounce one's own name; when the name is thus given away there is loss of mana. Many hotels today omit the thirteenth story because of the widespread tabu on that "unlucky" number. There is a superstitious tabu against lighting three cigarettes from a single match. These are only a few out of the hundreds of examples that might be quoted. They rest obviously on what are by now familiar principles of magic.

But tabu has a propitiatory aspect also. There are many tribes in which the son-in-law must never speak to or remain in the company of his wife's mother; if the latter chooses to appear he must take his leave until such time as she makes her departure. This tabu on social contact is not always based, as one might expect, on the desire of the man to escape from an unpleasant relationship. On the contrary it is often a means of showing respect, and the mother-in-law would be insulted if she were addressed in even the friendliest fashion.³¹ Another illustration is the tabu on eating the totem plant or animal. A member of the kangaroo totem in the Aranda tribe in Australia must not kill a kangaroo except by hitting it on the neck; any less gentle way would be disrespectful to the ancestor god incarnated in the animal. Once killed only the head, feet, and liver may be eaten; the rest must be left to members of another totem.³²

The well-known Jewish tabu on the eating of pork is supposed to be the result of a direct injunction by Jehovah:

Whatsoever parteth the hoof, and is cloven footed, *and* cheweth the cud, among the beasts that may ye eat. . . . And the swine, because

³⁰ Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

³¹ Robert H. Lowie, *Are We Civilized?* pp. 142 ff., Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1929.

³² Alexander Goldenweiser, *History, Psychology, and Culture*, pp. 231 ff., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1933.

he parteth the hoof, and is cloven footed but cheweth not the cud, he is unclean unto you.⁸³

The Lenten tabus of the Catholic and some of the Protestant churches fall in the same category. Religious ritual is full of prohibitions, many of which are uneconomic and irrational, serving to make the life of the folk more difficult rather than easier. Yet so strong is the propitiatory sanction back of them that they are carefully observed even at the cost of hardship. We still have our "sacred cows" in every branch of life today.

Propitiation. Tabu is only one of the many techniques developed by man in the effort to deal successfully with spiritual beings. While sometimes, as in the case of the genie of Aladdin's lamp, the god is the slave of a charm and can be dealt with by means purely magical, usually he is a free agent who has to be cajoled into giving power and protection. In order to get the help of ghosts, spirits, and deities and avoid the harm they might do him, man had to invent ways of pleasing them. What did they like? Why, in general the same things man himself did, food, property, sex, beauty, and especially respect and reverence. Food sacrifices were therefore made to them, property was destroyed in their name, virgins prostituted themselves to the gods' incarnations in the temple, dances were danced and songs sung in the gods' honor, and they were addressed always in forms that breathed of awe, worship, and respect. All this was not done cold-bloodedly, as a form of bribery or of trading good for good; it arose naturally out of belief and was shot through with reverence and devotion. There was a religious thrill connected with propitiation as with magic.

Whatever ways man found of propitiating deities tended to become standardized as ritual. The gods were supposed to like the "good old ways" and to be distrustful of innovation in the ceremonial. As the ceremonial grew more detailed and meticulous it became too complex for the common man to grasp and to perform. A class of rite-masters grew up to mediate between the ordinary citizen and the spirits. These priests were interpreters of the gods' will and at the same time the only avenue through which the individual could petition for divine intercession on his own behalf. Since man was in constant need of supernatural aid and

⁸³ Leviticus 11:3,7.

guidance the priesthood tended to become rich and powerful. High priests, the leaders of the cult or profession, stood at the right side of kings. Often they made or unmade temporal rulers.

Of course these last remarks apply only to the more complex cultures, like those of central and west Africa, of Central America, of the ancient Mediterranean world, of India and China. In the simpler societies there was great variability in the type and role of propitiatory ritual and in the functions performed by the priesthood. The Crow had gods but no priests and little ritual. Toda priests were dairymen, tending sacred buffaloes and observing meticulously an elaborate ritual in connection with dairy operations that kept them occupied every minute of the day. Among the Tinguian contact with the spirits takes place through the trance of a woman medium; after certain ceremonies the spirit comes and "possesses" her, uttering commands, giving advice, answering questions with her voice. The Aranda of Australia have a vague concept of an All-Father but the principal deities are sacred ancestors who now reside in fetish objects called *churingas*. Each individual inherits his *churinga* with his sib membership but must not be allowed to see it until he comes of age.

If this diversity of belief and practice is thought to be a phenomenon solely of primitive society, remember that there are 212 recognized³⁴ and innumerable other unrecognized religious sects and denominations, each with its own ritual peculiarities and its special dogmas, in the United States today.

Religion and science. More has been said and written on the subject of the relation between religion and science than on almost any other intellectual question of modern times. This is not the place, however, to add fuel to the fire of bitter controversy over the implications of the latter for the truth of the former. That is the metaphysician's fight, not the sociologist's. We wish to compare, not evaluate. What have the magico-propitiatory and the scientific approaches in common; how and where do they differ? Magic is closer to science than is propitiation; it has in fact been called "science's bastard sister."³⁵ We might commence, then, by trying to see if a common parent for magic and science does really exist.

³⁴ Cf. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Religious Bodies*, vol. 1, pp. 10-12, 1926.

³⁵ Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

It was early pointed out by Sir James Frazer³⁶ that the magician and the scientist both believe in a certain orderliness in nature; that a given cause must always be followed by the same effect. But whereas the scientist has tested and retested his law of cause-effect relationship before he will stand sponsor for it, the magician's conclusions are based on a neglect of negative instances. If his spell seems to work now and then, that is enough to prove its efficacy for always; failures are quickly forgotten or if noticed are attributed to little mistakes in ritual or to counter magic and not to any inefficacy of the spell itself. An example may make this distinction clearer. We now know as the result of repeated experiment that powdered cinchona bark (quinine) in the proper doses is a specific for the disease called malaria and we can speak of the treatment with this drug as an illustration of the scientific approach. Making an effigy of the patient and keeping it in a cool place is another method of "curing" malaria, but this one we now reject with the term "magical"; yet granting the premise of imitative magic, it is as logical a method of dealing with malaria as the first. The point is that in the second case the premise is a faulty one. According to Frazer magic is simply pseudo-science, good logic based on false assumptions that are not checked up by experiment but accepted as dogma. Magic is science that doesn't work.

This view of the relation between science and magic is now seen to be too intellectualistic. It neglects the supernatural element and particularly it neglects the primitive man's emotional reaction to the supernatural, what we have called the religious thrill. As Frazer admits, the primitive himself has no concept of an orderly Nature, such as is implicit in science. The primitive man's world is capricious, uncertain, catastrophic, and in dealing with the lawless supernatural forces which produce the catastrophies he cannot be certain of success. He clings to the old forms in spell casting and tabu observance because tribal lore reports their efficacy in many situations, but there is seldom any sense of certainty about the outcome. The mood is not coldly confident and matter of fact, as in science; it is one of faith complicated by qualms and fears but buoyed up by hope.

Magic and science are, then, both ways invented by man for

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

dealing with an unfriendly, or at best an impartial universe, in order to achieve human purposes. But whereas science is homely and practical, concerning itself first with things near at hand, familiar, manageable, and only later branching out to span eons and solar systems, magic is strange, exotic, and awe-inspiring. Based on the vague assumption of the existence of an impersonal mana and seeking to deal with the fortuitous, the uncertain, the unlucky, the mysterious, by control of that mana, magic exists on the fringes of science in a realm which science has not yet occupied. While "science is the enemy of magic" and is ever reducing the domain in which the latter still operates, it has not yet made a complete and final conquest. Superstition lingers with us still.

Science gradually cuts away at the body of propitiatory rites just as it does at magic. We no longer ask the gods to bring us rain with the old faith and confidence; when we are sick we may pray to the Deity but we consult a doctor too. Thus the gods grant power to mortals which they used to reserve for their own glory. Man is growing up; he can be trusted with these powers, is one explanation. Science has made him a god himself; he can dispense with the supernatural, is another.

Perhaps the most destructive influence which science has had on religious faith and dogma has been in connection with mythology. All peoples have their stories of the deeds of gods and spirits, passed on from generation to generation by the faithful. While these tales do not always glorify the deities, they do make them seem human, real, and near to man instead of cold, abstract, and distant. Belief in the tribal myths helps also to solidify the group, to make tribesmen brothers who share the same glorious tradition.³⁷ When, therefore, science comes along to question the alleged miracles, to cast doubt on the sagas and point to their demonstrably human origin, the challenge to the whole world-view of the common man is a serious one. Often he resents and fiercely resists the attack on his holy faith; he tries to show that it is only false science that contradicts his principles and that true science

³⁷ "Myth is not idle speculation nor is it the outcome of contemplation of nature and rhapsodical interpretation of its laws. . . . The function of the myth is neither explanatory nor symbolic. . . . [It] is to strengthen tradition and to endow it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it to a higher, better, more supernatural and more effective reality of initial events."—From Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4, p. 640. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

would support them; sometimes he persecutes the scientists themselves as heretics and unbelievers. But while some reject that part of science which seems to cast doubt on revealed religion others accept it gradually, if not at once. The result in the latter case is to push the gods farther away again, make them first causes and prime movers, perhaps, but not constant interferers in man's everyday life.

With the spirit world removed to a distance, man devotes more attention to the relations with his fellow men and less to those with the gods. Modern religious trends, to be discussed in chapter 20, reflect this socio-ethical interest. But the supernatural realm is not banished completely. There is renewed awareness of the fact that the naturalistic method and philosophy of science also has its limitations. Science cannot penetrate all the mysteries of life and mind, and the unknown will still continue to thrill man, pique his curiosity, and lead him to postulate power in the supernatural. In some form, therefore, the religious pattern seems likely to survive in human culture.

ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

THE POTLATCH AMONG THE KWAKIUTL³⁸

[Among the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island] possession of wealth is considered honorable, and it is the endeavor of each Indian to acquire a fortune. But it is not as much the possession of wealth as the ability to give great festivals which makes wealth a desirable object to the Indian. As the boy acquires his second name and man's estate by means of a distribution of property, which in the course of time will revert to him with interest, the man's name acquires greater weight in the councils of the tribe, and greater renown among the whole people, as he is able to distribute more and more property at each subsequent festival. Therefore boys and men are vying with each other in the arrangement of great distributions of property. Boys of different clans are pitted against each other by their elders, and each is exhorted to do his utmost to outdo his rival. And as the boys strive against each other, so do the chiefs and whole clans, and the one

³⁸ Adapted from Franz Boas, "The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians," *United States National Museum Reports*, 1895, pp. 342-354. Reprinted by permission of the Smithsonian Institution.

object of the Indian is to outdo his rival. Formerly feats of bravery counted as well as distributions of property, but nowadays, as the Indians say, "rivals fight with property only."

I referred to the distribution of blankets. The recipient in such a distribution is not at liberty to refuse the gift, although . . . it is nothing but an interest-bearing loan that must be refunded at some time with 100 per cent interest. This festival is called p'a'sa, literally, flattening something (for instance, a basket). This means that by the amount of property given the name of the rival is flattened.

There is still another method of rising in the social scale, namely, by showing one's self superior to the rival. This may be done by inviting the rival and his clan or tribe to a festival and giving him a considerable number of blankets. He is compelled to accept these, but is not allowed to do so until after he has placed an equal number of blankets on top of the pile offered to him. . . . Then he receives the whole pile and becomes debtor to that amount, i.e., he must repay the gift with 100 per cent interest.

Still more complicated is the purchase or the gift, however one chooses to term it, of a "copper." All along the North Pacific Coast . . . curiously shaped copper plates are in use, which in olden times were made of native copper, which is found in Alaska and probably also on the Nass River, but which nowadays are worked out of imported copper. . . . These coppers have the same function which banknotes of high denominations have with us. The actual value of the piece of copper is small, but it is made to represent a large number of blankets and can always be sold for blankets. The value is not arbitrarily set, but depends upon the amount of property given away in the festival at which the copper is sold. On the whole, the oftener a copper is sold the higher its value, as every new buyer tries to invest more blankets in it. Therefore the purchase of a copper also brings distinction, because it proves that the buyer is able to bring together a vast amount of property.

The rivalry between chiefs and clans finds its strongest expression in the destruction of property. A chief will burn blankets, a canoe, or break a copper, thus indicating his disregard of the amount of property destroyed and showing that his mind is stronger, his power greater, than that of his rival. If the latter is not able to destroy an equal amount of property without much delay, his name is "broken." He is vanquished by his rival and his influence with his tribe is lost, while the name of the other chief gains correspondingly in renown.

Property concepts in primitive society. The festival at which the distribution of property takes place is usually called a *potlatch*. This potlatch institution of the Northwest Coast tribes provides a sort of satiric commentary on certain phases of life in our own society. Our rich men do not deliberately burn yachts, wreck automobiles, or tear up expensive rugs at a public ceremony to prove they are wealthier than their rivals, but in less direct ways they engage in "conspicuous waste" of substance in order to maintain their social station. Luxury goods with short life and little real utility are purchased in large quantities; houses, motor cars, clothes, and jewelry are duplicated unnecessarily by the plutocratic "upper crust." Meanwhile the rest of us "put up a front," live beyond our incomes, fall for snobbish advertising copy, all in the interests of being thought to "belong" to some social class above us. The Kwakiutl only carry out this logic more completely.

This psychology of what Veblen calls "pecuniary emulation"³⁹ is not the only thing which the Kwakiutl and we have in common. It is important to note that many of the basic economic institutions of modern society are found in the culture of this Neolithic people. First and foremost is the institution of property ownership itself. Three classes of property were recognized by the Kwakiutl and by most other primitive tribes as well: property in things, property in persons, and incorporeal and intangible property like patents and copyrights. Under the first category, articles of manufacture like tools, weapons, and canoes are important, and so are rights to land. The Kwakiutl practiced little or no agriculture, but families and sibs owned special hunting, root gathering, and berrying rights to definitely outlined strips of territory. The sea was similarly divided up for clam digging and halibut fishing. Property in persons was found among the Kwakiutl in the form of slaves captured in war or purchased from neighboring tribes. Wives were also purchased, but here the price paid at the marriage potlatch had to be returned with interest when the woman bore her husband a child. By far the most important forms of Kwakiutl property were intangible, and their possession conferred only social prestige on the owner. But in order to possess nobility titles, the right to use certain crests, the right to

³⁹ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, pp. 22-34, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, 1919.

sing certain songs, the right to be initiated into the Cannibal Society, the Kwakiutl would potlatch away his whole fortune. These rights were in part hereditary but in part purchasable; they find counterparts in the patents, trademarks, and copyrights of today.

There has been much argument as to whether primitive groups were communistic in their systems of property holding. The preceding paragraph indicates that for the Kwakiutl, at any rate, the answer is yes and no. Some types of property, and this is most often true of land, are held by sibs and village groups in many primitive societies, but joint ownership never covers the whole domain of property holding. Chattels—tools, weapons, clothes, domesticated animals—are nearly always owned individually. Hospitality and courtesy rules may virtually enforce sharing of these tangible goods on occasion, but title still resides in the individual; and he can refuse and be thought stingy if he will.⁴⁰

Exchange of property in primitive society. Kwakiutl society also exhibits in variant forms a number of the modern institutions concerned with property exchange. As has been seen, the potlatch festival is basically an exchange institution although there is an overlay of combat psychology and of sheer display in order to gain prestige. In other primitive groups the exchange mechanism may be much simpler and the actual transfer of goods may be consummated immediately. Inter-tribal trade, as well as intra-tribal, is common in primitive society, as was noted in a preceding chapter.⁴¹ The great "kula" ring in Melanesia is an "international" exchange system involving a dozen or more islands, some of them a hundred and fifty miles apart.⁴² Obsidian implements found in Ohio burial mounds must have come through trade with Plains Indians since the nearest known obsidian mines are in the west two thousand miles away.

Money, credit, and interest are aids in the exchange process that are found widely in primitive society. In discussing money it is important to distinguish between commodities used as a standard of value but at the same time valuable in themselves, and true money,

⁴⁰ On the question of primitive communism see Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 205-255, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1920; and Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 269-306.

⁴¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 73, 86.

⁴² Cf. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London, 1922.

which has relatively little intrinsic worth but is valuable because it will purchase other goods or services. The Chilkat blanket⁴³ is a unit of exchange of the former class in use among the Kwakiutl, who may be said to be on the "blanket standard"; the buffalo performs a similar function in Toda society; and there are a hundred other commodities that have served at some time or other as the conventional unit of barter in other tribes. True money is found somewhat less frequently but is by no means rare in primitive communities. The cowry shell, while it is sometimes used as an ornament or treasured because it has magical significance, was nevertheless a real monetary unit among the blacks of West Africa until recent times. Cowries were used as money in other parts of the world, too, and so were dog's teeth, strings of shell beads, counters fashioned from spondylus shell, knives (conventionalized so as to be useless for cutting), fox hair, and the vertebræ of an aquatic mammal called the dugong.⁴⁴

Interest on money loans was charged in many tribes, the rate and term of the loans varying widely in different cultures. Often borrowing and lending became so important as to require the services of a special class of "public accountants" (as among the Kwakiutl) or loan brokers. In the Rossel Islands, for instance, the

. . . brokers derive their income by keeping their capital in motion and by a process somewhat analogous to the activities of a London bill-broker—by borrowing at a lower rate of interest and discounting at a higher—and practice magic by means of which they claim to act on the minds of their debtors, making them repay within the customary time, while the minds of their creditors are affected in the reverse direction.⁴⁵

⁴³ The Indians now use a cheap woolen blanket, worth less than a dollar apiece.

⁴⁴ Cf. Wilson D. Wallis, *An Introduction to Anthropology*, pp. 181-184, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1926; Arthur R. Burns, *Money and Monetary Policies in Early Times*, p. 50, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., London, 1927; Bella Weitzner, "Primitive Dollars," *Natural History*, vol. 33, pp. 325-336, May-June, 1933.

⁴⁵ From W. E. Armstrong, "Rossel Island Money," *Economic Journal*, vol. 34, p. 427, 1924. See also W. C. MacLeod, "A Primitive Clearing House," *American Economic Review*, vol. 15, pp. 453-456, 1925.

Modern bankers would certainly be happy if they had this magical secret of the Rossel Islander for use in keeping their institutions solvent today.

Social attitudes toward property acquisition. With all of these economic institutions of modern society functioning also in the society of primitives, do we find in the latter the same all-absorbing interest in economic gain that our critics claim is characteristic of contemporary America? There are undoubtedly "acquisitive" primitive societies. Of the inhabitants of New Britain Danks says, "To [money], or rather to love for it, may be attributed in no small degree their intense selfishness and their glaring ingratitude."⁴⁶ Among the Manus of the Admiralty Islands "trade is the most important thing in life."⁴⁷ Margaret Mead reports that "The ideal Manus man has no leisure; he is ever up and about his business turning five strings of shell money into ten."⁴⁸ But tribes like these are rather the exceptions. There are so many other ways to gain prestige than through purely economic prowess. Military exploits, magical power, aristocratic lineage, skill in the arts and crafts, knowledge of tribal lore, membership in the right secret society, are all primary roads to preeminence in some primitive group or other. And there is more than one way to gain the respect of one's fellows in every society.

It just happens, therefore, that our civilization is one of those in which, at the present epoch, the money standard of success is unusually prominent. That the mores of prestige are different in some primitive groups does not, of course, prove that our view is wrong or immoral; it simply shows that it is not inevitable. *Homo sapiens* can create (he has created⁴⁹) cultures in which the wealth standard plays a less important part.

While we might go on discussing cultural variability in relation to still others of man's social institutions, enough has already been

⁴⁶ Benjamin Danks, "Shell Money of New Britain," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 17, p. 316, 1888.

⁴⁷ Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, p. 81, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1930.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Cf. Margaret Mead, ed., *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1937. This book was published too late for use in connection with the preparation of this manuscript. It includes detailed accounts of a number of cultures much more "competitive" than our own.

done with marriage and the family, religion, and economics to illustrate what anthropologists call the "comparative point of view" toward cultural achievements. This viewpoint involves tolerance for and appreciation of the customs of other peoples and an unbiased comparison of culture complexes without passing judgment on their merits and defects. Eventually, of course, there must be evaluation if the experience of other groups is to be brought to bear on our own social problems, but this was not the purpose of the section now being concluded. We have been seeking only a background against which later (in part IV) to examine the institutions of contemporary life.

So far we have been concentrating on group behavior, on *folkways*. Now we must for a while pay especial attention to the individual. How does he manage to live and thrive in a given culture? How is his behavior shaped by the force of social tradition? What effect does the cultural pattern have on his personal characteristics? These are questions we shall try to answer in the next section.

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PART II

MAN'S SOCIAL NATURE

Chapter 7

THE RAW MATERIAL OF SOCIALIZATION

THE WOLF-CHILD OF MIAWANA

ALLAHABAD, British India, April 5, 1927.—Herdsman near Miawana, seventy-five miles from here, found a small Indian boy, supposed to be about 10 years of age, in a wolf's den. From marks in the den it was obvious that the boy had been living there. He was unable to talk or to walk properly, but went on all fours, lapped water and ate grass.

The boy was brought here, put in a special lockup and supplied with food and medicine. At night he barked, bit himself and other people and had to be tied down. He is very thin and emaciated, but his limbs are otherwise well formed. He has a terrible scar on one side of his face as if he had been mauled by some animal. . . .¹

LONDON, April 26.—Further information is now available about the so-called "wolf-child" whose discovery near Miawana, British India, . . . provoked so much discussion. . . .

The boy found in Miawana is judged to be between 7 and 12 years old and in general appearance is said to be little different from an ordinary child, but in his actions betrays signs that are declared to point to his bringing up with wolves. He can stand up and walk, but sometimes prefers to crawl, sitting on his haunches with legs curled up and propelling himself forward with the palms of the hands.

His knees are hardened as if used to frequent dragging on the ground and there are also calli on the palms of the hands.

The medical conclusion is that the chief sustenance of the child consisted of roots and herbs for years. He is now getting meat and other foods, which he appreciates, but frequently eats grass. He has a prodigious appetite. The boy is subject to fits and is at times fero-

¹ *New York Times*, April 6, 1927, p. 4. Reprinted by permission.

cious. Before removal to a mental home he several times attacked two policemen guarding him. He has also bitten himself and shows signs of sores on his shoulders and legs. A kind of bark which is his only means of vocal expression is continuously and vigorously employed. . . .²

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

The story of the wolf-child just reported is one among a considerable number that crop up from time to time in the news.³ Children running wild in the forests, children abandoned by adults and "brought up" by animals, children reared in cellars away from the light of day by cruel or stupid parents, all exhibit when brought into contact for the first time with normal human beings the same brutish characters. While they have the physical form of *homo sapiens* they act like idiots or animals. Furthermore, unlike the famous Mowgli of Kipling's *Jungle Books*, they in most cases do not improve much with training. They remain wolf-children or cellar babies throughout their usually brief lives in "captivity."

Some of the *feral* children, as they are called, were doubtless idiots or morons to start with; that is to say, they were born with a mental deficiency which no amount of training could eradicate. Others, however, were almost certainly normal as far as inheritance was concerned; their trouble was isolation from ordinary human contacts. Since the feral child has managed to survive until captured, he may be said to have come to terms with his physical environment, at least after a fashion. What he lacks when brought back into society is what has been called culture. He has no language facility, no "manners," no knowledge or understanding of the folkways of the people with whom he is now forced to live. If he is to become really human, and not simply human appearing, he must go through the process of *acculturation*, or, to use another term with approximately similar meaning, he must be *socialized*. A "wolf-child" at ten years, however, starts with too great a handi-

² *New York Times*, April 26, 1927. Reprinted by permission.

³ Some of the accounts have authenticated others are doubtless apocryphal or exaggerated. Cf. Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard, *The Wild Boy of Aveyron*, trans. by G. and M. Humphrey, The Century Company, New York, 1932; P. C. Squires, "Wolf Children of India," *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 38, p. 313; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 239-243, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1921.

cap. He cannot catch up with the normal ten-year-old whose learning from other human beings has been uninterrupted since he was an infant. So the feral child remains a freak, an only partly socialized and an unadjusted personality as long as he lives. A deaf mute, unless given special training, remains in an almost similar position. He too is among people with whom he cannot communicate freely; acculturation for him also is necessarily incomplete.

The great power of socialization to shape the characteristic habit patterns of the individual is implied in the vast difference between the normal acculturated child and the feral child who has grown up in no culture at all. It can also be illustrated by noting the variations when babies are brought up in different cultures. Acculturation makes a Bushman infant into a Bushman, an Eskimo baby into an Eskimo, the offspring of Mrs. Babbitt of Zenith into George F. Babbitt, the so-called typical American. Furthermore if the three infants were mixed up right after birth, with the Bushman baby consigned to the igloo, the young Babbitt to the Bushman foster parents in South Africa, and the Eskimo to the cradle in the Zenith nursery, the results would not be so very different. Mrs. Babbitt's black-haired, high cheek-boned, swarthy-skinned son and heir would have his difficulties with cruel schoolmates who would point out his physical peculiarities, but he would learn English, dress like an American, and in most respects really be one, just as are the second generation American-born Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, and Mexicans who go to our schools today. If sent back to Eskimo land young Babbitt with his American ways would be a curiosity, an utter misfit, a stranger in a strange country. The white-skinned "Bushman" and the tufted-haired, black-skinned, pygmy "Eskimo" would be in much the same situations. Reared in the native manner, acculturated as Eskimo and Bushman (and because of their aberrant physical form probably made shamans), they would be Eskimo and Bushman to all intents and purposes, in spite of their foreign parentage. Socialization can make many sorts of models out of the same human material.

It is this process of socialization, of turning "baby into Babbitt" (or Bushman or Eskimo)⁴ that we are to pay attention to in this

⁴ The authors are indebted for the Bushman-Babbitt illustration and for many other ideas in these chapters on social psychology to the late Russell Gordon Smith, sociologist at Columbia University.

and the three succeeding chapters. We are born more or less helpless individuals with a biological equipment that will function under proper conditions to keep us alive. We are born also with a vast set of potentialities which permit us to adjust to many different types of culture, or to remain feral in the absence of any culture. The choice of which world we shall live in, which culture we shall adapt to, is made for us before we know the difference, one culture from another. Through *contacts* with others who have grown up in the same social heritage before us, we become acculturated, and in the terminology of social psychology, we cease to be simply *individuals*, mere biological units; we become *persons* with habits of thought and action that merge us into the particular cultural atmosphere around us. These habits are *traits* of our personality, which is not something possessed only by the go-getter (the man who has Pep and Personality with capital P's!) but by everybody. A *personality* is simply a person's pattern of life, the integration of his habit systems, capacities, and attributes into a single whole.

While it will be convenient in this section of the book to hold to the view that culture molds and shapes personalities, we must not forget that this represents only one side of the picture. Culture does not arise mysteriously in a vacuum; while it creates it is also the creation of personalities. Not some supernatural or mystical agency but *human beings* have after long generations built up culture's imposing edifice. Culture and personality everlastingly react on each other; they are in fact two faces of the same reality. As Faris puts it:

Culture is the collective side of personality; personality the subjective aspect of culture. Society with its usages, and personalities with their variations, are but two ways of looking at human life.⁵

HUMAN ORIGINAL NATURE

So far in this chapter the tendency has been rather to neglect the human clay, the raw material of socialization, and emphasize the skill of the potter, culture. But while it is true that in the shaping of personalities the cultural model is all-important, there

⁵ Ellsworth Faris, "Culture and Personality Among the Forest Bantu," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 28, p. 7, May, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

are limits set by biological nature that must not be forgotten. It is time to ask ourselves what is the nature of the human raw material, and how does it provide the basis for and at the same time set bounds to the socialization process.

Unfortunately this is a most difficult and controversial subject. The debate between the supporters of environment as the chief determiner of personality and those who put forth the claims of germ plasm or heredity is an old one, and one that still continues. Everyone agrees that both are necessary, that both play an important part in the determination of the final product, the adult personality. But the question is how large a part, and specifically what part, does each play. Every action of every adult human being is a compound result of the influence of both hereditary and environmental factors, but just what factors are operating and just what degree of importance to assign to their influence are the actual matters for argument. Happily or unhappily for the reader, there is not space enough in this book to take up the whole heredity-environment question in detail and cite the extensive pro and con evidence that has been accumulating.⁶ All that can be done here is first, to try to define the two terms, heredity and environment, in their relation to human development a little more accurately; second, to indicate how social psychologists proceed to evaluate the hereditary factor; and third, to give some idea of the specific influences exerted by heredity on personality development.

How we determine the hereditary component in personality. Social psychologists have coined the term "original nature" to cover man's inherited tendencies and potentialities:

Any man possesses at the start of life—that is, at the moment when the ovum and the spermatozoon which are to produce him have united—numerous well defined tendencies to future behavior. Between the situations which he will meet and the responses he will make to them, pre-formed bonds exist. . . . What a man is and does throughout life is a result of whatever constitution he has at the start

⁶ See, for instance, Gladys Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933; Gardner and Lois B. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, pp. 97-127, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931; and F. N. Freeman, K. J. Holzinger, and B. C. Mitchell, "The Influence of Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and Conduct of Foster Children," *Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, pp. 103-218, 1928

and of all the forces that act on it before and after birth. I shall use the term "original nature" for the former and "environment" for the latter.⁷

How, then, do we determine what original nature includes, what tendencies toward certain kinds of behavior we possess by reason of inheritance?

The simplest way to answer this vitally important question would be to take a cell or two out of the body of the individual, put it under the microscope, and make a simple catalog of the "behavior tendencies" it possesses. We know that each cell contains a complete and identical set of chromosomes in which these vital "tendencies" are located, so any cell would do equally well for our purposes. Alas for this easy method, however; while the tendencies are indubitably there, we cannot see them. Some so-called "genes" which apparently determine parts of the structure of the individual have, it is true, been approximately located in the chromosomes of certain plants, animals, and insects, but the relation between genes and behavior, between chromosomes and acts, has not been charted. We must resort to less direct but at present more feasible methods than the "cellular inventory" if we are to get this original nature catalog actually made.

The genetic approach. If it is impossible to see and describe the potentialities resident in the germ plasm, what can be done? The answer is, wait until the potentiality becomes an observable actuality, wait until the organism *does something* as the result of its inborn tendencies, and then draw inferences from what is seen. But although this method is better than none at all, it does involve us in new difficulties. While we are waiting for the individual to reveal his inherited tendencies by acting in various situations, the environment has time to step in and modify the tendencies and change the nature of the acts that finally take place. What we get then as the result of our observation is not a manifestation of original nature pure and uncontaminated. Through the subtle influence of environment, or nurture, it has already been defiled.

The question then becomes one of the degree of this defilement. Unless the mother is diseased or of low vitality or unless the infant in embryo is injured physically by an accident to the mother or by

⁷ Edward L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, p. 2, Columbia University Bureau of Publications of Teachers College, New York, "Briefer Course," 1914.

a difficult or abnormal birth, pre-natal environmental influence can for all practical purposes be neglected.⁸ If, therefore, we start observing babies at or shortly after birth, the behavior we see must be almost if not entirely the result of hereditary factors. The things an infant can do, apparently without practice, may be reasonably included as a part of the original nature we are trying to describe.

So far so good. But the behavior patterns ready to function in the infant at or near birth—sucking, blinking, swallowing, digesting, excreting, crying, and a hundred others—while they constitute a part of original nature do not comprise the whole of it. As the child grows, certain parts of the neuro-muscular system that were not yet ready to function at birth come into action. The child cannot walk for a year or so after birth, and while he then must, as we say, be *taught* to walk, the *ability to learn* does not come from the parent or nurse; it must be present in the organism. There are many other response patterns that are clearly in large part inborn and yet are not ready to work until the child is partly grown. The plantar reflex set off by scratching the sole of the foot is not normally functional during the first eight weeks of post-natal life. Some of the sex responses that are clearly a part of original nature are not made at all until puberty. This factor of delayed *maturation* of the structures upon which certain types of functioning depend further complicates the original nature problem. Physiologists have to work with psychologists in order to distinguish which new behavior traits appearing in the growing individual are due to learning (environment) and which to maturation (heredity). Or it would be more accurate to say that they must cooperate to determine how large a part each of the two factors has played in a result that is due to a compound of both influences.

What we have been describing is the so-called *genetic* or developmental approach to the study of the original nature and personality development. The genetic social psychologist devotes himself to watching the behavior of infants and young children in order to witness the first appearances of original and acquired traits. He is handicapped in this work by the phenomenon of late maturation of original nature potentialities, but with the aid of the physiologist, who reports on the development of neuro-

⁸ The standardized environment of the womb affects all babies in almost the same way.

muscular structure, he surmounts the difficulty as best he can. Admittedly this is not yet as well as could be wished for.

Comparative psychology. There are two other quite different approaches to the original nature problem which, while less satisfactory than the genetic method, are none the less important. One is the use of comparisons between animals and humans. Animal nature, as we already know, is less plastic than human nature, less modifiable by learning; consequently, native or instinctive behavior tendencies show up in animals in a more clear-cut and observable fashion. Animals are, moreover, so similar to humans in many details of physical structure, of anatomical pattern and physiological functioning, that it is hard to believe that theirs and man's psychic makeups are not also in many respects parallel. Cannot we then infer that some of the instinctive tendencies, some of the drives and urges that appear so clear-cut in animals, are present at least in rudimentary form in their evolutionary cousin, man? Such reasoning lies at the base of much research done in the field called comparative psychology. It is possible to observe many animals, among them man's near primate relatives, under controlled laboratory conditions into which man himself cannot be placed. Recent studies of monkeys, gibbons, and chimpanzees especially, as well as the large body of research on the behavior of other animals, have thrown much light on man's own original nature. But inferences concerning man based on experience with even his near biological relatives have to be drawn with great caution. Man's inborn nature is much less specific, much more generalized even than that of the chimpanzee or gorilla. That is why he has gone so much farther than the ape.

Comparative anthropology. The second of the two supplementary approaches used in the study of human original nature rests upon comparative anthropology rather than comparative psychology. If, in the examination of the varied cultures man has created, certain traits or patterns keep cropping up constantly, so often in fact that they may truly be termed cultural universals, then, so the reasoning runs, they must be due to specific traits of original nature. Man, because he is man, could not help creating them any more than the beaver can help building dams or the birds refrain from building nests. But, while the logic underlying this approach is sound, its application is difficult. What are these human cultural universals? Unfortunately they can be stated

only in the most vague and general terms. Men everywhere mate, fight, acquire property, imitate their fellows, beget and rear children, cooperate, and seek honor and glory. There must then be in man, it is argued, instincts, inborn tendencies driving him to carry on these activities, but when this is said we have reached the limits of the comparative anthropological method. The really important questions—How strong is the fighting instinct and how does it fit in with the tendency toward cooperation? Does the acquisitive drive operate only for self or may it extend to accumulating for others? Does the mother love children because she has them or have them because she loves them? And many others like these, defining the role of the instincts in more specific terms—remain unanswered. Human beings, as we have already seen,⁹ have all sorts of different mating systems. They also fight in one culture where in another they would compromise peaceably, hoard property in one group where they would dispense it in hospitality in another, seek prestige as a teller of tall tales in one society and as a speaker of truth in another. To say, then, that man has an instinct of gregariousness, of pugnacity, of cooperation does not mean much. The terms are fuzzy and ill-defined and do not help a great deal in predicting what he will do in a specific situation. Man can fight, in fact the physiologist can show that he is remarkably well equipped to mobilize energy resources for doing so, but whether or not he will actually become combative will depend much more on the situation and its meaning in the culture he lives in than on any mystical urge periodically to blow off steam through violence. The same is true of the other so-called instincts inferred from comparative culture analysis. Possibly man has them, but if so they are generalized and free floating, capable of inhibition or of redirection by cultural influences. They constitute therefore, and this is important, no final bar to man's attaining Utopia. Human nature is not fixed and unalterable and human instincts do not, as many conservatives are wont to claim, set definite limits to change in the social order. Through socialization human beings can be adapted to living, at one extreme, in a cruel, lustful, predatory society, and at the other, in a humanitarian, peaceful, and cooperative state.

What may seem unnecessary stress has been laid on the *methods*

⁹ Cf. *supra*, chapter 5.

used in compiling human original nature trait inventories. The state of knowledge in the field is still so incomplete and unsatisfactory, however, that it is impossible simply to present a list of human instincts without some explanation as to how it was derived. Now, after reading the preceding paragraph, it should be clear to the student why all such lists must be taken as tentative formulations, subject to change as information accumulates. The genetic approach to the study of inborn nature, especially, has only just begun to be exploited. In another ten years we may know twice as much about the whole matter as at present, but we cannot wait until the last word, or even the next to last word, has been spoken by the researchers. Our educational machinery, and our methods of child guidance generally, will inevitably be based on some theory, implicit or explicit, of original nature. It is well, therefore, to use all the knowledge now available and construct the best theory possible, even though it may be changed in detail, or even fundamentally, by later research.

Inborn traits in human nature. There are now almost as many lists of native traits, of "original tendencies," of "innate behavior patterns" as there are social psychologists.¹⁰ But, while some of the compilations reflect differences in point of view and method that will not be ironed out until we have more data, most of them represent similar ideas cast only in different terminology, repeated with different use of *words*. After all, words *are* poor things to describe the richness, the variety, the complexity of subjective experience, and even descriptions of supposedly objective acts (muscular movements or glandular reactions) are hampered by inadequate vocabulary. Can one describe by a single word or phrase the complicated process of getting food into the mouth and down to the stomach, involving as it does the coordinated activity of innumerable nerve cells, glands, and muscles? Even more impossible to find an adequate term for the complicated sensation one feels when one sights a beautiful girl or (this is bathos!) a hot, juicy beefsteak. Psychologists faced with the necessity of characterizing human reactions like these use language as best they can, and if they assign connotations to word symbols somewhat

¹⁰ For a brief summary of some of these lists see E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 144-153, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1931; and Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 149-158, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1928.

variously it is not to be wondered at. After all, beautiful girls and juicy beefsteaks affect all personalities in complex ways and different persons differently. We cannot escape reliance on words to describe human thoughts and actions, and we must accept the inevitable difficulties about shades of meaning when we use them. With this final caution we are ready to try our hand at enumeration of original nature traits. Four categories will be employed: (1) reflexes, (2) motives, or drives, (3) temperament, and (4) capacities.

Reflexes. The reflex is frequently termed the unit of behavior; it is the simplest possible reaction tendency of an organism to a change in the situation facing it either externally or internally. While it is not planned in this book to go into details of the physiological basis underlying human activity, it is worth while at least to note the bodily elements taking part in the reflex. These are (1) a sense organ, (2) at least three (afferent, central, and efferent) nerve cells or *neurones*, and (3) a muscle or a gland. Tied together by heredity they function in such a way that when one of the changes in situation to which the particular sense organ is attuned (say a pin prick on the skin or a drop of sugar solution in the mouth) takes place there will be a predetermined adaptive response by the muscle (jerking away) or the gland (salivation). The human organism is equipped at birth or, through maturation shortly after birth, with a great number of these simple reflex response tendencies. They enable the infant to protect itself against some of the simpler hazards of existence that impinge directly on its body (burns, pricks, bruises, tickles) and to carry on vegetative processes like breathing, digestion, and defecation. It is impossible to list all the reflexes possessed by the newly born, both because they are so numerous and because they are usually so indefinite that it is hard to find names for them. But here are a few of those fairly well agreed on by genetic psychologists¹¹ as being functional at or very shortly after birth:

¹¹ The list is compiled from the following: K. C. Pratt, A. K. Nelson, and K. H. Sun, *The Behavior of the Newborn Infant*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1930; Buford J. Johnson, *Child Psychology*, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1932; M. G. Blanton, "The Behavior of the Human Infant During the First Thirty Days of Life," *Psychological Review*, vol. 24, pp. 456-483; and Ada H. Arlitt, *Psychology of Infancy and Early Childhood*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1930. It should be remembered that the reflexes in the list, and in fact all reflexes, are really only convenient

breathing, heart-beat and blood circulation, peristalsis, urination, defecation, perspiring, sleeping, crying, sneezing, hiccupping, yawning, tear secretion, turning head, spreading fingers, clutching, stretching, arching back, squirming, thrashing of arms and legs, pupillary contraction, nursing (a pattern response involving sucking, swallowing, digesting), vomiting, hearing (but what classes of sounds is yet uncertain), winking, erection of penis, starting, wincing, knee-jerking, and toe spreading

A few others that appear a little later, but are probably in large part unlearned, are:

smiling, blinking, reaching, crawling and hitching, eye coordination, manipulating, "babbling," thumb opposition

Since all of these patterns become quickly modified as the result of learning, it takes keen observation to see them in their pristine state. The baby at the start is an almost helpless lump of an organism. But in its many reflexes the infant possesses the raw material, the building blocks as it were, out of which can be constructed highly complex adaptive behavior. To bring about this change from helplessness to relative independence, from the "automatic" reflex response level to that of highly complex and voluntary behavior, requires years of learning. But the baby wastes no time

abstractions of small segments of behavior out of a much more complex total reaction pattern of the organism. In order to describe infant behavior, and thus original nature, it is necessary to pick out and give names to part-responses like crying and sneezing, even when we know that both are never as simple physiologically as the typical reflex arc. They doubtless involve thousands of neurones.

One of the issues in psychology and physiology is as to the *degree* of independence of these part-responses from the whole when they are first functional. Do they mature as relatively (although never completely) separate functional entities to be later combined into patterns? Or are they merely specialized or differentiated fragments of a total pattern response that genetically precedes rather than follows them? For an exposition of the latter view see G. E. Coghill, "The Early Development of Behavior in *Amblystoma* and in Man," reprinted in R. H. Wheeler, *Readings in Psychology*, pp. 528-549, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1930. The psychological implications have been especially exploited by the Gestalt psychologists. See, for instance, Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, pp. 310-319, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1935.

once he is in this world; he starts putting reflexes together into patterns without delay.

Inborn motives. Some of the reflexes in the preceding list, as sneezing, clutching, squirming, and blinking, are essentially defensive reactions. They help the organism as a whole to maintain its equilibrium in the face of noxious, harmful, or upsetting stimuli coming from the outside world. If the infant were equipped only with response tendencies of this type we might be tempted to think of it as directed wholly from without, a highly complex mechanism controlled solely by external stimuli. A moment's thought will show the inadequacy of such a view, however. What would become of the individual in a state of nature who always passively waited to be fed? What would become of the species in which there was no internal urge to release sex tension through copulation? The organism must be at least to some extent dynamic and self-directing. It must be equipped with *drives* or *motives* strong enough to make it persist even in the face of unfavorable environmental conditions. Otherwise it cannot survive.

One way to go about enumerating these native drives to behavior is simply to take those of the reflex patterns which are set off by *internal* stimuli and generalize on them. Breathing, for instance, may have to be started the first time by slapping the new-born infant vigorously, but thereafter the activity goes on without further outside stimulation. Even in the absence of air the baby tries desperately to breathe as long as he exists at all. The same is true of a number of the other reflexes in the list. They are called out rhythmically (like heart-beat or peristalsis) or periodically (sleep, defecation) because of recurring disequilibrium or *tension* states in the individual organic structure. Using, then, the group of internally set-off reflexes as a basis, we may list the *organic needs* of the individual as the first part of a catalog of the dynamic factors in original nature:

1. *Hunger:* The basic drive to secure food and eat it is a result of periodic changes in metabolism. These changes register in the nervous system and produce the "feeling" of being hungry. Later one *learns* to feel hungry at the sight of delicious food, but only if one is not already surfeited.
2. *Thirst:* The need for water or liquids containing water as an ingredient, again the result originally of an organic disequilibrium.

Later one acquires the habit of feeling thirsty in certain social situations.

3. *Excretion*: Socially controllable as to times and places but periodically urgent.
4. *Temperature adjustment*: The need to maintain a nearly constant body temperature leads to all sorts of behavior to prevent chilling or overheating.
5. *Fatigue—rest—sleep*: Human beings must sleep part of the time although some individuals can get along with much less than others.
6. *Sex—lust—love*: Probably not internally stimulated until sex hormones are secreted at puberty.
7. *Random activity* (sometimes called the play instinct): In the infant includes much squirming and wriggling, some vocalization (crying “for exercise” and babbling), spontaneous smiling, reaching and grasping, manipulating, locomoting. The organic basis for random activity is uncertain; in a rough metaphorical sense there seems to be a need to “blow off” surplus energy.
8. *Other vegetative activity*: Digestion, circulation, breathing. When these processes are interrupted or interfered with, the organism becomes “upset,” just as when there is thwarting of drives 1 to 7. Usually, however, we are not conscious of the need to breathe, to digest, and to continue heart beat (at least until we have studied physiology) because the activities go on “automatically.”

In addition to these essentially *appetitive* factors in human original nature there is another much less clearly defined group of motivating tendencies that are *defensive* in character. They drive the organism to protect itself against external hazards. While the physiological basis in muscular and glandular behavior for the following two urges or needs has not yet been worked out at all completely, there is enough evidence as to their hereditary basis to justify including them in our list:

9. *Escape from pain*: The infant's withdrawing responses in the presence of pain-producing stimuli are somewhat rudimentary. The first effort is apparently to pull away from the source of the painful stimulation but, failing of success in this, the infant will apparently try out his whole repertoire of matured and functional responses, many of which are completely useless to effect the

present purpose. There will be crying, kicking, squirming, holding of breath, etc. Probably the feeling state could be termed one of fear.

10. *Escape from restraint*: Pratt, Nelson, and Sun¹² subjected 66 infants less than two weeks old to the stimulus: "pressing the arms firmly against the body and holding them there against whatever energy the infant would exert." Contrary to what might have been the expectation, in the majority of the trials (58%) the baby remained passive. Where there was a reaction it was uncoordinated and diffuse. These experiments cast doubt on the existence of a rage or an anger pattern in the new-born infant, but it is possible that the response may mature later. With the present limited knowledge no definite statement can be made, but there is perhaps still a good presumption in favor of an innate basis for the frequently recurring anger responses in small children when thwarting of some sort takes place.

Finally there is a large and indefinite group of variously titled instincts, impulses, drives, and urges which are supposed to guide man in his relations with other men. They are offered as the biological results of man's long history as a social animal, although many of them have roots in a much earlier period when his pre-primate ancestors were living a solitary existence:

11. *Gregariousness*: The urge to consort with one's fellows, to avoid a hermit-like existence. While majority opinion today perhaps inclines to the view that the gregarious tendency is a product developed in each individual by socialization, there is a respectable minority who believe that, just as in the case of social insects and animals, man's herding tendency is at least in part inborn.
12. *Maternal and paternal tendencies*: These are certainly not as definite in human beings as in some animals, but they may still be present in original nature in modified form.
13. *Pugnacity*: Does man carry a "chip on his shoulder" or does he fight only when necessary to satisfy some other basic need? Current expert opinion now inclines strongly toward the latter view. (See pattern 10.)

¹² Pratt, Nelson, and Sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-182.

14. *Acquisitiveness—hoarding—ownership*: The drive to accumulate personal property. Hoarding among squirrels is instinctive without doubt, but the acquisitive tendency in man, if it exists, is certainly capable of being directed by culture into a variety of pro-social as well as anti-social channels.
15. Many others, such as curiosity, self-assertion (domination), constructiveness (workmanship), imitation, and mutual aid (cooperation), cleanliness, and self-adornment.

The so-called instincts or inborn drives in the third group are, for the most part, simply names, or word symbols, attached to vague, general categories of frequently recurring behavior. In any given instance of pugnacious, acquisitive, domineering, etc., behavior it is impossible to tell how much is due to heredity and how much to learning, because the terms "pugnacity," "acquisitiveness," "domination" cannot be defined accurately. Nevertheless there are many psychologists and sociologists who still feel that there are definite and rather highly organized inborn components in each of the types of behavior 11 to 15, even though they cannot be isolated and their relative importance, as compared with the learning factor, determined.¹³

Temperament. Temperament is one of those terms which everybody uses but which no one can accurately define. We think of it as relating to such things as the characteristic mood of the individual (elation, depression), to the ease with which strong emotion like anger ("temper") is aroused, to speed of habitual reactions to stimuli (the hair-trigger type of person and the one who reacts slowly, who seems always to be in a daze, are extremes here), to the rapidity with which fatigue sets in, and to what Allport¹⁴ calls "emotional attitude" (cynicism, timidity, suspicion,

¹³ The most extreme supporter of this view is William McDougall. See his article, "The Hormic Psychology," in Carl Murchison, ed., *Psychologies of 1930*, pp. 3-36, Clark University Press, Worcester, 1930. For intermediate positions see Morris Ginsberg, "The Place of Instinct in Social Theory," in his *Studies in Sociology*, pp. 119-143, Methuen and Company, Ltd., London, 1932; R. M. Ogden and F. S. Freeman, *Psychology and Education*, pp. 16-101, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1932; and C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 275-296, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1925.

¹⁴ Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 108, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1924.

etc.). Distinctive reactions of these various sorts are found in very young children:

From the moment of birth there are clearly marked differences in nervous behavior among babies. One baby is placid and contented, another is fidgety, restless and enterprising. The shock of birth, which is unquestionably present to all babies, may be very upsetting to a child of nervous inheritance, but accepted with calm by a stable placid baby.

Babies of nervous inheritance, on the other hand, will show clearly by the violence of the response provoked that their nervous system is easily stimulated and exhausted. They will wiggle and squirm for hours together, emitting the same constant reflex cry. The whole body will start convulsively at a sudden touch or a loud sound which would wake no response from a more stolid infant.¹⁵

These temperamental traits will in most cases continue to characterize the babies when they grow up and become adults, but special care in training may greatly mitigate the bad effects of a weak or unstable nervous constitution on personality. Consequently, the sooner it is possible to determine what the inherited temperamental characteristics are, the better able we are to plan for the individual an educational program that will produce the best results.

Unfortunately, simple observation of behavior does not always yield the quick and easy diagnosis of temperament that the quotation given might seem to indicate. We need to know much more about the underlying physical basis of temperamental traits so that behavior study methods can be supplemented by physiological and biochemical analyses. According to the best current hypotheses, the so-called *ductless glands* play a vital part in determining the type of temperamental reactions which the individual exhibits. These glands (thymus, pineal, pituitaries, thyroid, parathyroids, suprarenals, and gonads) secrete directly into the lymph or the blood stream certain chemical substances known as *hormones*, which in turn exert a profound effect on behavior. At present, however, while it is known what types of influence many of the

¹⁵ Adapted from H. C. Cameron, *The Nervous Child*, by H. T. Woolley in the *Handbook of Child Psychology*, p. 29, Clark University Press, Worcester, 1931. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, publishers.

individual hormones exert on bodily development, their several relations to temperamental reactions are much less well worked out. The problems are complicated by the fact that the gland secretions not only act upon the nervous system directly to affect behavior, but they also act and react upon each other in complex and little known ways. The result is that it is not a simple influence we have to measure, but the net effect of a number of influences which partly supplement and partly cancel one another. The pattern of hormonal interaction when the organism is vegetating peaceably is sometimes termed the "endocrine balance." Some unusual situation, an external danger or an internal injury, may result in "upsetting" the balance temporarily with the result that one or more of the hormones "gains the upper hand" and exerts a direct influence on conduct. Thus when a fighting situation presents itself there is an abnormal secretion of the hormone epinephrine from the suprarenals. The result is a speeding up of the heart beat, the stopping of all digestive processes, rapid elimination of fatigue poisons, and a feeling of unusual muscular power. The organism is thus made ready to exert unusual effort in the forthcoming combat. The degree to which this bodily change takes place is of course partly a matter of habit but also partly of temperament. A choleric type of individual will be so equipped with suprarenal tissue and will possess such endocrine balance as to mobilize more energy and be in general more ready to strike the first blow.

But while endocrine factors are probably basic in personality makeup, it is impossible as yet to classify temperaments, to determine who is choleric and who is not, by endocrine analysis. As Gardner and Lois Murphy point out sadly:

The trouble is that we cannot isolate and measure the very things we know are most significant. Individual differences in sex characteristics, for example, as well as in motility and general activity, are known to be, at least in part, endocrine affairs, but except for "basic metabolic rate," there are no accurate methods of measuring endocrine make-up. The picture is further confused by the fact that the person with the theoretically active make-up, having a high basal metabolism, may learn to slow down, that is may learn that in order to get along in life he must "go slow." Paradoxically, then, the person who is

actually active may not be the one who, on the basis of sheer physiological analysis, ought to be so.¹⁶

Extreme caution is therefore indicated on the subject of endocrine influences on personality. The classification of temperaments in terms of glandular functioning must await further research.¹⁷

Capacities. The last category of original nature traits is that of native aptitudes or *capacities*. While a great deal of research has been done on human special abilities, there is as yet no general agreement on a list of the separate inborn capacities which a human being may or may not possess. The psychologist, as we have seen, cannot "X-ray the genes" to determine native aptitudes; he can only infer their existence when they are actually manifested in children and adults. The subject who learns to solve mathematical problems of various types much more quickly and more expertly than the average of a group all of whom have had approximately the same training is labeled as possessing "mathematical capacity." A person who cannot learn to typewrite with speed and accuracy in spite of continued practice is either "not trying" or else is deficient in "typewriting aptitude." So one may go through a list of all activities human beings carry on. Learning to do them with greater facility than that shown by the average person of the same age will be a function of training, of application and industry, and of inborn capacity. The latter factor, while often concealed by the two former ones, is still present as an important influence affecting performance. The earlier in life we can determine the degrees to which the individual possesses each of the native capacities the better we can plan a career for him that will fit his potentialities, give him the kinds of special training which will bear richest fruit in the development of skills and the knowledge

¹⁶ Gardner and Lois Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 569. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁷ A. J. Carlson, the physiologist, says on this point: "Unfortunately there has been a tendency unduly to emphasize the endocrines or hormones as causative agents in human behavior, in both health and disease, and to put them in the place of the spirits or demons of several centuries ago. The hormones or endocrines are undoubtedly more significant in human behavior than are those demons, at least as now understood; but the actual significance of hormones . . . is still a research problem [but] a problem that may yield data of extreme importance both in diagnosis and in therapeutics."—From *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, I. Madison Bentley, ed., p. 240, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

of subject matters. If we had a battery of tests of some sort that would predict *future learning ability* in all sorts of different categories we could fit "square pegs into square holes" and round pegs into round with much greater confidence.

The first difficulty met with in an effort to create these diagnostic instruments is the fact that we do not really know what we are testing for. After all, mathematics and typewriting are categories of activity that are products of culture. There is no particular reason to suppose that they have any meaning as unit factors in biology, that there are mathematics and typewriting genes or gene combinations in human germ plasm. If there *are* inborn capacities based on definite differentia of structure in brain, nervous system, or glands we cannot yet give names to them. We had best call them A, B, C, D, etc., until we can identify them with more certainty.

What, then, is the relation between the trait we can, after a fashion, measure and the original nature factor or factors underlying it? If the ability to learn solutions to mathematical problems is anything more than the results of past training, then some of these hypothetical innate capacity factors must be involved. We could, in fact, write a rough sort of equation to express the relationship between M, mathematical ability as measured by a test of performance, and the factors that make it up. It would read

$$M = E (xA + yB + zC \dots)$$

where E stands for the influence of the environment, of learning and practice, and A, B, C are the biologically rooted aptitudes figuring here in the proportions x, y, z. Mathematical ability is, then, the result of a particular combination of native capacities in interaction with a specific background of education.

A similar statement might be made about the trait T, the ability to learn typewriting. Typewriting aptitude is also a composite of several more basic factors, some of them perhaps the same as those that help to give facility in mathematics. Our typewriting equation might be

$$T = E' (x'A + y'B + vD + wE \dots)$$

with A and B (here in different proportions, x', y', to the other constituents) as common factors in both equations. Tests for both M and T would then in part be measuring the subject's

possession of the abilities A and B, in part measuring other factors (C, D, E, etc.). The tests would be (with respect to A and B) *overlapping*; that is to say, a high score on one would be predictive of a higher than average score on the other. But because the two tests overlap does not mean that they are identical; still less does it mean that all good mathematicians are potentially good stenographers (and *vice versa*). A successful typist has to possess the hypothetical A and B as well as D, E, and other aptitudes concerned perhaps with eye-hand and other motor coordinations. But in addition she has to be practical, to be alert, neat, a good speller, and (in some business offices and in all stage plays and movies) good looking. The degree to which she possesses T, typewriting aptitude as determined by the best test we can devise, is, it must be reiterated, only one factor in her ultimate failure or success.

An employer is not particularly concerned about test overlapping since at one time he is testing for only a single (albeit compound) capacity. The vocational counselor, however, does not confine himself to determining his client's aptitude for one job only; he must survey the whole range of abilities to discover where all the strengths and weaknesses lie. Here a battery of non-overlapping tests is really needed, a series of aptitude diagnosing instruments such that the score on any one of them bears no relation to (is independent of) the score on any other. So far this has been difficult to achieve; there have been such definite correlations between a subject's score on most of the tests constructed that psychologists have been led almost to the conclusion that overlapping is inevitable. They have come to postulate the existence of one or more "group factors" of learning ability which (like A and B above) enter into and form part of a number of different special aptitudes. Spearman believes that there is only one common intellectual factor;¹⁸ he calls it "g" and regards it as a sort of mental energy with which individuals are endowed at birth in varying degrees. According to the Spearman school, "g" exists as a component in all measurable human abilities; it is very close to what other psychologists have called general intelligence.

But one group factor does not any longer satisfy most of the aptitude testers. There is an increasing tendency to think in terms

¹⁸ Cf. C. Spearman, *The Abilities of Man*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927; C. Spearman, "G and After—A School to End Schools," in *Psychologies of 1930*, pp. 339-366.

of a fairly large but as yet indeterminate number of A's and B's which combine with each other and probably with more specific factors like C, D, E, in the above example, to form different capacities for which tests are devised. A third view¹⁹ which is at the opposite extreme, holds that there are no group factors whatever but only specific factors. General intelligence is, from this latter standpoint, merely a sum total of a lot of C's, D's, and E's without any A's or B's included. The three differing hypotheses concerning the nature of human mental endowment can be contrasted thus:

- (1) General intelligence = g
- (2) General intelligence = A + B + other group factors
- (3) General intelligence = C + D + E + F + G . . . Z
(all specific factors)

Any one of the three is at present tenable, pending more conclusive results of research.

Tests for native capacities. There are two types²⁰ of capacity test now in general use. The first is the so-called test for general intelligence, the second the test for a "special capacity" like musical ability, or mechanical aptitude. The general intelligence test is in effect simply a miscellaneous series of tests for special capacities all given at the same time and with the results combined into a single numerical score. In the Army Alpha examination, one of the first of the group tests for general intelligence ability,²¹ the subject was asked to solve simple arithmetic problems in his head and write down the answers, he was required to follow correctly and without hesitation some complicated directions given orally, his "general information" was tested by a series of questions about people, things, places, and events, he had to choose the "common

¹⁹ Cf. Edward L. Thorndike, E. O. Bregman, M. V. Cobb, et al., *The Measurement of Intelligence*, pp. 415-422, Teachers College Bureau of Publications, Columbia University, New York, 1926.

²⁰ Prognosis or placement tests for school subjects and achievement tests, such as a final examination in a course in sociology, are also capacity tests in a sense. But they are not designed to test solely the inborn factors in the capacity.

²¹ The test was avowedly constructed for the purpose of selecting officer material for the U. S. Army, but it was designed to have "a high degree of validity as a measure of intelligence" and to be "as completely independent of schooling and educational advantage as possible." Cf. C. S. Yoakum and R. M. Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests*, pp. 3 ff., Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920.

sense" alternative among a series in a number of different hypothetical situations, and he had to perform other pencil and paper tasks of still different nature. While "general intelligence" was supposed to enter into the speedy and accurate performance of each of these various sets of tasks, because of the possible effect of special abilities on the score, no one set was supposed to be alone sufficient adequately to test it. In other words, while the ability to solve arithmetic problems is a function of "g" or of the group factors that make up general intelligence, it is also, as we have seen, a matter involving special aptitudes, such as B and C, as well. When enough separate tests are combined, however, the effects of the specific factors become relatively less important (in part cancel each other) and the combination score reflects chiefly the thing we call, for lack of a better name, general intelligence.²²

All this rather abstruse theory is necessary if we are to understand the logic on which the now extensively used intelligence test is based. The results from testing can, after all, be no better than the tests used or the hypotheses concerning the nature of the human mind which underlie them. In the present uncertain state of our theory about native capacities, we must not fail to recognize the purely empirical status of most of the test procedure. It is perhaps safer at the present time to define general intelligence as "what a so-called general intelligence examination tests" than to talk in terms of mental energy or of group factors, but sooner or later we must know what the relation is between test intelligence and real inborn capacities if the testing program designed to reveal the possibilities inherent in original nature is to be established on firm ground.

The intelligence test. Since the intelligence test is not going to be put away on a shelf until such time as the theoretical problems relating to it are all solved, since it is going to continue to be given to grade school, high school, and college students in large numbers, it is important to view the test from the practical side for a moment. How is an intelligence test score interpreted? What is it used for? If an individual tries hard and still does badly, and if his concentration on the tasks involved in the test has not been affected by

²² On the third of the three hypotheses about mental make-up the combining of separate tests to make a general test is explainable simply as a matter of addition. The more specific aptitudes included, the more general the resulting combination of them will be.

last night's romance or this morning's head cold, then his poor score is susceptible of two explanations. One of these is that he has not had the normal educational opportunities, that he has not developed the language facility necessary to comprehend the instructions, that he has not had the mathematical training necessary to solve problems in mental arithmetic—in other words, that he is simply *retarded* in intellectual development. The other explanation is that he is endowed by heredity with sub-normal *capacity* for problem solving, that he is of below average native intelligence. Often both explanations are partly true, especially so when the subject is really mentally deficient, for then he will inevitably be retarded sooner or later when compared with a group of his own age.

Intelligence tests are, however, not given so much to explain the past as to predict the future. Unless the low score can be raised by retesting, it constitutes a forecast of subnormal or below average performance in a wide variety of future life situations. Relative non-success in those types of problems where the "intellectual" factor bulks large, problems involving abstract ideas and complicated thought patterns, is especially indicated, but the test has some predictive value for nearly the whole range of human activity. Consequently it is used not only to determine scholastic aptitude, to predict John Jones' probable academic record if he is admitted to X college; it is also employed extensively, as would be expected, in vocational counseling. Some occupations apparently require more of this thing we label intelligence than others, and the counselor with an intelligence test score before him can warn an individual away from fields of endeavor in which his low intelligence would prove a serious handicap. It must be emphasized, however, that such conclusions must be drawn with the greatest of caution since, as we have seen, innate capacity is only one of the factors entering into an intelligence test score.

Tests for special aptitudes. If we are to obtain a complete picture of the potential personality of the individual, general intelligence testing should be supplemented wherever possible with tests for special aptitudes. Ideally, of course, the latter should give results uncorrelated with the former, but there are only a very few special capacities that at present do not seem to include a factor of general intelligence. Probably the most successful of the special

apptitude tests have been those for musical ability.²³ An unintelligent person can apparently make strides in the development of musical skills, can learn to play musical instruments well, if he has musical capacity in good measure. A person without much native musical ability but with even a high intelligence test score cannot. Of course the really great musical artists must have both intelligence and musical capacity as well as the best of training. But many fond parents would have saved much money and avoided much mental anguish if they had had their children tested for musical aptitude before the ordeal by piano for Jean and the lessons in violin for little Willie were commenced.

There are not many other special aptitude tests to put beside the one for ability in music. The sensori-motor skills underlying achievement in graphic art (representative drawing) may quite probably be regarded as an aptitude factor largely independent of general intelligence.²⁴ Tests have also been repeatedly devised to measure innate "mechanical ability" and the claim is made that the best of them do provide a means of assessing an important special capacity, and not, as critics declare, merely mechanical training.²⁵ Other tests for arithmetical ability, for linguistic ability, for the capacity to operate a sewing machine, a telegraph key, a lathe, a typewriter—all these and many others are now available. In all these latter tests, however, the factor of background and training enters prominently, and furthermore there is overlapping with tests of general intelligence. So while some men are doubtless equipped by original nature with other special types of learning ability, are perhaps potential geniuses in some new field or other, we cannot as yet forecast their rise to eminence by aptitude testing. Other possible geniuses remain hidden because of the lack of training which, if it knew of their high capacity, society might be only too willing to supply.

²³ Cf. C. E. Seashore, *The Psychology of Musical Talent*, Silver, Burdett and Company, Boston, 1919.

²⁴ Cf. Frank S. Freeman, *Individual Differences*, pp. 306-311, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1934; Leta S. Hollingsworth, "Special Gifts and Special Deficiencies," in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, p. 631.

²⁵ Cf. John L. Stenquist, "Measurements of Mechanical Ability," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, no. 130, 1923; D. G. Paterson, R. M. Elliot, et al., *Minnesota Mechanical Ability Tests*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1930.

Summary. Let us now summarize briefly the general conclusions to be drawn from this chapter. All human beings come into the world endowed with some very rudimentary drives and reflexes that are useful, but in infancy not sufficient, for self-protection. Added to these are a vast set of potentialities for learning new and better ways of self-preservation. Out of this original nature equipment different cultures, through the medium of person-to-person and group contacts, produce varied and yet basically similar personality patterns, adults who think and act very differently and yet in some ways are still much alike. How alike are people the world over, how plastic or how rigid is original nature in the hands of environment, is the age-old question, only to be answered (if at all) by research. Careful observation of actual personality development from infancy through childhood and into adult life, the genetic approach in social psychology, will continue to yield significant data on the nature-nurture problem. So will comparative studies of animals and humans. So too will the great social experiments in mass education in soviet, fascist, and democratic states.

Personality differences in different cultural worlds interest us, but still more are we concerned about variations within one society. George F. Babbitt may be the typical product of American socialization, but no two Babbitts are alike, as we know. Part of their differences are due to original nature. They have different endocrine balances or whatever other structural variations that make for basic differences in temperament. They have different capacities; each has his own developmental limits which he may reach under favorable conditions, but which he may not exceed. To describe the inborn temperamental predispositions and to enumerate the inherited capacities of each individual is the dream not only of the practical psychologist, but also of the social philosopher who would like to make division of labor biologically perfect. Why are these dreams not realities? By analyzing the still shaky structure of psychology back of current test procedures, at least one answer has been given to the question. Another is the uncertainty about maturation, to be referred to again in the succeeding chapter.

Even with the inevitable uncertainties and qualifications we still have been able to gain a rough but serviceable idea of the behavior possibilities which we possess by reason of inheritance.

Logically the next step is to see what we make of them. In the two succeeding chapters we shall first examine the process of "remaking" original nature a little more carefully than has yet been possible. Then we shall take time to watch socialization at work producing some of the particular habit systems that are most important in adult personality.

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Chapter 8

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

JOHN JONES FROM BIRTH TO MATURITY¹

At birth:

cries when pinched or when hungry
salivates, digests, defecates
sneezes, yawns, vomits
sucks and swallows

At three months:

holds head erect
smiles responsively to approval of parent
shows anticipatory excitement at feeding
shakes rattle
cries when mother leaves the room
follows moving pencil with eyes
cries if feeding is delayed

At one year:

walks with help
says two words (such as "ma-ma" and "da-da")
holds cup to drink from
inhibits simple acts on command (stops banging with spoon)
scribbles with pencil on paper
imitates adult beating two spoons together
plays peek-a-boo

¹ The developmental summary was compiled with the aid of the following: Arnold Gesell, *The Mental Growth of the Pre-School Child*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925; Rachel Stutsman, *Mental Measurement of Pre-school Children*, World Book Company, Yonkers, New York, 1931; Charlotte Bühler, *The First Year of Life*, The John Day Company, New York, 1930; Ada H. Arlitt, *Psychology of Infancy and Early Childhood*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1930.

At two years:

- runs
- tells name
- "shows it to mama"
- blows nose, tries to brush teeth
- tells experiences
- identifies picture of mother or nurse
- has bladder control, except at night
- goes on simple errands
- about 250 words in vocabulary

At five years:

- draws a man
- crosses street alone
- tells age
- defines "chair," "horse," "fork," "doll"
- wants to be a locomotive engineer when he grows up
- plays follow the leader
- asks "Why don't we see two things with our two eyes?"
and "Why does water go out of the way when anything
goes in?"
- dresses himself, except for tying shoe laces
- uses about 2,000 words

At sixteen years:

- plays complicated team games like baseball and basket-
ball
- is active in school clubs and social life
- has had his first ("puppy") love affair
- objects to parental control over his social life and
friendships
- wants to be an automobile manufacturer
- writes "poetry"
- has an allowance from parents and lives within it
- smokes occasionally when away from home

At twenty-one years:

- has a job as a filling station attendant
- is in love with a girl named Jessamine and wants to
get married
- belongs to the Eagles, a local lodge

wants to be a garage superintendent
plays billiards, poker, baseball
knows the names of the governor of the state and the
local mayor but not those of his congressman or his
two senators
thinks it is all right to drive past a red traffic light
if no "cop" is watching
about 12,000 words in his vocabulary

THE PROCESS OF HABIT FORMATION

Habit, socialization, and the learning process. This highly synoptic sketch of the personality development of John Jones is chiefly a chronicle of the acquisition of *habits*. John Jones possesses by reason of inheritance, as we saw in the last chapter, certain *capacities* for habit formation, certain flexibilities of the nervous system which make possible the combining of reflexes into new patterns and the attaching of new goal situations to some if not all of the inborn drives. At twenty-one years we see John Jones possessed of habit systems of several different types. He has developed certain *motor skills* or muscular coordination patterns which enable him to drive an automobile, play billiards and baseball, and dance with (and not on!) Jessamine. He has acquired desires and ambitions, *wishes* we shall come later to call them, for preeminence in the lodge, for success in a particular vocation, for matrimony. He has also a fund of information and misinformation and a set of *attitudes* toward things, people, and events. John Jones likes poker, for instance. He believes in the benefit of the lodge fellowship, but he has a feud on at the moment with the Grand Panjandrum. He is willing to indulge in minor violations of the law. He distrusts Italians ("wops," he calls them) and feels superior to Negroes, Mexicans, and Greeks. Finally, in addition to motor skills, wishes, attitudes, and information, John, like all the rest of us, lives in a habit *routine*. He brushes his teeth twice daily, has two cups of black coffee for breakfast. On Tuesday nights he goes to the lodge meeting; on Saturday he takes out Jessamine.

All these different kinds of habits go to make up John Jones' personality. In the broad sense their acquisition is a part of what we have called socialization, fitting John Jones into a society. In a narrower, more analytical view, however, the process of habit

formation is always one of learning. We *inherit* original nature response tendencies, we *learn* habits. *How* we learn them is obviously a question of great importance. All educational programs are based on some theories of learning, explicit or implicit. Since the sociologist is interested in the transmission of culture from generation to generation and its spread from area to area, he cannot escape some study of the mechanisms of habit acquisition. He must know something of the learning process.

General characteristics of human learning. A vast amount of work has been done by psychologists and physiologists on the subject of animal and human learning. Rats have run mazes and by taking the right turns have learned to avoid those new menaces in the rat world, electric shocks. Cats have been put in contraptions known as "puzzle boxes" and spied on while they tried to get out. Chimpanzees have fabricated tools in order to get bananas coyly placed out of arm's reach by psychologists. Human beings have been subjected to tests of every type. The result of this experimentation plus the painstaking and clever work of the physiologists with nerve tissue has been a series of hypotheses concerning the nature of the learning process, each theory based on some of the data elicited by research, but no one theory completely inclusive of all of it.

The fact is that the more the learning process is studied the more complex it is seen to be. Apparently the whole organism, and not just some localized brain area or single set of nerve connections, is involved in the acquiring of every new habit. Through the complex and delicately tuned nerve pathways reverberations of any localized event in the body are carried to other parts of the organism which in turn react on the area in which the habit formation appears to be taking place.² Because of the many ramifications of nerve impulse that are produced by even one stimulus it is extremely difficult to isolate single units or incidents of learning for scientific analysis. In attempting to do so the psychologist is in danger of working with an artificially simplified abstraction and not the real and much more complex act of learning itself. It is no wonder, therefore, that there are so many differences of opinion among experts concerning the true nature of the learning process.

² Cf. Knight Dunlap, *Habits, Their Making and Unmaking*, pp. 51-57, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York, 1932; and C. K. Ogden, *The Meaning of Psychology*, pp. 56-77, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1926.

More time is needed to develop more complex methods appropriate to the nature of the task.

Pending the development of an inclusive and generally accepted theory of learning, however, it seems unnecessary in a book on sociology to deal with the various partial theories put forth by psychologists. Accordingly the discussion here will be confined to some general characteristics of the learning process which are facts of observation (and hence will be taken account of in any theory) and which have especial significance in the development of personality.

The integrative character of learning. One of the things we notice first about both animal and human learning is its *integrative* character. Reflexes and simple habits are constantly being built up into more and more complex systems or patterns which function thereafter as units when the appropriate situations call them out. This is most conspicuously true of the motor coordinations involved in such acts as typewriting, telegraphy, golf, bicycling. The first attempts at a golf swing are clumsy, uncoordinated muscular movements. Attention has to be given to all the details of stance, grip, swing, and follow through, with the result that concentration on one tends to make for poor performance in another. As practice continues, however, coordinations between the elements are (often quite suddenly) established. The whole series of muscular movements of eye, wrist, arm, shoulders, and trunk become knit together into a swing that, if not subjected to too much further analysis by the golf professional, will function serviceably and without conscious attention to details whenever a golf ball is addressed. The same general statements could be made about typewriting. Given typewriting capacity to start with, all that is needed is proper instruction and a great deal of practice in order to perfect a technique that is also a beautiful example of integration. Of course there are "plateaus" in the learning curve, periods when no progress seems to be made, but these are often merely preparatory to a rather quick shift to a higher level of performance.

While the integrative character of learning is most evident in the field of muscular coordination, it is found in the realm of thought and ideas as well. We suddenly "see" the solution to a puzzle; "all in a flash," as we say, there is insight into a previously baffling problem. In a similar manner we often acquire attitudes. It comes to us all of a sudden that Bill Smith is an unpleasantly ambitious person who is really trying to exploit us and who would

sacrifice any of his friends to get ahead. A lot of facts we had already known about Smith's personality now fit into a pattern and we understand him and know how we feel about him much more completely and definitely than before.

Though the discovery of Smith's true character may be a shock to us, still we are relieved to have *organized* our varied reactions toward him. It is the same with all physical and all social objects in the complex and confusing environment in which we live. We must reduce them to some sort of order and consistency, classify them and develop unified patterns of response toward them. We cannot exist in a world of anarchy, and since our habits are our world they must be synthesized and organized somehow. This ability to put sensory experiences and muscular and glandular responses together in patterns or, on the ideational side, to combine scraps of information into generalizations, emotional reactions into organized attitudes, is found especially in human beings and is basic in human personality.³

Learning by imitation. In teaching the novice, one of the things the golf professional does is to swing the club in the proper manner himself. The beginner looks on and then tries to move the club in the same way as the teacher; he tries to *imitate* the teacher's motions. As those who play golf know from sad experience, he does not at once miraculously succeed, for the skill is not acquired without long and arduous practice. Having a living model to follow does help, however, in the learning process of golfers as of human beings in general. Correspondence school instruction, where there are only pictures to imitate, is recognized to be teaching of an inferior sort.

Such a modest statement about the role of imitation in learning would not be disputed. It is only when the term is given a much greater significance, when it refers to an inborn drive or a native capacity, that we enter the realm of controversy. For a long time man and his animal cousins, the primates, were supposed to be

³ For a more extended discussion of the integration principle see Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 89-92, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1928; C. J. Herrick, "Factors of Neural Integration and Neural Disorder," in *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, I. Madison Bentley, ed., pp. 197-215, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1934; I. Madison Bentley, *The New Field of Psychology*, pp. 175-190, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934; C. M. Child, "Biological Foundations of Social Integration," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 22, pp. 26-42, 1928.

endowed with a strong urge to copy the behavior of fellows. Laughing when others laugh, listening when others listen, running when others run, crying when others cry, these and many other similarly frequent types of "imitative" behavior were offered as illustrations of a general inborn imitative tendency which pervaded all phases of social life. Today we are much more skeptical of the "instinct to imitate." If we run when we see others run, it is because we infer from past experience that they are running from something dangerous or to something interesting or exciting. Since we wish to avoid danger and since we like excitement—not because we are impelled to do so automatically, instinctively—we put ourselves in rapid motion too. It is the same with so-called imitative laughter. We laugh with others at the same amusing circumstances; we laugh perhaps to hide the fact that we missed the point of the joke that has so amused them; we laugh for conviviality; we laugh because it is expected of us; we laugh to cover pain, defeat, or disappointment. So while we actually do imitate others in the sense of mimicking their behavior, we have some reason other than instinct for it. The urge to imitate breaks down on analysis into a series of more specific desires or wishes. Imitation is simply one among many techniques we employ to get the things we usually want out of life.

So much for the instinct of imitation viewed as a drive. Now how about it viewed as a capacity? The golf illustration shows that we cannot always imitate perfectly even when we ardently desire to do so. Other examples chosen from almost any field of learned activity would bear out the conclusion that a general imitative capacity does not exist any more than does a general imitative urge. The presence of a model in learning plus the desire to reproduce the model is not enough to guarantee performance. The model may be useful in focusing *attention* on significant phases of the act to be learned (the golf professional watches the ball, not the club, while swinging and so, therefore, should we). But knowing the elements in a skill is not enough to integrate them into a smooth performance like that of the instructor. Imitation is therefore a factor of real but definitely limited importance in human learning: it is not a general capacity but simply a way of developing specific capacities. Certain habits can be acquired more easily if one can and will observe closely someone else's performance. Other habits, especially those concerned with one's own vegetative processes, with

activities involving rhythm and timing, or with feeling states and emotions, are acquired but little if any easier through force of example. They depend much more upon practice or the past experience of the individual concerned.⁴

Language and learning. The group of habits which we lump together under the title of language facility have to be learned in the same way as do all other habits. Once acquired, however, the language habits open up new possibilities in the whole process of learning and greatly facilitate the acquisition of all the other habit systems which go to make up the adult personality. For this reason we speak of the extensive use of language symbols as one of the important characteristics of the human learning process.

Commencing at the age of ten months or thereabouts John Jones begins to fashion some of his random babblings into meaningful syllables—in other words, starts to acquire a vocabulary. His first words (repetitions of simple sounds like “da-da,” “ba-ba”) are not so much names for objects or persons as handles for manipulating them. He utters the single word “ma-ma” with an inflection and accompanied by facial and other muscular movements which are in effect gestures. The result is to communicate to the understanding adult what is really a whole sentence (“Ma-ma come here” or “Ma-ma, do something about the pain in my insides”), although only one word has been said. Later John Jones assimilates the idea that everything has a name, and then the acquiring of a vocabulary of nouns goes on with extreme rapidity. Half of John’s 250 word vocabulary at two years will consist of names for objects and persons he sees around him,⁵ but many of them will still be used as “sentence-words” with the “I want” or “give me” still implied rather than expressed. True verbs, which constitute perhaps 15 per cent of the total verbal equipment of the two-year-old, increase rapidly in proportion thereafter, as do the other parts of speech. John begins to acquire a *grammar*, a technique for putting words together in socially meaningful combinations. Eventually he has a set of symbols and a way of using them which permit him to make his wishes perfectly clear to others. He can describe to

⁴ For a more extended treatment of the role of imitation in learning see Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-123; Ellsworth Faris, “The Concept of Imitation,” *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 367-378, Nov., 1926.

⁵ Cf. Dorothea McCarthy, “Language Development,” in *Handbook of Child Psychology*, Carl Murchison, ed., pp. 295-299, Clark University Press, Worcester, 1931.

himself and communicate to his playmates and to adults ideas about objects, situations, qualities, relationships, in fact all the phenomena in his own expanding universe, in symbolic terms.

With the acquisition of language symbols the learning process becomes greatly facilitated. Instead of learning from others by mere imitation or mimicry, the child can now understand definite instructions. Let us suppose the problem to be solved is that of learning to dress himself. In order to be able to perform this task the child must acquire a set of motor coordinations and place them in the proper sequences. With the aid of language the series of acts to be learned can be translated into abstract symbols while John Jones is told how to proceed and which garment to put on first. Then, after the attention is called verbally (perhaps supplemented by pointing) to the important elements in the solution, the task is shifted back from the symbolic realm to that of motor activity. John now tries to do not only what he has seen his parent do (imitation) but also what he has been *told*. A solution comprehended in terms of language symbols, a "mental" solution, is now with the aid of practice translated back into physical terms.

An even more important use of language habits is the storing up of past experience for future use. John's parent can bring to bear on the self-dressing problem John's last week's discovery that shoe laces are pulled through holes in the shoe just as string goes through his beads or that a pair of trousers has a front and a back side just as a picture or a clock has. "Pull through" and "front side" are language symbols generalizing experience and enabling the child to utilize already acquired (stored) knowledge in solving new problems. It needs only for the parent or teacher to point out the analogy between a part of John's past experience and his present problem situation for the "transfer of training" from one to the other to be made.

But of course John, or any other normally intelligent youngster, learns much for himself without instruction. Here too, although in a different and really more fundamental way, his language facility helps him to solve problems. As an infant John's attempts to get what he wants are, as we have seen, crude, fragmentary, and halting. He flies into a rage, he kicks, jerks, reaches, pulls, until by chance some of his actions better his situation somehow, solve at least partially his current problem. Placed repeatedly in the same situation, the infant comes gradually to sort out the

“successful” from the “unsuccessful” responses. He learns finally by what we call *trial and error* to do the right thing in order to get the rattle dangling above him or to avoid the bright light in his face.⁶ This sort of overt “try anything once” method of acquiring new habit patterns does not continue long the dominant type of learning in human beings. Just as soon as the individual can symbolize possible solutions to his problems he can try them out in his imagination, instead of overtly, and “see” whether they would likely be effective. When he actually does make a move it is after *covert* or mental trial and error has at least eliminated for this problem a large number of the possible responses in his repertoire. When John does finally act it is with such relevance to the problem that he appears to have had a flash of insight, a sudden integration of his responses with respect to the problem situation. The correct act, once made, is remembered and reproduced again in repetitions of the original circumstances, whereas this is not true except after long practice when the trial and error is not mental manipulation of symbols but actually overt.

This covert trial and error learning is perhaps simply another name for *thought*. When we think, we are using unspoken or “incipient” words, arranging them and rearranging them until they fit into a pattern which solves the problem that is upsetting us. Without a problem of some sort before us we are content to rely, as

⁶ Pechstein and Jenkins report an experiment illustrating trial and error learning by an infant: “The father displayed a gaudy and loud sounding rattle, a few inches above the chest of the young hopeful. . . . In response to the moving object and the resultant noise, the infant fixed his gaze, became somewhat rigid, then suddenly the arms and legs, tongue, lips, and other facial muscles, even those of the diaphragm and the internal organs which mediate crying, probably, were called into play. . . . In this mass of wriggling, flinging of arms, crying, cooing lies the basis for the successful reaching reaction. If the right hand bumps accidentally into this strange object in space, the grasping reflex of the fingers takes place, and in as unconscious a fashion, the right arm contracts and, the rattle is brought to the mouth. . . . Then, of course, the father takes the rattle from the child and, after the resultant crying has ceased and order is restored, the learning situation is again staged. Again appears the random out-going of energy into thousands of motor channels and again appears the accidental bumping into the rattle and bringing it to the mouth. In due order, and after many repetitions, the proper reaching reaction becomes selected and the remaining movements of the original response are inhibited.”—L. A. Pechstein and Frances Jenkins, *Psychology of the Kindergarten-Primary Child*, pp. 73-74, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Dewey says,⁷ upon the routine of established habits. We think only when we have to, when something happens to disorganize the habit routine.

Of course not all the symbols employed by the "mind" in thinking are necessarily parts of speech. Some of them are implicit gestures instead of implicit words, for facial expressions, arm movements, postural attitudes are also used on occasion to symbolize, to stand for, objects, qualities, or relations.⁸ Probably when most people have occasion to think about the custom known as "hitch-hiking" it is the crooked thumb pointing over the shoulder rather than the phrase "Please, mister, give me a ride" which comes to the mind most vividly. It is the gesture symbol rather than the verbal formula which takes first place in the imagination.

Words are, however, in general by far the most important forms of symbolization. The languageless feral child can hardly solve any but the most practical and immediate problems of existence. He can learn the use of a few simple tools by imitation, but the control of an automobile, the operation of an automatic dial telephone, or the manipulation of a slide rule will remain a closed book to him. They present problems that, without training in verbal symbolization, are beyond his grasp. Youngsters whose language development is, for some reason, retarded are in a similar if not as serious situation. They may sometimes acquire special skills, such as musical ability or drawing ability, but until they acquire vocabularies and greater verbal fluency they are cut off from many parts of culture.

Intelligence and learning. A person with more symbols to manipulate in thinking will be able to solve a greater variety of problems than one with less, provided that he can *use* this equipment, provided that he can actually rehearse events in imagination and draw conclusions that are pertinent. This latter ability to combine symbols into meaningful patterns is partly a result of practice, but it rests fundamentally on native capacities which are possessed in different degrees by different people. The most important and

⁷ Cf. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 172-180, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1922. See also J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, pp. 92-110, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931; George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 117-125, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934.

⁸ Cf. Margaret W. Curti, *Child Psychology*, pp. 203-210, Longmans Green and Company, New York, 1930.

generalized of these capacities is the one we have called "g," or general intelligence.⁹ While the relation of intelligence to learning ability has been dealt with to some extent in the preceding chapter there are one or two additional aspects, relating to the development of the "g" capacity as the individual grows toward maturity, that need to be discussed.

It has already been pointed out that what is inherited is a potentiality which may or may not be developed by actual use and training. It has perhaps not been made equally clear that this potentiality is, in a manner of speaking, not all potential at once. At the age of two years only a small proportion of John Jones' ultimate intelligence is actually matured and available to solve problems; John is a "mere child" and not too much is expected of him, but we know he will do better as he grows up. By the time he is four, John's nervous system is further developed and his learning ability, wholly apart from training, is considerably greater. But it is not until the middle teens (and in some individuals still later) that all of the intelligence which came with John's biological endowment is actually functional and ready, if needed, for use.

There are in fact three kinds of intelligence which it is important to distinguish one from another, if the development of John's or any other child's learning ability is to be understood. It will help, perhaps, if we list the three and assign symbols to them which we can use in the discussion to follow. They are:

1. *Potential intelligence* (g_p): the ultimate limit of inherited learning capacity, found in the mature adult. For each individual, g_p is fixed at birth, or rather at conception; g_p is inherited.
2. *Matured intelligence* (g_m): the proportion of g_p which has been developed by the growth process at a given age level; $g_p = g_m$ after age 17 or thereabouts.
3. *Trained intelligence* (g_r): a product of g_m (the available capacity) and experience in using that capacity. It is g_r that is actually applied to any given task.

Now all that an intelligence tester could hope to measure are the relative amounts of g_r possessed by John Jones or Joan Green

⁹ Size of vocabulary and "g" are, of course, not completely independent variables. Ability to learn a language (as well as to use it in problem solving) is in part a function of the general intelligence.

when compared with other children of the same age. If all the children in the group have had approximately similar schooling, however, and are of similar economic status, the training factor will be roughly (only very roughly!) the same for all and in comparisons will cancel. What is left are differences in g_m , the mental energy or intellectual power that the organism has available at the time to solve problems. But while it is helpful to be able to compare children with respect to the g_m they possess at the time, what we really would like to do is to compare their possibilities for development in the future. We want to know how much intelligence they will be capable of exhibiting as adults so that we can decide how much training it is worth while to give them. How to get from g_m to g_p is, then, the problem.

Let us suppose that the g_m of Joan Green at six years is one and a half times that of the average for other girls of the same age and of similar backgrounds. If this is so then one of two possible conclusions follow. Either Joan is going to reach her intellectual limits (her g_p) sooner than the average girl in the group, or else she is ahead of the others because she is going to develop farther, because her g_p is greater than those of the girls she is being compared with. While Joan may be, as we say, precocious—while she may be simply getting her mental growth early, so to speak—the chances are that this is not the case. Psychologists feel that it is a good average assumption to attribute Joan's high intelligence score at age six to a high g_p , which she is in the process of developing. In other words, they feel that the process of intellectual maturation in most children is orderly and continuous and, therefore, that the backward child does not suddenly become normal or the normal child superior without some change in environmental influence.¹⁰ Actually it is found that at eight years Joan's test performance will exceed that of the average eight-year-old of similar background again in about the same ratio ($1\frac{1}{2}$

¹⁰ The typical maturation curve for intelligence is probably roughly parabolic in form, with g_p as a horizontal asymptote that is approached fairly closely by the eighteenth year. At any earlier age the ratio g_m/g_p is approximately the same for all individuals of the same age and sex. Cf. Edward L. Thorndike et al., *The Measurement of Intelligence*, p. 466, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1926. See also Arnold Gesell, *Infancy and Human Growth*, pp. 136-163, 355-378, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928; F. S. Freeman, *Individual Differences*, pp. 219-255, Henry Holt and Company, 1934; Frank N. Freeman, *Mental Tests*, pp. 327-364, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1926.

to 1) as at age six, and the same is true at other ages up to maturity. The *intelligence quotient* or "IQ" of 150 which is assigned to Joan represents this ratio between her ability and that of the average. It remains roughly constant throughout her period of development, and if determined first when she is four or five it predicts, within limits,¹¹ that she will excel her age-mates all through her subsequent childhood. While subject to qualifications due to the impossibility of exactly equating environmental backgrounds (so as to get g_m instead of g_r) and to the fact that developmental rates are not exactly the same in all children, the IQ remains, when rightly interpreted, an extremely important diagnostic index. An IQ of 150 appears in only about two of every thousand school children. It is therefore regarded as an indication of very high g_p or potential intelligence and hence a justification for special training so as to develop the capacity to the full. An IQ of 100 represents the average amount of g_p , about that necessary to graduate from high school. IQs below 100 indicate less than average mental endowment; below 70 an individual is rated as definitely feeble-minded.

We cannot leave this question of intelligence rating without a warning against too cocksure prediction of a child's future possibilities from his IQ. The testing procedure itself is not infallible (there may be no desire to do well in the tests or there may be poor concentration on them), and there are cases on record where the IQ has not remained constant but has improved considerably at a subsequent test under better conditions.¹² Sometimes there has

¹¹ The Stanford-Binet tests begin at three years, "but there is reason to question the standardization of the Binet Scale for the ages below five and six." Cf. F. S. Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 234. The Gesell tests (Arnold Gesell, *The Mental Growth of the Pre-School Child*), which begin at birth and run through five years, have some predictive value for later development when the test results are combined with the results of observation by a skilled clinician. By themselves the Gesell test results must be interpreted with extreme caution.

¹² "In terms of the amount of change in IQ, practically all investigators agree in finding that about fifty per cent of the cases will vary by five points or less in either direction from the original quotient. They show, further, that the chances that the IQ will vary by ten points are about one in five; that it will vary by fifteen points, the chances are about one in twenty. Furthermore—although there is not complete agreement on all the points—it seems that no special influence on chances is exerted by the chronological ages of the subject or by sex membership."—From *Individual Differences*, by F. S. Freeman, copyright, 1934, by Henry Holt and Company, publishers.

been improvement in general health in the interim; sometimes a change in the attitude of parent or teacher has given the child a self-confidence previously lacking. The whole matter is well summarized by Gardner and Lois Murphy and we cannot do better than to quote from them in concluding the discussion of intelligence and learning:

. . . neither a moron nor a person of average intelligence is likely to develop a level of outstanding brilliance through improvement in environment; and conversely, . . . a mind of distinctly high caliber is not likely to appear definitely inferior as a result of poor environment; but . . . it is quite possible if not probable that, in general, slightly below average performance may be improved through environmental changes to somewhat above average performance. From the point of view of the individual, or the educator, or of the social scientist who is weighing democracy in the balance, this possibility is of the greatest moment. Even if every street cleaner's son may not be a great engineer, he may perfectly well be a surveyor or a postal clerk; and a general raising of average IQs even of five points may have far flung consequences.¹³

Summary. We may now sum up this discussion of the modes and methods of habit formation in human beings. The learning process is one of integration of fragmentary responses into larger and more differentiated wholes; at the same time it is one of specialization of responses to meet a wider and wider variety of separately discriminated situations. The process takes place in part through experimentation—trial and failure, trial and success—on one's own. However, as language habits are accumulated the rest of the learning process is speeded up, for it is then possible to receive instruction in highly condensed form and also to experiment with ideas and images instead of with motor acts. With the aid of symbols the learner can rehearse in his imagination the role he is going to enact; he can criticize it and then modify and perfect it before he actually tries it out on the stage.

There are highly important individual differences in learning capacity. From their parents children inherit each a certain legacy

¹³ Gardner and Lois B. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, p. 107, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

of abilities and aptitudes, but while some of the principal of this bequest is available for use at birth it is impossible to touch all of it until the individual is almost grown. As soon as any part of the inherited intellectual capital becomes available through maturation, it must be put to use. If employed in the various enterprises of the organism it will, in effect, multiply and allow the individual to expand still more his operations, to solve more and more different kinds of problems. On the other hand, if intelligence is not developed through use it will, like money in a vault, bring no interest and eventually be taxed away. Since it is impossible, however, to live as an independent person in a complex society without using most of the wit one is endowed with there is little fear that the child's fund of mental energy will not be put out at some sort of interest. The question is rather one of whether the investment made is the best possible under the circumstances. Will socialization in his case produce a personality that utilizes to the full his resources of native ability? Or will many of the aptitudes remain latent and undeveloped? It is the function of the educational institutions (in the broad sociological sense of the term) so to direct the learning process as to put native capacities to work.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Through learning, original human nature is rapidly modified. It is now time to ask what results from this process of remaking the biological organism. What are some of the changes that take place in the individual as he acquires the attributes of personality? The most important change is the acquisition of a set of *attitudes*. Since this term "attitude" is another of those found indispensable in sociology, we must pause to define it rather carefully before we proceed.

What is an attitude? An attitude is an acquired predisposition to act in a certain way toward a specific object or person or in a specific situation; it is a tendency to respond that exists previous to the response itself. To illustrate and make concrete this rather abstract definition, let us note some of the attitudes of the movie-goer. Before leaving home to attend the performance he has what might be called a recreational attitude; he is set to "have a good time." Perhaps he has an admiring attitude toward

the featured ingénue and consequently a hopeful attitude toward the picture which, because of her part in it, he is predisposed to enjoy. Some people have a chronic fear of being late for a performance and have therefore a tendency to rush unduly, an attitude of haste and tension which they would be better off without. Some people like noisily to crunch pop-corn in the theater, and this predisposition is an attitude also. In fact all things we are set to do in connection with the movies are movie-going attitudes, tendencies to behave in such and such a way at various stages of the movie-attending process.

Now if you know my attitudes you can, within limits, predict my conduct. You know that I, being the "hurrying type," will arrive at the picture house too early and have to stand around until the previous performance is finished. You know what kind of plots and actors I detest and what kinds I like, so that you can tell whether I am going to have the good time I went for. The same will be true of my other activities. Once you suspect I am in love with a certain girl you will not be surprised if I see much of her, look hopelessly adoring in her presence one minute and masterful and possessive the next. Of course you cannot predict just when I will "pop the question" for you cannot tell just when an appropriate situation for the bended knee will present itself. Perhaps, too, I have a lovelorn but not a marrying attitude. Or I may not know what my "intentions" are myself.

All attitudes are habits in the sense that they are the results of past experience; they are tendencies toward forms of behavior which the organism has learned during its lifetime to make. Reflexes are not attitudes until they have been integrated into patterns and tied to new stimulus-situations. This happens so soon, however, that the new-born infant has attitudes toward feeding almost after the first time he has been fed. But while attitudes are habits, not all habits are attitudes. The attitude has a dynamic quality about it which some habit patterns lack; it involves an *evaluation* of the object or situation toward which or in which it is called out. Thus tennis playing is a skill made up of habits, but the urge to play the game or the confidence one has in one's cross-court forehand drive (the tendency to use it when in a tight situation) are attitudes. Similarly, we can say that the procedure of getting to the office each morning is a routine of habit, but the distaste, frustration, and ennui felt each time at the thought

of another day's work ahead are attitudinal. They are as truly a part of the response to the situation, "Time to leave for the office," as are the kissing of the wife and the race for the train or street car. An attitude is "a state of mind toward a value"; the state of mind is a tendency to act toward the value in certain ways.

If attitudes are dynamic, how do they relate to the drives and instincts we discussed in the last chapter? The answer is evident. Drives underlie attitudes and profoundly condition them. Attitudes are drives or segments of drives that have become, through learning, attached to external values. The periodic hunger urge remains throughout the lifetime of the individual and it is a part of all dietary preferences, special tastes for this or that food or this or that way of serving. These preferences, together with the shorter list of dislikes for certain dishes, comprise our gastronomic attitudes. In the same way the reproductive urge accounts for our general interest in the other sex, but not for our particular tastes or predilections. As for gregariousness, acquisitiveness, pugnacity, these are now considered by most psychologists to be simply names for very general attitudes in which the instinctive drive component, if present at all, is unidentifiable. We have to know who the individual wishes to associate with, what he seeks to acquire, and under what circumstances he will fight (in other words the specific values toward which the attitudes are directed) if we are to predict his behavior with even the least pretense of assurance.

Social attitudes. In the broad sense, all attitudes are social attitudes. As the child grows up he acquires attitudes toward inanimate objects and impersonal forces as well as toward people, institutions, and issues, but the significances which the objects and forces come to have for him are in large part culturally, that is socially, determined. If one acquires an attitude toward a particular tree, for instance, or toward thunderstorms, it will usually be because a particular tree or thunderstorms in general have been singled out for general social attention. The tree is of a species that makes good lumber, or it is a tree in which there nests a bird whose song was imitated last week in a bird lecture on the radio. Thunderstorms are indications of divine bad temper, or they promise cooler weather, or they always come along just at the time to interrupt baseball games at the most exciting part. Atti-

tudes toward these phenomena created by nature are tinged with the experience of previous generations and are seldom developed entirely *de novo* by the individual himself.

Attitudes toward persons. But if we grant anew the point that has been made repeatedly before, namely that man's personality is chiefly the result of socialization, then we may, without doing injustice to this principle, admit that some attitudes are more thoroughly social than others. Obviously the most "social" of all attitudes are those toward other persons. Since we learn chiefly through the agency of those about us, interpersonal attitudes are of fundamental importance in our lives. We can so seldom consider a fact apart from its source, an opinion apart from our reaction to the person who delivers it, that almost all our equipment of attitudes are subtly colored by our personal relations, past and present. The closer and more intense the relationship, the greater will be the influences on the personalities, on the attitudes of each party to the tie between them. It was to give emphasis to this well-known fact that Professor Cooley put forth¹⁴ his now famous classification of *primary* and *secondary* groups.

A primary group, according to Cooley, is one in which a relatively small number of people, certainly not more than fifty or sixty, are in "relatively lasting *face-to-face association* for no single purpose, but merely as persons rather than as specialized functionaries, agents, or employees of any organization."¹⁵ The family is the most universal of primary groups; others are the old-fashioned neighborhood, the spontaneous play-group of children, and the college fraternity. All groups which are not properly classified as primary belong in the secondary category. There may be intermittent face-to-face contact in secondary groups, as in the student body of a large high school, or the group members may be so widely distributed as to make direct contacts impossible. Secondary associations in any case are not intimate ones, and they usually are for some special purpose, such as electing a list of candidates to office (the political party), getting a high school diploma (the student body), or worshiping God in one of the conventionally approved ways (the religious sect).

¹⁴ Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 23-31, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1929.

¹⁵ Charles H. Cooley, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, p. 55, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933.

Of all groups, primary and secondary, the family is undoubtedly the most important in shaping attitudes. The child's earliest needs and desires are satisfied through the agency of parents or thwarted by them. The result is that the child develops attitudes of dependence, confidence, and trust, of domination and exploitation, or of fear, humiliation, and hatred toward the persons who minister to or stand in the way of its aims. The attitudes developed toward parents are carried over and color the relationships with other people. Thus the spoiled child who has been able to get anything it wants from doting and not-too-wise parents will expect to exploit friends and acquaintances in the same way. The following extract from a student's autobiography illustrates how through the influence of over-fond parents (in this case grandparents) unwholesome attitudes in out-of-the-home social contacts may be formed:

When I was about four years old my mother's father and mother came to live with us. My grandfather was very ill and died a few years later, and my grandmother remained in the home. She was too good to my sister and myself. She took over, as work she liked to do, the cooking and sewing. She never let my sister or myself help her in any way . . . ; she would do anything for us and we came more and more to rely on her and gradually we began to expect her to do things for us which we were perfectly capable of doing ourselves. We came to expect people to do more for us than they are willing to do. I have come to realize that not everyone will do things for me, but even now, I find myself expecting to be waited on by individuals, expecting to receive more than I give. It requires double the effort for me to volunteer my services and to help any one, and in certain situations, similar to the ones at home, it would not even occur to me to help, though being conscious of the fault helps to overcome it. I found when I visited my cousin, that for a while it did not even occur to me to help clear the supper dishes, till suddenly I realized it was not my right to receive such services from her. Sometimes at school I find myself leaving the girls to do for me what I would hesitate to do for them.

The grandmother's influence here, while important, was after all only a minor one in the long run, since the student already has an attitude of disapproval toward her own uncooperativeness. But

family influences may be—in fact, usually are—responsible for much more basic attributes of personality; indeed, the whole pattern of personality in the child may be an adjustment to some particular parent-child relationship. Today we hear much of the over-loving mother who attaches the child to her by a “silver cord” of so intense and strong affection that there is no room left in the child’s life for other close personal relationships. When such a tie persists until adolescence or until maturity it prevents love affairs with the opposite sex and interferes seriously with the normal process of mating. The “victim” of the too-great maternal affection becomes an “old maid” or a “perennial bachelor,” unable to break the strong habits that have been stamped in in childhood, unable to relegate mother love to its proper place in the hierarchy of an adult’s affections.

Of course, if too much parental affection is bad, too little is perhaps even more so. The unwanted child will face life with a fearful handicap. He will crave the affection other children get from their parents but which is denied him. He will either become sensitive, retiring, uncertain in his attitudes, feeling that he is “different” because he has not loving parents as his playmates have, or else he will grow bitter, resentful, full of hate. Even in mild degree uncertainty as to parental love is likely to warp the child’s attitudes. The adopted child, even though he is treated the same as are the foster parents’ own children, still cannot help feeling there is a difference between his status and theirs:

When I was seven my father died. A year later my mother’s death left me a complete orphan and I was adopted by an aunt and uncle whom I adored. There were five cousins, three girls and two boys, all of them older than myself. I was extremely fond of them all and since my mother and I had shared a private home with them after my father’s death, the change in my life was not very difficult to make. There was no reason why I should not have been extremely happy. Only a few, however, who are not orphans themselves realize the problems which have to be faced. My aunt and uncle are the kindest people in the world. I became one of their children and was treated by them just as were their own children. But there was, of course, something lacking. Or rather, shall I say, there was something added. That was my own self-consciousness of the situation. Though rather young to really understand my position in the house,

old friends who came to visit made me see that I was different. I realize now that they were only extremely tactless but well meaning people and cannot really be angry with them. However, the result of their words of advice about being "sufficiently grateful" and "do you realize how kind your aunt and uncle are"—you can imagine the sort of thing—had extremely bad results. First of all it made me terribly self-conscious. I was afraid that every person I came into contact with was pointing me out and talking about me. I became very shy and mortally afraid of meeting people. For some strange reason, I got the idea that my aunt was ashamed of me. As soon as a stranger entered the home, I would disappear into my room and a steam engine couldn't drag me out. I spent a great deal of time reading and had only a few friends. As I grew older, I of course grew out of a number of my fears. I became more sociable, and found I enjoyed being with people. But I never did really get over my fear of meeting older people or of meeting boys.

Next to the family in its influence on interpersonal attitudes is the children's play-group of age-mates. From three years of age on, the typical boy is in almost daily contact with one or more playmates, and the role which he adopts in this group is likely to be the one played in other group relations the whole life through. If he is the leader, if he commands the loyalty and obedience of his fellows in the play-group, his "gang," his circle of intimates, he will acquire confidence in himself and executive attitudes toward others. If on the other hand the boy is the "tailer," a just-tolerated member of the "bunch," a near outsider, if he is bullied and teased and can do nothing about it, he is going to be unsure of himself in contacts with his fellows for years thereafter. Constant defeat in personal relations may make him wary, shifty, even underhanded; it may simply make him self-conscious and tongue-tied, or it may lead to withdrawal from as many social contacts as possible to avoid the expected (and often imaginary) snubs and sneers. Sometimes, however, the unadjusted member of the play-group stages a big "comeback" later. Since the failure sets more store by success than one who is always succeeding, the boy who fails to get recognition at first may be led to redouble his efforts. By sacrificing other things and by concentrating his energies he may eventually achieve power, and with it some of the respect, that means so much to him. But if the early failures were poignant

at the time their effects will still linger. Relaxation and sense of proportion may have been lost while making the great effort. One may have gained power and yet not have the affection and loyalty that go to the man who, having always succeeded, can evaluate success more nearly at its true worth.

The girl's personality is affected by her play-group contacts equally as much as is the boy's. Her group is likely to be smaller, the relations more confidential and intimate, but the girl's clique is no less exclusive, no less hard on those who do not measure up to its standards, than the boy's gang. To be an accepted member of either group and not an outsider is to lay the basis for easy personal relations, for liking people (because you know they like you), for recognizing individual differences in abilities without a sense of inferiority because you know that while you have faults which your friends deplore you have virtues also which they respect. The nursery school movement, with its effort to introduce three- and four-year-olds to group play under carefully controlled conditions, is a recognition of the value of training in the art of getting along with others at as early a time as possible in the life of the individual. It is also a recognition of the importance of controlling by careful supervision the quality of the associations so that all children derive benefit and not harm therefrom.

Attitudes toward mores and institutions. The attitude of the socialized person toward the mores and institutions of his society can be characterized by such words as acceptance, adherence, conformity, reverence, loyalty, and belief. These attitudes have to be acquired if the individual is to function as an adult in any culture. A person may perhaps be critical of a few of the sacred dogmas and violate a few moral precepts of his society without being thrust out of the group, punished, or regarded as a harmless crank or a case of insanity, but the list of eccentricities must not be too long or involve too great heresy. This being true, the child is faced with the necessity of acquiring orthodox attitudes as a part of his process of growing up.

That these attitudes are developed as easily (almost automatically) and painlessly as they are in most children is due again to the influence of primary groups, and especially to the family. In a hundred different aspects of living the child takes his parents as models.

If his parents are critical of the school and his teachers, he reflects this attitude by rebellion or antagonism. If he feels that his parents are fair in their judgments of his own mistakes and misbehavior, the child gets an attitude of fair play which he carries on in his own relations with the people he meets. Whether he considers the rights of the other people depends more upon his experience in his family than upon oft-repeated precepts. His attitude toward work may be a repetition of that of his parents. Even his sense of humor is largely dependent on the family mood.¹⁶

Parental ideas of what is right and proper in matters of sex conduct, religious belief, race and class attitude, patriotic loyalty, political affiliation, as well as parental convictions about what is and what is not beautiful, all are assimilated by the child without his really knowing it. He acquires them by imitation from his parents and they are reinforced and further stamped in by contacts with neighbors. Unorthodoxy is also defined by parental disapproval and neighborhood gossip, and while it is true that there is always some rebellion against the ideas of the older generation, especially during adolescence, hundreds of attitudes are accepted for one rejected.

In our society there is perhaps a larger permissible range of variation in economic, moral, religious, and political attitudes than in primitive cultures; consequently, our younger generation is in a position to be more critical of parental viewpoints and still not be regarded as dangerously radical or criminally irreverent. The following document illustrates a typical reaction of the modern college student to parental ideas:

I have reacted considerably against some of my early home training, mostly in belief but not in habit. For example, while I would not say I drink, smoke, swear, etc., I have, on occasion, done all three, have found them at least explainable if not justifiable at some times, and do not feel such things as morally wrong. At home I never go to the show or play cards on Sunday. Here I do, if I choose to, and do not do it in a sneaking way either, for I feel the same way at home, but refrain out of deference to my parents' feelings

¹⁶ Edith N. Burleigh, "What Is Environment?" *The Family*, vol. 8, p. 318, Jan., 1928. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

on the subject. I feel that my ideas are based on a much stronger base than they used to be.

Of course, for the maximum parental influence to be exerted, the relationships between parent and child must be based on mutual trust and confidence. When there is basic antagonism on the part of the child toward the parent the tendency is to react against, rather than to accept, parental attitudes and to escape from home ties as much as possible. One student reports:

My home ties, which were more like shackles to me, have been pretty well severed by my coming to college. Although I have returned home for every vacation but the last one, I have not looked forward to it, and have had a streak of the "blues" for one or two weeks after each one. I write home once a week, a general family letter, telling about such general things as banquets, crew, competitions, etc., with little reference to my personal life, or specific detail; or my ideas and feelings. I do not ask advice on any problems, for I know by experience in many discussions that my views and ideals are at the opposite pole from those of the family as a whole. I receive a letter of the same caliber once every two or three weeks from my aunt. The only vital thing left in my relationships with home is antagonism, and though I deplore that, I cannot change it without completely reforming myself, which I am unwilling to do.

Usually, however, the inevitable differences in attitude between the older and the younger generation remain essentially minor when compared with the vast number of similarities. Cultural continuity would be impossible if this were not the case.

REFERENCES

See end of chapter 9.

Chapter 9

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (*Continued*)

HERMAN SCHMIDT—THE FAILURE¹

“I DON’T KNOW WHY they do it,” said Herman Schmidt, “but they are always electing me to something. The first thing I know, I’m editor of the school paper and then I’m president of the dramatic club and pretty soon I’m chairman of the prom committee. I’m not worthy of these honors—I can’t do these things. I don’t know why they shove me into it.”

“You were president of your class in high school, weren’t you?”

“Yes, twice, I guess. Or three times. But I shouldn’t have been. They don’t know what a dud I am or they wouldn’t do it. I’m the lowest of the low and I ought to be kicked out of polite society. I’ve just got ’em all fooled. I don’t intend to fool them. It’s a terrible predicament. . . . If they really knew me they’d despise me. . . .”

SELF-ATTITUDES

It is Herman Schmidt’s misfortune to see himself as a failure even though others regard him as a success. In what should be his greatest moments he is doomed to feel unhappy and thwarted because he has a distorted picture of himself. While Schmidt’s tragedy is perhaps not a common one, we all, in minor degree, suffer from self-portraiture that is either inaccurate and self-misleading or else is too revealing for our own good. How do we acquire *self-attitudes*, our views of our own personality? So far (in the previous chapter) we have been concerned with a person’s attitudes toward other persons and toward culture objects, toward things, symbols, rules of conduct, institutions, issues. It is now

¹ Reprinted from *The Human Mind*, by Karl A. Menninger, by permission of and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publishers.

time to consider his attitudes toward an object much more important to him, namely *himself*.

Of course the infant does not at first have attitudes toward himself any more than toward any other objects. Self-attitudes, like all other attitudes, are acquired by the learning process. It is some time, in fact, before the child can even define the purely physical limits of his personality, before he knows that his foot is in much more permanent and intimate relationship to "him" than is his rattle, before he can differentiate between visible and touchable things that are a part of his body and those that are not.

But the thing we call "the self," while it has a nominal residence somewhere in the body, is not the same thing as the body. As we have seen,² primitives believe that the self can leave the body to go on excursions. Today many people feel that the self survives after the body's dissolution, and that it survives amputation of parts of the body there can be no doubt. What, then, is the self and how do we develop attitudes toward it?

Definition of the "self." "By self is meant that which is designated in common speech by 'I,' 'me,' and 'myself.'"³ The jocular phrase, "I gets along with me pretty well," or the statement, "I know myself to be of such and such a type," bring out the unique character of the concept. The self is that part of the human personality which has attitudes that are reflexive, that are directed toward itself as an object or value. The "I" condemns or approves of, is pleased or displeased with a thousand things the "me" does or fails to do. When the moral standards of society are involved, then the "I" plays the role of *conscience*, when it is prestige that is particularly at stake, the "I" becomes the *ego*. But conscience and ego are only phases of a more inclusive self-consciousness which all socialized human beings possess but which animals do not, or at least only in rudimentary form. The human self includes all of the self-regarding attitudes, is in fact composed of them. It is a general picture of what the person thinks he himself is really like.

Now the important thing to note about this self-portrait is that it is not an original, created mysteriously out of the "mind" of the personality. A's picture of himself is a kind of composite

² Cf. *supra*, p. 125.

³ C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell, and L. J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, p. 117, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933.

copy made from a large number of different models. The models are the sketches of A which exist in the minds of the people about him. Of course A cannot tell just what B and C and D think of him; he can only guess as to their attitudes and frequently his guesses are very wide of the mark. The mirror in which he sees himself is then cracked or distorted and he is unjustifiably elated or unwarrantedly depressed because of good or bad ideas of himself he wrongly imputes to others. But whether right or wrong as to the attitudes others have toward him (and he is always partly one and partly the other) it is only through some estimates of the judgments of others concerning him that A can come to have judgments of his own about himself. The self is therefore always a social self (a "looking glass self," Cooley calls it⁴) because the individual must experience other selves, and become conscious that they have attitudes toward him, before the idea of "himself" can have any concrete meaning.

The genesis of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness must therefore develop along with and as a part of social consciousness. The infant, like the animal, has at first only organic needs, drives, urges, the goodness and the rightness of which he does not question. Soon, however, he becomes sensitive to parental gestures of approval and disapproval; he comes to look forward to his mother's smile and to feel unhappy in a vague sort of way when she frowns. As soon as the young child acquires language facility, the attitudes of the persons around him toward his actions and demands are made more explicit and are understood more clearly. He develops reciprocal attitudes toward those who have attitudes toward him. He "loves" his mother because she ministers to his desires and takes his part against his father. Perhaps he is afraid of and dislikes his father because that parent thwarts his wishes and subjects him to unpleasant discipline. But the child at this stage does not have attitudes toward himself. Paternal disapproval is simply paternal disapproval and not a cause for self-depreciation; mother love is mother love and has not yet led to self-love. Other people have become objects or values toward which the child has attitudes, but the self is still not "a social object in the child's experience" and he does not yet reflect upon his own desires,

⁴C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and The Social Order*, p. 184, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, revised edition, 1922.

capabilities, and conduct, comparing them with those of others. That is a further step, and one which requires explanation. How does it come about?

The social psychologist, George Herbert Mead, has put forward⁵ a theory to explain how self-attitudes develop from social attitudes. Self-consciousness arises, he says, through "taking the role of the other," first in the dramatic play of early childhood and later in the many cooperative activities of late childhood and adolescence. Finally one comes to take the role of a "generalized other" which is community opinion, the attitudes of "society," the mores, and learns to see oneself in the light of the standards that obtain in the culture in which one was brought up.

What does all this mean? What is "taking the role of the other"? Let us illustrate with the case of little Gertrude, aged four, who is trying to play mother to her doll. Gertrude gives her dolly supper and puts it to bed with a routine of tucking-in, prayer-saying, and "good-nighting" with which Gertrude is all too familiar. The doll naturally does not like all the food that is set before it and has to be coaxed and cajoled by Gertrude to "eat it all up"; the doll does not want to go to bed either, and stern discipline is necessary—which Gertrude, enacting the role of mother, supplies. But of course the doll cannot have or express all these aversions to its "mother's" wishes. Gertrude has to enact the role of the doll as well as that of the mother—first she is doll and then mother and then doll again. Since the doll to all intents and purposes exhibits Gertrude's own reactions to her own supping and going-to-bed experience, they can be thought of now as objectified, taken out of Gertrude and put where Gertrude can get a good look at them. They are also linked up with the attitudes of the mother toward them. Gertrude in the role of the mother is conscious of attitudes of disapproval toward Gertrude in the role of the doll; in other words Gertrude through taking the role of the mother, an outsider, an *other*, has developed attitudes toward herself. In other similar types of dramatic play Gertrude enacts the roles (as her experience enables her to conceive them) of different "others," of father kissing her good-bye and going to the office in the morning, commenting on how well she looks in her

⁵ In *Mind, Self and Society*, pp. 135-226, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934; and earlier in several journal articles.

starched dress (she is a neat little girl); of lady callers visiting mother and being very polite and conventional; of the kindergarten teacher keeping order in the classroom (some children are naughty, but I'm good!) in the game called "playing school." Gertrude's conversation between the "I" playing the role of the other and the "me" playing herself serves further to define self-consciousness by forcing her to see herself through the eyes of other people. Her self becomes defined as a composite of the roles she has to play in response to the assumed (and dramatically enacted) roles of others.

Mead points out⁶ that when a cooperative play-group is formed, the enlargement of the self goes on much more rapidly. The basketball player has to know the roles played by his four teammates and he has constantly to take these roles in his imagination in order to predict what the other members of the team are going to do. If on a scoring play he fails to visualize the probable behavior of each member of the team correctly he will not be at the right place at the right time to play his part. And he knows what his teammates will think of *him* if he fails to do the right thing, because he knows what he thinks of *them* when they fail to play the roles he has learned by experience (or the coach has taught him) to expect of them. His opinion of his basketball ability will again be made up of the opinions he thinks other basketball players, the coach, and the student body have of his prowess. He will have a "basketball self" made up of his self-regarding attitudes concerning his abilities in that line of activity.

As we grow older, we acquire more and more different "selves" which grow out of activities we carry on in relation to different people. There is a "student self" based on our conception of our success or failure in the classroom; there is a self concerned with the opposite sex and our apparent ability to be either fascinating or boring; there is the self that relates to the role of "mother's pet" or "father's pride and joy" still played when we go home. Gradually these selves become fused into a single generalized self-consciousness which is, in effect, our conception of our role in society, our *status*, as we view it, in the general social group of which we form a part. But the fusion process is never complete. We always remain conscious of the fact that we have many different and mutually inconsistent self-regarding attitudes, that we

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

are "different persons" in different situations. Thus we are overbearing to inferiors and yet cringe before the boss; we are a "terror with the ladies" when on a business trip to the metropolis yet meek and domesticated when under the wifely eye at home. We say "I hardly knew myself" when some unassimilated fragment of our self-consciousness becomes suddenly the "I" which directs conduct. We talk realistically about conflicts between our better self and our worse, between conscience and the "devil within us," when we are faced with temptation and are trying to make up our minds what to do.

In general, however, by the time we are adults we know, or think we know, what sort of person we have turned out to be, because we think we know what is expected of us. We struggle to exceed these expectations, to surprise our friends and associates and improve our status, but meanwhile we know what that status is approximately. Thus:

. . . at forty John Smith is fairly sure that he is a good accountant, that his business associates respect him professionally and like him personally, and that he is a good husband and father, a solid man in the community, a pillar of the church. At the same time Smith knows that he does not rate in the esthetic circles (even his taste in neckties is execrable he has finally been forced to believe), that he is not a successful stock market gambler, and that, barring miracles, he will never break eighty on the golf course or be able to afford a yacht. He does not like to admit "to himself" these latter deficiencies, but they, like his virtues, are now a part of the role in society he has become used to playing. At his age he is about ready to accept this role as representing *him* as he is, and not as youthful dreams made him think he might be.

While John Smith's conception of himself will continue to change in some manner each day till his death, only a miracle or a catastrophe will now alter it fundamentally. Unless John suddenly gets a new religion, falls in love again, inherits a million dollars, or is "shell shocked" in an accident, his self-consciousness is going to remain in its main outlines pretty much the same until he dies.

The self and primary group experiences. John Smith at forty is fairly set in his ideas about himself, but what about John

Smith at thirty or at twenty? Of course it is obvious that since the self is something one acquires rather than something one is born with, the earlier in life one examines a self, the more flexible, the more potentially modifiable it will be found to be. What agencies shaped John Smith's self-consciousness, molding it into the form described?

At twenty the world was still pretty much John Smith's oyster. A "big man" in college, he could see himself through the eyes of admiring classmates as a sure-to-be-successful man. Of course he knew he had yet no very effective "way with the women" and his classroom averages were only respectable, not brilliant. But he had, he felt, proved that he could manage "activities" and that he could command public confidence. He felt he was "fairly well balanced," reasonably tolerant, and no worse informed about the world than others of his friends.

While John at twenty may perhaps not have been exciting company for the intellectual or the esthete, he is to be considered on the whole a lucky person. He had arrived at late adolescence with no serious personality distortions, with at least a fair idea of his abilities and disabilities, and with enough self-confidence and self-approbation to make him try out his powers and not too much to make others dislike him. John's successful adjustments in college helped to give him these healthy self-regarding attitudes, but their base of course was laid down earlier in his life history in contacts with primary groups. The fundamental attitudes in John's self-consciousness were acquired before he was ten through his home contacts and through the, for him, generally satisfying relationships of the playground group. His parents were careful to avoid emphasizing his childish incapacities; they were careful to stress his achievements rather than his inevitable awkwardness and failures, and without making him think he was "the most wonderful child ever" they conveyed to him the impression that he was at least as clever and capable as his age-mates. John also made good adjustment in his street-corner gang and with his school classmates. He was frequently the leader, but not always. He was never excluded from the group, never an "outsider."

The value of this sort of a childhood in building a self-conscious-

ness that will in later years promote mental efficiency and aid in achieving a reasonable degree of happiness is hard to realize. Only by studying what happens to personality when conditions like these do not obtain can one get a conception of John's general good fortune. So few children escape either having their egos, as we say in colloquial parlance, "over-developed" by parental babying and "spoiling," or "under-developed" by parental ridicule and disparagement! So few youngsters arrive painlessly at satisfying roles in the society of their age-group. We are all to some extent the victims of unwholesome relationships in the play-group or in the home.

Even relatively minor lapses in parental wisdom may have quite unfortunate influences on the child's self-feeling and, through this, on his behavior. Thus in the following autobiographical fragment the mother made the common mistake of characterizing her daughter to others while the daughter herself was present. The daughter reports:

I was quiet and reserved, particularly when not in an environment to my liking—my mother's company and friends was one of the latter. She has always introduced me to people with what appears to me to be a kind of apology, saying, "This is my Joan, she's kind of quiet, a serious kid." Such an introduction always sent me into my shell, and I became exactly as she had explained. Worse yet, my sister got this sort of a push, "This is my Carol, she's such a ray of sunshine." At this my sister would immediately beam. I simply hated these introductions. I was beaten before I started. On account of them I have always been at loss with my mother's friends. . . . Little wonder it is if friends of the family and relations regard me as a sort of monstrosity, as backward, dull, and uninteresting.

The result of the mother's lack of judgment was to drive Joan still further into her shell and make it even more difficult for her to acquire self-confidence in relations with adults. In spite of herself Joan played the role her mother defined for her.

When the child has some speech defect, some physical blemish or any observable traits different from the ordinary, great care has to be exercised to avoid "feelings of inferiority" as a result. In the following document the effect of physical incapacity on play-group adjustment and thus in turn on self-consciousness is illustrated:

I was very unfortunate in having a weak and emaciated body during my early years due to a chronic ailment which had beset me. I had little opportunity to come into active contact with others of my age, for I could not participate in the games which they played. I looked on with envy from my seat at the edge of the walk, and prayed that I too might be able to join in the gamboling of my age-mates. I was further handicapped by my inability to ascend or descend stairs. I very soon acquired the obnoxious name of "mama's boy."

To rid myself of this undesirable appellation, I often tried my hand at games which my fellow age-mates participated in but, due to my infirmity, I found it difficult to perform with any degree of skill. Active play was not to be mine, however, for a "dub" was unwanted. Thus my efforts to be one of the boys proved themselves to be very futile. After all the derision I could endure, I gave up my feeble efforts to play with them, and retired into myself by reading books and engaging in games of my own making.

These games and books kept me quite well amused, and gave me more satisfaction than I had heretofore had in the company of my fellows. No longer did I fear mockery, for I was "I" and all that mattered was pleasing and amusing myself. The gibes of my play-mates were forgotten and I became somewhat of a recluse.

In this manner time sped on so that by the time I was ready for secondary school, I found that I had acquired no friends at all. In secondary school, a large urban coeducational institution, I found myself still unadjusted in spite of the fact that my infirmity had been cured. I was unaccustomed to friendships and associates, and even though my environment had been changed, I was at loss in endeavoring to have social intercourse in my new surroundings. The old fear of ridicule had not left me as yet.

This individual remained "socially backward," as he put it, until he was well along in college, but he did finally overcome most of his fears and acquire some facility in social relations. Not all victims of ridicule and derision in childhood are so fortunate. Many times the feelings of inferiority developed in connection with some specific set of activities, such as athletics, radiate and permanently affect phases of the self concerned with other activities. The individual comes to feel that he can do nothing well; he becomes introspective and hypercritical of his own efforts in every line because he believes, sometimes rightly but often quite wrongly,

that others are critical of them. Then he either tends to withdraw from all situations in which his incapacity may be "exposed," and this usually means from most social relations, or else he tries to cover up what he secretly fears is lack of ability with bluff, bluster, and seeming cockiness and overconfidence. Such a person is suffering from what has come to be called an "inferiority complex." A set or complex of fears about himself has become central and now dominates his self-consciousness. But while many, perhaps all, individuals have a few symptoms of the inferiority complex, are given to worry about their competence in some type of activity or other, there are not as many victims of the complex in its pathological form as one might think from the way the term is used in everyday conversation. When a person has a real inferiority complex he is verging on the neurotic; he is seriously handicapped in achieving his life purposes. In the next chapter further consideration will be given to personalities of this type.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISHES

One more category of attitudes remains to be considered, namely, that of *wishes*. An attitude is, as we have seen, always directed toward an object or situation, but in many cases the tendency to react toward the object or situation in question and the type of reaction that the person is set to make cannot be explained or understood except as modes of behavior that have grown habitual. Thus the reason why I am set to avoid eating chocolate éclairs whenever possible is long since forgotten, and all that I can say now about my motives in declining the delicacy is that I prefer something else. My dietary likes and dislikes have no particular purpose back of them, except that of avoiding starvation in as comfortable a way as possible. They are like the folkways in that their only justification is simply that they exist and I am used to them.

But suppose I go into training for the college crew. Immediately my diet becomes of definite significance because it relates directly to a goal I have now set before myself, of making the crew and winning the big race. I can now explain to myself my refusal to eat éclairs and pastry; what is more, my friends, seeing me confine my menu to training-table diet, can also understand my behavior. It has acquired meaning in relation to the new desire for

athletic glory, and this desire has in effect integrated a whole group of food-consuming attitudes into a planned and meaningful whole. Social psychologists would say that I now had a *wish* motivating my conduct. The wish is simply the fact of tying together the attitudes into a purposive and functional unit. It is end and means all in one, an attitude-complex focused on a goal.

Once we understand the relations between wishes and attitudes a good deal of human behavior becomes explicable. Thus a politician has hand-shaking and baby-kissing attitudes toward his constituents which are intelligible only in connection with his wish to be elected, only as a means toward achieving the seat in Congress which is his goal. In the same way we can analyze student attitudes in relation to the more basic purposes which they serve and from which they derive meaning. The goal-situation toward which much class-attending, text-book-reading, professor-cajoling behavior of the college student is directed is the award on Commencement Day of a degree. That there is a "degree wish" motivating attendance at a given class does not mean, however, that the student is present because of that wish only. He may be there also to see his best girl or because he is interested in (has a wish to master) the particular subject matter dealt with. Which wish is most important in bringing the student to the particular classroom at the particular hour would of course be a matter for special determination. Perhaps the motives are so mixed as to defy analysis. But any "explanation" would have to be in terms of *some* wish or wishes, for these are the dynamic elements in personality. To really know a person and explain his behavior, it is necessary to know what he thinks he wants out of life.

The genesis of wishes. Wishes, of course, develop out of the original nature drives and organic needs discussed in the last chapter. But whereas the drive is a blind *push* from inside the organism, the wish is a *pull* from without.⁷ The energy mobilized originally to serve bodily needs is, in the wish, called out by perception or symbolization (imaging) of objects or values external to the organism. These latter are taken as goals and are pursued persistently, although sometimes intermittently, until the end is gained. In the process a wide variety of response patterns may be utilized and

⁷ Cf. J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, p. 137, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931.

the personality may be prepared, through attitudes, to use a great many others. *Persistence with varied effort* to achieve an external end or goal characterizes wish-motivated behavior.

Unfortunately it is one thing to say (quite truthfully) that the wishes develop out of original nature drives and another to explain just how the transition from drive to wish, from "push" to "pull," comes about. We have to begin with the vague feeling states of the child that are a part of the urges we call hunger, thirst, excretion, and the rest. The experience of hunger becomes *defined* in the child's mind in relation to the external food objects which in its experience have been primarily concerned in relieving the hunger pangs. The same is true of thirst and excretion; the former becomes the "I want a drink of water feeling," the latter (after long parental travail) the urge defined as "I want to go to the toilet." When hunger, thirst, and excretion have thus acquired definitions in terms of external objects or goal-situations they have become rudimentary wishes, yet they remain dynamic because of periodically recurring internal needs.

The young child's wishes are all of this relatively simple type; the goals are near at hand and can in many cases, if not in all, be related directly to one or another of the original nature drives listed in the last chapter.⁸ Not so, however, with the wishes of older people—they are complex and the goals are often far-distant, involving years or even a lifetime of directed effort. From whence comes the energy to attain an ambition to be a captain of industry, to write the "great American novel," to marry a countess, or to be ranked among the social élite? It is organic energy and it is an outgrowth of original nature, but the process of developing the wish for one of these goal-situations out of one or more of the vaguely defined original nature drives is too complicated to trace. As we have seen, the earlier tendency of psychologists was to work from the opposite direction. They took commonly appearing wishes of adults, like "to be with others" and "to acquire wealth," labeled

⁸ Of course it must be remembered that such "relating" involves considerable over-simplification and that the analysis is largely a purely verbal one. After all, the organic drive, *thirst*, is not a discrete entity. No two "thirsts" are ever exactly the same and any thirst experience has elements in common with "hunger," "pain-withdrawing," and other *named* urges. Similarly the goal-situation of the wish is constantly undergoing redefinition. To get any picture at all of human motivations a certain amount of over-simplification is necessary.

them as "instincts," and added them to the catalog of dynamic original nature traits. Thus for these particular wishes the problem was solved by abolishing it—each wish had its own separately inherited energy system. All that had to be explained was the kind of people one preferred to associate with and the form of wealth one wished to hoard.

It is now seen that this approach leads logically to indefinite multiplication of human instincts (one for each wish) or else it simply means adding a few more native drives which will in turn explain a few more, but far from all, the wishes that the adult personality develops. The first of the alternatives just mentioned is of course the extreme hereditarist position—man like the animals is driven by a large number of specific instincts. This view has already been shown not to fit the facts.⁹ The second alternative represents what might be termed a sort of middle position.¹⁰ There are some persisting instinctive drives in addition to the urges concerned with vegetative processes, but not enough directly to explain all the wishes of human beings. Explaining the others (for instance, the wish to travel or the wish to be well dressed) as outgrowths of one or more of the list of postulated instincts is, in our present state of knowledge, largely a matter for speculation and arm-chair theorizing. After all, is the travel urge basically play, acquisitiveness, curiosity, a greater gregariousness (the desire to see one's brothers in other lands), or a compound of all these instinctive tendencies? If it is a compound, as is probable, in what proportions do each of the instincts figure? Obviously it is impossible to say.

There is still another approach to the problem, exemplified by the Freudian group of psychologists. For them, all wishes are infused with a greater or less amount of a single type of energy. This energy, called *libido*, is basically sexual in nature, but is

⁹ Cultural variability is too great within the human species to admit of a purely instinctive explanation of human activities. Human society is not like that of ants.

¹⁰ Midway between extreme hereditarism and extreme environmentalism. The latter position is perhaps approached by R. S. Woodworth in his *Dynamic Psychology* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1925), where he argues that any purposive activity is capable of furnishing its own energy; it does not need to tap some one of a series of specific reservoirs furnished by heredity. See especially pp. 61-76, 104. See also John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 89-171, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1921.

capable of being directed into many at least outwardly non-sexual channels of behavior. There is an elaborate system of "mechanisms" or energy-diffusion patterns to explain how libido comes to be involved in such adult wishes as the desire to make a million dollars, or the longing to be a good bridge player. While social psychology has benefited much from some of the insights of Freud and his followers there is general unwillingness at present on the part of most of the socio-psychological fraternity to take over the Freudian doctrine *in toto*. The Freudian mechanisms (*sublimation, identification, projection, etc.*), while useful explanatory concepts in many cases, are not thought adequate to explain all wish behavior. And to call all energy sexual energy, even when the term sexual is broadened as it is by the Freudian school, is regarded still as a great over-simplification.¹¹

How far have we come in this somewhat theoretical discussion? We began with the assumption that individuals are born with certain organic urges connected with the processes of bodily functioning. Possibly they are also equipped with a few "instincts" or drives which lead the organism to make impacts of certain general types on its external environment. Through the learning process in general but in specific ways that are not yet worked out, these drives and instincts become tied up with a multiplicity of different goal-situations; in so doing they become wishes. Each personality strives to satisfy as many wishes as possible. One way, therefore, of explaining the behavior of a human being is to refer it to the particular wish or wishes which are the motivating factors behind it at the time.

But human personalities develop such a wide variety of different wishes! A wants to be elected governor, B desires simply to earn enough money to finance a trip to the "old country" before he dies, C's strongest wish is to break a motor-boat speed record. How account for these diversities in aims? We must remember first that for any personality the choice of wish-goals is from among those made available by culture. We desire only those things which have meaning in the society in which we have been brought up.

¹¹ A similar criticism may be made of Alfred Adler's well-known "individual psychology" which centers about a basic *will to power*. For an excellent and more detailed exposition and criticism of Freud's and Adler's theories, see R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, pp. 126-168, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1931.

But while culture defines the meaning of the terms "success" and "failure," in modern civilization especially there are many different kinds of success for which one may strive. Selection of particular goals from among the large number defined in the cultural background is a function of native capacities (one wants to excel in the fields in which one is equipped to do so) but even more an outgrowth of primary group influences. Contacts with parents, playmates, and neighbors subtly shape our ambitions just as they do all our other attitudes. Sometimes, of course, we react against the standards and aims of others who are close to us and choose different goals just to feel independent of parental pressure or neighborhood gossip. A negative influence is none the less an influence, however. In general, primary group relationships *affect* our wish systems much more than the more casual secondary contacts. They determine the *kinds* of wish-goals that will enlist our energies if not the specific ends for which we strive.

Classification of wishes. It is always a temptation to make out a list of personality aims and say, "These are what make up human nature." Often the list comprises terms so vague and general as to be virtually useless for real personality analysis or else, in the attempt to be specific, there is inevitable neglect of some of the many important personality traits. To find such a happy medium between these extremes as will help to increase and not to befuddle our insight into human personality is indeed difficult. Yet if one is to impose any organization on the bewildering complexity of human motivation, if one is to get any general picture of what human beings strive for most universally, an attempt at classification of the wishes must be made.

We shall try to safeguard ourselves against the error of expecting more from a mere classification than it can in logic yield us. After all, every set of categories reflects the bias of the author and his particular purpose in making it. In order, therefore, to avoid taking any one classification scheme too seriously three different sets of basic human wishes will be presented, each the product of a different social psychologist. All three sets of wish-categories will inevitably overlap since all are dealing with the same entity, human personality. They differ in emphasis and employ different terminology because they represent the ideas of three different people with different symbolizing habits (vocabularies) and different insights. But any one of the classifications singly, or still better, all

of them taken together, will tell something valuable about human nature because they emanate from careful students of the socialization process in human life.

The first of the three lists of basic personality aims comes from the late Russell Gordon Smith.¹² While different men have many different wishes Smith maintained that all human beings, in Western civilization at least, strive constantly to attain the following ends. These for him constitute the basic underlying wishes in personality:

1. *Heterosexuality*. In the narrow technical sense of the term, heterosexuality is to be contrasted with homosexuality. It is the tendency to take as primary love objects individuals of the opposite sex. Smith maintained with the Freudians that to react to this type of love object is not instinctive but is the normal result of being brought up in a society where heterosexual mating is the rule.¹³ But even in such a society not all individuals develop the heterosexual attitude. Some lean toward various types of homosexual fixation, some remain sexually inert.

Heterosexuality in this restricted meaning is a precondition for the attainment of heterosexuality in its broader implications; it is a *sine qua non* for a successful mating and a satisfactory married life. To arrive at a mature heterosexual love experience in marriage, uncomplicated by mother-fixations, "narcissus complexes," fear and shame in connection with childhood auto-eroticism, prudery, or frigidity, is in a puritanical society a real and difficult achievement. Yet to find the ideal mate and to achieve the ideal marriage is the most deeply cherished wish of nearly everybody at some time or other. Because the goal is difficult to attain we prize success the more highly. We make the achievement of heterosexuality in its fullest sense one of the primary topics in our literature and art. Society, by placing barriers in the way of free exercise of the sex impulse, has helped to define the goal-situation for one of our basic wishes.

2. *Happiness*. The term is here used in the special sense of (1) freedom from fears, and (2) freedom from mental conflict.

¹² The material is taken from notes of lectures given by Smith at Columbia University in 1927.

¹³ No human society could survive beyond one generation unless heterosexual mating were the rule, and not the exception.

The conquest of fear would make man almost an Olympian. If we could face the future calmly, without fear of poverty, of loneliness, of catastrophe, of sickness, of death, and if we could stop worrying about little things "that will never happen" we would certainly be much nearer happiness. The goal here is to arrive at a state or position where we think we no longer "need" to be afraid of certain consequences, where we feel relatively *secure* from the particular menace that has been facing us. We never reach this state completely; we are always looking forward to and striving for this kind of happiness.

"Mental conflict" arises when we have to give up something we want very much in order to get something else we want still more. To decide which goal we will abandon is a painful process! We always want both the job at home *and* the three-year adventure trip to the Amazon; both to get rich quick *and* to be respected. The person who can make these decisions clear-headedly and then concentrate on enjoying what he has achieved instead of mourning what he has lost will gain something he wants more than either of the original goals, namely, peace of mind, which is after all one very real kind of happiness.

3. *Social approval.* The desire to be looked up to, respected, by one's fellows is so universal that many psychologists have called it an instinct. We all wish ever to improve our status, to increase self-confidence by finding evidence that others have confidence in us.

Smith's list is a short one and perhaps there are some basic aspirations of personality that are omitted. The famous "four wishes" of William I. Thomas¹⁴ are somewhat more inclusive and perhaps also a bit more systematically worked out. They may be enumerated as follows:

1. *The desire for new experience.* "Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death which characterized the

¹⁴ Cf. *The Unadjusted Girl*, pp. 1-40, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1923. For Thomas's earlier statement of the four wishes see W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. 1, pp. 72-74, Richard G. Badger, Boston, 1918. A rather extensive development of the four wishes theory is provided in Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-165.

earlier life of mankind.”¹⁵ Individuals are seeking satisfaction of this *adventure* wish when they travel to out-of-the-way places and indulge in dangerous exploits, when they engage in competitive sports where the situation is changing constantly, when they seek the stimulation of alcohol and drugs, when they gamble, when they avidly pick out the sensational news in newspapers, when they attend “horror pictures” at the local movie house or stay at home and read crime thrillers.

There are, too, more subtle and less obvious ways of satisfying the desire for new experience. Courtship may be as exciting as any daredevil exploit with automobile or airplane. Scientific research may open up as fascinating a new world to the experimenter as travel. The thrill of artistic creation is in part the excitement of pioneering, and the person who dotes on meeting new and “interesting” people is simply doing his adventuring in the realm of personality. There are many different things we can do to get out of the rut, to make a break in routine. But escape monotony we must (at least periodically) in order to remain healthy personalities.

2. *The desire for security.* When the adventure impulse has spent itself there comes the desire to retreat to a safe haven. We may run risks for the fun of it, for excitement, but an “anchor to windward” is a precaution we seldom fail to take. Particularly as we grow older stability and security become important to us, but there are hazards to be encountered at all ages. Security wishes reflect our desires to avoid or escape those hazards; as Smith noted, we want to be free of the fear of them. We want to be fed, clothed, sheltered, and provided with “creature comforts,” to keep well, to escape dangers both natural and supernatural, and especially to keep from having our life upset by the need for sudden change. The person in whom security wishes dominate is the thoroughgoing conservative. Any change in the established order is a challenge to the nice adjustment he has made to his environment. He is always for the “safe and sane.”

3. *The desire for response.* This is perhaps another name for gregariousness. We wish to be in contact with fellow men but more than that we want our contacts to involve mutual sympathy and understanding. Response wishes develop first in connection with the mother-child relation, are developed and differentiated in friendships,

¹⁵ William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, p. 4. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

in conviviality, in nostalgia for places and experiences. They reach their most intense form in relations between the sexes, especially in courtship and in the mutual affection of married life.

4. *The desire for recognition.* This is Smith's wish for social approval plus a little more emphasis on the desire to feel superior to others. It is related also to the Adlerian "masculine protest," the will to power.¹⁶ Prestige is sought by everybody and we not only want to be thought well of but to be looked up to. We want to achieve recognition and thus enhance our self-feeling. We want the respect of others so we can respect ourselves.

The third list of basic personality aims comprises nine "primary desires." These are the contribution of Knight Dunlap.¹⁷ They are presented by him as follows:

1. Alimentary desire. The desire for food and drink.
2. Excretory desire. Riddance. The desire to be rid of annoying or inconvenient materials or processes.
3. Protection desire. Desire for shelter from adverse external forces.
4. Activity desire. The desire for motor performance and occupation.
5. Desire for rest and relaxation.
6. Amorous or erotic desire. Desire for stimulation by, and association with, a member of the opposite sex.
7. Parental or philopedic desire. Desire for the possession of children.
8. Desire for preeminence. Desire to be a leader, or a focus of attention and interest.
9. Desire of conformity. Desire to belong to a group and to participate in the group characteristic.¹⁸

Secondary desires, which include all of man's wishes for specific goal-situations, are supposed by Dunlap to grow out of the primary desires. The latter are therefore, in a sense, intermediate between the instincts and the specific wishes.

The three varying interpretations of the dynamic factors in personality that have been presented may perhaps arouse in the

¹⁶ Alfred Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, pp. 1-34, Moffat, Yard and Company, New York, 1917.

¹⁷ *Civilized Life, The Principles and Application of Social Psychology*, Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1935.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 64. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

student the desire to dismiss the whole matter with "A plague on all your houses." Until the experts can agree, it may be urged that it is too much to expect for the laymen to get excited over what looks like nothing but a game of words. The difficulty is, however, that we cannot wait until social psychology is able to give cut-and-dried answers to all questions. We are in the business of trying to understand human personality today, and we need all the help that experts can give us. Pending the discovery of verified *facts* we have to rely on opinions and hypotheses, but the best opinions and hypotheses are those of the persons who have studied the problem most. While these persons may differ among themselves on some points, they agree, as we have seen, on others. Their points of agreement should constitute the foundation on which we base our own individual approaches to personality. It must always be remembered, however, that textbook descriptions of personality dynamics are aids to, not substitutes for, the use of one's own experience and the exercise of one's own insight.

DIAGNOSING PERSONALITY TRAITS

All our lives through we are being called on constantly to predict what other people are going to do in certain situations. Employers want to know how prospective employees are going to "fit into the organization" before they hire them. Merchandisers seek to find out how people are going to react to their products and to advertising which extols them. Politicians have their ears to the ground to catch the rumblings of ballot-box landslides. Educators try to determine how they have changed the personalities of students who have been under their tutelage. What they all—business men, politicians, teachers, ministers, journalists—are trying to discover is whether certain people in whom they are interested have certain attitudes. If science could produce an infallible attitude-detector which when focused on a victim would reveal one by one his attitudes, the device would certainly be put to wide use.

As yet no such personality X-ray machine is available. All that we have are a few techniques for personality appraisal that (1) supplement and reinforce intuitional judgments and (2) help us to combine estimates of the attitudes of individuals into an average appraisal of the attitudes of a group. It will be impossible

in the space allotted here to do more than illustrate a few of these approaches to measuring personality and outline the logic underlying them. Since, however, sooner or later nearly every college student is subjected to one or more of these attitude-measuring devices,¹⁹ and may later himself come to use them to appraise others, it may be desirable to introduce a brief discussion of them at this point. Attitude testing is becoming one of the recognized techniques of sociological research.

Opinion questionnaires. An attitude is not something we can get at directly. Tendencies to act, predispositions, are implicit quantities known only to the person who has them (and not always even to him, since, as we say, some attitudes are unconscious). If A is to know B's attitudes toward brandy, toward President Roosevelt, or toward A himself, B must either tell A about them or else he must reveal them by action, he must *do* something that enables A to draw conclusions concerning them for himself. When B informs A that he likes brandy very much, that he is a supporter of the President, and that he is indifferent to A's charms, he has expressed his attitudes in *words*. These verbal expressions of attitude are called *opinions*. Knowing B's opinions A may predict how B will behave in concrete situations: B will accept a proffered brandy and soda, he will vote for candidate "X" at the next election (if his attitude doesn't change in the meantime), he will reject A's advances toward a closer friendship. Opinions are not attitudes but *indices* of them. When we elicit the opinions of individuals we are getting close to their attitudes, but there is always the possibility that they may be deceiving us, that they may be deceiving themselves in thinking that they will do what they say they will, or that they may change their minds. It is undoubtedly true also that many solemnly rendered opinions are what the psychologists call *rationalizations*, efforts to justify attitudes that one is a bit ashamed of, efforts to make attitudes appear in the most favorable light, efforts to give the impression that one is well informed when he really knows little about the matter at issue. Even the most *opinionated* person may have little real definiteness or stability in his attitudes; his verbalizing may be all a sham.

¹⁹ As well as to aptitude or capacity tests, like those discussed in the pre-

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, opinions are fairly good indices of attitude. A large proportion of the attitude-indicating devices are nothing more than opinion tests. The subject is required to assent to or dissent from a series of statements which express varying shades of opinion toward or about an object, person, idea, or issue. For instance, the Thurstone-Hinckley test of "Attitudes toward the Negro"²⁰ requires the individual either to agree or disagree with each statement in a list which contains, among others, the following:

No Negro should hold an office of trust, honor or profit.

I place the Negro on the same social basis as I would a mule.

Inherently the Negro and the white man are equal.

It is possible for the white man and the Negro to be brothers in Christ without becoming brothers-in-law.

The Negro should be given the same educational advantages as the white man.²¹

It will be noted that even this abbreviated list of statements includes a number of "shades of opinion" on the question of the role of the Negro in white society. An elaborate system of scoring the assents and dissents of the subject to the whole list of statements (sixteen all told) yields a single index figure or rating. This rating is measured along a scale whose extremes are an attitude of complete equality with respect to Negroes (in general) and an attitude of complete superiority to them. The subject's rating on this scale provides a sort of shorthand estimate of his general disposition toward the Negroes and the "Negro problem" and predicts how he will act on the average in the general class of situations where white-Negro relations are concerned. Thus a score of 2.0 on the test indicates that the subject is "prejudiced against the Negro"; this prejudice is a sort of common factor in all his behavior tendencies toward Negroes. *On the average*, but by no means always, the individual A whose score is 2.0 will be less sympathetic to Negro aspirations, more domineering toward Negro individuals, more willing to believe ill of the race and of the individual members of it, than subject B whose score is, say, 8.5.

²⁰ L. L. Thurstone, ed., *The Measurement of Social Attitudes*, scale no. 3, prepared by E. D. Hinckley, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930.

²¹ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

A host of other factors, however, in addition to this general bias will determine the attitudes of A in any concrete situation.²² Thus he may be highly benevolent in regard to his own Negro servants while viewing all other Negroes with distrust; he may be temporarily incensed with Negroes because of some single incident which he will soon forget; or his anti-Negro prejudice may be almost entirely subordinated on occasion to some stronger bias, such as anti-socialism, and he may judge Negroes not as members of a race but rather as conservatives or radicals.

Because of inconsistencies and instabilities like these in the attitudes of persons, such a test as that just described is perhaps of limited value in predicting behavior of single individuals. It is much more useful in comparing the average biases of different groups. When the scores of a number of people in one group are averaged and compared with a similar average for an entirely different group, or perhaps for the same group at a later date, many of the individual variations and inconsistencies tend to cancel one another. The result is that the comparison of average scores tells something useful about the differences in bias between the two groups in question. Thus it is possible to get a rough measure of the effectiveness of a propaganda campaign by submitting a representative sampling of the members of the group to a standardized attitude questionnaire before and after. The differences in the average group score will be a measure of the change in attitudes brought about.

There are now over thirty of these so called "social attitude tests" constructed according to the Thurstone pattern. Among them are tests for attitudes toward God, toward war, toward capital punishment, censorship, patriotism, evolution, free trade, foreign missions, divorce, public ownership, birth control, Sunday observance, and preparedness. These are all in some sense current

²² For a more complete discussion of these and of the logic underlying the Thurstone testing procedure see L. L. Thurstone and R. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929; Stuart A. Rice, "Statistical Studies of Social Attitudes and Public Opinion," in *Statistics in Social Studies*, pp. 180-189, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1930; Read Bain, "Theory and Measurement of Attitudes and Opinions," *Psychological Bulletin*, vol. 27, pp. 360-368, May, 1930; Rensis Likert, "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes," *Archives of Psychology*, no. 140; and Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Assumptions and Methods in Attitude Measurements," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 1, pp. 75-88, Feb., 1936.

social issues. In addition to the Thurstone tests there are now available all sorts of other opinion questionnaires dealing with topics similar to those just listed but constructed on different principles. There are also tests for other general social attitude variables such as conservatism-radicalism,²³ "social distance" (race and class attitudes),²⁴ and "fairmindedness" in dealing with social and political issues.²⁵

Diagnosing general biases on broadly defined social issues is not the only use to which the students of personality have put the opinion questionnaire. It has been employed extensively, although perhaps as yet less successfully, in the determination of the individual's and, by averaging scores, the group's *interests* (attitudes toward possible activities). It has been used to measure *beliefs* (opinions about the truth or falsity of propositions in the realms of religion, science, and philosophy), temperamental characteristics, and personality balance and stability.²⁶ In the interests tests the subject is asked to check a long list of occupations (architect, confectioner, opera singer, poet) and activities ("solving mechanical puzzles," "taking long walks," "writing personal letters")²⁷ in which he thinks he might like to engage. The test is scored in such a way as to indicate the vocational categories into which, on the basis of interest if not aptitude, the subject seems to fit best. The chief utility of the test lies in helping the individual to organize what he already knows (or thinks he knows) about his interests

²³ Cf. H. T. Moore, "Innate Factors in Radicalism and Conservatism," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 20, pp. 234-244, 1925; M. F. Washburn et al., "The Moore Tests of Radical and Conservative Temperament," *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 38, pp. 449-452, 1927; and H. Harper, "Social Beliefs and Attitudes of American Educators," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, no. 294, 1927.

²⁴ Emory S. Bogardus, "The Concept of Social Distance," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. 8, p. 339, 1924; and *Immigration and Race Attitudes*, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1928.

²⁵ Goodwin B. Watson, "The Measurement of Fairmindedness," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, no. 176, 1925.

²⁶ For lists of the standardized interest and belief tests, the tests for extroversion-introversion, ascendance-submission, and other temperamental traits, and the "neurotic inventories," see Gertrude H. Hildreth, *A Bibliography of Mental Tests and Rating Scales*, pp. 168-171, The Psychological Corporation, New York, 1933; Alfred A. Horsch and Robert A. Davis, "Mental Hygiene and Personality Tests," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 646-658, Mar., 1935.

²⁷ The examples are taken from E. K. Strong, *Vocational Interest Blank for Women*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California, 1933.

into a pattern that has meaning in relation to vocational and avocational opportunities. Previously, of course, the test must have been given to a large number of people already successfully adapted in various vocational fields in order to establish the interest patterns that seem most often to go with the different lines of activity. In standardizing the test the psychologist works from the individual to the group; he collects a large number of individual interest analyses and by averaging he constructs occupational norms in terms of test scores. Once these norms are available the procedure is reversed and applications are made of group experience to the problems of the individual. The individual is given the test and his score is interpreted in the light of the results of the standardization procedure. This is essentially the logic involved in all personality testing. Test results are significant only in a comparative sense. They relate the individual's interests, beliefs, and temperamental traits to those of a standardization group.

Objective personality testing. So far we have been considering only the pencil-and-paper questionnaire type of test. This approach relies entirely on the subject's ability to put himself into a hypothetical situation and report his probable behavior in that situation. It depends upon a purely verbal analysis. If we are not content to accept verbal statements as true revealers of attitude, the only other way of dealing with the problem short of waiting until the individual reveals himself inadvertently in his everyday behavior is to create artificial test situations in which the subject's attitudes will be disclosed, not as opinions but as overt actions. Of course we contrive many such informal test situations in our daily lives. Deliberately we give John Jones an opportunity to pay the dinner check to see whether he is stingy (or perhaps exploitable). In the movies at least, Mary Ellen gets her girl friend to tempt Jack in order to find out whether he really loves her (Mary Ellen) or not. These are certainly test situations which call out revealing behavior but they are not standardized. In the more formal objective personality tests the stimulus situation is carefully defined and the different possible responses are also defined and rated. Then when different people are put into the test situation there can be comparison of the results.

This whole approach to personality study can perhaps be well illustrated by some character tests devised by Hartshorne and

May.²⁸ Following are brief descriptions of some objective tests designed to measure in school children the attitude-complex to which we give the name "honesty":

The over-change test. The subject is sent to the store to buy some article. The merchant has already been instructed to give him a certain amount of over-change. The test is what the subject will do with this extra money for which he need not account to the person who sent him. Will he keep it or will he return it to the merchant?

Peeping test. The subject is given parts of a form-board to assemble and is instructed to do the task with his eyes closed. If he succeeds easily, he has opened his eyes, for the test cannot be done under a certain time if the eyes are really kept shut.

Cheating test. Two different forms of short-answer school test "which look alike but have slight, imperceptible, but important differences" are distributed alternately through a school room and "staggered" so that no two pupils side by side or back or front of each other will have the same form. A pupil who attempts to copy answers from another sitting beside, or in front of him, will copy the wrong answers although the questions on his neighbor's paper will appear to be the same as his. It is a simple matter in scoring to tell who has cheated and who has not.²⁹

A battery of such tests given to a child would yield some valuable information about his attitudes of fair play and honesty in certain concrete and apparently "real life" situations. The child will not know that he is being tested so that his behavior will be that which is habitual to him in those and similar situations. Whether, however, there is a unit trait of honesty-dishonesty, which children (or grownups) possess in varying degrees and which is exhibited consistently in all situations where underhanded methods are possible, seems questionable. Hartshorne and May found that subjects who were "honest" in one situation would cheat, given the opportunity, in others.³⁰ The same was found to be true in relation to such traits as "selfishness-unselfishness," and "self-

²⁸ Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, *Studies in Deceit*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928.

²⁹ The descriptions of the tests are adapted from Hartshorne and May, *op. cit.*, Book One, pp. 44 and 49, and from J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, p. 277.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, Book Two, pp. 211-243.

control.”³¹ These conclusions are, however, based on studies with grade-school children. Hartshorne and May suggest that as socialization proceeds there is a tendency toward integration of attitudes, toward more consistency in ethical behavior,³² but this remains to be proved. The greater consistency, of course, the greater utility of the attitude test, for it will then predict a wider range of future activities of the subject taking it.

Case study methods. Individual attitude tests, either of the opinion questionnaire or the objective type, reveal only small fragments of the total personality. Since often we are interested only in small segments of the whole, in attitudes toward some narrow class of objects or situations, the testing procedure with all its limitations is still useful; and if we want more information we can of course give more tests and accumulate more personality fragments. There are in fact regular batteries of tests already in use by students of personality which make it possible to compare the subject with the “average man” on quite a large number of different “traits.” After subjecting Alfred Green to a test battery one learns that, if the tests are accurate,³³ he is 10 per cent more submissive than the average of the group in which the ascendance-submission test was standardized, 5 per cent more extroverted, 15 per cent more orthodox in his religious beliefs, 25 per cent more conservative, and so on. One can plot a sort of “personality profile” for subject Green which will represent graphically his variation from the average on a series of test-defined personality traits. A glance at the profile and one has a mind’s-eye picture of Green; at least that is the theory upon which the test inventory is based.

³¹ Hugh Hartshorne, Mark May, and Julius B. Maller, *Studies in Service and Self-Control*, p. 442, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929.

³² Hugh Hartshorne, Mark May, and F. K. Shuttleworth, *Studies in the Organization of Character*, pp. 355-360, 371-376, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930. See also Rensis Likert, *op. cit.*, p. 38; and Gardner and Lois B. Murphy, *Experimental Social Psychology*, pp. 603-604, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931.

³³ The technical term for test accuracy is *reliability*. A reliable test measures whatever it measures (and we do not always know what that is) *consistently*. That is to say, the test does not yield widely different scores for the same subject on repetition unless he has suffered a real personality change in the meantime. A thermometer is a reliable testing instrument because it always measures heat and not sometimes heat and sometimes velocity, humidity, or the intensity of gamma radiation.

The trouble with this procedure is that it is purely additive, the mere summing-up and not the piecing together into a pattern of a series of fragments. Unless personality is viewed as a complex pattern of traits not just "laid end to end" or "piled up" but actually woven together into a fabric, the analysis of Alfred Green is likely to give inaccurate and misleading results. Just as the use of a particular colored thread in a tapestry derives significance almost entirely in relation to the *design* which appears on the tapestry surface, so a particular trait of Green's personality cannot be really understood and evaluated except in relation to other traits, and especially to those higher units of personality organization which we call temperaments, habit systems, and wishes. Take for instance Green's trait of conservatism, indicated by his score on a conservatism-radicalism opinion questionnaire. To interpret this trait we need immediately to relate it to others. Is Green's conservatism violent and unreasoning or measured and tolerant? In answering this question we need to know whether he is choleric or a calm and even-tempered person. Similarly we might ask the *why* of the Greenian conservative bias; is it due to success or to failure, to fear or to carefully concealed ambition? We will not really understand Green's conservative attitudes until questions like these are answered, and again we cannot gain this understanding until we tie the test result in with other data about more general and less easily definable attributes. To do this we need to know much more about the *organization* of Green's personality than the current attitude-test batteries can give us. This is where the so-called *personality case study* comes in.

The case study is simply a more complete survey of personality attributes, based on a more complete acquaintance with the subject than that implied in the administering of a few attitude tests. Test data may be utilized in a case study but it will not be the only data exploited. Other ways of getting information will be employed as well, and the more different sources that are tapped the more complete, the "truer," the case study report will be. Carefully done case studies take time and energy; consequently they are not undertaken if only one narrow phase of the personality is to be studied. There are enough instances, however, where there is vital need to know "all about a person" to provide a rich field of practice for the case study art.

Cross-sectional case studies. There are two different approaches in personality case study which are worth while distinguishing even though a good case investigation will almost certainly utilize both. One of these approaches may be called the cross-sectional, the other the genetic or biographical. Attitude testing illustrates one form of cross-sectional approach since the aim is to survey the person as he is at the moment of testing, to describe him as possessing a series of tendencies to behave in certain ways in future situations, what we call attitudes or, more broadly, traits. Now as we have already seen, attitude testing must be supplemented in the complete case study by less tangible but more revealing impressions concerning the grouping of attitudes and habits. The aim is to get *insight* into the self of the subject, to learn what are his basic wish-goals, what roles he thinks he is playing among his fellows and what roles he would like to play, what habit routines (sometimes called "ruts") he seems to be the victim of, what temperamental characteristics he possesses, what are his realized and unrealized capacities. Much of this information is gathered in what amounts to a series of informal interviews with the subject himself and with his friends and associates. Friends or members of his family usually understand the subject far better than the skilled worker can after one or two conferences and they are therefore the best informants about his personality. The expert has, however, to discount their bias and estimate the degree of candor they are showing. It is necessary to seek information from as many sources as possible, estimate the informants' various degrees of reliability and penetration, and always check one informant against another if the case study record is to be dependable and complete.

In interviewing the subject himself or those who are to give information about him the investigator will need to exercise no little skill. Successful interviewing is an art which in part seems to be the special gift of some people and in part the result of careful training and of practice. Much attention has been given recently to defining the interview technique objectively.³⁴ Thus Bingham and Moore have listed a set of thirty-two suggestions for

³⁴ See Emory S. Bogardus, *The New Social Research*, chap. 3, Jesse Ray Miller, Los Angeles, 1926; C. Luther Fry, *The Technique of Social Investigation*, pp. 60-83, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934; and Walter V. Bingham and Bruce V. Moore, *How to Interview*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931.

interviewing, in the hope of making the case worker more conscious of the flaws in his own interviewing methods. Among the suggestions are the following:

Gain and deserve the interviewee's confidence.

Render your interviewee a real service.

Do not ask questions directly until you think the interviewee is ready to give the desired information and give it accurately.

Let the interviewee tell his story; then help him to supplement it.

Be straightforward and frank rather than shrewd or clever.

Avoid implying the answer to your own question.

If you offer alternative answers, phrase them so that neither one is acceptable to the interviewee.

Give the interviewee opportunity to qualify his answers.

Allow time enough.

Record all data at once or at the earliest opportunity.³⁵

Attention to common-sense rules like these will of course not alone make a person a good interviewer. But there are many people in the daily business of interviewing—doctors, lawyers, ministers, priests, counselors, and social workers—who could profitably analyze their own technique in the light of criteria like those above.

Genetic personality studies. Turning now from the cross-sectional to the genetic approach to personality study we may define the latter as the attempt to collect materials for a subject's biography in the hope that a knowledge of his past will reveal new aspects of his present personality. As we all know, a chance discovery of some chapter in the earlier life of a friend may throw a flood of light on his present behavior. We now know why he is so bitter and seems so defeated, we know perhaps why he sets so much store by material success, we can guess why he is so embarrassed in the presence of women but so at home in masculine society. Knowing his past history we know *him*, or at least important parts of him, better than we ever could except by long continued cross-sectional analysis. Adding the time dimension to a case study often greatly increases its accuracy as well as its completeness, for it gives perspective on the subject's habits and attitudes. Some of

³⁵ Bingham and Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-52. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

them which seem so important at the moment are seen to be merely of temporary significance. A good biography tells what are the basic personality problems, the persisting drives.

There are several biographical techniques in use by students of personality. The psychoanalysts have an elaborate procedure for eliciting the subject's emotional history in a long series of clinical interviews. Rapport between subject and interviewer must be built up to the point where the subject is ready to reveal what he thinks were his most sinful thoughts and his most shameful actions. Especial stress is laid on the recall of childhood experiences, and the dimmest memories of the early years are gradually dragged into light. A genetic approach less dogmatic, less intense, and less clinical is provided through what has come to be called the *life history*. Bogardus describes the life history as follows:

The life history differs from the autobiography in that the latter is more formal, is written with an idea of maintaining status and with the judgment of the public in mind, is likely to devote considerable space to "family trees," and other more or less objective data. The life history deals with personal experiences; it brings out what is in "the back of the head," without special thought to favorable or unfavorable judgments that may result.³⁶

According to Kreuger, the life history document

. . . is introspective and reflective, revealing the inner, private life in terms of the fundamental motives or attitudes and social situations which call these attitudes into existence.³⁷

The life history of the confessional type is especially revealing and the investigator who is able to induce what the psychoanalysts call *catharsis*, or release of tension through verbalizing one's troubles, will acquire a document in which there is a "high degree of candor, of completeness of detail, and a revelation of the fundamental motives."³⁸

³⁶ Emory S. Bogardus, *The New Social Research*, pp. 131 f. Reprinted by permission of the University of Southern California Press, publishers.

³⁷ E. T. Kreuger, "The Value of Life History Documents for Social Research," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. 9, p. 197, Jan.-Feb., 1925. Reprinted by permission of the University of Southern California Press, publishers.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 198.

When the life history is elicited in a series of interviews or written out by the subject at the request of the investigator, a systematic questionnaire is often provided to help to organize the subject's thinking. The questionnaire serves to suggest new leads and at the same time to eliminate irrelevant material. Kreuger points out³⁹ that it should be "suggestive rather than detailed" and designed to get the subject started on new and pertinent lines of thought rather than to submit him to laborious questioning. When the person under investigation has kept a diary, it may form the basis for a life history document that will be more than ordinarily complete and revealing. Diaries are often written with a view to possible later publication, however, and may therefore be self-justificatory and highly selective. The confession which "breaks out with the force of molten lava after a period of inner convulsions" may not be as detailed an account of the person's past history but it is often a more penetrating and essentially truer description of his personality characteristics as they exist today.

Finally it should be noted that the life history approach yields not only data concerning personalities. Since the *status* of the subject is emphasized, his roles in various groups described, the life history may throw much light on the real nature of group life and the actual functioning of social institutions. Recognizing this the sociologists have come increasingly to rely on biographical data of the life history type as an adjunct in their study of social organization and social processes.⁴⁰ This aspect of the genetic method will be described more in detail later. Here we may content ourselves with a conclusion which concerns the person rather than the group. If we wish to acquire real insight into a personality, to understand it in the sense of seeing reasons why it behaves the way it does in various situations, then biographical perspective is necessary just as is cross-sectional attitude analysis. Only by attacking from both angles can we gain an adequate and

³⁹ E. T. Kreuger, "The Technique of Securing Life History Documents," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, vol. 9, pp. 290-293, Mar.-Apr., 1925. See also John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1935.

⁴⁰ See, for instance, William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. III, "Life Record of an Immigrant"; and Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931.

sufficiently penetrating description of what the socialization process has actually turned out.

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Chapter 10

PERSONALITY DISORGANIZATION

SOME EXAMPLES OF DISORGANIZED PERSONALITIES

A WOMAN of 40 lies on a specially made springless bed, maintaining as nearly as possible a motionless position. She is carefully fed and nursed by her solicitous farmer husband, who comes in from his work many times a day to attend to her needs. She talks glibly and volubly of her "terrible condition" and recites in detail how five years previously she permitted herself to make a slight move in the bed that resulted in a sudden and terrible pain in the head, blackness and a feeling of imminent destruction. Since then she has not ventured to repeat the rash act.

This patient was hypnotized, and in this state she arose from the bed in which she had not moved for five years, went to the supper table and ate with the family. For a few weeks she repeated this even when not in the hypnotic state. Then she relapsed into the old conviction of helpless immobility. Five years have passed; she is still lying motionless, fed and tended by her faithful husband.¹

2. The case of Norma-Polly is that of a nineteen-year-old girl who displayed all the symptoms of a dissociated personality. Norma, aged nineteen, would suddenly fall into a deep sleep and awaken as Polly, aged four; and as Polly, would display all the characteristic reactions of a four-year-old child. When awake as Norma, she could not remember anything of her behavior or of what occurred during the time she was in the Polly state, and vice versa. Reintegration was achieved by building up her physical energies to supply new nerve energy to her run-down system, and the use of suggestion when in the hypnotic state, telling her while she was in the state of hypnosis that she would awake as Norma or Polly and would recall the things the other personality said and did. This girl, never strong physically,

¹ Karl A. Menninger, "Hysteria," *Hygeia*, vol. 5, pp. 395-396, Aug., 1927. Reprinted by permission of the American Medical Association.

was placed under severe strains incident to the death of both parents and the break-up of the home during her adolescence. She was forced to go to the city and work for a living. Illness drained her of physical and nervous energy. She developed longings for, and day-dreamed about, the life of freedom enjoyed by her four-year-old sister who had been adopted in an ideal home. Her real life had one system of nerve connections; her imaginative life had another. Her nerve energy became so low that it could supply only one system at a time. Consequently in her waking moments the energy would flow through one or the other, but never through both.²

3. Of course we still have the Miss Johnsons. Poor Miss Johnson. She says she's forty, but if she isn't over fifty I'm sweet sixteen. Her work history is a long record of failure—always someone else's fault of course—but she insists she's a high class stenographer and nothing else, and that she positively will not be left on relief. It's just politics and favoritism in the W.P.A., she says, that keeps her out. We tried her three or four times on the old work-relief projects but she wrecked the morale of every office she set foot in. W.P.A. can't do a thing for Miss Johnson and it isn't fair to expect it to. Neither can we as things stand now, but I still believe that a good psychiatrist could do a lot for her and bring her to the point of accepting training for some kind of work by which she could quite possibly support herself for a good while to come.³

4. Case No. 42—Age 19 years. Indicted for robbery first degree, grand larceny second degree, assault first degree, criminally receiving stolen property first degree; pleaded guilty to robbery second degree, without use of weapon, and was sentenced to state prison from seven and a half to fifteen years. Appeared in a court of truancy and was committed to a truant school. Has been arrested three times, for selling narcotics, for unlawful entry, and for grand larceny; has been discharged twice and acquitted once. Father dead; mother has maintained offender and other children. History of offender indicates

² Quoted from an abstract by L. S. Cottrell (in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, p. 692) of an article by Henry H. Goddard in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 21, pp. 170-191, July-Sept., 1926. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers. The classic case of dual personality is, of course, that of Miss Beauchamp. For an account of the history of this almost incredible personality dissociation see Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1910.

³ Gertrude Springer, "Border Lines and Gaps," *Survey*, vol. 71, pp. 333, Nov., 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

epilepsy but no diagnosis has been made. Offender drank and was sexually promiscuous. Family known to at least five social agencies.⁴

PERSONALITY DEVIATIONS AND DISTORTIONS

If we were to give names to the four personality types represented in the documents just quoted we should probably call them (1) hysterical, (2) dissociated or split personality, (3) unemployable, and (4) criminal. There would be disagreement about these classifications and questions as to whether the word "unemployable," now so widely used by relief administrators, is a really scientific term. All observers would agree, however, that there is something serious the matter with each of the four, that each in its way is a case of pathology, a failure in the process of socialization.

We need to study these and the many other types of failure in socialization, first, because they all represent serious maladjustment problems for society, and second, because they throw light on the life history of the normal individual. However distorted these personalities appear it must be remembered that they and the normal human beings are not members of separate species. The distorted personalities simply exhibit in extreme degrees traits that we all possess in milder form.

Later an attempt will be made to define this thing called the normal personality, or at least some criteria will be suggested which may help to identify normal personalities when we see them. For the time being, however, let us concentrate on the personality types which we shall eventually learn do not fulfill these criteria. Time spent acquainting ourselves with some of the more common forms of personality deviation should provide a background against which the normal non-deviate's characteristics will stand out more clearly. If we study the extremes we will be better able to define the "golden mean" of normality that lies between them.

Symptoms of personality distortion. Just as the doctor knows the physically ill person because of certain symptomatic indications (high pulse rate, fever, headache, etc.) so the student of behavior abnormalities identifies the distorted or disorganized

⁴ The Crime Commission of New York State, *Individual Studies of 145 Offenders by the Sub-Commission on Causes and Effects of Crime*, p. 114, Albany, N. Y., 1928.

TABLE IV
SYMPTOMS OF PERSONALITY DISTORTION

GENERAL CLASS OF SYMPTOM	Symptoms Involving a Deficiency of Some Quality or Attribute	Symptoms Involving an Excess of Some Quality or Attribute	Symptoms Primarily Involving Distorted, Inappropriate, or Atypical Conduct
OVERT ACTIVITY	Inertia ("Laziness") Motor paralyses Chronic fatigue	Mania (General overactivity) Tics (Involuntary part movements like muscle twitching, blinking, repeated throat clearing) Convulsions ("Fits," seizures)	Compulsions (Irrational acts for which subject can give no excuse, kleptomania, wanderlust, pyromania, etc.)
MOOD	Apathy (Lack of interests) Chronic depression (Melancholia)	Overexcitability Chronic elation	Moodiness (Victim of strong and frequently shifting moods) Chronic bad temper (Hates, grudges, temper tantrums) Phobias, anxiety states (Strong and uncontrolled fears, chronic worrying)
PERCEPTION	Deafness Blindness Skin insensitivity Deficient smell or taste sense	Hypersensitivity to some form of sensory stimuli (to the point of irritability)	Hallucinations (False perceptions, seeing, hearing, feeling things "that aren't there")
MEMORY	General memory deficiency Special memory deficiency Amnesia (Loss of memory for a part or all of the past)	Hypermnnesia (Exaggerated memory faculty in moments of stress) Abnormal memory for some particular subject matter	Disorientation (Loss of memory for passing of time, for familiar people, etc.) Feeling of familiarity in strange situations

THINKING	Feeble-mindedness (General mental deficiency) Special defects in capacity Defect in judgment	"Genius" (Superior general intelligence or great superiority in some special capacity) Over-specialization in development of mental skill	Delusions (False beliefs, distortions of judgment) Excessive day-dreaming Dissociation (Over-compartmentalization) Aphasias Incoherence (Jumbled associations) Delirium
SYMPOMATIC ATTITUDES			
Toward People	Chronic subordination (Submissiveness) Ascetic (Withdrawing, self-isolating)	Chronic superordination (Domineering, bullying) Overgregarious (Too dependent on others)	Sadism, masochism Chronic suspicion of others Electra, Oedipus complexes Chronic jealousy Intolerance
Toward the Mores	Amorality (Lack of moral sense) Cynicism (Iconoclasm)	Prudishness Fanaticism	Eccentricity (Marked unconventionality) Pathological lying Criminality Sex perversions
Toward the Self	Inferiority feelings Extreme introspectiveness (Extreme introversion)	Jehovah complex (Over-estimation of self in relation to others) Gross overconfidence	Gross misconceptions of vocational ("Square peg in round hole") and social role

personality by certain unusual, atypical reaction tendencies which it exhibits. In Table IV there is presented a classified list of a few (but by no means all) of these symptoms of personality disorganization. A brief discussion of some of them will help us to understand what the phrase "personality deviation" means.

A glance at the table shows a number of symptoms with which we are already thoroughly familiar. Blindness and deafness, for instance, we already know to be serious handicaps. A blind person is unable to participate in so many activities we habitually engage in that it would be surprising were his personality not "different" from those belonging to people of normal vision. We are especially careful how we act toward the sightless. By that very fact we indicate that we are dealing with a deviate, not perhaps an unhappy one and not certainly one upon whom we pass any moral judgment. The blind are simply so handicapped as to be unable to play a completely normal, usual role in social life.

While the classification of symptoms under different heads is a very rough one, it is perhaps worth while to look at the different categories for a moment. Take first the overt motor activity group of symptoms. These are usually fairly easy to observe. A real manic, for instance, is so generally overactive, he talks so fast and so much, he expends energy so rapidly, that his abnormality is clearly apparent. Of course there are borderline cases and we are all slightly manic on occasion (while celebrating a football victory perhaps), but at least the differences are on the surface and we can see whether an individual is afflicted with an extreme manic condition or not. The same is true for the opposite of mania, inertia, and for the different types of motor paralysis, the convulsive fits, and the tics. The latter are slight but involuntary muscle twitchings of face muscles or muscles of the body; they are not serious handicaps but bespeak a nervous, rather high-strung personality, just as do nail biting and head scratching. When the cause of the nervous instability is removed the twitchings, winkings, repeated throat clearings, and other tics tend to disappear.

When we come to the chronic and abnormal emotional patterns the identification of the symptom in the subject becomes considerably more difficult. Moods or emotional states in individuals have to be inferred from behavior, verbal and otherwise, and the correct inference as to the real feeling state of the subject is not always drawn. For instance, it is extremely important but not

always easy to distinguish between the apathetic person, who doesn't care, and the melancholic, who cares very deeply but who has lost hope. The former feels little or no emotion in situations which would excite the rest of us greatly, or in relation to desires and ambitions which the normal person cherishes. The latter may seem equally unaroused, but if so, it is because he has learned to hide his very real feelings from a world that has proved unsympathetic. His frozen face and seeming apathy are only a defence against being hurt again.

There are other baffling emotional quirks, some of which are listed in the table. However, mere listing of names for these types of deviation from normal gives little hint of the really difficult problems which they present to the student of personality deviation and distortion. All sorts of unusual and handicapping emotional patterns present themselves, no two of them alike. There is the victim of a chronic elation for whom the world is too utterly wonderful to be real; overoptimism sooner or later gets him into trouble because his sense of power is far greater than his actual ability to accomplish, and he makes commitments he cannot meet. There is the moody person, who swings back and forth between extremes of elation and melancholy, who has too overwhelming "ups" and "downs." There is the person with the violent temper who "flies off the handle" at small provocation and who has, therefore, a long list of enemies. There is the chronic worrier who fears the future. There are the other phobics, who are panic stricken when in some common everyday situation (like a closed room or a crowd of people), or who are afraid of the dark, of high places, of insects, or of snakes. All these people, and many others like them, are around us constantly. Only the extreme cases are in asylums. Emotional balance is one of the hardest things to attain.

We may skip over the defects in perception, in memory, and in intellection, since many of those listed are already familiar to us and some of the others are defined in the table itself. The last category, of symptomatic attitudes, needs some elucidation, however, especially so since it is this group of atypical personality traits in which the sociologist is most interested.

As pointed out in an earlier chapter,⁵ attitudes are directed toward values. When persisting attitudes of individuals are directed

⁵ Chapter 8. Cf. p. 197.

toward values which society disapproves of, then these attitudes are symptoms of personality deviation. The persons exhibiting them are "different" from the rest of us; they are "queer," "bad," "dangerous," "hateful," or "eccentric," and we treat them differently from the way we would a person whose attitudes are more like our own or those of our social group.

Only a few of the more common attitudinal distortions are listed in the table. The first group, attitudes toward people, includes the over-domineering and the over-submissive ("Caspar Milquetoast") reaction patterns, the extreme self-isolating or hermit attitude and its opposite, the attitude of over-dependence on the companionship of others. There is also the chronically suspicious person who in extreme form has what are called delusions of reference (everybody is talking about him) and persecution (they are plotting against him). There is the sadist who is cruel because he really enjoys the pain of others, and the masochist who gets a twisted sort of pleasure, sexual at root, out of the infliction (by himself or others) of pain upon himself. The person with an abnormal love fixation on a parent is a type that we have recently come to recognize. Even the man in love with a maid may seem abnormal to his associates and his moon-struck attitudes may be a handicap to him in other endeavors. But being in love is a kind of personality distortion which society in general tolerates! Furthermore, love is a kind of malady whose acute symptoms subside fairly quickly even though (fortunately) a life-time may not suffice for a complete cure.

Attitudes regarded, in the particular society in question, as immoral or anti-social constitute a large category of symptoms of personality distortion. So long as the person exhibiting one of these attitudes finds approval for it in the mores of some group, he will not necessarily become a disorganized personality, although he may be a deviate from the point of view of the larger society. This is often the situation with respect to the criminal; his own criminal gang supports him in his activities, and he acquires status in that group to compensate for the lack of it in society at large. Often the radical, the Bohemian, the demi-monde, the homosexual, and the members of strange religious cults are in a similar position. On the other hand, the cheat, the habitual liar, and the chronically disloyal are types likely to be maladjusted in any group of

which they are members, since unless its members at least "play the game" with each other the group cannot exist.

Abnormal self-attitudes have been discussed earlier.⁶ Lack of self-confidence born of a sense of inferiority is one of the most common symptoms of distortion. Extreme egoism and apparent conceit are usually, although not always, forms of defence against an inner conviction of incompetence and unimportance. The individual is throwing a bluff to avoid having any more people find him out than have already done so. Of course there really may be nothing to find out, he may not be objectively inferior at all, or only so in a few unimportant respects. A person with a tender ego has a hard time, however, to escape being a deviate; in acting to protect his ego he does things (domineers, sulks, withdraws, slanders others, resents fancied insults) which make him a difficult person to get along with. His ego problems keep getting in other people's way.

Types of distorted personalities. So far we have been listing only individual symptoms of personality deviation. In a given distorted personality, however, there is usually a pattern of symptoms, a symptomatic picture like that presented to the medical practitioner when he is called in to examine a case. The doctor finds that his patient has a fever, a headache, a sore throat, and aching in the limbs, all symptoms that might be present in a number of disorders. It is his task from these and from the other symptoms exhibited to *classify* the malady, to make a diagnosis. Diagnosis in the field of personality disorders is so difficult that it is hardly profitable here to do more than indicate a few general classes into which personality distortions fall. Perhaps it would be well to begin by eliminating the terms "insane" and "insanity."

Insanity is a legal term, not one of psychology, psychiatry, or sociology. A person is adjudged insane by a court when he is *non compos mentis*, that is, not of competent or sound mind. Such an individual should be under the custody of others, either at home with his relatives or in a mental hospital. He is not legally responsible for his criminal acts since he is assumed to be unable to tell the difference between right and wrong. In the legal sense, although not in modern medical or psychological parlance, the

⁶ Cf. chapter 9, pp. 212-214.

term insanity includes not only *dements* (mentally diseased) but also *aments* (feeble-minded).

Medico-psychological (as distinct from legal) attempts to classify personality disorders start out by making a distinction between the hereditary defectives whose difficulty is a deficiency in some important capacity (vision, hearing, intelligence) and the disordered or diseased who presumably have normal powers but are using them in an abnormal manner. The latter group are subdivided in almost as many different ways as there are experts to classify them. One simple classification attempts only to deal with the relative degree of the distortion exhibited. The most severe forms of distortion are the *psychoses*, of which there are many, with *schizophrenia*, *manic-depressive psychosis*, *paresis*, and *paranoia* perhaps generally the best known. Psychotics are usually institutional cases; they are so helpless, so queer, or so dangerous that custodial care is necessary unless and until there is a cure. Next to the psychoses in order of severity come the *neuroses*. Neuroses are distinctly handicapping, and the neurotic person is likely to be a conspicuous misfit in society; nevertheless, by making much more than ordinary effort, he usually manages to get along somehow. His is a personality markedly distorted in some respects but normal in others. Among the more common forms of neurosis are hysteria (see case 1 at the beginning of the chapter), hypochondria ("enjoying poor health"), neurasthenia or nervous exhaustion, and anxiety neurosis. Neurotics are curable with proper treatment provided the distortion has not persisted too long or gone too far.

Below the neuroses on the scale come what might simply be called the personality problems. Most of us have one or more of these to wrestle with; a miscellaneous list might include bad temper, parent fixations, inferiority feelings, sex maladjustment, unreasonable fears and worries, "spoiled child attitudes," vocational maladjustments, ineptitude and lack of tact in social relations, recklessness and lack of judgment, laziness, and unreliability. We are conscious of some of these as defects in our personalities and struggle to eliminate the "bad habits" we have got into. Others of them make us unhappy or interfere with our success without our knowing it. Childhood is the time when most of these personality problems get their start. If allowed to develop in individuals they are likely to lead to more severe distortions under the strains of adolescence and adult life. Such personality types as the libertine,

the criminal, the hobo, the fanatic, the miser, the sexually frigid man or woman, the cynic and iconoclast are usually preventable if caught in their early stages. Many of them can even be changed in later life if the key that unlocks the personality, that explains the real significance of the distorted behavior, the reason why it takes place, can be found.

The causes of personality distortion. This raises the question as to the factors that produce personality distortion. It is not enough to describe the symptomatic pattern, to give the disorder a name, and to recognize it when it appears in individuals. Wherever possible there is a search for the underlying causes, the antecedents of which the personality deviation in question is the consequent. Here again, unfortunately, there is much that is yet unknown. It will promote clear thinking, however, if we outline at least the major categories into which the factors producing distortion fall.

In the first place it hardly needs to be repeated that all personality traits, normal or abnormal, are the result of the interaction between a particular biological inheritance of tendencies and potentialities and a particular succession of environmental influences. The individual is born with certain strengths and weaknesses; the latter are either exaggerated by experience so that the personality breaks over into the distorted or abnormal when it faces a crisis, or they are compensated for, eliminated by unusual effort, or simply minimized by training. The influence of inherited weakness may be minor and that of environmental strain or pressure great, or the environment may simply set the stage for a failure predetermined by heredity. It is safe to say that few individuals capable of survival at all find it impossible to make some sort of an adjustment in a favorable environment. On the other hand there are few individuals so bountifully endowed by heredity that they cannot be brought through unhappy childhood or through later persecution and disappointment to disorganization and defeat.

Organic factors in personality distortion. Heredity and environment admittedly underlie all personality development, normal or distorted, but what are the more immediate *precipitating causes* of personality deviation? They fall under three general heads: (1) organic lesions and disease, (2) physical trauma or shocks, and (3) wish frustration and mental conflict. In the first group come the various physical disorders that modify behavior in such

a way and to such an extent as to produce maladjustment. There are, for instance, a whole series of distortion symptoms now fairly directly traceable to abnormal gland functioning. The *cretin*, a type of imbecile whose mental defect is due to insufficient thyroid secretion, is one rather extreme example; the *eunuch*, a castrated male exhibiting many female physical and temperamental characters, is another. Much work has been done on the relation of specific endocrine excesses and deficiencies to specific psychoses and neuroses but the results are not as yet conclusive.⁷ The relation between general metabolism and mental balance seems an especially fruitful field for research.

In addition to organic factors of glandular nature there is the toxin-produced group of personality disorders. The effect of focal infections (in the teeth, sinuses, etc.) has perhaps been exaggerated, but there can be no doubt of the deteriorating influence on mental processes of diseases like sleeping sickness and brain syphilis (paresis). Toxins which are introduced into the system from outside, such as alcohol, morphine, cocaine, and lead, may also interfere seriously with normal mental functioning. The so-called alcoholic psychoses in 1930 accounted for about 4½ per cent of all admissions to state hospitals in the United States.⁸

A third group of precipitating organic factors are the non-infectious diseases such as arteriosclerosis, diabetes, epilepsy, brain tumor, and pellagra. Not all of the diseases in this category involve mental symptoms and some of them affect personality balance only when the lesion is serious and long persisting. Brain tumor of course will inevitably involve some disturbance in functions, increasing as the tumor continues growth.

While a particular disease may not affect the mental functioning directly, it may do so indirectly through the exhaustion of nervous resources involved in fighting it off. Prolonged physical or mental strain of any type may result in an exhaustion psychosis,⁹ often called a nervous breakdown when it appears in less severe form. Increasing old age is perhaps a special type of exhaustion.

⁷ Cf. R. G. Hoskins and A. J. Carlson, "Endocrinology," in I. Madison Bentley, ed., *The Problems of Mental Disorder*, pp. 234-240, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1934.

⁸ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1932, p. 71.

⁹ One school feels that prolonged physical or mental strain *itself* indicates a prior mental conflict. The normal individual will do what he can without straining, and will not overstrain himself for any long period.

There is, however, much truth in the statement that "a man is as old as he feels," for worry and nervous strain will bring on old age prematurely. Very old age, senility, is likely to bring mental deterioration and sometimes unpleasant neurotic or psychotic symptoms in its train.

The effect of shock on the personality. The second main type of precipitating cause of personality distortion is the traumatic episode, or more simply, the shock. All sorts of accidents befall people, and produce physical injuries that in turn handicap the individual in his social relations. Beginning with the birth injury, a common cause of later feeble-mindedness, we are exposed to all sorts of hazards which may cripple or distort us physically and shock us out of our mental balance. Sometimes a very intense emotional experience, such as a terrific fright, may have traumatic effects and produce at least semi-permanent symptoms of distortion. Sometimes a crash or an explosion leads to loss of memory (amnesia) or to delirium or dementia. Even the shock of an operation may bring on neurotic manifestations in a patient whose nervous constitution is weak.

The World War produced a large number of mental as well as physical casualties. While the lay presumption was that the symptoms of these "shell shock" victims were due to concussion effects of the explosion of enemy shells, actually the physical shock factor was usually only one of several in the etiology of the disorder. In the following case record, for instance, a large complicating factor was simple nerve strain and fatigue:

Patient a private 20 years old. Although he had never had neurotic symptoms, he showed a tendency to abnormality in his makeup. . . . After five months of fighting he had to fight for three days at one time without sleep. He became tired, developed no anxiety or "jumpiness" but felt a strong desire to get out of the fatiguing situation in which he found himself. This desire showed itself in the hope that he might receive wounds which would incapacitate him from service, for a time at least. Then he was suddenly buried by a shell. Did not lose consciousness, but when dug out by his companions he was found to be deaf and dumb. . . . Physical examination revealed no abnormality to account for the deaf and dumb condition. This condition persisted for a month. In a hospital for functional cases he was completely and permanently cured in less than five minutes.

This was effected by demonstrating to the patient that he had not really lost his hearing. This was done by having him face a mirror and observe the start he gave when hands were clapped behind him. He was spoken to immediately, and told that the jump was evidence that he had heard the hand clapping, and that as his hearing was not lost neither was his speech. He promptly replied verbally, and had no relapse during two months prior to the making of the record.¹⁰

Not all hysterical symptoms can be liquidated as easily as these were, unfortunately. And many of the shell shock victims are still in mental hospitals today.

Frustrations as causes of personality distortion. The third great group of causes of personality deviation are the wish frustrations. When an individual fails to gain an end or reach a goal that he has set his heart on, when he confesses himself balked, then psychic pain, suffering, the pangs of disappointment result. While the feeling of frustration persists and the emotional tone remains one of hostility and resentment or of chagrin, hopelessness, and despair, the personality is disorganized, incapable of functioning normally and satisfactorily. But such a state cannot persist indefinitely, for "The neuro-muscular system inherently tends to protect itself against acute suffering."¹¹ Some sort of readjustment, first to make the suffering bearable and then gradually to eliminate it from consciousness, will inevitably take place.

The great question of course is as to the character of this readjustment. Will it be of the type to leave permanent scars on the personality, a relief from immediate psychic pain at the cost of developing some of the symptoms of distortion previously referred to? Will it mean only a temporary patching up and leave the personality helpless against another frustration? Since we all must face frustrations many times in our lives it is all-important that we develop a sane technique for dealing with them, for "life must go on" no matter how great the disappointment. A large share of the neurotics and psychotics are simply people who have made the worst instead of the best out of a bad situation. They deny the frustration by a retreat into fantasy, they cherish their

¹⁰ Case originally from J. T. McCurdy, adapted by E. S. Conklin in his *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 170, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹¹ Joseph K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, p. 168, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931.

grief and keep their great sorrow alive instead of overcoming it, they become bitter and hostile and take their chagrin out on others, they give up and become resigned to perpetual defeat.

While a single frustration, say a disappointment in love or a failure to get a much desired promotion, may precipitate a neurosis it must not be forgotten that there is usually a long history of inadequacy and disorganization in the background. Personality distortion is really a *process* rather than a state of being, a process that begins in childhood and only culminates when some particular crisis proves too much for the personality organization to withstand. More and more the causes of adult breakdown, when they are not clearly organic or traumatic, are sought in childhood maladjustments to the home and the play-group. Truancy, delinquency, bullying, insubordination, lying, sex misconduct, retardation in school are all problems whose solutions are not only immediately important to parents, teacher, and the community but are also vitally necessary if still more serious and socially expensive deviations are not to come as the "problem child" grows older. On the other hand the correct meeting of frustration situations in childhood and the surmounting of obstacles helps to strengthen the personality for the crises of adolescence and adulthood. The child who overcomes his physical handicaps or accepts them without chagrin as deficiencies balanced by other virtues; who has learned to be philosophical about defeat without losing the will to win in the next encounter; who, denied friendship in one quarter, can find it in another; who doesn't sulk, indulge in temper tantrums, cherish grudges, or retreat into isolation when disappointed—such a child has built up resources in habit which will stand him in good stead later. He can survive a serious bereavement, a long illness, an unhappy marriage, financial reverses, or a long period of unemployment without "breaking." He has developed a technique for dealing with frustrations on a wholesome basis when and as they arise.

THE NORMAL PERSONALITY

All this talk of distorted, disorganized, abnormal personalities has perhaps brought the reader to the point of wondering what a really normal personality is like. If we wish to avoid distortion with all its unpleasant symptoms, what should we aim for? How may we identify the normal personality type?

In the light of previous discussion the most obvious way of defining personal normality, and by no means the worst, is simply to say, "A normal personality is one that is not abnormal, i.e., one that does not exhibit any of the symptoms of distortion in strong degree." Thus viewed, the normal personality becomes identified with the typical, the usual, since the symptoms were deviations or aberrations. The purely arbitrary nature of any definition either of normality or abnormality is then properly emphasized, together with the important and never-to-be-forgotten fact that the difference between normal and abnormal is one only of degree.

But we need to make our definition more positive. While it is true that we have often learned much about normal personalities through studying abnormal ones it will hardly do to define basic criteria of adaptation in such a backhanded fashion only. In attempting to outline positive criteria by which the normal personality may be measured, attention will be directed successively to three different levels of approach to the problem, which may be called the physiological, the psychological, and the sociological. In considering personality normality under these three heads it must be remembered that the data of the physiologist, the psychologist, and the sociologist are not really separated in different compartments, but are to a quite considerable extent identical. What seem to be variant conclusions are often merely restatements of the same thing in different terminology. In almost no field of research in the social sciences do merely terminological differences bulk as large.

Physiological criteria of personality organization. The physiologist views the human organism as an energy system one at least of whose important "purposes" is self-perpetuation. If within its given life span the organism so functions as to insure periodic satisfaction of the basic organic needs listed in chapter 7, then from the physiological viewpoint it is a healthy, organized, biological unit and a normal personality. Impairment of any of the vital functions (digestion, respiration, circulation, etc.) will mean disorganization and endanger self-perpetuation; hence the symptoms to be feared are those which indicate actual lesions of the body and particularly of the nerve structure. Degenerative changes in the brain or the other nerve tissue, perhaps brought on by lesions in other parts of the organic structure or perhaps developing independently, are held to account for nearly all of the queer behavior

that characterizes the so-called insane person. If post-mortem examination does not reveal the nerve lesions in the case of psychotic and most of the neurotic patients, it is because we have not yet developed delicate enough technique to discover them. The extreme physiological point of view implies firm belief that they are there.

The more moderate physiologist's position would stress the importance of neurological factors and the close relationship between physical health and mental health, without denying the possible influences of frustrated wishes, of attitudes and habits, in some cases. This is in general the point of view of the medical profession, trained to see organic disease symptoms but not altogether unaware of the crotchets brought about in their patients by the effects of continued frustration or of bad rearing. The layman also tends to view personality disorders from this angle; he has gradually been educated away from the theory of demonic possession to a belief that germs, accidents, or heredity are at the root of most serious personal idiosyncrasies, with perhaps just a dash of original sin thrown in. The physical health cult with its "A sound body means a sound mind" doctrine still tends to dominate the average man's thinking on these matters except among people in "advanced" circles who have read Freudian psychology or sent their children to progressive schools.

Psychological criteria in defining the normal personality. The psychologist does not deny the importance of physiological factors in producing normality; he as well as anyone else recognizes the importance of physical well-being. However, out of his more intensive specialization on what may be called the mental functioning of individuals the psychologist has developed some criteria of his own for appraising personality normality and organization. In general he concerns himself with the quality of the individual's own thought processes and emotional states, with his integrity and efficiency as a thinking and feeling unit.¹²

A list of the psychologist's key-words in describing normality

¹² Most psychologists might admit that these criteria may be reducible in the last analysis to physiological processes and nerve functioning, but at present there are no neurological terms to describe many of the real and important psychopathological or normal states. Neither can they yet be modified or controlled by neurological methods. For a statement of the neurologist's present dilemma see I. S. Wechsler, "The Neurologist's Point of View," in I. Madison Bentley, ed., *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, pp. 39-50.

would include *mental efficiency* (getting the most out of one's mental powers), *integration* (coordination of one's various selves so as to make a unified response to the environment), *orientation in reality* (rather than retreat into fantasy), and *emotional stability*. Perhaps only the last needs further elucidation. The need for control over the emotions is well stated by Howard and Patry:

Every conscious state has its feeling tone. All our responses are modified to produce satisfying results. Our strongest impulses to know and do are colored by emotion. Our moods, passions, sentiments and inner patterns of feeling are continually directing our specific acts as well as our whole moral conduct. What we experience with our emotions under control is most worth while. Only when they get out of gear with intelligence and race on their own account do they head us for trouble. When this happens the fault is with the driver and not the engine.¹³

Emotional stability means essentially the habit of keeping emotion in gear. The emotionally stable person is not the victim of moods. His activity is not governed by fears and rages, elations or depressions, over-strong sex cravings or overweening ambition. Perhaps the best characterization of the normal personality's emotional reactions is to say that they are sensibly proportioned to the situation which arouses them and that, when necessary to make an important decision, they can at least be temporarily held in check.

The sociological point of view on normal personality. The sociologist would naturally be concerned with those personality attributes which enable the individual to function successfully in social groups. He would agree that all of the psychological criteria just listed must be met if satisfactory social adjustment is to be possible, but he would give greater weight to the individual's past social experience in producing emotional instability, muddle-headedness, or the other symptoms of distortion.

If, then, the sociologist were to undertake to define personality normality for himself, he would begin with this criterion of social adjustment and work back to the psychological factors that

¹³ Frank E. Howard and F. L. Patry, *Mental Health, Its Principles and Practice*, p. 111, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

contribute to it. He would start by examining the *status* of the individual in his group relations and ask what roles he played in the societies of which he is a member. Are these roles approved of by the other group members, or is the individual regarded as of no account, as odd, queer, immoral, or dangerous? The stress is thus laid on conformity to the expectations and wishes of some group of associates. A personality becomes disorganized when it cannot find some social support and approval. When an individual loses status he loses his most precious possession.

Of course we must remember that it is the individual's conception of his role that is important in this connection, rather than the objective role as viewed by outsiders. But there cannot be a wide discrepancy between the two for any length of time if the person is to remain a normal member of society. When a man sees himself as a great hero, as a Messiah, as a public benefactor but the neighbors regard him as an ordinary mortal, the chances are that he will be treated as an eccentric or a poseur is treated, as harmless but foolish, as reprehensible, or as dangerous. If treatment of this sort does not sooner or later deflate the ego then society's tendency is to call the man's ego-ideas delusional and treat him as insane.

In a later chapter the relation between social disorganization (disorganization of group life) and personal disorganization (loss of status with accompanying symptoms of distortion) will be discussed. It is enough to point out here that in such a society as ours, with a rapidly changing set of mores, a good deal of personality distortion is inevitable. In a primitive society the basic individual life values are established, and in accepting them and living by them the person could feel that his role was a useful one and one full of meaning. This can hardly be said for members of the present younger generation, who are facing what appears to them to be a disorganized world in which they, or any human beings, seem helpless to avert disaster. In such a situation it is easy to understand the appeal of the fascist and communist movements which at least promise the individual a chance to act with others toward the achievement of a new social order, which give him what appears to be a meaningful role in a corporate activity.

On the other hand we must remember that a certain amount of personal disorganization is the price any society has to pay for

social change. Every innovator is from the strict sociological point of view a maladjusted personality, at least until he has begun to gather a following around him to give him status. And there are countless others, with no desire to innovate and only an inability to give up the old ways for the just accepted new ones, whose personalities are broken on the wheels of progress.

A general definition of the normal personality. It would be desirable to effect a synthesis at this point of the three viewpoints on normal and abnormal personality, which we have been discussing. But while the physiological, psychological, and sociological approaches have, as we have seen, much in common, complete synthesis is impossible at this stage of our knowledge. Let us be content, then, with a general definition that takes into account some of the common elements and exhibits our own, the sociological bias: *A normal personality is one whose physiological and psychological functioning is not so inefficient and whose social behavior is not so unconventional or bizarre as to prevent social adjustment.* All of the terms in this definition are relative ones, and it is wise to conclude that the large majority of citizens are within the normal range, even though many may be maladjusted in some groups or at some levels of society. It is wise also to remember that the radical or eccentric of today may be the prophet of tomorrow. Abnormality is a stigma which should be employed only for the more extreme maladapted types.

PERSONALITY REORGANIZATION

We have now contrasted the normal and the abnormal or distorted personality, suggested some of the factors which may turn the first into the second, and noted the importance of slow accumulation of handicaps as well as the damaging effects of crisis in producing a personality breakdown. That both organization and disorganization may be viewed as trends or processes in personality development as well as conditions or states of being has also been pointed out, and we come now to the questions, How can the already distorted or disorganized personality be rehabilitated or reorganized? How can unfavorable trends in development be reversed?

If social adjustment is the important criterion in determining organization and disorganization, then there are obviously two

possible approaches in attempting to effect a reorganization. We may either change the social environment so that the unadjusted will be able to make an adjustment or change the personality so it may fit the environment it is already in. The first approach, changing the environment, is at best too slow a process to help much with any particular case.¹⁴ About all that can be done is to move the individual to a different environment where the strains and pressures will be less or where he will more likely be appreciated. A mental hospital or a prison represents the carrying out of this method to the extreme; the inmate is placed in a specially created environment where, if he does not attain status, at least he will be adequate to the tasks imposed on him. A much milder and more common use of the "new environment technique" is through the injunctions frequently given neurotic patients to go away for a change of scene or to cultivate contacts in different circles. The former suggestion provides only temporary aid however, while the latter would usually have been carried out earlier on his own initiative if the patient could have done so. Very often that is just the trouble—his inability to acquire status in any normal group.

Usually the point of departure in personality reorganization has to be the person himself, and the effort must be made to change him, or rather get him to change himself, so that he can fulfill his present social obligations in his present environment more successfully. All human cultures seem to have provided at least one professional group of people who specialize in remaking personalities. In many primitive groups and even today in backwoods areas of the United States medicine men and sorcerers use spells and charms to cast out the malignant demons who are responsible for an individual's strange or unconventional behavior. Another group of personality remakers are the evangelical religious leaders who help the downhearted and discouraged to find a new faith and be born anew.

Religious conversion and personality reorganization. The therapeutic effects of religious conversion on a disorganized personality are sometimes quite astounding, and yet while the mental processes that lead to the "rebirth" may be tortuous the change

¹⁴ Of course, a social revolution, even on a small scale, will rehabilitate some personalities at the same time that it disorganizes others. It is, as far as the generation that participates in it is concerned, an expensive form of therapy.

itself is not unexplainable. As an instance take the case of Jack, the drunkard, who is enticed somehow into a Salvation Army meeting:

He [Jack] stood in the front of the standing pack which occupied the back of the hall, listening. He saw men who had been prize-fighters, criminals, tramps, and petty thieves standing clean and happy on the platform, speaking of the joy that had come to them with conversion, and explaining that conversion meant a surrender of man's mutinous will to the will of a God all-anxious to care for them. Again and again came the assurance: "However bad any man here may feel himself to be, however hopeless and ashamed and lost he may feel, he has only to come out publicly to this penitent form, kneel down and ask God for His mercy, to have the load lifted off his soul and to feel himself strong in the strength of Almighty God to overcome all his temptations."¹⁵

Jack must be a hardened sinner to resist such an appeal, for it means not only again standing well in the eyes of God but also gaining anew the respect of men. And what the social outcast, the sinner, needs above everything is status. Of course if Jack's conversion experience is not an unusually intense and transforming one he may backslide on the morrow; that is what happens to many who hit the sawdust trail. A good evangelical mission, however does not stop with a single emotional experience:

At the Water Street Mission in New York, for example, it is not assumed that a down-and-out is really on his feet as soon as a conversion climax has occurred. No; his surroundings are looked after; he is helped to get work; friends accompany him to and from work so that he may be sure not to yield to the old saloon habit; he is brought to the mission every night and made happy there; he is set promptly at the task of helping other down-and-outs. In short, he is given the experience of a new external as well as internal world, and he is drilled in definite social acts with pleasurable associations until good conduct becomes habitual. . . . Wherever converts "stick" it will

¹⁵ Harold Begbie, *Twice Born Men*, p. 251, Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, 1909. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. Also quoted by James B. Pratt in his *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 159, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1920.

be found that habit formation, particularly through a new social fellowship, follows the conversion crisis.¹⁶

The convert discovers that there is a group of "friends" who care about him in spite of his former failings. Perhaps he isn't such a bad fellow after all, especially if he is allowed to help convert others. Thus is personality rehabilitation begun.

Of course there are many kinds of conversion, of varying intensity and effect. One man may "see visions on the road to Damascus" and become a follower of Christ, the Lord; another may become "changed" at an Oxford Group house party; a third may arrive suddenly by himself at peace and certainty after years of mental travail. The problem is one of achieving what Boisen calls "inner organization,"¹⁷ of which a large element is self-respect born of the knowledge that one has the respect of others. Sometimes the intense emotional crisis brought on through the technique of the skilled evangelist seems to fuse previously unfused elements in the self-consciousness and produce a new social orientation. Sometimes (for evangelists like others who deal in the reconstruction of personalities have their failures as well as their successes) the emotional upheaval results in more disorganization than there was before.

Psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Based upon the scientific researches of physiologists and abnormal psychologists but relying also much upon empirical factors and intuitive judgments, we now have the comparatively new discipline of *psychiatry*. The psychiatrist is a mental healer like the evangelist and the witch-doctor, but his methods are grounded much more firmly in the applied science of medicine and in social psychology and he deals much more thoroughly and carefully with all phases of the personalities of his subjects. The approach of the psychiatrist is very much like that of the medical man (in fact he is usually a graduate of a medical school); there is a careful examination of all the present symptoms of mental disorder, a long and searching investigation into the patient's past history, and finally a diagnosis. The psychiatrist concludes that the patient is suffering from one of the

¹⁶ George A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 168, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁷ A. T. Boisen, "The Sense of Isolation in Mental Disorders: Its Religious Significance," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 33, p. 563, Jan., 1928.

psychoses or neuroses, or he has an unsolved personality problem with which he either does or does not need expert help. According to the diagnosis varying treatments are prescribed. When necessary the psychiatrist advises custodial care or even institutes legal proceedings for the commitment of the patient to an institution. There various treatments such as hydrotherapy (immersion for set periods in a bathtub, sometimes to stimulate, sometimes for relaxation), occupational therapy (manual work of the arts and crafts variety), electrotherapy, massage, and psychotherapy are often resorted to. Psychotherapy, the last on the list and the most important, includes all the efforts to influence the patient's mental habits through suggestion, reassurance, distraction, persuasion, and will-training. Some psychiatrists on occasion carry suggestion to the point of hypnosis, especially in treating hysterical types. On the whole, while there are still many individual points of view in psychiatry (of which the public becomes aware when the alienists testify on an insanity plea in a murder case) there is a growing body of established knowledge of abnormal behavior. Psychiatry is making rapid progress and psychiatrists are becoming increasingly regarded as indispensable in dealing not only with the criminally insane but with all cases of serious personality distortion.

Closely akin to the psychiatrists but perhaps with somewhat less right at present to apply the word scientific to its discipline is the school of psychotherapists who espouse the doctrines and employ the special techniques of *psychoanalysis*. The psychoanalysts have their own special theory concerning the factors which produce most neuroses and psychoses; in fact, there are several competing theories put forth and religiously adhered to by subcults within the general group. However, it is not psychoanalytic theory but psychoanalytic *method* which interests us. This method is known as *catharsis* and it consists essentially in a recall to consciousness of long "forgotten" memories of childhood experiences. If the process of emptying the memory storehouse is pushed far enough there will eventually come to light the most painful and most crucial of these experiences, the ones whose repression from consciousness at the time they occurred laid the groundwork for the neurotic behavior of the present. These repressed complexes, essentially unsolved frustration problems which the mind has attempted simply to seal over, when now brought back to consciousness and seen in the light of an adult's perspective appear

as very minor instead of major catastrophes. The feelings of chagrin, disappointment, or guilt associated with them, which have been "festering" for so long in the unconscious, are now dissipated and the subject is freed from a load he has been carrying to his destruction. Since according to psychoanalytic theory the real causes of present-day difficulties lie in these burdens from the past which have accumulated gradually until they have become too great to bear, after the catharsis it is possible to reorganize the personality that is now freed from them. Thus a cure results.

So much for the theory of catharsis sketched in bare outline with perhaps many of the reader's questions left unanswered. Now how is the catharsis brought about? It is a long-drawn-out process, involving often as many as two hundred sessions with the analyst, stretching over a period of nine or ten months. It takes time, in the first place, to establish the rapport between analyst and subject which is necessary in order to overcome reticences against baring the inmost soul. It takes time to get the flow of associations started and to lead them back gradually, usually against the unconscious resistance of the patient, to the really important episodes of the past. But it is surprising what one can recall if the analyst is really skilled and the patient not too unwilling to be aided. The treatment is a Spartan one, and both painful and expensive; furthermore it does not always work and is of course useless for some types of cases. When it does work, however, it greatly increases the patient's enjoyment of life and his efficiency. Because of this the cathartic method, perhaps in truncated form, is used on occasion by psychiatrists who do not accept the whole Freudian psychology. And the confessional, which is also a sort of catharsis, is a very ancient therapeutic device still in use by the Roman Catholic Church.

Mental hygiene and social work. The line between psychiatry and the field of *mental hygiene* is difficult to draw, since both psychiatrists and mental hygienists employ many of the same forms of psychotherapy and deal with the same sorts of personality deviations. In general, however, whereas the psychiatrist tends to concern himself with the definitely neurotic and psychotic classes the mental hygienist deals with the personality problems of normal and near-normal people. He counsels with such individuals and tries to help them find a way out of their difficulties that will restore or maintain their mental health and personality balance.

Even more is the mental hygienist interested in preventive measures, and he is as much an educator as a clinician. That "childhood is the golden period for mental hygiene" is one of his cardinal principles and it is he, rather than the psychiatrist, who is called in to deal with problem children either in the home, the school, or the juvenile court. At the college level there has come increasing recognition of the need for having on the staff a person with a mental hygiene point of view to aid students when they get into difficulties and to advise the authorities when student adjustment problems arise.

The practice of mental hygiene is far from being confined to those who call themselves mental hygienists; in fact, the latter term is only beginning to come into general use. Clinical psychologist, consulting psychologist, personnel counselor are other names under which mental hygiene is practiced; then one must not forget that mental hygiene principles pervade the whole field of *social work*. The social worker, whether as visiting teacher, family case worker, parole or probation officer, recreation supervisor, public health nurse, or investigator for a government relief agency is constantly required to work with and through people. Reconstructing personalities and improving relationships between personalities are the social worker's primary jobs; consequently he or she is as much a mental hygienist as one who goes professionally by that name.

Sociology has always been regarded as a part of the background of social work, and recently there has come a new emphasis on the importance of sociological training for the practice of mental hygiene. The work of William Healy¹⁸ in Boston and of Clifford Shaw¹⁹ and E. W. Burgess²⁰ in Chicago has revealed concretely

¹⁸ Cf. William Healy and Augusta Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals—Their Making and Unmaking*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1928; and William Healy, Augusta Bronner, E. M. H. Baylor, J. P. Murphy, *Reconstructing Behavior in Youth*, pp. 183-194, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1929.

¹⁹ Clifford Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*, University of Chicago Press, 1929; Clifford Shaw and H. D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," vol. 2 of the *Report on the Causes of Crime*, U. S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Washington, 1931. See also Clifford Shaw, *The Jack Roller*, University of Chicago Press, 1930; and Clifford Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, University of Chicago Press, 1931.

²⁰ E. W. Burgess, "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 28, pp. 657-680, May, 1923.

the vital role which neighborhood and community cultural patterns play in the development of juvenile delinquents, hoboes, unemployables, and other types of social misfits. Shaw has shown that juvenile delinquents come largely from areas in the city that are deteriorating physically and undergoing a process of disorganization socially. There the usual community controls which make the person who conforms to the mores the socially approved type have broken down. They have been replaced by the canons of adventure and exploit characteristic of a frontier, unorganized society. Since the child will inevitably seek status, and since in the disorganized areas that status is not acquired by conformity but may be acquired by predatory exploits, it is only natural that truancy and delinquent and criminal activity result. The boys' gang, subjected to no social checks, runs wild and breeds socially untamed personalities.

Unless the social worker is aware of these essentially cultural and ecological factors, treatment of the individual cases of delinquency will be on a much too narrow basis, for the personality cannot be reconstructed in a setting where normal behavior receives no community approval and support. Mental hygiene practiced under such conditions must be tied in very closely with social reorganization through the aid of boys' clubs, social settlements, and other constructive community agencies if any headway in reducing the incidence of anti-social behavior is to be made.

Some techniques of mental hygiene. While every personality that comes to the mental hygienist's or the social worker's attention is unique and requires specially adapted treatment, there are certain general principles that may be used as guides in the task of rehabilitating personality. Some of these principles may be set down briefly, since they not only illustrate the aims of the mental hygienist for his client, but are also sound rules which even the normal person may follow in order to maintain mental health.

1. The first step in any clinical interview is to eliminate any possible physical causes for the symptoms which the patient exhibits. A physical examination with such supplementary medical and psychological tests as to give a fairly complete constitutional picture is almost routine procedure. Mental or physical handicaps due to inheritance, disease, or accident; organic disorders interfering with normal physiological functioning; and toxic states due to bad eating and drinking habits can be evaluated more easily than most

"mental" symptoms; hence it is logical to begin with them. Some of them are susceptible to medical treatment, or to treatment by special exercise or change of diet. Make sure there is a sound body before tampering with even the most unsound of minds is a good rule, although sometimes the two are so interrelated that attack on both fronts must proceed simultaneously.

2. Encourage social contacts. The person who gets on well with people, who is easy, relaxed, and happy in his social relations is much less likely to develop personality difficulties than is the isolated, reclusive type. The college man who does not make a fraternity should not retreat into his shell, accept defeat, and isolate himself in order to avoid future rebuffs. He should seek the company of other men and continue to live a social existence.

3. The mental hygienist tries to develop self-insight in those he counsels. A realistic view of one's abilities and disabilities is often a necessary prelude to personality reconstruction.

4. One should face reality not only about oneself but also about the world in which one lives. It does not do to wish for the impossible, for eventual frustration is then inevitable. Perhaps "One's reach should exceed one's grasp," at least one's immediate grasp, since then one is spurred to activity. But goals that can be reached only in a world of fantasy should be recognized for what they are. The pain of frustration is in proportion to the degree of expectation of attainment.

5. "Never cry over spilled milk," is an adage with much wisdom behind it. The mental hygienist tries to help people to make clear-cut decisions, and then stick to them without back-looks and remorse. The past is past; there are problems enough in the present to enlist all a person's energies.

6. When a wish is frustrated some sort of adjustment to this fact must take place. Energy generated in relation to the sought but unattainable goal has to find some other outlet. In this situation, and it is the most common one the mental hygienist has to face, a good general rule is to *substitute*. This means accepting some other goal "as just as good" or "the next best thing" and releasing the pent-up energy into this new channel.

There are all sorts of substitutions, some of which are much better than others. In general, substitution of goals involving overt activity are to be preferred to those in which there is simply a retreat to the imagination. Personality organization is more

promoted when John, failing to make the crew, takes up tennis than when he sits at home and paints mind pictures of himself as a crew hero. A certain amount of substitution of covert or imaginative activity is, however, often useful in meeting the immediate shock of frustration. John *redefines the frustration situation* in order to explain or excuse failure at least in part and thus salve a wounded ego. (His crew career was hampered by illness, or handicapped by favoritism shown his rival.) And John gets a certain release out of imagining a big comeback that he knows will really never be made.

7. The mental hygienist works to make his clients independent of him, able to meet subsequent frustrations and solve future problems by themselves.

No better summary of the whole mental hygiene point of view can be found than in Howard and Patry's description of the way the normal person adjusts to frustration:

All people tend to compensate, rationalize, and regress, or return to immature ways of adjustment; but the healthy-minded individual makes intelligent shifts, compromises, renunciations and substitutions when his drives or wishes meet resistance. He gives up impossible wishes, accepts frustrations, finds a variety of outlets to his energy, breaks up fixations, and in general develops a flexibility of mind. The common human drives are operating in him but his formulation and direction of them are such that they can be realized in one way or another. In short, his method of wish realization is saner, more workable, and more in keeping with the demands and opportunities of reality. The neurotic cannot or is unwilling to shift his plan of attack; consequently he is bowled over by the resistance and frustrations he meets. . . . If he suffers from a conflict he waits for someone else to straighten him out in his thinking and get him to try a different mode of striving. A normal person trains himself to meet painful situations frankly without an excess of emotion. He becomes cognizant of his complexes, accepts them as a dynamic- and growth-determined part of his personality and honestly tries to desensitize them. He is willing to accept life as it is, with its inevitable conflicts, thwartings, discouragements and failures. He does not kill his wishes but puts them to work on realizable goals.²¹

²¹ Howard and Patry, *op. cit.*, p. 263. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

These last four chapters have been devoted to a study of the process of socialization. We have learned how the infant as it grows to physiological maturity acquires habits, attitudes, and wishes which enable it eventually to function as an adult in a human society. Latterly we have been discussing some of the failures in this socialization process, and some of the means whereby socialization may be made more complete and adjustment more successful.

We must now again shift our focus of attention, this time from the person to the group of which he is a member. Instead of concentrating unilaterally on the individual and his development we shall turn our scrutiny to the relationships that develop between one individual and others. This approach is bilateral since it takes into account the attitudes of each toward the other. In the two ensuing sections we shall consider the various types of social aggregate within which these bilateral person-to-person relationships develop. Later we shall examine into the forms and qualities of these relationships themselves.

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PART III

FORMS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Chapter 11

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUP

THE BOYS' GANG, A NATURAL SOCIAL GROUP¹

ON THE SOUTHERN boundary over a stretch of grassland and surmounting a rugged hill stood the old "water-tower." To us it represented a fortress from whose majestic height could be viewed an amazing panorama of grassy countryside, comparable in our minds to the broad and astounding views from the Canadian Rockies. The possession of this fortress was very much coveted and it was the solemn pledge and inspiring ambition of us all to keep it. Often a gang from Hoquire's alley would catch us unaware and then and there a two-fisted fight would begin. Sometimes they succeeded in driving us out of our stronghold, but their victory would only be temporary for we always managed to call out the reserves and save the day. On the eastern boundary there was the Harrison gang to vie with. They seldom bothered us, though, and once or twice they actually became our allies in times of dire need. I remember that it was invariably on Halloween Night that we had our greatest trouble with the "foreign" invaders, and invariably it was that night that our parents insisted we remain at home. The gangs on the northern and eastern boundaries seldom became a menace to us for they were too far removed to be a constant worry—it was really only in baseball and football that we clashed with them, and somehow those games always culminated in a scrap. Thus, we as youngsters had no real friends outside of our own neighborhood which fact tended to bind us even more closely to one another. It was by such means and such means only that we were able to hold our own. These experiences now are amusing, although then they seemed intensely serious!

Neighborhood gangs are not planned in advance; they come into existence spontaneously in response to the social needs of boys

¹Taken from an unpublished autobiographical essay by Edwin Grandstaff.

in quest of adventure. When supervised by the guiding hand of an adult they take the form of a Boy Scout troop or an athletic team, and later the same boys outgrow these forms of association to become fraternity members, business men, leaders in church groups, participants in clubs, fraternal orders, and other associations with which we are familiar. Social relations in one form or another are so ever-present, so much like the atmosphere on which we depend without questioning its nature, that the suggestion of studying groups objectively and scientifically may appear a novel undertaking, and yet that is the principal task of sociology. Social groups belong to the sociologist just as rocks belong to the geologist and stars to the astronomer. The present chapter is an introduction to the nature of social groups, describing their more obvious characteristics.

WHY GROUP LIFE

The spontaneous quality in social relations, as evidenced, for example, by the natural development of a neighborhood gang, caused sociologists in the early days to think of group life as automatic, rising instinctively from man's gregarious, herd-like make-up. In those days the instinct theory also explained why men fought, why they were religious, why they played, and why they engaged in other standard forms of human behavior. This theory, once generally accepted, no longer stands in good repute, as was made clear in the analysis of inheritance and personality.²

Inevitability of social groups. After the instincts and inherited nature were found not to be responsible for all that man does, sociologists followed another approach by examining more directly social behavior itself. The close scrutiny of bridge clubs, boys' gangs, football teams, labor unions, trade associations, missionary societies, research foundations, and leagues of nations told one simple truth—that every association is related to human needs. That is to say, the typical life problems which man faces are such that he cannot avoid being social. His complete physical dependence in childhood, his constant need for food, for warm clothing in winter, for a place to live, and the necessity for getting on with the people about him inevitably make him a social being.

² Cf. the discussion of instinct in chapter 7. See also L. L. Bernard, *Instinct*, pp. 305-320, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1924.

From the evolutionary point of view it is apparent that only a creature capable of social adjustments could survive the conditions which confront man. In the words of William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller:

Societal bonds were forced upon lawless men by the necessities of the struggle for existence; association was a species of insurance which one could not afford to be without.³

Plainly association is a decisive advantage in the struggle for existence, and those who developed it were of the fit. By their survival it was bound to prevail.⁴

Man is found to have hit unwittingly and early upon this expedient for living; but that does not prove him instinctively gregarious.⁵

Following this line of thought one step further, we may say that through group life—one of man's devices for avoiding extinction—he finds security, a sense of importance, the response of friends, and new experience. We already know⁶ these are the things which man needs, whether he be an Eskimo or an East-side tenement dweller. Groups arise for the simple reason that man cannot get along without them; human desires are at the root of social organization. Once the social organization exists, the children who are born into it do not question the group customs which control them, any more than they question the physical environment which limits and shapes their activity. They follow the ways of the group because those are the things they know to do and because only by so doing can they attain what they desire as individuals. In the formation of new groups, association on the basis of common need is clearly observed. As individuals face the common danger of an enemy at war, they organize for protection; as they face the common problem of securing food and shelter, they cooperate in tilling the fields and erecting houses. Group association originates and is maintained as a means of satisfying the similar interests of individuals. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess say that "we may apply

³ William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. I p. 14, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁶ *Cf.* the discussion of human wishes in chapter 9.

the term social to any group of individuals which is capable of consistent action, that is to say, action, consciously or unconsciously directed to a *common end*."⁷ The *need* for working as a group in reaching the *common end* is the social bond which we have been describing. Edward Sapir, in studying the problem from the viewpoint of an anthropologist, similarly emphasizes this *common interest* basis of group life:

Any group is constituted by the fact that there is some interest which holds its members together. The community of interest may range from a passing event which assembles people in a momentary aggregate to a relatively permanent functional interest which creates and maintains a cohesive unit.⁸

Once this main point is clear, minor qualifications should be made to avoid over-simplification. The following paragraphs will deal in order with two refinements of the general principle of the common need for group association.

Exceptions and variations. Man is not only a social conformist but also a rebel. Corporate life—that is, group life—implies regulation, control of individual behavior. Although a person cannot live without society he sometimes resents and tries to avoid its control. The freedom of the desert island appeals to many a day-dreamer. The social irresponsibility of the vacationist in a strange land, the freedom of the hardened criminal from social constraint, and the relief one finds in the solitude of a mountain retreat give evidence of the not uncommon desire to escape social bonds. That this individualistic tendency is only relative is indicated by the fact that the criminal needs gang support to protect him from the law, the vacationist returns to civilization, and Robinson Crusoe welcomes the coming of his man Friday. Although man occasionally rebels, fundamentally he remains social, for otherwise life itself, as well as the attainment of its more subtle satisfactions, would be impossible.

Each generation does not construct a new social order, con-

⁷ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 42, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1921. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. (The italics in the quotation are ours.)

⁸ From Edward Sapir, "Groups," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7, p. 179. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

sisting of groups specially designed to meet its needs. The impression may have been given that in the beginning there was man, and then came group life; that each new set of men finds that a social order is needed, and sets about to construct it. The process is far more subtle, less conscious. Every individual is born into a ready-made social world. It surrounds him with conditioning influences which shape his desires and determine the ways in which he will satisfy them. Men are born into some groups, join others, but create new ones very slowly, except in times of general social change. We must not be so naive, therefore, as to assume that man, after awakening to the need of a social world, beckons his fellow creatures to come and help build one. The point was made earlier in the book that man is social before he knows it; even his discovery of himself is a social experience.⁹ Social groups, on the other hand, must really function—must serve needs which man recognizes as his own—or they will be supplanted by new forms. The person and the group thus become two aspects of the same thing; one does not exist without the other.¹⁰

Occasions for group association. The occasions for group action are so numerous that a complete list is impossible, but Pitirim Sorokin has summarized a few of the more common situations in which individuals are customarily related to one another as members of a social group:

1. Physiological kinship and community of blood or origin from the same physical or mystical (totemic) ancestors.
2. Marriage.
3. Similarity in religious and magical beliefs and rites.
4. Similarity in native language and mores.
5. Common possession and utilization of land.
6. Territorial proximity (neighborliness).
7. Common responsibility (sometimes imposed by other groups) for the maintenance of order, payment of taxes, etc., and common acquisition of certain privileges.
8. Community of occupational interests.

⁹ Cf. chapter 9.

¹⁰ Cf. the discussion of the relation of personality and culture in chapter 7, and see also Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1922, especially chap. 1, "Society and the Individual."

9. Community of various types of economic interests.
10. Subjection to the same lord.
11. Attachment, either free or compulsory, to the same social institution or agency of social service and social control, such as the same police or political center, school, temple, and church, trade agency, military authority, election bureau, hospital or any one of the various other agencies.
12. Common defense against a common enemy or common dangers.
13. Mutual aid.
14. General living, experiencing, and acting together.¹¹

Sapir has similarly listed the common interests which lie at the basis of the formation of a group. He includes the economic, political, vocational, meliorative, propagandist, racial, territorial, and religious.¹² These social inventories add a note of realism to what has been said in the preceding sections. With such situations in mind it is not hard to understand what is meant by common interests and the inevitability of group life.

BEHAVIOR OF A GROUP

Interaction of persons in a group. In conceiving of persons associated in a *common enterprise* we should not think of them as soldiers lined side by side marching as regimented units toward a predetermined objective. A social group does not act with that precision and singleness of mind. In group action, more than in military campaigns, deserters drop out along the way, new leaders contest for command, divergent ideas are expressed about objectives and how to reach them. By the time a goal is attained it is not the same as the original idea any one person may have had. The line of march, conceived as an orderly course, often looks in retrospect like the wanderings of a lost people. That is, the "togetherness" of a group is not that of an aggregation of many identical units, like soldiers in a rank. Park and Burgess put it this way: "However we may conceive the relation of the parts to the whole, society is not a mere physical aggregation and not a mere mathematical

¹¹ Pitirim Sorokin, Carle C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, eds., *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, vol. I, pp. 307, 308, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1930. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹² Sapir, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

unit."¹³ Society is rather an *interrelationship of persons*. From a distance they seem to be moving steadily toward a common goal, but from near at hand it is apparent that the movement is halting, less direct. The members quarrel, help one another, divide responsibility, shirk duties, punish those who cause too much trouble, and move on one step closer to economic security, salvation, or whatever it is they want. In a social group there is constant movement and striving—an interplay of personalities. It is not follow-the-leader, sheep-like action, nor is it side-by-side, military march; *the group is a moving unit of interacting personalities*.¹⁴ The following section will consider the *general* relation of social interaction to the integration of persons in a group; an analysis of the different *forms* of interaction in group life is the central problem of part V of this book.

Group integration, participation, and morale. The integration or solidarity of a group is largely dependent upon the *frequency*, the *variety*, and the *emotional quality* of the interaction of its members. When a family, a boy's gang, a college fraternity, or a religious group is closely unified, it is usually because the members are related by *several common interests*, they have *frequent social contact* with one another, and the emotional quality of their interaction expresses a *high degree of morale*, of loyalty and enthusiasm. Group integration developed without planning in primitive societies because persons were born into family and clan relationships which encompassed all of their social experience, but in the more specialized and segmentary contacts of modern life, unity is maintained more often by conscious effort.

In general, morale or emotional unity is highest when (1) the members feel that the preservation of the group is of vital importance to their personal welfare, when (2) each has a sense of sharing in the achievement of its objectives, when (3) the relations of the members are intimate and personal so that words of encouragement and praise flow freely from one to another, when (4) the group's objective is not too easily attained but calls for the exercise of concerted effort, when (5) the common interests of the

¹³ Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁴ We have here applied to the group in general the idea of the family developed by Ernest W. Burgess and presented in his article, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, vol. 7, pp. 1-9, Mar., 1926.

group are symbolized for the members in the appealing forms of music, ritual, distinctive names, titles, banners, slogans, insignia, and when (6) the members are made aware of the significance and superiority of their group through acquaintance with the glorified tradition of its achievements. These elements are present naturally in primitive groups and in modern groups which have developed slowly over a period of time, but in more artificially constituted organizations, leaders become skilled in hastening the emergence of group loyalty. One may study the integration of any group in terms of the three characteristics of its interaction which have been mentioned—the frequency with which the members associate for a common purpose, the range or variety of their common interests, and, of special significance, the morale and emotional quality of their interaction.

The structure of a group. Social structure denotes simply the more stable aspects of group life—the framework which gives form to its organization, the better established relationships which preserve unity during periods of change. These more formal, impersonal aspects of a group's interaction usually include (1) some plan (not always thought out deliberately) of dividing responsibility among various functionaries, (2) some means of introducing new members into the group and transmitting to them its traditions and ideals, (3) some means (folkways, mores, or laws) of standardizing the behavior of the members, especially with reference to the central interests or common objectives, and (4) some provision for improving or maintaining the status of the group in relation to other groups in the society of which it is a part.

In the intimate friendship group there is little need for elaborate social structure because its members are bound by a personal loyalty which is stimulated by their common interests and frequent contact. But as the size of a group increases, and as its membership becomes dispersed, the regulative power of personal attitudes is considerably diluted. For its own preservation the group develops means of facilitating indirect contacts and of controlling the behavior of its members through standard patterns, in the form of rules, laws, official customs, and ritual, and through such special techniques as the establishment of a central headquarters with executive officers, official publications, and annual meetings. The standardizing forces of functionaries, buildings, and procedures for

selecting and initiating new members all tend to formalize and make permanent a particular pattern of social relations.

We say that a group with these characteristics is *institutionalized*. This means simply that the tendency toward stability is concretely expressed through well-developed behavior patterns, that is, through institutions, which are passed on from one generation to another. In common parlance, the group possessing many institutional features is called an institution. The terms "group" and "institution" are therefore closely related, but each emphasizes a slightly different aspect of human association. The first connotes *the dynamic, personal elements in association*; the second, *the formal, organized, stable patterns through which the dynamic interests are expressed*. As a *social group* the church is a congregation of persons engaged in common worship and religious activities. As an *institution* it consists of forms of baptism, ordination, dogma, rules, tradition, and official control. These patterns, which become fixed in the habits and sentiments of the members, constitute a social structure by means of which the group life is perpetuated.

One of the most interesting projects in sociology consists in tracing this gradual transition from a small, intimate group to an institution. The fraternity which began as a friendship group on a single campus, and is now a national organization with officers, standard ritual, and formal conventions; the religious sect which started as a small group of dissenters who found fault with the old religion, and which is now, itself, an established denomination with dogma and church councils; or the business enterprise which originated through the cooperation of two or three partners and is today a corporation with thousands of employees and stockholders, are all illustrations of the way in which social structure develops as a group increases in size, complexity, and the impersonality of its contacts. When later we place groups together in their community setting and deal with the inclusive social organization, we shall analyze further the stabilizing force of the institutionalized features of group life.¹⁵

Our present preview of the characteristics of group behavior will be concluded with a cursory survey of different types of relationships. The following descriptions do not constitute fixed

¹⁵ Cf. chapter 16, in which the relation of social structure to community organization is considered.

categories into which social groups can all be neatly classified, for we shall find the problem of classification far too complex for that; they should, however, serve as useful guides in directing our attention to some of the common differences in group behavior.

TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPS

Primary and secondary groups. These two groups, whose acquaintance we made in an earlier chapter, are distinguished from each other by their type of social contact and degree of formal organization. In the *primary group* which is usually a small, face-to-face association, the contacts are personal. Individuals live close to one another socially and do not need the formal framework of constitutions and laws to achieve their purposes. Members of a family, a neighborhood, or a friendship circle interact as whole personalities, sensitive to the approval or censure of others in the group, and loyal to one another because of personal regard and the sharing of many interests.

In contrast with this type of association, the *secondary group*, larger and more formal, specialized and indirect in its contacts, relies more for unity and continuance upon the stability of its social organization. An army, as an illustration of a secondary group, impresses one with its formal orders, hierarchy of ranks, and rigid discipline. When personal regard and official orders conflict, when a soldier is absent from camp longer than his leave permits, personal interests are subordinated to the maintenance of army discipline. A similar loyalty to formal rule and organization, a similar categoric rather than personal judgment of individual behavior, a similar allocation of responsibility according to prescribed rule and rank is a tendency in any group whose relations involve secondary contacts.

The distinction should not be drawn too sharply, however, because occasionally the two types of contact appear as dual characteristics of the same group. One may observe a family, customarily classified as a primary group, in which the relations are quite authoritarian and categoric, in which one personality rules the behavior of the others in an arbitrary, impersonal manner. Again, secondary groups are not always devoid of primary contacts, as the accounts of army officers who have set aside rules to save an individual from punishment, or of employers who take a

personal interest in their workmen, will testify. Furthermore, secondary group leaders, realizing the superior value, in terms of efficiency and unity, of personal loyalty rather than forced obedience to an organization, have often tried to bring primary relations into the formal structure of their group. This is frequently done by dramatically identifying the welfare of the individual with the existence of the group through the use of personalized symbols, slogans, and ritual. Loyalty to the state in time of war is achieved through such means. As a general observation, however, the principle still stands that intimate relations are more characteristic of the small, non-specialized, face-to-face group than of the far-reaching discipline of an army, the impersonal organization of a large factory, or the balance-sheet frame of mind of a modern corporation.

The "in-group" and the "out-group." A second basis of classification centering on the social attitudes related to membership in a group, contrasts the "we-feeling," characteristic of persons who belong to the same group, with their attitude toward those who are members of "outside" groups. The individual thinks of the "we-group" or the "in-group" as "my group," the group "whose members I know, whose purposes I share, whose traditions I revere," in contrast with the "others-group" or the "out-group," "whose members I regard as strangers, foreigners, and sometimes as enemies, because their traditions and purposes are different, and in some cases antagonistic to those of *my* group." The sense of difference is of course heightened in time of conflict. The "we-feeling" of a nation at war prejudices its people against the "out-group," rendering them credulous of exaggerated accounts of their own superiority and of their enemy's degradation.

Circles of varying dimensions separate "in-groups" from "out-groups," each depending upon the relationship in question. One may consider one's home community an "in-group" with reference to outside communities, but when one's attention is centered upon another relationship, let us say one's own family, one regards the family as an "in-group" in contrast with the rest of the community, who in this case belong to the "out-group." The test of the "in-group" attitude can be applied somewhat objectively by noticing the terms which persons use in referring to their relationships. When a person says, "We feel," "We believe," "We are agreed," "We demand," "We object," "We contend," he is speaking as a

member of an "in-group," but when the pronoun is changed to the third person, he separates himself from the group in question, and, in so doing, betrays the "out-group" attitude, which may range from a mere implication of difference to open hostility. One's "in-group" attitude may also be tested by his acceptance of responsibility, for a person is normally responsive to the appeals of his *own* group but untouched by those of the "out-group."

Transitory and permanent groups. A third type of distinction between groups may be made on the basis of their degree of stability. The stability of a social relationship may vary from a crowd's momentary interest in a passing event to the relatively permanent functional interest of a family, a church, a university, or a government.¹⁶ In an earlier section we traced the general factors that affect the stability of a group, and in the chapters on social organization to follow we shall analyze the problem still further. Transitory types of groups will be considered in chapter 12.

Vertical and horizontal groups. A fourth division of groups, into vertical and horizontal types, is suggested by the writings of Herbert A. Miller.¹⁷ He refers to a *vertical group*, such as a race, nation, or community, as including all ages and types of people within a given society. Although people may be organized in an infinite variety of ways, according to other relationships, as members of the same nation they all have a status and a sense of belonging to one group. On the other hand, *horizontal groups* cut across a population, defining social classes and castes as different strata in the same society. The characteristics of these groups will also be covered in the chapters which are to follow.

Other types. Many other criteria for distinguishing one type of group from another have been advanced at various times. There are, for example, the *blood kinship groups* such as the family, sib, or race, whose social unity often involves an awareness of common biological descent, and the *non-kinship groups* in which the factor of blood relationship is unimportant. There are the *non-optional groups*, such as race, family, state, and caste, which the individual does not choose to join but of which he is automatically a member, and the *optional* or *voluntary groups* such as clubs and societies,

¹⁶ Based on the earlier statement by Sapir, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

¹⁷ Herbert A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1924.

which he is relatively free to join or not join as he chooses.¹⁸ These latter are often *special interest groups* signifying that, like a cycling club or a choral society, they satisfy a particular interest of those who have formed the group. There are *territorial groups*—neighborhood, community, and region—in which the relationship is affected by the factor of a common place of residence, and the *non-territorial groups*, often of the special interest type, in which the location of the members is of less importance than their bond of some common interest. There are groups designated by the function they serve: economic, religious, recreational, political, etc. And there are groups designated by their basic form of interaction: the *accommodation groups*, such as a state which permits persons with diverse interests to cooperate in a common enterprise, and *conflict groups*, such as criminal gangs, whose antagonisms toward one another and toward the police are so active and personal that strife rather than cooperation is their typical form of behavior. And so the list might continue, for many other bases of classification have been proposed by different students of sociology.¹⁹ We have listed only those more commonly used.

Difficulties in group classification. The limitations of group classification should be apparent from this summary. In almost every case, groups were divided into types on the basis of a single classifying principle, a single criterion, whereas in real life no social situations are so simple. We must remember throughout our study that groups, even the more stable ones, are not static forms, but are dynamic and complex relationships of persons whose own interests are always changing. Any single classification of these relationships runs the risk of over-simplification. But the different categories are valuable if we remember that each is a specialized approach, that each abstracts from a complex situation only a few characteristics for comparison. Obviously, therefore, the various classifications are neither altogether logical nor mutually exclusive. A "we-group" may be a primary, or it may be a secondary group, and the same is true for an "out-group." A kinship group may

¹⁸ This freedom is of course relative. In many situations the individual joins organizations through social pressure over which he has little control.

¹⁹ For a rather complete summary of the different classifications read the section, "Concepts Pertaining to Various Classifications of Plurals," in Earle E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, pp. 135-156, D. C. Heath and Company, New York, 1932.

also be a special interest group, and a horizontal group may be classified functionally as an economic form of organization. This problem of overlapping is not, however, peculiar to social science—it besets the classifier in any field—nor does it destroy the service which classification may render when we judge the results according to the limited criteria which were selected for the analysis. By applying various approaches in this manner we obtain valid insight into the nature of social behavior.

The present chapter has introduced us to some of the more general characteristics of social groups, particularly to their common interests and social structure, to their unifying forces and types of behavior. These principles will be useful tools of analysis in the later study of particular aspects of human society which we are now ready to begin. It will be a fast-moving survey in which we pause long enough before each type to learn its dominant characteristics and make comparisons with other forms of social behavior. For the reasons stated we shall not follow a strictly logical classification but will discuss in greatest detail those types of social relations which historically have come to be of value to the sociologist and in relation to which he has carried on the greater part of his research. These types will be grouped in general classes which have characteristics of their own, and some similarities with other groups as well. The order of study will be, first, crowds and publics; second, races and “race conscious groups”; third, nations and classes; fourth, territorial groups; and finally the total social organization, viewed according to its different functions. If the previous discussions have provided the broad, sweeping panorama of the social scene, the succeeding chapters will show the people in their daily social life arranged according to their varied and picturesque social groupings. When completed they will serve, in their turn, as background for a still closer analysis of the processes and forms of interaction involved in group life.

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Chapter 12

CROWDS AND PUBLICS

A CROWD IN ACTION¹

WE HAD FALLEN OUT and were lounging before our tents when a strange soldier from another regiment passed rapidly down the company street.

"There'll be some fun at the sutler's shack, just before taps," he remarked, to no one in particular. Twenty paces further on he repeated his statement, mechanically, and we heard him repeat it once more as he passed by the mess tent on his way to another company.

"Say, did you hear what that fellow said?" cried the cook, thrusting out his head from between the flaps of the mess tent.

"O, shut up!" said the first sergeant. "You fellows have got to stay right here. Mind, I'm watchin' ye. The first fellow that leaves the company street'll get reported."

"What do you think?" murmured my tent-mate, Buck, an eager boy, enlisted under age. "They've been talking of running the sutler out."

"Nothing to it," I asserted. "They wouldn't dare. Anyway, you and I are going to keep out of it."

"Well, all right. But damn the sutler."

"Amen," I agreed. It was two weeks beyond pay day, and not a soul in the company had any money left. The sutler had garnered it all. What could you expect? After two hours' drill on a sweating morning, one had to drink, but not, if he could help it, the tepid water in the company barrel, tasting of vegetable mold and vinegar soaked wood. At the sutler's were to be had lemonade, passably cool

¹ Adapted from Alvin Johnson, "Short Change," *New Republic*, vol. 14, pp. 381-383, Apr. 27, 1918. Reprinted by permission of the author and of the publishers. The scene is laid in an American army encampment of 1898. Also quoted by Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys in *An Introduction to Sociology*, The Ronald Press, New York, 1929.

and refreshing even if it was made without lemons, bottled soft drinks and a marvelous beverage known as blackberry bounce which made a total abstainer grotesquely gay. Until the pay ran out the sutler was confronted from morning till night with thirsty and hungry soldiers, sometimes in ranks ten deep. And from morning till night an ugly quarrel was going on over his counter.

"Here, you damn dago, I gave you a dollar. Where's my change?"

"No, no, you gave me fi' cents."

"You're lying. Give me my change or I'll knock your damn head off."

The sutler would shrug his shoulders and serve another row of customers. If the trouble maker was very persistent, the sutler would shell out change with poisonous gesture. He was an Armenian, and no doubt had learned in the trade with Kurds how far one may defy, how far one must compromise with violence. Current report was that the sutler made a regular practice of short change, but there was a strong minority opinion that this report was eight-tenths pure fabrication and one-tenth founded on mistake. Several men in my company boasted of their success in getting drinks for nothing and bullying the sutler out of change besides. Probably some one else suffered for it. Anyway, the sutler was bound to win out in the end; if his customers occasionally cheated him he nevertheless got the money back in trade. Inevitably he was cordially detested. . . .

The dusk was growing heavy. I was preparing to turn in, when Buck, who had been making a call on a neighboring company, thrust his head into the tent.

"Say," he whispered. "There aren't ten men in D company's tents. Our boys are all gone, too. Let's get out before the officers catch on."

"They're all crazy," I grumbled. "They'll drill us to death tomorrow for this."

"Come on!" cried Buck, tugging at my belt.

I blew out my light and stepped out of the tent. Men from other companies were stealthily slipping through between the tents, headed for the sutler's. I caught some of Buck's eagerness and in a moment we too were slipping between tents in the darkness. Beyond the camp we issued upon a trail, now quite packed with dark figures.

"Hullo," sounded a strange voice in my ear. "Did he short change you?"

"No," I replied. "I never trusted him to make change."

"You were smart. I don't know another man he hasn't skinned.
— You're Peters, M company, aren't you?"

"No. C company."

"Oh, I mistook you. Gosh! Hear 'em?"

I caught a confused wave of sound, shouting interspersed with shrill whistles. We began to run.

In the clearing, under the flickering gasoline torch, hundreds of men were packed about the front of the sutler's shack. The Armenian stood in his doorway, pale but imperturbable, his eyes glaring fiercely, his thick lips curving in a nervous smile. The crowd was keeping its distance, as word had passed back from the front that the sutler had his finger on the trigger of a six-shooter. We were after fun, not shooting, and it was enough to hurl imprecations at him. When Buck and I arrived, the spirit of the crowd was good humored, for the most part, but occasionally one could perceive a note of real hatred. What seemed a deliberate competition in imprecations got in motion, and the more violent curses gained rapidly over the milder ones. The character of the voices, too, began to change: the original miscellaneous clamor split into two well defined currents of deep notes and high that would occasionally reinforce each other and make one thrill unaccountably. The crowd was pressing closer. The Armenian still kept his nerve but the movements of his head were becoming spasmodic. It was still fun with us, but the idea that it was serious was visibly gaining on the Armenian.

"Poor devil," I thought, "this has been carried about far enough." And then a new baying note rose from the mob, a note I had not supposed to be within the range of the human voice. I shivered, and as I glanced again at the Armenian, darting his eyes from one quarter to another, in suppressed panic, I felt my pity slip from me. I began to exult, like a hunter who has found a wild animal in a trap, to finish at leisure. "Kill the damn thief! Kill the damn dago!" the crowd was yelling. It thrilled!

There was a lull: something was going on that we in the centre could only divine. Above the mutterings, subdued for the moment, we heard a sound like the splitting of a timber. Word passed from the flanks of the crowd, "They've pried out a plank behind." The Armenian turned to look back into his shack: his jaw dropped; his thin acquisitive profile quivered; the white of his eye seemed to glaze. A sharp pebble hurled from behind him struck him just below the cheek bone: it clung for a second, like a hideous black growth, then

dropped, thrust out by a jet of blood. A mantle of frenzy fell upon the mob. An atrocious roar arose, carrying on its waves all the obscenities and blasphemies known to young America.

"Kill the damn Jew! Kill the God damn Nigger!"

The mob surged forward: all around me men wedged between converging lines of force were crying out that they were being crushed. The Armenian darted into his shack, snapping the door to in the face of a dozen men springing for him. They beat and pushed at the door while a hundred others thrust their weight against the counter shutters. The shack was rocking on its foundations: another thrust, and over she'd go. Suddenly I became conscious of a weakening of the pressure from behind me; of a subsidence of the volume of yells, of a subtle change in the quality of the sound. Did I merely imagine that I heard a sharp "Halt!" at my left? I stood on tiptoe, to look over the heads of the men about me. Through an opening produced by an accidental grouping of shorter men, I caught a glimpse of a long line of men in khaki, springing from the darkness to the rear, passing across the lighted circle, and into the darkness beyond, within which by straining one seemed to distinguish the dull gleam of rifle barrels and belt buckles, extending interminably.

"Fix bayonets!" sounded the command distinctly.

"The regulars!" murmured voices all around me. In an instant we were rushing across the lighted space, in a panic as infectious and as blind and overpowering as our rage of a moment past. Everywhere the woods resounded with the steps of running men. I lost Buck, and ran wildly, without a sense of direction, until my breath was gone. Over the comb of a little hill I paused to gather my wits, only to be run down by a group of men who had clung together in their abject panic. I picked myself up, bruised and still more dazed, and began to run away at right angles to my previous course. I burst into a little clearing and stopped short: before me in the darkness was something upright: a sentry? It remained perfectly immobile. Cautiously I approached: it was a granite slab, one of the many erected to commemorate a battle of the Civil War fought on this terrain. I seated myself with my back to the stone, for protection against any galloping figures that might chance my way. Through my shirt, clinging with perspiration, I could feel the cold, sharp cut characters of the inscription: the names of Americans of my father's generation who had fallen here in defense of a race of alien blood. Had that atrocious, non-human cry of race hatred and blood thirst,

sharply cut into my memory like these letters on granite, actually issued from my own lips? Or had I just heard it and made it my own, in the moment of the collective frenzy and the fused emotions and will of the mob?

THE BEHAVIOR OF CROWDS AND MOBS

Under such circumstances as just described, crowd behavior easily arises and may not cease until it has gone the whole way to mob action. Not all crowds engage in violent action as this one was about to do; some stop at the stage of intensive feeling accompanied by only moderate overt behavior. A crowd of football fans celebrating around the victory bonfire after the game, a crowd assembled at the gates of Buckingham Palace at the time of the illness of George V, waiting for a report of his condition, and a crowd welcoming Lindbergh after his historic flight, are not mob-like in their behavior; they are forms of collective action which a society generally recognizes and encourages. But because in some cases one stage does lead to another, eventuating in the uncontrolled acts of a mob, we may well consider at one time the characteristics of these two types of groups. In order to mark off more clearly the fields we expect to study in this section and to rescue some of the terms from the loose connotation of general usage, we should at once suggest preliminary definitions.

Our use of the term "crowd" is not identical with its popular meaning. For us it does not refer to a mere aggregation of individuals such as one sees on Main Street at the noon hour, or in subway stations; they possess no unifying interest, no sharing of experience—or at any rate the degree is almost negligible.² If, however, the usual hurry and bustle of noon-day traffic is interrupted by a novel occurrence—for example, if fire sirens shriek, smoke and flames burst through the windows of an office building,

² Park and Burgess believe that even on such occasions the mere fact of persons being aware of the presence of others "sets up a lively exchange of influences, and the behavior that ensues is both social and collective." We may grant that whenever persons are together there is likely to be some interaction, but on some occasions when individuals regard each other more as physical objects than as persons, the interaction is so slight as to be of no great significance in the analysis of collective behavior. It would be well, nevertheless, to understand the theoretical point stated by Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 865, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924.

employees rush down fire escapes, and police clear the streets—the onlookers do become a social group which we may call a crowd. They are then no longer impersonal. They speculate about the cause of the fire, wonder if everyone got out of the building, and express concern as a fireman overcome by smoke is brought to the street. This is a crowd of the least organized type, but nevertheless it may go by that name, because, for the moment, *individuals have a common interest, respond emotionally to the same stimuli, and influence one another by expressions of alarm, curiosity, amusement, or pity.* Earle E. Eubank has given a concise definition which may well serve as an introduction to our study. Incidentally, his statement tends to confirm the point that crowds and mobs have many characteristics in common.

The *crowd* and the *mob* are alike in the following ways: (1) they are each a personal assemblage, (2) for a single occasion, (3) characterized by absence of discussion and reflection, (4) being motivated by emotion and impulse. (5) Their individual members are so merged with the whole as to be dominated by the collective emotion, (6) and each individual identity is so submerged as to render them virtually anonymous. Their essential condition is a state of *rapprochement* among their members. . . . When the crowd changes from a passive state, or from one of mere interaction among its members, into a state of aggressive, collective action toward some unreasoned objective, it becomes a mob.³

The full meaning of this definition will be more apparent as our discussion progresses.

EMOTIONAL NATURE OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

The important characteristic of a crowd is not its personnel or its organization but its state of mind and its behavior. Everett D. Martin probably exaggerated when he called the crowd, “a device for indulging ourselves in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together,”⁴ but he did not entirely miss the point.

³ Earle E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, pp. 154-155. Reprinted by special permission of D. C. Heath and Company, publishers.

⁴ *The Conflict of the Individual and the Mass in the Modern World*, p. 190, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1932.

Persons in the midst of crowd excitement forget themselves, are freed from the usual inhibitions of polite society, and, without thought of consequence, follow the impulse of the moment. Such was the case with the soldiers who attacked the sutler. Such also is the case with lynching mobs, which have not been uncommon in the history of our country. Since 1882, 4,628 lynchings have occurred in the United States.⁵ In 1933 alone there were 28 lynchings.⁶ Approximately 75,000 mob members participated in the lynchings during this one year.

The sociologist is interested in studying this form of mob action both because it is a major social problem and because it illustrates so many of the characteristics of crowd behavior, as is shown in the following description. Notice the successive steps in its development as the crowd is transformed into a lynching mob.

Upon the report of the alleged crime and subsequent arrest, curious people gather about the peace officers or jail. As the crowd grows and discusses the case, the details inevitably are exaggerated. These exaggerated reports, in turn, further excite the excited people who exaggerated them. After a time, the various stories of the crime take on a sort of uniformity, the most horrible details of each version having been woven into a supposedly true account. This milling process continues until an inflammatory speech, the hysterical cry of a woman, the repetition of a slogan, the accidental firing of a gun, the waving of a handkerchief, the racing of an automobile engine, the remarks of some bystander, or some other relatively trivial thing, throws the group into a frenzy and sets it on a career of arson, sadistic mutilations and murder.⁷

The wild emotionalism of mob action is especially apparent in the following case, in which the lynchers not only murdered

⁵ Monroe N. Work, *Lynchings, Whites and Negroes, 1882-1933* (Revised Report, Jan. 9, 1934), on file in the Department of Records and Research, Tuskegee Institute, Alabama. Statistics on lynching vary somewhat because of the difference in definition. Dr. Work's investigation defined lynching as "summarily taking the life of an individual for some crime or offense punishable under the law but in which instance the law was not allowed to take its course."

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Arthur F. Raper, *The Tragedy of Lynching*, p. 44, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

their victim but, unhampered by a sense of responsibility, involved the taxpayers in a \$100,000 loss in so doing.⁸

Scene: The Courthouse, Sherman, Texas.

Time: 1 P. M., May 9, 1930.

A Negro named George Hughes, accused of rape, is on trial for his life. A mob outside is demanding the Negro. A 17-year-old boy throws a can of gasoline through a courthouse window, another pitches in a match. When it does not take fire, the second boy climbs back up to the window, strikes a match and jumps down, saying, "Now the damned old courthouse is on fire."

That was when voices cried: "Let 'er burn down, the taxpayers'll put 'er back."

"By late afternoon the courthouse was gutted." The prisoner had been put into a steel vault. When the fire died down the leaders of the mob began to try to open the vault. "Several unsuccessful attempts had been made with dynamite when an acetylene torch was carried by ladders to a window on the second floor. After some time a hole was cut through the outer steel casings of the heavy shutters; some concrete filling was dislocated; dynamite was placed in the cavity, and the immense shutter was blown from its hinges."

Later: "Arriving at the Smith property, the members of the mob went inside the Negro drug store and other shops, for chairs and furniture with which to make a fire under Hughes' body, which had been hanged in a cottonwood tree nearby. The funeral pyre was lighted. About this time mob members set fire to the Smith Hotel property.

"When the fire at the hotel was dying down a new fire was started in the Andrews Building, a two-story brick structure belonging to Negroes. . . . The mob went to the nearby residence belonging to a Negro physician . . . and fired the house. The Negro properties destroyed . . . included two undertaking establishments, residential property, two cafes, the Odd Fellows Hall, two barber shops, two dentists' offices, two doctors' offices, a lawyer's office, a theater, K. of P. Building, hotel, life insurance office and drug store. . . . Because

⁸"The Cost of the Mob," reprint taken from the *Birmingham Age-Herald*, Oct. 8, 1933, on file at the office of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, 703 Standard Building, Atlanta, Georgia. This news article is based on an address given by Dr. Henry M. Edmonds, and includes several direct quotations from that address.

of riot clauses no insurance money can be collected to replace these losses."

When people act in this way we say they are irrational—they are slaves of their emotions—but what is really meant by these two terms? Does each individual possess one mental compartment for emotional reactions and another for rational? Is crowd behavior an expression of only one aspect of our nature? Many modern psychologists deny any such dualism in personality. The terms "emotional" and "rational" merely emphasize two aspects of personality; there is no purely emotional behavior any more than there is purely rational behavior. There are, nevertheless, differences of degree or of emphasis. In this guarded sense, emotional, crowd-like behavior is that in which *the impulse to act is accompanied by a strong overtone of feeling and leads directly to overt expression*. Behavior which may be characterized as rational involves a *delayed response*, which means that impulses and desires are not satisfied at once, but are held in check for a time until proposed lines of action can be compared and evaluated. The rational person does not indulge his first impulse but *stops* and *thinks*. That thinking consists in dramatizing in one's imagination the outcome of a proposed act and comparing that with outcomes of other possible acts.

The difference in emphasis may be stated for our purpose in simple terms: *in crowd behavior, irrational as it always is, the impulse to follow a suggested course of action is obeyed at once; whereas, in any form of rational behavior, there is always delay enough to permit comparisons and evaluations*. Our immediate problem, therefore, in answering, "Why does a crowd behave that way?" is to see *what elements in the crowd situation render a person especially suggestible*. A person may be said to be suggestible when he is easily stimulated by a word, a command, or an example of another to follow a pattern of conduct which he has acquired through imitation. In most crowds the reason for this condition can be found in a rather definite set of factors, to which we shall now turn. The first is the simple fact of the novelty of the crowd situation.

Novelty and suggestibility. When one is surrounded by strange circumstances, habits lose their power and lessons learned from previous experience seem inapplicable. Many persons will

stop whatever else they are doing to watch a police raid, join the "fun at the sutler's shack," or follow a lynching party. That break with routine experience clears the stage for a change of action; lack of relation to former experience leaves one free from restraints. But there is an added factor. Novelty itself has an attraction; the desire for new experience is one of great strength. One welcomes a break in the routine just for its own sake. This desire to experience something unusual will frequently draw the passerby into a crowd and sometimes hold him as a member. One Saturday afternoon on the board walk at Atlantic City a crowd gathered around a woman who, because of her unusual features and her strange costume, presented an extremely grotesque figure. At first there were only four or five persons. Then others, wondering what had attracted these people, looked at the woman and joined the earlier arrivals. Within half an hour the crowd was so large that police were called to disperse it. During the entire time the woman remained motionless and expressionless. No one ever knew whether she was some concessionaire's added attraction, whether she was trying an experiment in crowd psychology, or whether she really was just unintentionally bizarre. In any case, the novelty of the sight made adults forget themselves and stare like little children. This fixing of attention on something new and startling to the exclusion of all else has given rise to the special term, "mental isolation."

. . . the tense state of excitement which is characteristic of crowds operates to break down the conventions which ordinarily inhibit the expression of the prejudices and passions. It creates a temporary mental isolation.⁹

The state of mental isolation is also induced by the factor of anonymity.

Anonymity and suggestibility. According to those who can speak from experience, an intoxicated person is not aware of how silly or revolting his behavior may appear to others. He is for the time oblivious to the rest of the world. Similarly, when intoxicated with the excitement of the crowd, persons lose social consciousness.

⁹ Doris M. Lorden, "Mob Behavior and Social Attitudes," *Sociology and Sociological Research*, vol. 14, p. 330, Mar.-Apr., 1930. Reprinted by permission of the University of Southern California Press.

This condition of irresponsibility is hastened by the vague assurance that their behavior will not get them into trouble because everyone else is doing the same thing. And if the others in the crowd are strangers one feels perfectly certain that one's own identity has been lost. To come face to face with a relative from the home town at such a time is a most embarrassing experience. But usually a crowd assures anonymity or at least protection from punishment if one is identified. During the past fifty years, "of the tens of thousands of lynchers and onlookers . . . only forty-nine were indicted and only four have been sentenced."¹⁰ This loss of personal identity and responsibility in a crowd and still more so in a mob is a strange and powerful force.

Release of repressed emotions. The *novelty* of the experience and the feeling of *freedom* in a crowd which we have been discussing are supplemented quite often by another important factor. This factor is the tendency of repressed emotions to find expression at the first opportunity that presents itself. Unsatisfied prejudices, grievances, and wishes create impulses to act, which are normally held in check by the social restraints of public opinion and law. But the development of a crowd offers the ideal opportunity for their release.

Tense emotional situations have a tendency to resolve themselves by means of action: A spontaneous fight ensues, a house is set afire, a duel is arranged, a shot is fired from ambush, one woman slaps another, or a man stands up before a crowd and abuses his adversary.¹¹

Back of this apparent insanity is often a basic maladjustment. Individuals without social moorings, reckless because they have little to lose, restless because of unemployment, prejudiced rather than educated—these are the ones especially susceptible to crowd appeal. Dr. Raper found many of the lynching mobs to be "unattached and irresponsible youths of twenty-five or less. . . . Few of the lynchers were even high school graduates. . . . Most of the lynchers read but little, and were identified with but few or no organizations."¹² He concluded that:

¹⁰ Raper, *op. cit.*, p. 2. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 11. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Lynchings are not the work of men suddenly possessed of a strange madness; they are the logical issues of prejudice and lack of respect for law and personality, plus a sadistic desire to participate in the excitement of mob trials and the brutalities of mob torture and murder.¹³

In her research studies Miss Doris Lorden states that "the behavior of the mob is thus expressive of the body of attitudes held by men but conventionally concealed. The mob situation simply lifts the inhibitions at the same time that it stirs the emotions."¹⁴ This lifting of inhibitions permitting the expression of repressed attitudes is evident in prison riots, which have occurred frequently in recent years. They can often be traced to tense emotional situations which reflect an accumulation of hard feelings against officials and fellow prisoners. Curt orders from guards must be obeyed without retort, unpleasant work assignments accepted, and poor food endured. These grievances—some real, some imaginary—create a state of tension which may be set off in open revolt by a trivial incident.

A riot was narrowly averted in a state penitentiary when the same kind of food was served for breakfast on three successive mornings. The warden's explanation that an unavoidable delay had occurred in the shipment of bacon did not stop the booing and shouting. The men refused to eat, became increasingly restless, and started pounding tables with their aluminum dishes. The warden expected to lose completely his control over the men. He finally shouted for attention, and ordered them back to their cells, little expecting to be obeyed. A "lifer" whom he had befriended on several occasions jumped to his feet and shouted, "You ——— get back to your cells like the warden says." As he started to walk out several yelled, "Sit down or we'll kill you," but he continued and no one stopped him. Several others started out and soon the mess hall was cleared. The crowd was in such a high state of excitement that its behavior was unpredictable. Had the "lifer" shouted, "Come on, you cowards, get the warden," a mob scene would have followed.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 47. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁴ Lorden, *op. cit.*, p. 331. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁵ Based on a first-hand account given the author by one of the officers.

Such a crowd did engage in mob action at the seven and a half million dollar state penitentiary in Graterford, Pennsylvania, although "the prison had been regarded as 'riot proof' because of its physical arrangement providing for comforts not usually found in penitentiaries and because of the treatment given the convicts."¹⁶ But these conditions did not prevent the development and violent expression of grievances.

Shouting demands for more and better food, more liberties, and a reduction of penalties, 200 convicts rioted for two hours today in Pennsylvania's model prison, the new Eastern State Penitentiary at Graterford.

Before an army of State Troopers and State highway patrolmen obtained control of the situation, the rioters, armed with baseball bats, metal pipe, knives, and meat cleavers, had burned a barn and two garages. They also wrecked three cell blocks of 400 cells each and left a trail of havoc through the industrial workshop, laundry, kitchen and several other prison establishments.¹⁷

Prisoners are especially susceptible to crowd-mindedness because of their many repressed impulses, but the same condition exists in other groups as well. It is least apparent in individuals whose lives are well balanced, that is, who find some degree of satisfaction for their basic desires. Persons who feel secure in their economic and social positions, who have friends with whom they can share their problems and their joys, who are working toward goals which they consider worth while, who receive social recognition for their achievements, and who have occasional opportunities for change of experience such as is afforded in travel, adventure, vacations, and hobbies, are poor candidates for a crowd and least of all for a mob. It is the socially maladjusted and emotionally unstable who give reckless expression to repressed desires when opportunity comes.

Crowds prevalent during periods of unrest. If the socially maladjusted are the best candidates for crowd membership, then we should expect crowd behavior to be especially prevalent during periods of social change and unrest. This principle is well illustrated by the frequency of race riots in northern cities after the

¹⁶ *New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1934, p. 28. Reprinted by permission.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission.

World War. *The Negro in Chicago*, a research study prepared by the governor's commission, gives an extensive account not only of the riot which occurred in Chicago, but of the conditions which preceded it.¹⁸ This study shows that the Chicago race riots, certainly a good example of crowd hysteria and mob action, did not happen merely because a few Negro and white swimmers engaged in an argument at a bathing beach. Rather, it reflected accumulated grievances following the mass migration of southern Negroes to northern cities. Instead of finding the North a land of promise, the Negro encountered new forms of social and economic discrimination, and acute problems of adjustment in health and housing. On the other hand, certain classes of whites had become increasingly resentful of the Negro's presence in Chicago because of his invasion of white residential areas and his competition for jobs. This was the state of discontent that made possible a riot which resulted in the death of 38 persons and the injury of 537 others.¹⁹

During a depression, the masses of unemployed provide a more ready audience for radical appeals than in times of steady employment. Mass meetings, hunger marches, and demonstrations are easily organized. Indeed, a not infrequent justification for the huge expenditures on relief is that unless the nation provides for the unemployed, radical leaders will secure followers for a revolution.

We may summarize this point by saying that any major social change—the substitution of machine for man power in production, a depression, a war, or a mass migration—may so disrupt society that persons, no longer finding security and recognition, are ready subjects for the emotional appeal of the crowd. *Social disorganization, personal maladjustment, and crowd-mindedness are closely related.*

Thus far, we have found that the important elements in the development of the crowd are: (1) the novelty of the situation; (2) the condition of anonymity which is often conducive to irresponsible behavior; and (3) the condition of social maladjustment in which repressed emotions are easily released through unconventional forms of behavior.

¹⁸ The Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1922.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Establishing rapport. All of the conditions described may be present and still no crowd develop. Novelty, anonymity, and release of emotions are effective conditions only when a state of *rapport* exists among the persons present. Rapport is as indispensable to a crowd as discipline is to an army. It is that condition of common understanding and responsiveness that fuses personalities in corporate action. Persons no longer count as individuals; they are members of one body intent upon the same objective. How is this state of oneness achieved in crowd behavior? What is necessary for the establishment of a high degree of rapport?

The first prerequisite is the physical presence of the members. Actually being together, seeing and touching each other, and responding simultaneously to the same stimulus—these are important characteristics of the crowd. They are important as aids in the communication of sentiment. A high state of emotionalism can be reached only if there is a rapid-fire exchange of suggestion. Even spoken language is too slow. A crowd communicates through the suggestion of movement, the expression of the eyes, and the meaning of gestures.

A general background of common experience is also important in the establishment of rapport. The emotional behavior of the old-time religious camp meetings took on crowd characteristics partly because rapport was established so quickly and perfectly. This was made possible by the fact that those who gathered at the camp ground had a similar background of experience. They were engaged in the same occupation, faced the same problems, and, of special importance, were reared in a common religious culture. To them such admonitions as, "Ye must be born again," were familiar and meaningful. As they sang, "In the blood of the Lamb, in the soul-cleansing blood of the Lamb," they were moved with a common emotion. But when the same theology is expressed by the Salvation Army band as it holds its meetings on the street corner of a modern city, the ideas are meaningless to many who pass by. The sophisticated theatergoer pays no attention to the Salvation lassie who is testifying for her Lord. His theories of salvation, if he has any, would sound to her like blasphemy; and social differences set him far beyond her reach of influence. He looks at any band of street worshipers as a group of fanatical "down and outers." When they talk about "the blood of the Lamb" and try to preach the Lord's gospel from a street corner, they seem to him utterly lacking

in a sense of appropriateness. This *social difference*, or, as we shall later call it, *social distance*, between the meager band of worshipers and the worldly ones who pass them by prevents the development of any common interest, of mutual responsiveness, of *rapport*, without which the emotionalism of a revival, or of any crowd, cannot exist.

Rapport can be more easily established among persons who are standing side by side and who have a common background of experience, but not until a third factor enters the picture does crowd behavior become almost inevitable. In some startling way the crowd must be made aware of its common interest. A colorful symbol introduced at the right moment often does the trick.

The dramatic symbolization of common objectives speeds the establishment of rapport. The symbol, or as the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, called it, the "collective representation," is often a catch phrase expressing a central idea of the group, or it may be a flag or an idealized hero. French history contains an excellent illustration of the idealized hero in the person of Joan of Arc, who, as she rose to a position of leadership, symbolized the yearning for faith and freedom of a disillusioned, war-ridden nation. Wherever she went crowds responded to her hope of national salvation. When, instead of a person, an idea serves as the symbol, it is often a stereotyped, ready-made idea, which acquires emotional power when introduced at a dramatic moment. "Kill the damn thief," shouted as the crowd pressed toward the sutler's shack, summarized the hatred of the soldiers and united them in intense emotionalism. Richard Schmidt has listed a number of apt symbols, which leaders have employed in uniting a group for action, such as "'aristocrats' and 'privileged classes' in the first phases of the French Revolution, and 'despotism'—a term often applied with amazing looseness—in all constitutional struggles; such slogans as 'Italia unita e Roma capitale' in the Italian Risorgimento, 'home rule' and 'Sinn Fein' (independence) in the Irish struggle for freedom and the corresponding terms, 'swaraj' and 'swadeshi' in the contemporary Indian movement."²⁰ Americans were united during the War in a violent hatred of the "Huns." It was a powerful symbol because it encouraged us to kill our enemies and to feel self-righteous in the act.

²⁰ From Richard Schmidt, "Leadership," in *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9, p. 285. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

It was a comfortable symbol because it put justice on the right side. It was for such reasons that these slogans were used time and again when patriotic crowds assembled.

When the members of a crowd are *en rapport* by reason of the factors mentioned, they are in an appropriate state of mind to be controlled easily by the suggestions of a leader. Because of its emotional instability and its desire for action, the crowd, possibly more than any other group, is subject to the power of aggressive personalities who assume the role of leadership.

As we begin this study of crowd leadership, keep in mind the ground that has already been covered: that we are here dealing with a loosely organized, transitory type of group noted for its highly emotionalized behavior, and that such conditions as novelty, irresponsibility, social unrest, personal maladjustment, repressed emotions, physical presence, and the invention of dramatic symbols all play their part in making ready for a riot, a mob scene, or an emotional orgy. Now that we know this much about the general conditions of a crowd and the nature of the followers, let us see who the leader is and how he performs.

THE LEADER AND THE CROWD

In spite of the fact that this type of group is especially susceptible to the influence of leadership, there are crowds in which no leaders appear. At a prize fight the crowd is so unorganized that usually no one stands out as a leader. But when the crowd swings into action as a mob or indulges itself in orgiastic behavior, leaders are sure to be present. They may arise quite naturally then and there, or they may be persons who because of previous experience can anticipate the development of the crowd and be on hand to direct it, or, going a step further, they may even conceive the idea of organizing a crowd, set the stage appropriately, and have the right actors present. Billy Sunday, the revivalist, and Big Bill Thompson, Chicago's one-time political boss, were past masters in this art of crowd creation and manipulation.

The characteristics and functions of the crowd leader vary with different situations, but there are, nevertheless, several features of leadership which are quite generally found wherever crowd leaders appear. These characteristics manifest themselves in an interesting way in the field of religious revivals which *in their most spontaneous*

and extreme forms may be considered crowd behavior. A study by an English scholar, Sydney G. Dimond, analyzes the case of John Wesley, one of history's most successful religious leaders.²¹ In his life we see concretely expressed the function of the leader in arousing and controlling the emotions of crowds.

More than any other person John Wesley affected the religious life of England during the eighteenth century. Wherever he preached, crowds of persons, stirred by his message, confessed their sins and pledged themselves to a life of faith. On some occasions the emotional reaction of converts was so strong that Wesley himself had to exert a restraining influence. A group in London described their conversion experience thus:

"... feeling the blood of Christ running upon their arms, or going down their throat, or poured like warm water upon their breast or heart." Wesley writes, "I plainly told them the utmost I would allow ... was that these circumstances might be from God (though I could not affirm that they were) working in an unusual manner ... but all the rest I must believe to be mere empty dreams of an heated imagination."²²

Hallucinations of this type would seem to represent the extreme form of emotional behavior, and yet in his own *Journal* Wesley refers to fourteen cases of insanity which developed during conversion experiences, nine of which were incurable.²³

Wesley traveled by horseback approximately 4,500 miles a year during his active ministry and preached an average of fifteen times a week. People responded so eagerly to his message that hundreds were added monthly to the newly formed Methodist societies. At the time of his death the membership had reached a total of 120,000 in England and America.²⁴ Wesley was of course more than a leader of crowds—he was the founder of a permanently organized denomination; and his religious groups were often not crowds, but formal, deliberative assemblies. There was also, nevertheless, this other, the colorful side of his work in which a fiery condemnation

²¹ Sydney G. Dimond, *The Psychology of the Methodist Revival*, Oxford University Press, London, 1926.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 137. Reprinted by permission of the author.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

²⁴ *New International Encyclopædia*, second edition, vol. 23, p. 549, 1916.

of sin and the invitation to be saved turned sedate audiences into psychological crowds.²⁵

The case of Wesley illustrates two important characteristics of the crowd leader. The crowd leader is generally one who is *capable of sharing the experiences of the group and whose example sets a pattern for their behavior*. As a crowd exists only in a state of mutual responsiveness, so also the leader can influence the crowd only when he is *en rapport* with it. Although occasionally the skillful pretender may fool the group into thinking he is one of them, leadership develops in most cases only when the leader is actually on the inside as participant. Communists have frequently made the mistake in this country of assuming that they can go into the heart of a strike situation as leaders without first establishing rapport with the workers whom they seek to control. Quite the contrary was true in the leadership of Wesley. He was one of the few clergy of the Established Church who dared to forswear the security of the cloister to mingle with the common people. He visited the collieries, the factories, and even the jails. In this way he could speak from experience on social questions, but the same was equally true in the field of religion. When he asked his listeners to repent of their sins he knew whereof he spoke. For years Wesley had been tortured by a consciousness of sin which was finally relieved by a conversion experience that can best be described in his own words:

In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate Street, where one was reading Luther's preface to the Epistles to the Romans. About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; and an assurance was given me that He had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*, and saved *me* from the law of sin and death. I began to pray with all my might for those who had in more special manner despitefully used me and persecuted me. I then testified openly to all there what I now *first* felt in my heart. . . .²⁶

Having had such an experience himself, Wesley could interpret religion with profound sincerity; his own example became his most

²⁵ Dimond, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97. Reprinted by permission of the author.

convincing appeal. Crowds accepted his gospel as truth unquestioningly, and were stirred to repent their sins and be saved. The suggestive power of his sincerity and his own example, together with other emotional factors in the religious crowds which he addressed, caused many of his listeners to outdo their leader in the extreme forms of their emotional expression. In addition to the case already cited there were other startling reports. Wesley described eighty-five cases of persons who "dropped as dead." "Two cases of persons struck blind . . . are reported from Newcastle."²⁷ Convulsive tearings, violent trembling, groaning, strong cries and tears, and other physical effects are frequently recorded throughout the second and third volume of Wesley's *Journal*.

Without attempting the complicated analysis called for by such remarkable suggestibility in crowd behavior, we may at least conclude that Wesley's own religious conviction enabled him to speak with an authority that made crowds feel that here at last was a leader who understood their problems. When he had, by his own example, established himself in their confidence, they were ready to follow his suggestion uncritically. Seldom do crowd leaders achieve such complete control over the behavior of their followers.

Not only does a crowd leader thus identify himself with the problems of his group and by his own example suggest a new way of action, but he also has in many cases *a keen sense of the dramatic*. John Wesley was possibly the most successful type of dramatist because he enacted the parts without realizing it. He had, of course, the advantage of dealing with a situation which was itself dramatic. What could be more engrossing than an offer of salvation to a people who believed implicitly in the horrors of eternal damnation? Satan and Christ, Hell and Heaven, Sin and Salvation were powerful symbols of the times. Wesley made the most of the dramatic possibilities afforded by this social and theological setting. In colorful terms he pictured for his listeners the Omniscient Being before whom each must stand in judgment. The fear of a verdict of worthlessness made them eager to follow the way of salvation.

In other types of crowds the dramatic ability of the leader is often expressed in a still more theatrical manner. The field of political crowds is replete with examples. William Hale Thompson,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127. Reprinted by permission of the author.

formerly Chicago's leading politician, was as clever a showman as Buffalo Bill. His appearance on the speaker's platform at a political rally was usually preceded by blaring of bands and waving of flags. His henchmen scattered throughout the crowd set the example for others with their wildly enthusiastic cheering. When the crowd excitement was well under way, "Big Bill" would march to the platform wearing his cowboy sombrero. He was greeted with boisterous applause. When his deep voice began its booming, everyone knew he was in for an exciting time—"Big Bill's" bag of tricks was never empty. On one occasion he held before his audience a cage of white mice, and, after giving each the name of a political enemy, dramatically recounted all his sins. Even his opponents had to concede that he was a master showman in the political arena. In more recent years our attention has been directed toward other leaders of political crowds who keenly sense the dramatic and adjust their techniques accordingly. Mussolini and Hitler have been acclaimed as talented leaders in this respect.

In summary, we may say that the effective crowd leader is usually one who can share the experiences of his followers and direct their behavior by his own example, and who also can utilize the dramatic possibilities in a situation. Although lesser characteristics of the leader could be analyzed in detail, the major points have been suggested.

Persons who by virtue of these qualities emerge as leaders of crowds commonly serve the following functions in the brief life history of the group: (1) *The leader builds up emotional tensions by defining for his followers the cause of their unrest*; (2) *he suggests a line of action which will release that emotion*; and (3) *he makes at least a pretense at justifying the suggested action*. In performing these tasks the leader relies in no small degree upon the use of colorful symbols, such as we have already considered. By defining a complex situation in simple, graphic terms, he relieves his followers of the necessity of rational deliberation, and makes the immediate indulgence of emotions seem right and inevitable.

We have now concluded our study of the *characteristics* of crowds. We have considered under what circumstances crowds arise, how they behave, what accounts for their instability and emotional nature, how rapport is established, and what role is played by the leader of such a group. Furthermore, in advancing this theoretical analysis, specific cases of these forms of collective

behavior have attracted our attention. We have noticed the crowd of excited onlookers at a fire, the ecstatic religious group in a revival, the impassioned members of a lynching mob, and the rioters in a prison. These cases by no means represent all of the types of crowd behavior. More than any other group, crowds defy classification. They are so spontaneous, unpredictable, and short-lived that after we have completed a list we find another bobbing up at some unexpected point. And, as though to confuse us still more, the members of almost any group may on occasion exhibit crowd characteristics. Whenever it is difficult to make a sharp classification of social relations, marginal—overlapping—cases are certain to appear. The following section will serve to bring together some of these near-relatives of the crowd.

RELATED TYPES OF CROWD-LIKE BEHAVIOR

Social contagion in an audience. Inter-stimulation and social contagion are ever-present characteristics of a crowd. These processes are present to only a slight degree in the usual audience. Although members of an audience are aware of the presence of others and are somewhat stimulated by their example of attention and applause, yet the principal interaction is not between members of the audience, but rather between each individual in the audience and the performer on the stage. Unlike the milling process and the *circular stimulation* of the crowd in which the comment of A affects the attitudes of B whose gesture in turn influences A, the audience reacts individually and often differently to the same stimulus. That is one side of the argument. The other is that audiences do sometimes become crowds, and in almost all cases there is likely to be some degree of mutual influencing.

In her study of the theater audience, Miss Harriet L. Touton questioned 300 persons about the effect the reactions of others had upon their own attitudes. Those who did not think they had been influenced by the audience numbered 26.7 per cent, while 40.6 per cent said they had been affected by the contagious approval or disapproval in the audience's reaction to the play, and 16 per cent had been disgusted by the response of others.²⁸ This study is of limited

²⁸ Harriet L. Touton, "The Theater Audience," *Sociology and Sociological Research*, vol. 18, p. 562, July-Aug., 1934. For a more extensive treatise on the characteristics of the audience see Harry L. Hollingworth, *The Psychology of the Audience*, American Book Company, New York, 1935.

value because it relies too much upon the individual's ability to analyze the cause of his own response, which is difficult to do.

One might expect that in an audience where large numbers are in close association crowd behavior would easily arise. The counter-acting factors which prevent it are the formal ritual and the traditional organization that governs most assemblies. Because of these latter factors one may ordinarily be safely removed from the excesses of the crowd when he enters a formal, scheduled meeting such as the morning service at the Cathedral of Saint John the Divine. But even on this stately occasion there has been an exception. It occurred when the former Denver judge, Benjamin B. Lindsey, interrupted the service conducted by Bishop Manning with the demand that his side of the argument on the question of companionate marriage be heard, the subject which the Bishop had discussed in his sermon. The sedate assembly was instantly converted into a crowd.

The Bishop delivered his sermon; the Judge arose and asked for a hearing. He was promptly howled down, ejected from the church, arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.²⁹

There are other types of audiences in which crowd behavior is not so exceptional. This is notably true in political meetings and athletic contests. Extra police are always on hand when a Socialist or Communist rally is held, and Republican and Democratic conventions are not without their unscheduled demonstrations. When strong rivalry exists between the basket-ball teams of nearby towns, the spectators at the deciding game of the season often act like crowds, and a mob scene has been known to develop before the evening was over.

Crowd behavior in the boys' gang. A boys' gang is too well organized to be classed as a crowd, but, nevertheless, it often behaves like one. When, following the impulse of the moment, it upsets the peddler's cart, attacks the hangout of an enemy gang, or smashes the windows of an unpopular storekeeper, one would guess that a miniature mob was in action. The following qualities of gang life give it these appearances: its behavior is often impulsive, unpredictable; the gang is uninhibited by the usual social conven-

²⁹ "Clash in a Cathedral," *Outlook and Independent*, vol. 156, p. 604, Dec. 17, 1930. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

tions; it often expresses its antipathies in violent behavior; and, of most significance, the gang is sometimes the inciting nucleus for widespread crowd and mob activity. This is the conclusion reached by Frederic M. Thrasher in his study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago:

When the gang becomes inflamed it may behave like a mob. Moreover, it may become the actual nucleus for a mob, as is shown by the Dirty Dozen's invasion of the Black Belt. The superior organization, solidarity, and morale of the gang give the mob an unwonted stability and direct its excited activities to greater destruction. The less active elements in the mob, on the other hand, and even the mere spectators, give moral support to or provide an appreciative audience for the more active nucleus—the gang. This is well illustrated in the case of the Chicago race riots of 1919, when gangs frequently served as nuclei of mobs.³⁰

In spite of these relationships, a gang is not to be classified as a crowd. Its solidarity and more permanent personnel set it apart as a far more organized type of behavior.

Social movements. The student strike against war, staged in 1935 on the anniversary of our entrance into the World War, illustrates steps in the development of a social movement. The idea of walking out of classes at the eleven o'clock hour as a symbolic means of expressing opposition to war and to fascism was conceived by a small group. It spread rapidly from campus to campus, and, as it spread, local committees were organized to arouse other students in the support of the demonstration. Although this was a social movement of miniature proportions in comparison with the great crusades and revolutions of the past, yet it shared some of their characteristics.

Beginning with a small group, interest in a social reform may spread throughout a wide area, taking on the appearance of an important crusade. Few of the listeners could have predicted that the Women's Temperance Crusade would follow from the suggestions made in the stirring sermon against alcoholism delivered by Dr. Dio Lewis of Boston in Hillsboro, Ohio, in 1873. The idea of saloon prayer meetings spread quickly from one locality to another.

³⁰ Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, p. 53, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

The following paragraph describes their novel technique of reform which met repeatedly with temporary success.

On the twenty-sixth, the hotels and saloons were visited; Mrs. Thompson presenting the appeal. And it was on this morning, and at the saloon of Robert Ward, that there came a break in the established routine. "Bob" was a social, jolly sort of fellow, and his saloon was a favorite resort, and there were many women in the company that morning whose hearts were aching in consequence of his wrongdoing. Ward was evidently touched. He confessed that it was a "bad business," said if he could only "afford to quit it he would," and then tears began to flow from his eyes. Many of the ladies were weeping, and at length, as if by inspiration, Mrs. Thompson kneeled on the floor of the saloon, all kneeling with her, even the saloonist, and prayed, pleading with indescribable pathos and earnestness for the conversion and salvation of this and all saloon-keepers. When the amen was sobbed rather than spoken, Mrs. Washington Doggett's sweet voice began, "There is a fountain," etc., in which all joined; the effect was most solemn, and when the hymn was finished the ladies went quietly away, and that was the first saloon prayer meeting.³¹

The more general characteristics of social movements as a form of group behavior will be analyzed further in chapter 28. We are interested here only in the more emotional aspects.

The social movement has crowd characteristics, especially in its beginning stages, when out of a condition of unrest a group is stimulated by some incident, possibly trivial in itself, to oppose that which it considers the cause of its trouble, and demand a reform. And again, when the movement is within reach of victory, emotionalism prevails, not infrequently in the form of mob action. The horror of the post-revolution days in Russia is described in terms of violent behavior which the leaders did not order and could not control.

Since the mass movement is a marginal case it must possess non-crowd-like characteristics. And this is true. It is of longer duration, more organized, and far more extensive than the crowd. The

³¹ Adapted by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess from Mrs. Annie Wittenmyer, *History of the Women's Temperance Crusade* (1878) and quoted in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 901. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

reform idea with its accompanying pattern of action moves from one community to another until large areas are included in a united drive. The mass movement does not, therefore, depend upon the physical propinquity of all of its members, which, as we have seen, is always a prerequisite of the crowd.

Social epidemics. These queer phenomena recur often enough to humble man's opinion of his rationality. When factories of England had to be closed for several weeks until the girls recovered from their hysterical fright of mice, or when the fear of witchcraft so haunted the minds of the masses that Protestant and Catholic churches alike engaged in what now seems ruthless persecution of alleged evil-doers, we can see how the mental isolation so characteristic of the crowd may become widespread. Our belief during the war that Germans were primitive barbarians intent upon destroying civilization, the fear after the Russian Revolution that a "red menace" endangered every American community, the speculative orgy in the stock market sky-rocketing of 1928 and 1929, and the Florida land boom of 1925—all of these look ridiculous in retrospect, but at the time, were serious concerns of public importance.

As in the case of a crowd, social epidemics prosper best in periods of social change when people are emotionally unstable. Already distraught by the depression, thousands of minds were ready to believe the countless rumors circulating in the spring of 1933 regarding bank failures. Partially suppressed by the newspapers, stories of the insolvency of banks spread from person to person and group to group. The "run" on banks which quickly started, spread from one state to another. The soundest banks were not exempt and no amount of reasoning with depositors would allay their fears. In epidemic fashion states declared bank holidays, and not until federal action in the form of new banking regulations and guarantees on deposits were enacted did the people regain sanity and banks resume their function. Social epidemics are crowd-like in their suggestibility, but often lack that unrestrained emotional expression so common in the face-to-face stimulation of the crowd.

Fads, crazes, and fashions. Mah Jong, cross word puzzles, miniature golf, the Charleston and Rhumba dances, the dance marathon, tree-sitting contests, and slang expressions in popular speech are fads which arise as new culture forms, spread rapidly,

and usually die out as quickly as they came. They appeal to the restless elements in a population, and to those who enjoy the attention which novel behavior attracts. The pattern spreads most rapidly by personal example, which when assisted by the modern media of the movie and the radio may nationalize a fad within a few weeks.

Fashions differ from fads in that there is usually more conscious planning in their creation; they are transmitted through well-established advertising and through fashion shows; they do not represent such a rapid and complete break with tradition; and they are likely to be followed, at least in modified form, for a longer period of time. Sapir draws a distinction when he says that a fad "always differs from a true fashion in having something unexpected, irresponsible, or bizarre about it."³²

The craze or mania, similar to the fad, is another form of epidemic in which social contagion plays a prominent part. It involves a novel pattern accepted credulously by the same kind of persons who are caught off their guard by the other crowd and near-crowd forms we have discussed. People become "crazy" about an idea, that is, lose their ability to judge candidly, and their example is imitated by others who in the excitement of the moment, and influenced by false rumors, are also rendered uncritical. We do not need to cite the classical example of the seventeenth century tulip mania in Holland,³³ because our own recent history contains an equally good illustration in the chain letter craze. National attention was first given the matter when during May of 1935 the Post Office in Denver reported that extra clerks were required to handle the increased mail of the chain-letter business.³⁴ Within a month after this announcement was made the craze had spread far and wide. Ambitious promoters not content with the expected returns from the "ten cent chain" introduced chains of fifty cents and a dollar and substituted personal solicitation for correspon-

³² Edward Sapir, "Fashion," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 6, p. 139, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931.

³³ Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 702-704, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1928.

³⁴ Postal receipts in Denver for April and May were estimated at \$50,000 above the same period in 1934. "In the first fifteen days of the fad the volume of mail was 2,000,000 letters above normal. . . ." A total of 1,400 hours of overtime work was required on the part of regular postal clerks and substitutes to handle the mail. Taken from the *New York Times*, June 17, 1935, p. 19.

dence. This financial epidemic ended abruptly when persons realized that the promised returns were not forthcoming. The following is a verbatim copy of one of the letters circulated through the mails, the only change being the substitution of fictitious names and addresses:

PROSPERITY CLUB
"IN GOD WE TRUST"

John H. James	16 Fourth Street	Caseyville, Tenn.
Thomas W. Moore	129 North Street	Caseyville, Tenn.
Mrs. Fred Smith	256 Market Street	Caseyville, Tenn.
Jack L. Reasonover	1289 Sixth Street	Blue Castle, Ky.
Miss Jane Waters	1082 Green Avenue	Blue Castle, Ky.
Miss Joan Kelly	Box 258	Blue Castle, Ky.

This chain was started in the hope of bringing prosperity to all of us. Within three days make five copies of this letter, leaving off the top name and address, and adding your own name and address at the bottom of the list and mail to five of your friends to whom you wish prosperity to come. In omitting the top name, send that person a dime (wrapped in paper) as a charity donation. In turn as your name leaves the top you will receive, if the chain is unbroken through six operative stages, 15,625 letters with donations amounting to \$1,562.50.

Now is this worth a dime to you?

Have the faith your friend has and *this chain will not be broken.*

We have called all of these forms of collective behavior, marginal cases, because they do not fit into the category of the crowd and yet have some traits in common with it. If these types have affinity on the one side to crowds they are related on the other to *publics*. Like publics they influence large numbers of people widely dispersed. But let us now leave these in-between types to examine directly this last major form of collective behavior to be included in the chapter. Publics will be analyzed in less detail in this chapter than were crowds, because considerable attention will be given to the subject of public opinion in a later chapter. We are here interested in their characteristics as a social group.

PUBLICS

There was a time when writers spoke of "the public" as though all people could be included in one general group united by a common interest in "public questions." In his analysis of the concept of the public, Carroll D. Clark has found it much more realistic to think of many special publics³⁵ each composed of persons sufficiently interested in a common question to participate in its discussion and form an opinion about it—a *public opinion*.³⁶ He believes, however, that there may still be some use for a concept of a general public because occasionally a question which in the beginning aroused only a special public may, through either the propaganda efforts of that smaller group or some other circumstances, become of general interest. Thus during peace time a special public is interested in questions relating to the army and navy, but when war is declared almost the entire nation is included in that public. The essential criterion applied to determine whether or not a public exists is the same as that which tests the presence of any group, namely, social interaction. Harold D. Lasswell considers that if a person has "an active attitude toward the outcome of debatable alternatives of action," he is participating as a member of a public.³⁷

A public is a distinctive type of social group in that its membership is far-flung and inclusive, and its interaction is characterized by critical discussion. A public is a type unto itself, amorphous, constantly changing in personnel and interest, dependent in its interaction upon secondary contacts, and, because of its impersonal nature, capable of engaging in deliberation and objective discussion. L. L. Bernard refers to publics as "distance contact groups whose members respond to the same stimuli or intercondition one another."³⁸ These generalizations may now be supplemented by a closer examination of the nature of this group.

³⁵ The term had also been used in this sense by Emory S. Bogardus, Walter Lippman, and several other writers.

³⁶ Carroll D. Clark, "The Concept of the Public," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 13, pp. 311-320, Mar., 1933.

³⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Measurement of Public Opinion," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 25, p. 315, May, 1931.

³⁸ L. L. Bernard, "Crowd," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4, p. 612, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931.

The existence of publics is most apparent when issues stimulating discussion arise. The propagandist tries to prevent them from arising by preconditioning opinion in favor of his proposal, but, nevertheless, there are many public issues, notably in time of social calamities such as a depression, when old institutions have failed and new policies are proposed and debated. Politics and economics are not the only fields of public interest. Publics may be organized around an interest in religion, art, nature study, and any other common concern. In these cases, also, the principle holds, that the existence of a public is most apparent when issues arise for discussion. An illustration of this may be taken from a field not ordinarily considered in an analysis of public opinion.

The "opera public" in New York City normally reacts in a highly conventional manner. Occasionally, however, new factors enter the situation which stimulate the group to more active interest in the opera and which also increase the size of the interested public. The introduction of modern operas by American composers was such a stimulus. This was notably true at the premiere of "Emperor Jones" in 1933 when Lawrence Tibbett sang the title role. One patron came by plane from the west coast to attend the performance, reports of the opera appeared as front page news in the metropolitan papers, and opera critics and patrons everywhere discussed the event. The following excerpt is taken from the front page news story by Olin Downes in the *New York Times*:

One of the largest audiences the Metropolitan has ever known attended this production, for which the theater had been sold out days in advance of the performance. It is a pleasure to say that a gathering which included a majority of the leading musicians and men in the world of arts and letters of this city was not disappointed. The hoped-for sensation materialized. . . .³⁹

That same year another factor contributed to the development of the opera public. Because of financial difficulties associated with the depression, the Metropolitan Opera Company was saved from insolvency through the support of hundreds of people anxious to perpetuate this form of art. They made generous contributions, bought subscriptions in advance, and served as solicitors for the

³⁹ Olin Downes, "The Emperor Jones' Triumph as Opera," *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1933, p. 1. Reprinted by permission.

campaign committee under the chairmanship of Mme. Lucrezia Bori. During the intermission at the last performance of the season, Mr. Tibbett appealed for a larger supporting public by asking "members of the audience not only to contribute for themselves, but to ask their friends who might not be present to contribute."⁴⁰ The radio provided still another means of interesting additional people in the opera.

Since the membership of a public is dispersed, its interaction is greatly facilitated by such inventions as telegraph, telephone, radio, and movie. These, together with newspapers, magazines, and public addresses, make it possible for invisible forums to be constantly in session. Through these channels of communication persons condition each other's thinking until public opinions emerge—opinions which express themselves through the ballot at election time, through petitions to those in authority when a decision is impending, and also through conversation, the "voice of the people" in newspaper columns, and in discussion at public assemblies. Students of social psychology are now devising tests for measuring the "extent, direction, intensity, and effect" of public opinion.⁴¹ They have studied especially opinions about war, race, religion, prohibition, and communism.

We have said that a public was capable of deliberative action resulting from the opportunity its members have for comparison of many points of view. This is the case if members of a public have access to accurate information, are free to express their opinions, and have the ability to engage in objective analysis. Unfortunately none of these conditions prevails in pure form.

In the first place, accurate information on public questions is difficult to secure. Lasswell's study of propaganda in war time gives appalling evidence of how information concerning both one's own nation and the enemy is grossly distorted.⁴² Frederick E. Lumley's review of propaganda methods in other fields, including business, education, religion, and patriotic organization, recounts case after case of concealed or distorted facts.⁴³

⁴⁰ *New York Times*, Mar. 13, 1933, p. 14. Reprinted by permission.

⁴¹ Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

⁴² Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1927.

⁴³ Frederick E. Lumley, *The Propaganda Menace*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1933.

The control of public opinion for personal gain has come to be a highly organized profession. Students in some of our universities are taught how to "break down sales resistance" through carefully prepared advertising which will have emotional appeal but very little unbiased information. Leaders of pressure groups—groups that seek to influence the decisions of a public through the methods of coercion or propaganda—have learned well the tricks of their trade. Of course in some fields there is no motive in concealing accurate information, but when economic gain enters the picture a public is seldom free of indirect pressure.

In the second place, even after the individual has secured facts and formed an opinion, he is not always free to express that opinion. Freedom of speech on social questions has almost entirely disappeared in many countries, particularly those whose governments are fascist or communist, but an economic radical or a pacifist in a democracy must also learn when not to speak.

And finally, not all individuals are able to pass judgment even if they have the facts and the freedom, either because their thinking is distorted by previous conditioning which has made them strongly prejudiced, or, in some cases, because of sheer lack of mental ability. In the face of all these conditions one wonders how often a society can be deliberative, how often a public achieves its ideal of critical judgment. Still, we may say that the opinions of a public are generally more thoughtful and stable than the impulsive reactions of the crowd.

It is apparent from the foregoing approaches to the problem, that a public is not organized as a closely unified self-conscious group, but public opinion does stimulate the formation of many such groups. They do not replace a public but become part of it, a sort of "soviet" organization at its core.⁴⁴ Political parties become one of the nuclei for the public interested in governmental affairs. Consumers' leagues are societies around which interest in the welfare of the consumer is organized. In the case of the "opera public," the awakened interest in the preservation of the opera stimulated the formation of a committee to arrange an elaborate benefit ball, another to campaign for new subscriptions, and the Metropolitan Opera Company, itself, made internal adjustments to meet the crisis. These special groups were supported by public

⁴⁴ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

opinion and in turn influenced the opinion of a public, but they never in themselves constituted the opera public.

In the horse and buggy days of America, nearly all of a person's activities were centered in the home and immediate community. But today in industrialized America, where secondary contacts have replaced primary, publics have come to be increasingly important in the political life of the nation and in the fields of art, religion, science, philanthropy, and leisure-time activities. The individual even as a child becomes a member of a stamp collecting or an amateur wireless public, and by the time he reaches maturity he may be identified with a score of groups whose members he has never seen. The life of the nation is organized more and more around broadly inclusive, special interest publics. Their analysis is an important sector in the field of sociology.

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Chapter 13

RACE AND RACE-CONSCIOUS GROUPS

OPINIONS REGARDING THE RACES OF MANKIND

According to Adolph Hitler

ALL THAT we admire on this earth—science, art, technical skill and invention—is the creative product of only a small number of nations, and originally, perhaps, of one single race (Aryan). All this culture depends on them for its very existence. If they are ruined, they carry with them all the beauty of this earth into the grave.

If we divide the human race into three categories—founders, maintainers, and destroyers of culture—the Aryan stock alone can be considered as representing the first category.¹

But the road which the Aryan had to tread was clearly marked out. As a conqueror he overthrew inferior men, and their work was done under his control, according to his will and for his purposes. But while extracting useful, if hard, work out of his subjects, he not only protected their lives, but also perhaps gave them an existence better than their former so-called freedom. . . .²

According to Arthur de Gobineau

. . . "Inequality of races is sufficient to explain the entire enchainment of the destinies of peoples."³ This leads Gobineau to his second proposition about the *inequality of human races*. They are unequal. *There are the superior and the inferior races*. The former are capable

¹ Adolph Hitler, *My Battle* (Abridged and translated by E. T. S. Dugdale), p. 122, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

² *Ibid.*, p. 124. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³ Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*, vol. 1, p. vii, as translated and quoted by Pitirim Sorokin in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 224, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928.

of progress; the latter are hopeless. Civilization and culture have been created by the superior races exclusively, and each type of culture is nothing but a manifestation of racial qualities.⁴

According to Madison Grant

The backbone of western civilization is racially Nordic, the Alpines and Mediterraneans being effective precisely to the extent in which they have been Nordicized and vitalized.

If this great race, with its capacity for leadership and fighting, should ultimately pass, with it would pass that which we call civilization. It would be succeeded by an unstable and bastardized population where worth and merit would have no inherent right to leadership and among which a new and darker age would blot out our racial inheritance.⁵

According to Ernest A. Hooton

. . . These race propagandists commonly attribute to the physical subdivision of mankind to which they imagine that they themselves belong, all or most of the superior qualities of mankind—physical, mental, and moral. They talk of the psychological characteristics of this or that race as if they were objective tangible properties, scientifically demonstrated. Starting from an assumption that physical types have psychological correlates, they attempt to refer every manifestation of the psychological qualities assumed to be the exclusive property of this or that race, to the physical type in question. Great men of whatever period are claimed to be members of the favored race on the basis of their achievements and sometimes with a total disregard of physical criteria. In no case has any serious effort been made by such ethnomaniacs to isolate a pure racial type and study either its mental qualities or its material culture. The fact that most if not all peoples are racially mixed is consistently ignored. While some of the conclusions of such writers may be correct, none of them has been scientifically established.⁶

⁴ Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 225. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁵ Madison Grant, "Introduction," in Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, pp. xxix, xxx, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁶ From Ernest A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape*, p. 379. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

DEFINITION, ORIGIN, AND CLASSIFICATION
OF RACES

We shall try to explain what underlies these very conflicting statements and at the same time relate the analysis to the previous study of types of social groupings. Races, like nations and classes, are similar to publics in that they are inclusive associations not always separated from each other by sharp lines of demarcation. In ordinary times we reflect very little about our membership in them, but during periods of conflict when one's welfare becomes identified with the status of his nation, his class, or his race, they are of greatest importance. A careful study of these groups is required because their diffuse character has often been responsible for fallacious conceptions regarding them.

Race biologically defined. According to the biologist, or more specifically to the zoologist, the term "race" applies to a relatively large group of persons who because they possess common hereditary traits may be classed as a sub-species or variety of the *genus homo*.⁷ These biological terms are elucidated by the following paragraph from Hooton:

Zoologists in classifying animals fling about families, genera, and species like drunken sailors scattering their wages. These terms connote little more than relationship based upon morphological features. Families are groups of animals of common descent, the members of which bear to each other fundamental structural resemblances. Genera are smaller groups within the families, and the members of a genus are more like and more closely related to each other than they are to animals belonging to any different genus. The species is merely another splitting up of the genus into still smaller, more similar, and more nearly related groups. Varieties or races constitute a still further subdivision. . . .⁸

⁷ In chapter 3 reference was made to the evolution of man, *genus homo*, and to his position on the tree of life in relation to other biological types. A definition of race stressing its biological significance appears in Maurice H. Krout, "Race and Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, p. 176, Sept., 1931.

⁸ From Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 394. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

The study of racial origins. The origin of the different races extends so far back in prehistoric times that only fragmentary bits of fossil evidence provide a basis for speculation. Reading these signs as best they can, physical anthropologists make rough estimates regarding the thousands of years the broad racial divisions have been in existence. A. L. Kroeber typifies the reluctance of the scholar to speak in exact terms when the origin of race is under discussion:

About all that we can conclude from this fragment of evidence is that the races of man as they are spread over the earth today must have been at least some tens of thousands of years in forming. What caused them to differentiate, on which part of the earth's surface each took on its peculiarities, how they further subdivided, what were the connecting links between them, and what happened to these lost links—on all these points the answer of anthropology is as yet incomplete.⁹

Although the cause of the differentiation is unknown, it is assumed that when the differences arose they became fixed as racial types through the factors of geographical isolation and inbreeding. Looking at racial history in its broadest sweep, Thomas R. Garth does not hesitate to say that:

Such races as we find are merely results of inbreeding and are only temporary eddies in the stream of human generation.¹⁰

Problems encountered in the classification of races. Since accurate knowledge of the origin of races is lacking, how does the anthropologist secure information for his classification of racial types? Knowing that members of a race are assumed to be blood-brothers, that is, members of one large family with a common ancestry, he might search the archives for complete genealogies. If parentage had been recorded for many generations the anthropologist would be aided in classifying those now living into large family groups, to which he would apply the term "race." We are

⁹ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 35, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1923. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁰ Thomas R. Garth, *Race Psychology*, p. 207, Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1931.

well aware that no such records are available, and consequently this attempt must be abandoned. Turning then to quite a different approach, he might try, through the aid of the microscope, to examine all of the genetic traits in the germ plasm of different individuals in an effort to classify the types of heredity. These findings would be accurate, because the genes are the determiners of heredity and do not change from one generation to another. But the characteristics of the genes cannot be observed directly and classified. The microscope will not reveal their potentialities in advance, and, therefore, we must wait until the genes of one parent have combined with the genes of another to take form as a human body before we know what they are like. But then it is too late to observe them, because we are not sure which parent cell is responsible for which trait, nor do we know to what extent the original characteristics have been modified by environmental conditions during the process of development.

Deprived of these direct channels of study, the anthropologist must draw as accurate inferences as he can from the evidence which is at hand. This substitute evidence consists of the physical differences between adult people now living. After making scientific measurements of these differences the anthropologist classifies mankind into several large divisions to which he applies the term "race." He then infers that the similarities within each race represent a common biological inheritance. This procedure looks both simple and reasonable, but appearances are deceiving.

The anthropologist finds, for example, that although individuals differ in some respects—which would provide a basis for classification—they are also alike in many respects—which hinders classification. They may differ in pigmentation, but they all have the same number of fingers, the same body temperature, and the same type of organs. The world over, people are much more alike than they are different. But this obstacle is not as serious as it appears, because, in his task of classification, the anthropologist need only consider those traits which are variable. From this point onward he must proceed with caution. He cannot utilize every variable trait—only those that meet certain qualifications: they must be inherited traits little affected by experiences after birth, for race is defined as a matter of ancestry, not environment; they must be measurable traits, yielding scientifically accurate results; and they must cover a wide range of variability so that mankind

can be divided into several large racial divisions and sub-groups. Many scholars have advanced bases of classification which they think meet all or most of these requirements. The following criteria have at one time or another been given serious consideration by students in the field:

The length and breadth of the head (the famous cephalic index which equals the breadth of the skull times 100 divided by the length of the skull), the color and cross section of the hair, the hairiness of the body, the color of the eyes and the shape of the eyelid skin folds, the form of the nasal cartilages, the thickness of the lips, the shape of the external ear, the prominence of the chin, the size and shape of the incisor teeth, the length of the forearm relative to the arm, chest circumference, muscular type, and the chemical constitution of the blood.¹¹

Combinations of these and other criteria are in favor with different investigators. The three which are commonly known because they have been used repeatedly are the cephalic index, pigmentation of the skin, and color and texture of the hair. Recently the chemistry of the blood has received considerable attention, but it seems too early to know how serviceable this criterion will be.

Equipped with these techniques, the anthropologist measures thousands of sample cases, distributes his findings on a scale, and begins the task of marking off large division points for the races and smaller ones for the sub-races. The first confusion appears when he finds it difficult to locate on the scale the point where one race stops and another begins. There are border areas where there is no sharp distinction between two types; in this case an arbitrary point must be selected. This shows that contrary to popular belief, races are not distinct entities; many members of one race cannot be separated from those of another even when measured by a single trait.

Trouble of a more serious nature arises when measurements for

¹¹ A more complete list of anthropometric tests used in the study of racial types can be found in either of the following references. Some of the above were taken from these sources. Louis R. Sullivan, *Essentials of Anthropometry*, American Museum of Natural History, New York, 1923; and Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

TABLE V
THE RACES OF MAN—CHARACTERISTICS ¹²

Races	Pigmen- tation	Head Hair	Body Hair	Prog- nathism	Nose Form	Lip Form	Head Form	Stature	Miscellaneous
TRALOID Australian	dark	wavy, curly	abundant	pronounced	platyrrhine	medium	dolichocephalic	med.-tall	brow ridges, slender build
ROID West Negro	dark	kinky	sparse	pronounced	platyrrhine	full	very dolicho- cephalic	medium	stocky build
ilotic Negro	black	kinky	very sparse	slight	platyrrhine	medium	dolichocephalic	very tall	slender build, long limbs
ceanic Negro	dark	kinky	very sparse	pronounced	variable	thin	dolichocephalic	medium	brow ridges
egrito-Pygmy	dark	kinky	very sparse	pronounced	platyrrhine	medium	mesocephalic	very short	bulging forehead, infantile traits
ushman- ottentot	yellow-brown	kinky	sparse	medium	platyrrhine	full	dolichocephalic	very short	slight body build, "button nose," steatopygia
CASIAN inu indi editerranean ordic lpine rmenoid	brunet brunet brunet blonde med. brunet brunet	wavy wavy wavy, curly wavy straight, wavy wavy	excessive medium medium medium abundant abundant	slight slight slight slight slight slight	mesorrhine leptorrhine leptorrhine leptorrhine mesorrhine leptorrhine	medium medium medium thin medium full	dolichocephalic mesocephalic dolichocephalic doli-mesocephalic brachycephalic brachycephalic	short tall short tall short-med. medium	stocky build, brow ridges slender build medium build long face, brow ridges stocky build head rises high with flat occiput; nasal profile continues forehead slope; "Hittite nose"
MOLOID longol	yellow	straight	sparse	medium	mesorrhine	thin	brachycephalic	med.-tall	Mongoloid eye fold, wide malars
ido-Malay merindian	yellow-brown yellow-brown	straight straight straight usual	sparse sparse sparse	medium med.-slight	meso-platyrrhine mesorrhine usual	medium med.-thin	brachycephalic variable	short variable	Mongoloid eye usual Mongoloid eye sporadic, wide malars usual

¹² This and Table VI arranged by R. Lauriston Sharp.

three or four traits are combined. Many individuals who would be placed at a certain point on the scale as measured by one trait, go to another point on the scale when the second and third traits are considered. That is to say, the traits do not vary consistently. Some of the inhabitants of India, for example, test very dark in skin color, but have the cephalic index of a white man. But in spite of such problems this much can be said without doubt: the *average measurements* of one race differ somewhat from the averages of other races, a fact which allows the anthropologist to consider race as a convenient statistical concept. When applied to large groups the term is useful in describing averages. It is of less value when applied to individuals, and of almost no value in classifying those who appear as marginal cases on the measurement scale. R. Lauriston Sharp had these problems in mind when he prepared as tentative charts the classification of races given in Tables V and VI.

RACE—BIOLOGICAL OR SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT?

If we could print such charts and let the matter rest there, race would be a simple concept to be included with hundreds of other labels in the index of biology texts. But unfortunately the term has strayed into the field of sociology to be included in our textbooks as well, until we wonder where it really belongs. The following explanation of this confusion may appear to many a surprising one: People delight in pointing to differences between themselves and others which serve as marks of superiority. "Purity" in family lineage, outstanding success in business, and public honors are common symbols of social ranking. Frequently added to this list is pride in race. Especially when we are in the presence of members of other races, and still more especially when we are in economic competition with them, do we find physical differences convenient labels for setting ourselves apart as superior (in our own minds) and our competitors as inferior. We do not customarily stand on the street corners making such pronouncements, but in subtle ways these attitudes influence behavior. The person who claims "Nordic" ancestry looks with an air of condescension upon the queer appearing Mongolian or the very black man from West Africa.

Race, which started out to be a biological concept, thus becomes

TABLE VI
THE RACES OF MAN—HABITATS AND TYPE PEOPLES

Races	Habitat	Type Peoples
AUSTRALOID Australian	Australia, parts of New Guinea, Indonesia	Australian aboriginals
NEGROID Forest Negro Nilotic Negro Oceanic Negro Negrito-Pygmey Bushman-Hottentot	West Africa, Congo N. E. Africa, Lake Region New Guinea-Fiji (Melanesia) ; Tasmania Congo, interior New Guinea, Philippines, Malay peninsula, Andaman Is. S. Africa	Tschi, Ewe Dinka, Shilluk Melaneseans, Papuans, extinct Tasmanians Bambuti of Africa, Aeta of Philippines, Semang of Malay peninsula Bushmen, Hottentots
CAUCASIAN Ainu Hindi Mediterranean Nordic Alpine Armenoid	Islands of N. Japan India S. Europe, N. Africa, Arabia N. Europe; sporadically throughout Europe, N. Africa E. and Central Europe; sporadically throughout Europe, N. Africa, Asia Minor S. E. Europe, Asia Minor	Ainu N. and central tribes, upper Indian castes Southern Italians, Spanish, most Egyptians, Berbers, Arabs Highland Swedes, Norwegians, Scots, many N. Germans and English South Slavs, Austrians, Bavarians Armenians, Syrians; many Turks, Persians, Ashkenazim Jews
MONGOLOID Mongol Indo-Malay Amerindian	Mongolia, N. China, Manchuria, S. E. Siberia S. E. Asia, Indonesia N. E. Asia, N. and S. America	Goldi, Tungus, Manchus, Mongols Annamese, Siamese, Malays, Javanese Chukchi, Eskimo, American Indians

involved in our social attitudes, and, whenever this occurs, it enters the field of sociology. In order to cover both of these connotations, the biological and the sociological, the definition would have to be written somewhat as follows: A "race" is a broad association of persons of similar biological heritage who are united in sentiment by common cultural traditions and who in time of conflict claim rights to a privileged social position on the basis of an inherited superiority.

Is there scientific justification for this double use of the term? That is, are there *pure races* which can be accredited with the creation of a *superior culture*? Neither science nor philosophy will commit itself in final terms to the question of what constitutes a superior culture, but waiving that matter, let us direct our attention to the problem of immediate concern, racial purity.

Racial purity—a basis of cultural superiority? The preservation of racial purity could be possible only if a condition of isolation prevented inter-breeding among the different peoples of the earth. Contrary to this, we know that human migrations with their resulting mixture of different races have occurred repeatedly throughout history. As far back as records reveal, Syria has been a highway of the world, bringing together divergent types from many countries; Europe has received wave after wave of invaders from the East; stable China has known many great movements of population; and, in modern times, North and South America have vied with each other in jumbling together every variety of human life. After describing the migrations of primitive groups, E. B. Reuter concludes that:

In the present industrial and commercial era, the rapid means of communication, the safety of travel, and the cheapness of transportation have brought about an amount of migration far in excess of that of previous time.¹³

If different peoples thus come together and live in the same territory, miscegenation, interbreeding, is bound to occur in spite of barriers which social prejudice may erect. This is considered by Reuter to be an almost universal condition.

¹³ Edward B. Reuter, *Race Mixture*, p. 27, Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

There seems to be no historical exception to the rule that when peoples come into contact and occupy the same area there is a mixture of blood that results, ultimately, in the establishment of a new or modified ethnic type.¹⁴

Blood mixture through intermarriage takes place rapidly when the interracial contacts are friendly. If the relations are antagonistic, as when one race dominates another, intermarriage is prohibited by the "superior" group, which wants to preserve its "purity."

This, however, does not prevent the amalgamation of the races, perhaps does not even retard the pace of racial mixture. In a slave regime there is a more or less open appropriation of the women of the subject group to serve the needs of the master class. . . . As a result of this fusion of foreign blood, the physical characters of the servile group are progressively modified and in each new generation approach more nearly to those of the slave-holding caste.¹⁵

If this be true, then we must grant, after we have established the fact of racial differences, the second fact of *racial mixture*. If Europe, like the rest of the world, has been so notoriously a land of migrations, belief in the biological "purity" of the French or the German people is without scientific and historical basis. Even the Jewish group, which the man-on-the-street assumes to be a distinct race, has known no century when contact with other peoples has not been followed by some intermixture.

The Jews are such a group whose history is known from the beginning. In the beginning they were probably a mixture of Amorites, Hittites, and Semites. Throughout their history there have been appreciable infiltrations of foreign blood from every people among whom they have lived and to whose culture they have become to a degree assimilated. There is a multitude of Jewish types; they vary greatly from country to country, tending always to approximate the physical types among whom they live. Over one-third of the English, German, and Austrian Jews have light hair and nearly one-half have

¹⁴ Edward B. Reuter, ed., in "Introduction" to *Race and Culture Contacts*, pp. 7, 8, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

light eyes; some 10 per cent of the European Jews are blonds, fully 40 per cent are of mixed type. The Jews have long since ceased to be a racial type. Their identity is maintained on other grounds. What is true of the Jews is in general true of other sectarian groups of endogamous tradition.¹⁶

Does this same fact of racial mixture also apply to our own country which many people have dreamed of as the promised land of the "Nordic race"? Robert E. Park holds that "in actual numbers, if not in percentages of their total populations, the United States and Brazil have the largest contingents of mixed-blood peoples—as the term is ordinarily construed—of any countries of the world."¹⁷ In the United States not only have the Smiths, O'Reillys, and McGinnesses from the British Isles mixed with the Capolinis of Italy, the Zlotkins of Russia, and the Kyllonens of Finland to give us a heterogeneous population, but in addition to this, some of our ancestors did not shun contact with the American Indian nor overlook the opportunity of turning Negroes into mulattoes. Inter-marriage with Indians and Negroes has been slight; interbreeding has not been uncommon. The research of Melville J. Herskovits dealing with racial crossing in the United States, which has included a sampling of more than three thousand Negro genealogies, brought him to the conclusion that about 78 per cent of the American Negro population show traces of mixed European or of Indian ancestry.¹⁸ A study of this type based on family genealogies may not be altogether accurate, but the errors relate to the exact percentage and not to the basic fact of intermixture.

In looking for a "pure type" one might turn to isolated Africa, but Kroeber will not permit even this to be considered an exception. He describes a large sector "extending across the entire breadth of Africa of which it is difficult to say whether the inhabitants belong to the Negro or the Caucasian type,"¹⁹ and Reuter comments that,

¹⁶Edward B. Reuter, ed., *Race and Culture Contacts*, p. 10. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. See also Maurice Fishberg, *The Jews: A Study in Race and Environment*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1911.

¹⁷Robert E. Park, "Race Relations and Cultural Frontiers," chap. 5 in Edward B. Reuter, *Race and Culture Contacts*, pp. 61, 62. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁸Melville J. Herskovits, *The American Negro*, pp. 8, 9, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1928.

¹⁹*Op. cit.*, p. 36. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

"even among the various Negro tribes of Africa only two or three at most are without a distinct trace of ancient or recent intermixture with other racial stocks."²⁰ In some parts of the world there are, of course, population pockets whose isolation is so complete that undoubtedly no blood mixture has occurred for centuries. But in general, and certainly in the Western world, the fact of miscegenation of racial types is as well attested as the existence of those types in the first place.

In view of these findings the use of the term "race" as a basis of proving or explaining group superiority, even though a popular practice, is not supported by scientific evidence. To summarize the basis for this conclusion we repeat: (1) the criteria for classifying races are still in the experimental stage, and statistical problems involved are great; (2) the variation of characteristics within a race may be greater than the variation between races; and (3) migration and interbreeding of peoples when viewed as a long-time process renders doubtful the belief that national groups represent racial purity. If one were to indulge in broad generalization it would be safer to affirm that every man is to some extent a hybrid—a mixture at least of sub-races—than that he is a member of a racially pure group. In the pages that are to follow, the term "race" will be employed with these reservations in mind; it will be used only to refer to *the biological similarities of a large group, when measured by statistical averages.*

Racial differences in mental ability. Some who would follow the foregoing reasoning about the intermixture of peoples may agree that Germany and the United States cannot claim purity of race, but hopefully insist that at least all white people can think of themselves as a race, and in this case, a superior race. This hope is not quickly dismissed. Even the person who has never heard of anthropometric measurements knows for certain that he is physically different from the West African, the Polynesian, and the American Indian. And he probably is. If, then, he differs in the color of his skin and the shape of his head, is it not reasonable to suppose that he is also different mentally? He is especially interested in proving himself mentally different and superior, because it is a well-established folkway in America to regard intelligence as a general index of ability. For a number of years scientists have

²⁰*Race Mixture*, p. 28. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

given attention to this question. What, briefly, are some of the findings regarding the mentality of races?

Taking the results of tests at their face value, we can find considerable evidence of racial differences in mental ability. In an elaborate study conducted by Davenport and Steggerda in Jamaica in which 100 cases of presumably full-blooded Negroes, 100 cases of full-blooded whites, and 100 mulattoes were measured, the authors found the white cases superior to the other two groups and the full-blooded Negroes in third place. Generalizing on the problem of racial differences they concluded:

There are anthropologists who doubt if there is satisfactory evidence that the main races of mankind differ in innate capacity for mental operations. . . . While we also would not deny the possibility for further development of primitive peoples, especially by additions to tradition and by early intensive culture, that does not state that we agree that all such primitive peoples have the same "native endowment."²¹

Contrary to this view, Otto Klineberg, in his review of research dealing with race differences, concludes that although significant individual differences appear when psychological tests are given to large numbers of people, the group differences are of little value if they are assumed to measure the innate mental ability of racial stocks.²² With reference to comparative intelligence of Negroes and whites, he states:

It is the writer's opinion that this is where the problem of Negro intelligence now stands. The direct comparison between Negroes and whites will always remain a doubtful procedure because of the impossibility of controlling the various factors which may influence the results. Intelligence tests may therefore not be used as measures of group differences in native ability, though they may be used profitably as measures of accomplishment. When comparisons are made within the same race or group, it can be demonstrated that there are very marked differences depending upon variations in background. These

²¹ C. B. Davenport and Morris Steggerda, *Race Crossing in Jamaica*, p. 468, Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1929. Reprinted by permission.

²² Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences*, chap. 8, pp. 152-179, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1935.

differences may be satisfactorily explained, therefore, without recourse to the hypothesis of innate racial differences in mental ability.²³

In support of this conclusion Klineberg cites the results of a study of the relation between intelligence and educational opportunities. He found that Negroes living in New York City, where they have almost equal educational advantages with the white children, test markedly higher than their fellow Negroes in some of the southern communities which have segregated schools for Negroes. Moreover, the intelligence rating of southern colored children who move to New York City increases, on the average, every year they are there until they have been residents for four or five years.²⁴ Such a study tends to show either that the tests do not measure pure intellectual ability as they are supposed to do, but measure a mixture of intelligence and cultural attainment, or else, that intelligence itself is not entirely an innate ability, but is capable of development under favorable conditions of training. In either case, Klineberg's study seriously challenges the conclusion that the white race is born superior in mentality to the colored.

Ernest A. Hooton, whom we have previously cited, does not go as far as Klineberg in assuming that innate racial differences are a negligible factor in comparison with the more important differences in cultural opportunities of various racial groups, but he is in hearty agreement that our present knowledge provides no basis for judgments of racial superiority and inferiority. Because he has brought together all of these words of scientific caution in one concise statement, we shall consider several paragraphs taken directly from his writings:

It seems to be very difficult for writers on the subject of race to restrain themselves from indulging in speculations as to the mental powers and capacities for civilization of the several existing races of man. We observe that a group of people different from ourselves in physical characteristics has also different manners and customs and a distinct material culture. We may judge this culture to be inferior

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 189. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-189. *Cf. also* pp. 174-176. It should be noted that Klineberg has tried to control the problem of selection in this study; he found no significant difference in ability between the school children who moved to New York City and their classmates who remained in the South.

to our own. We are then likely to infer that the people who have produced it belong to a race inferior to ours. In so doing we reason fallaciously. In the first place we probably confuse nationality with race, since most cultures are the products of racially mixed populations. In the second place we are assuming that our own measure of cultural progress is an absolute standard by which all peoples may be judged. Then too we are leaving out of account the vast influence which environment exerts upon culture, often an overweening influence. Finally we are making the mistake of assuming that the complexity of a culture is an accurate measure of the individual intelligence of its producers.²⁵

Now it is quite evident that the status of the problem of racial intelligence is about as follows. Anthropologists have not yet reached the point of an agreement upon criteria of race which will enable psychologists to isolate with any degree of facility the racial types which are to be studied. Psychologists have not yet been able to develop mental tests which anthropologists are willing to trust as fair gauges of mental capacity. Neither group has yet perfected its technique of measurement. Until we know exactly how to distinguish a race and exactly what intelligence tests test, we shall have to hold in suspension the problem of racial mental differences.²⁶

If the statements of scientists are so lacking in support for attitudes of racial superiority, how do we account for the continued existence of such attitudes on the part of many groups? The answer is that people often develop beliefs without bothering to investigate the findings of research. Regardless, therefore, of the biological and psychological facts about race, there is the ever-present sociological fact of the *belief* in racial purity and superiority, which must be reckoned with if we are to understand the behavior of groups. After all, it is not what scientists say is true, but what people *believe* to be true that determines their behavior. For the sociologist these beliefs are, themselves, important data. W. O. Brown has described this added social meaning of the term "race" which accounts for its sociological significance:

²⁵ From Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 591. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 596, 597. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

But if race is defined as a social reality in the folkways, mores, and behavior of the folk, as in the United States and South Africa, it is more than a mere zoological fact. It becomes a significant symbol, evoking love and hatred and arousing men to words and deeds, a source of rancor and conflict. Races thus become important social units, possible conflict groups. Race prejudice, race consciousness, and race movements tend to emerge. Races acquire a past and aspire to a future; or, as Park has put it, they become historic groups, not mere aggregations of individuals tending toward physical uniformity. This transformation of race from a biological to a social fact is not a function of conditions inherent in human biology. Rather, it can be understood only in terms of the social situations and culture of a given society. From the sociological angle of approach, race contact is one form of social contact, and race conflict a type of group conflict.²⁷

In order to explain these sociological facts about race and at the same time avoid confusion with the biological facts, it will be well to use separate terms for the two ideas. Henceforth, we shall limit the use of the concept, *race*, to its *biological meaning* as stated earlier. On the other hand, we shall refer to the culturally unified group whose members *think* they are bound by racial ties as a "race conscious group." In this group the *belief* in racial purity is all-important. The "race conscious group" now takes its place with crowds, mobs, publics, and other forms of association as a definite social type the study of whose behavior is within the subject matter of sociology.

CHARACTERISTIC BEHAVIOR OF THE "RACE CONSCIOUS GROUP"

The unity of the "race conscious group" is slight during periods when its status is unchallenged, but in time of conflict or suppression its group consciousness is heightened and its unity strengthened. This principle can be tested in any period in the history of the Jews, who are often a "race conscious group." When undergoing persecution, they are keenly aware of their common interests; but when they are at peace with other groups, the bonds which hold

²⁷ W. O. Brown, "Culture Contact and Race Conflict," in Reuter's *Race and Culture Contacts*, p. 34, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

them together as Jews are often less important than those that unite them as individuals to the respective nations of which they are a part.

When discriminated against, the "race conscious group" develops definite techniques for maintaining its self-respect and for bettering its status in relation to the oppressor group. In this country the reactions of Negroes to discrimination illustrate such a set of techniques.

Reactions of Negro groups as typical of oppressed minorities. *The self-improvement reaction.* Brooker T. Washington defined one pattern for the Negro to follow when he told his fellow colored men to worry less about insults and unequal opportunities, and to give more attention to their own development economically and in other lines of endeavor. By demonstrating their efficiency in agriculture, industry, and business, he thought recognition and improved status would be forthcoming. This emphasis which led to the founding of Tuskegee Institute and many similar schools is still prominent in Negro life. Today Negroes are trained for every trade and profession. Especially in cities they have their own stores, restaurants, hotels, churches, lodges, insurance companies, manufacturing concerns, and many of the legal, medical, religious, and social needs of their people are served by institutions whose staffs are composed of professionally trained colored people.

The militant reaction. Although not minimizing the importance of this accomplishment, many of the younger leaders are realizing that the independent economic development of the Negro is limited by his place in the white society. They are, therefore, facing the fact of discrimination directly, and demanding the recognition of the Negro as a native-born American entitled to whatever protection and opportunities other citizens receive. They fight for the abolition of "Jim-Crowism" in all of its forms; they ask for equal wages and chance for advancement in industry, for the same kind of justice in the courts the white man receives; they seek greater recognition in government; and expect to be treated as equals in religion, education, and other forms of social organization. These leaders have formed militant organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Recently communist organizations in this country have welcomed the Negro to membership on an equal basis, offering to help in his struggle against white discrimination. At least a few Negroes have

accepted this offer. The first successful strike of women Negro factory workers in Chicago was, according to leaflet material circulated at the time, led by persons of communist affiliation.

The "oppression psychosis." When a group is as conscious of discrimination as is implied by the types of militant behavior just described, the members often develop characteristic attitudes which Herbert A. Miller refers to as an "oppression psychosis."²⁸ Common among minority groups subject to domination, the "oppression psychosis" involves attitudes of fear, hatred, resentment, jealousy, suspicion, and revenge. When in this state of mind a group interprets any action of the oppressor as another injustice. Although the Negroes do not have this complex to the extent to which it is found among some of the oppressed minorities of Europe, there are evidences of its presence. A perusal of the news columns and editorials in the Negro weekly, *The Chicago Defender*, will show story after story praising achievement of Negroes and condemning acts of discrimination of the white man. This group reaction has its counterpart in the personalities of some individuals; certain Negroes (as would be true with any oppressed group) become highly sensitive to comments which cast reflection upon them as individuals or upon their race as a group. A quick, impulsive flash of anger, a sharp retort, or even physical resistance may be expected from such a person. To him are attributed radical acts and impertinences, much resented by a similar element in the white group. Out of such antagonisms riots and lynching parties develop.

The cooperative reaction. The "liberal," as contrasted with the "radical" members of the group, are not belligerent in their relations with the white man, but rather pursue what they consider to be an expedient policy of cooperation. Interracial commissions, race conferences, and interracial education are the expressions of such an attitude. These "compromising" measures are hotly condemned by the "racial" leaders who think that by demanding justice, rather than begging favors, will a real change of status be won. There may, therefore, arise a conflict between the leaders themselves, similar to the conflict in political life between socialists and communists, both of whom are working for social reconstruction, while each condemns the method of the other in achieving it.

²⁸ Herbert A. Miller, *Races, Nations and Classes*, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1924. See especially chaps. 4 and 8.

These various types of reaction are of course not mutually exclusive. The same persons may react in different ways at different times, and within an oppressed group the various members may respond differently to discrimination, depending upon the temperamental and social factors involved in each case. In general, however, the behavior can be described by such categories as those we have mentioned.

The role of the hybrid in the "race conscious group." In this struggle for status, the members of the race who are acknowledged as hybrids play a somewhat different role. Again, the matter is determined not so much by the biological fact of mixed blood as by the sociological fact of the attitudes people hold toward hybrids. Their status is not the same as either of the parent stocks from which they came. Reuter has described the different reactions characteristic of this in-between social type:

The ambition of the mixed-bloods seems everywhere an ambition to be accepted into the advanced race and to escape from the lower group. Their actual role in the interracial situation is consequently dependent upon the attitude of the dominant group. Where no social color line has been formally drawn against them, they have tended to identify themselves with the superior race and themselves to draw a color line against the lower race or else to serve as a physiological tie between the extremes of the population during the process of its reduction to a mongrel unity. Where a color line has been drawn against them by the superior group in the population, they everywhere have tended to form an intermediate caste in the population. Where this caste has been more or less frankly recognized, it serves as a harmonizing group between the population extremes. Where it has not been recognized by the superior race, the caste seldom has been able to maintain itself and the mixed-blood individuals tend to unite their interests with, and become an upper-class among, the lower group.²⁹

The superior status of the hybrid in relation to the oppressed group. In the case of Negro-white relations, the mulatto has enjoyed a higher status than that of his darker skinned brothers. The white man has called him superior, and even the darker

²⁹ Edward B. Reuter, *The Mulatto in the United States*, pp. 376, 377, Richard G. Badger, Boston, 1918.

Negroes have looked up to him. In this way a selective factor becomes operative, that is, the mulatto is favored in educational opportunities, in economic life, and in mating. The biological factor enters here also. If light tan girls are preferred socially they have a better opportunity for marriage and moreover, when they marry, they will try to choose persons as light as themselves. Biological and sociological factors thus join in producing an increasingly light mulatto class.³⁰

The emulation of the white standard is not limited to the mulatto but is shared by his darker brothers as well. It is an unwitting process in which the millions of white patterns held constantly before them in the movies, on the billboards, in literature, over the radio, and in social contacts within the community create an all-pervading cultural atmosphere. The Negro's mode of dress, complexion, and manner of speech are made to resemble patterns in white culture. The sale of cosmetic preparations for lightening the skin and straightening the hair has brought fortunes to several astute men of the "race."

The superiority complex of the white man intrudes even within the inner circles of Negro social life. Those who most nearly resemble the "white type" are preferred. A sorority of colored girls followed the practice for a time of admitting no very dark skinned neophyte to its secret order. Until this policy was explained, a light mulatto had wondered why her dark brown sister had not also received an invitation to join. The darker sister and others like her who had been excluded, retaliated by forming their own sorority and excluding from membership all of the light faces, but this act of protest was an exception to the general practice; ordinarily preference for the white man's standards goes unchallenged.

The trend toward identification with the culture of the "superior" group is most completely expressed when the lightest mulattoes take the final step of "passing over." It is impossible to show statistically how many "Negroes" are now passing for "white," but if there were not a number of cases the expression of "passing over" would not be so readily understood in Negro circles. In casual conversation with urban Negroes, one finds that many can cite at least one instance such as the following. A very light complexioned "colored" boy born in the "Black Belt" of Chicago

³⁰ Cf. Edward B. Reuter, *Race Mixture*, pp. 162, 163.

became a member of a white fraternity in a university which he was attending. His former colored friends avoided betraying his secret by pretending not to recognize him whenever they chanced to meet in the presence of white persons. The dramatic quality of such cases may increase their gossip value to such a degree that the number of instances imagined far outreaches what actually occurs.

Conflict situations: the hybrid as a marginal man. The superior social position of the mulatto has not always been an unmitigated blessing. His superiority airs have been resented by the darker Negroes. Usually they do little about it beside grumble, but occasionally when a light-brown Negro needs to be reminded of his place they may shun him and elevate to a position of high honor a thoroughly black man of the "race."

Looking at the mulatto from the standpoint of his relation to the other parent stock, the white "race," we find a conflict situation even more acute. The mulatto's sharp profile and Caucasian features mellowed by a rich hue of brown pigmentation has made him a favored type, far preferred by the white man to the purer Negroid physiognomy. But let this preferred man act for a moment as though the nine-tenths of his blood which may be Scotch, German, or Swedish, has lifted him to the prized status of white society, and that very society will react with its choicest forms of discrimination. When these two plights befall him, discrimination by both of the "pure" races, the mulatto is the *marginal man*. He is without a race; he is without a society.

His marginality is a function, on the one hand, of his assimilation to the culture of the dominant group and, on the other hand, of the refusal of this same group to accept him as an equal. This refusal impugns his personal status, violates his ego, makes him race conscious. As a sophisticated and educated person he resents being treated as an outcast.³¹

Discriminated against by the society which he tries to join, the marginal man may cease looking for favors from the "superior" group and cast his lot with the masses of the oppressed whom he had not thought of before as brothers. When this comes about, "he

³¹ Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. The term "marginal man" was first applied to sociological analysis by Robert E. Park. It has become a most useful concept in dealing with culture contacts.

articulates their grievances and, as their experiences and aspirations become increasingly similar to his, they respond to his leadership. Their smoldering resentment eventuates in race consciousness and race movements, threatening the security of the dominant race."³² Or, taking a more moderate reaction, the marginal man, in this case the mulatto, may become a leader of his group not for the purpose of fighting the white man, but to create a genuine Negro culture which is something more than an imitation of white patterns. In this reaction he shows respect for the inherent ability of the colored "race." In recent times such a leader has found considerable support among his liberal-minded white friends who assure him that the earlier efforts to discredit the colored man and all other races not white were the work of the propagandist, not the scientist. This liberal white group encourages the mulatto to remain Negro and be proud of the achievements his group can make to the total life of the nation.

In the foregoing analysis we have examined the behavior of the "race conscious group," giving special attention to the one who because of biological inheritance is forced to play the social role of the hybrid. In the analysis we may have given the erroneous impression that all members of the "race conscious group" are fully aware of these problems and of their reactions to them. On the contrary, there are always many unconcerned with the problems of race who, nevertheless, are included in the group because of their physical differentia. And when a riot, a lynching, or some other crisis occurs, they do rise quickly to the status of "active members" in the "race conscious group."

Up to this point we have limited our attention largely to the oppressed group. At the other extreme on the social scale are those responsible for the oppression. They, too, constitute a "race conscious group" whose behavior we shall now subject to a similar scrutiny.

The oppressor group and race prejudice. The behavior of this group, as one might expect, is to some extent the reverse side of the picture just painted. Its group consciousness is also heightened during times of conflict. Whenever the subordinate group becomes restive and ambitious for higher status, the "superior group" expresses its prejudice and resentment by acts of suppression

³²*Ibid.*, p. 44. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

and discrimination. Park describes the situation which calls for such a response in the following words:

Race prejudice may be regarded as a spontaneous, more or less instinctive defense-reaction, the practical effect of which is to restrict free competition between races. Its importance as a social function is due to the fact that free competition, particularly between people with different standards of living, seems to be, if not the original source, at least the stimulus to which race prejudice is the response.³³

Race prejudice, then, is an external indication of a basic struggle for existence and status between the oppressor and the oppressed. Like any prejudice, it involves a bias, a pre-judgment which reflects an earlier conditioning.³⁴ Prejudice is especially efficient in interracial relations, because physical differences, slight and inconsequential though they may be, serve as convenient labels for pointing out those against whom prejudice is to be directed.

These physical labels give the "superior" groups a means of discriminating against and removing from competition all persons who bear such marks regardless of their merit as individuals. That is to say, *pre-judgment* of an individual's entire personality on the basis of a *single trait* is a characteristic of group prejudice. Thus the Negro who has earned a Doctor of Philosophy degree may expect to be insulted and excluded from many social contacts by persons whose own accomplishments are inferior to his, but whose skin is white. "Even the illiterate Florida cracker knows that 'niggers are niggers' and he would rather be his poverty-stricken self than a Dumas."³⁵

This categoric nature of prejudice has been found by Donald Young to characterize a great many relationships among cultural groups in the United States:

There is not a minority in the United States of whatever racial or national origin which has not brought with it or acquired group

³³ Robert E. Park in J. Steiner's *The Japanese Invasion*, p. xiii, A. C. McClurg and Company, Chicago, 1917.

³⁴ The process of social conditioning or socialization was explained in chapter 7.

³⁵ Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples*, p. 1, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1932.

antagonisms and prejudices concerning the capacities and characteristics of other minorities and of the majority of old American stock. Not a single individual in the United States is permitted by his own beliefs and by the controlling attitudes of his group to regard his fellows as individuals rather than as members of some class or caste based on racial or national ancestry, and characterized thereby.

. . . These attitudes affect beliefs in inborn qualities, limit employment, fix the place of residence, influence forms of recreation, and go so far as to prescribe permissible varieties of social relationships. They vary from group to group, are never identical in all parts of the country, and are altered radically in the passage of time. Although rigidity is not a characteristic of American group distinctions, their observance is required of all who fear the penalties of social disapproval.³⁶

Racial prejudice is not innate, as was once assumed to be the case, but like other attitudes is acquired through social experience. Bruno Lasker found this to be true in his investigation of racial attitudes among children,³⁷ and Donald Young reached a similar conclusion in his summary of the research which has been completed in this field:

Crude as they are, existing studies of racial attitudes confirm the prevailing belief of cultural anthropologists and others who emphasize environment rather than heredity, that race prejudice as evidenced by tendencies to antagonistic reactions is the result of a process of socialization rather than an inborn abhorrence. . . .³⁸

Social psychologists observe that white children do not instinctively hate colored, and vice versa, but that they take over the attitudes of their parents, their playmates, their story books; and, when they get older, learn how to justify these emotions with the same stereotyped arguments that their parents use. Unless new conditioning factors are introduced, the cycle continues generation after generation. The modern devices of newspapers, radio, and professionalized propaganda make the creation of prejudice, espe-

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³⁷ Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 8. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

cially in times of crisis when we are off balance anyway, a simple art, effective though crude.³⁹

In this chapter, the Negro has been used as a principal example because our relationship with him in daily living is more immediate. With minor variations similar behavior in race relations could be described in many parts of the world. These typical forms of behavior may now be summarized. The following are the characteristic reactions of the "race conscious group" which occupies an *inferior* social position: this group becomes more closely unified in times of increased oppression; it seeks security by trying to develop its own economic life; pride is protected by glorifying traditions, praising achievements of contemporary leaders, and welcoming laudatory comments from outsiders; it tries to improve its status with relation to other groups either by demanding justice in militant fashion, or by expedient measures of a cooperative nature; and its members, consciously or unconsciously, tend to judge their own worth by the standards of the "superior group." The hybrid plays an in-between social role in which he is either assimilated to the "superior" culture or, disillusioned in this attempt, turns to the masses in a common struggle for freedom.⁴⁰

The *superior* group which has the upper hand employs racial prejudice and discrimination as its methods of disqualifying a competitor. So long as the competitor stays in his assigned place, the superior group is friendly in a paternalistic way; but when the minority shows signs of discontent and upward striving, then those in power employ discrimination, motivated by prejudice, and justified by stereotyped rationalizations.

During our analysis of race and of the "race conscious group," we have learned that race is a biological matter for the classifier who studies head shapes and for the anthropologist interested in origins. But we now also know it is a sociological phenomenon—an unusually interesting one because it shows human nature in action, revealing its prejudices, its struggle for power, and its indirect means of achieving that power.

³⁹ Certain factors conducive to the development of prejudicial attitudes are analyzed by Frederick G. Detweiler in "The Rise of Modern Race Antagonisms," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, pp. 738-748, Mar., 1932.

⁴⁰ An analysis of the social role of the hybrid appears in Reuter, "The Personality of Mixed Bloods," *Race Mixture*, pp. 205-216.

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Chapter 14

NATIONS AND CLASSES

THE SPIRIT OF A NATION ¹

AS I SIT NOW in St. James' Park it is all over. The Guards are just tramping up the Mall towards Buckingham Palace to the strains of pipes and beating drums. The Queen and Princess Mary went by a few moments ago, bowing and smiling to the cheering crowds that line the route. All the gay, dignified spectacle is over in the great square of the Horse Guards, which looks so Russian at night, large, black and deserted, lit only by little gleaming lanterns, but which today, full, brilliant and alive in the bright morning light, was only and wholly British; all is over and the crowds are streaming west to catch a last glimpse of the Palace itself. From the scene behind Whitehall itself I for one come with very mixed feelings. The crowd cheered . . . and admired the colour and precision of it all, as the troops went steadily by in solid phalanxes and with bayonets flashing in the sun. The King and Queen are out there on the balcony at Buckingham Palace now and the crowds are cheering . . . and there's magic in the air and a devilish lilt as the bands go by! Heavy banners move slowly in the wind, a sea of gold and scarlet, black, steel, and white is going by, all in the sunshine of a bright June morning.

THE NATION AS A SOCIAL GROUP

A nation such as Great Britain, whose spirit of unity has just been illustrated, is not a race, it is not a state, it is not a government, though it may be related to all three. A nation is a relatively

¹ Adapted by John M. Gaus in *Great Britain*, pp. 42, 43, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929, from an article by "H. R." appearing in the British magazine, *New Leader*, June 10, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press and also by permission of the *New Leader*, London, England.

large group of people who are united by a common tradition, a common sentiment, and similar culture traits which set them apart from other groups. C. C. North in his theoretical study of social relations states that "nationality is based largely upon commonness of tradition,"² and then explains that

Traditions are created out of the past experiences of a people, around which time and literature have woven a halo of glory. Given a bond of such group memories, including accounts of dead heroes and achievements and exploits by representatives of the group, we have an exceedingly strong national bond.³

Judged by these standards there is no mistaking the Japanese as a nation. Their unity is based on a tradition that extends through the centuries—a tradition that glorifies the group as a favored people and recounts stories of unsurpassed accomplishment. The bonds of their unity are varied. The Japanese speak in the same language; worship the same gods; wear similar costumes; live in a territory dear to their people for generations; think of themselves as members of one race, a superior race; revere the same ruler, a direct descendant of God; and follow the same star of destiny in predicting still greater accomplishment in the future. To be sure, there are points of difference among the Japanese, even minor variations in the characteristics just named, but to the outside world these differences seem like family affairs overshadowed by the common interests and customs of the nation. A test of the sentiment of a Japanese for his nation could easily be applied if, in conversation, one were to suggest to him that the Koreans have a superior culture, or that the Chinese are a far greater people. The man to whom one was speaking would not react as a member of the Minakuchi family, nor as a member of the Mongolian race, but as a Japanese who felt a personal insult because the honor of his nation had been defamed.

The Japanese and the British are not isolated illustrations. Nationalism—that is, regard for and loyalty to a nation—is so prevalent in the modern world that it cannot be escaped in any country of Europe nor on the American continents. It has also

² Cecil C. North, *Social Differentiation*, p. 43, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

cast its spell over China, India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt.⁴ Indeed, it seems to be such an important basis for organizing the activities of mankind that one can easily assume it to be a part of the natural order of things. Like other social phenomena, however, it is not without a cause; it has a natural history. Carlton J. H. Hayes, a historian who has studied this problem intensively, states that in many of the earliest societies tribalism had some resemblance to modern nationalism, but that for at least sixty centuries of recorded history, society was organized more on the basis of cosmopolitanism or localism than on nationalism, although the latter was not entirely missing. As late as the eighteenth century there were very few evidences of national unity and loyalty in Germany—a country which today is an example par excellence of that spirit.⁵ But “since the eighteenth century the idea that each nationality should cherish its distinctive language and culture and should constitute an independent polity has been advanced by intellectual and political leaders in one country after another and has been accepted and acted upon by the masses of mankind.”⁶

After giving a careful review of the historical reasons for the rapid rise of nationalism in recent years, Hayes analyzes one factor of special interest to the sociologist—nationalistic propaganda.⁷ In his special study of the French nation, which was selected not because it is unique but because it is typical of the Western world, Hayes finds that its nationalism “is not exclusively or chiefly a product of physical geography or of racial heredity,” but that “it rests on traditions of politics, religion, language, war, invasion, conquests, economics, and society, which have been fashioned by peculiar and often fortuitous circumstances and which have been preserved and synthesized by great writers and other intellectuals.”⁸ Then follows an analysis of how national loyalty in its intense, modern form has been engendered among the masses by various

⁴ Carlton J. H. Hayes, “Nationalism: Historical Development,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11, p. 248, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-242.

⁶ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, p. 288, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁷ In chapter 12 we alluded to the part played by propaganda in determining public opinion.

⁸ Reprinted from Carlton J. H. Hayes, *France, A Nation of Patriots*, p. 16, by permission of Columbia University Press, publishers.

propaganda techniques. The author discusses the relation of the educational system in France to the development of nationalism, as well as the part played by the military regime, the churches, the press, the radio and cinema, and national societies.⁹ He summarizes their influence: "And what is most artificial about the whole phenomenon of contemporary French nationalism is the fact that it has been consciously taught to, and thereby imposed upon, the mass of Frenchmen."¹⁰ As illustrative of this conclusion the author has appended to his published report many excerpts from textbooks authorized for the government schools in France. The following paragraph, which is taken from a text intended for the use of children aged six and seven, shows how early the idea of national loyalty is brought to the attention of the people.

France has not always been as educated, as rich, and as prosperous as to-day. She was formed slowly, she has grown little by little, and she has ended by becoming one of the greatest states in the world. In studying history you will learn to know all those who have made the French fatherland: the generals who have won battles, the men who have governed our country, the writers and artists who have immortalized the genius of our race. You will see that if France is powerful and respected it is because she has never despaired after the most trying experiences. The glory of France has been slowly and dearly acquired: you have the right to be proud of it. And that is why you should learn none too soon, by examples of history, to acquire love of work and devotion to the fatherland.¹¹

We have had a glimpse, through the illustration of France, which Hayes holds to be typical, of the nature of the nationalistic attitude and the method of its inculcation. Now let us consider more carefully those common interests which serve as a bond of unity in this modern social group, the nation, which has come to play such a dominant role in world affairs and in the lives of individuals who comprise it.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chapters, 3-8

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 343. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. This translation given by Hayes is based on the textbook by Claude Augé and Maxime Petit, *Livre Préparatoire d'Histoire de France*, 111th edition, pp. 108 ff., Larousse, Paris, n. d.

The common interests of a nation. The bonds of tradition, sentiment, and common interest which unite the members of a nation are not the same in every case, nor are all nations equally well unified. What are some of the more important differences and similarities in this respect? No doubt everyone would agree at the outset that a common language is an important factor in national unity because through the medium of language similar experiences and sentiments are shared. Ernest Barker, an English historian, speaks as a sociologist when he points out that because

. . . thought and sentiment have deep congruities with speech, there is the closest of affinities between nation and language. Language is not mere words. Each word is charged with associations that touch feelings and evoke thoughts. You cannot share these feelings and thoughts unless you can unlock their associations by having the key of language.¹²

Without denying the truth of this principle in general, the reality of history forces us to recognize the existence of some nations which do not have complete uniformity of language. In this country the Pennsylvania Dutch are "Americans," but if one were to overhear a conversation of the older people in a village store he would recognize few words of English. In Great Britain, the dialects of the Scotch and the Welsh seem strange to the Londoner, but in spite of these local differences, Great Britain has achieved a national unity. Among the Swiss three languages are spoken, Italian, French, and German, in different sections of the country. These illustrations do not disprove the importance of language as a common bond, but merely show that in some circumstances a national group can exist without complete uniformity of dialect.

Most nations possess a common territory. This seems essential because living together makes it easier for the nation to have many types of experiences in common, and also because national sentiment is so easily associated with such physical features as the chalk cliffs of Dover in England, Fujiyama in Japan, or Popocatepetl in Mexico. Barker rates this factor as one of the most basic when he hypothesizes:

¹² Ernest Barker, *National Character*, p. 13, Methuen and Company, Ltd., London, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

If I had to invent a formula for the making of a nation, I should say: Take first a territory; add some form of organization (or State) to hold its inhabitants together; let one language, if it was not there in the beginning, gradually prevail by its weight; let some community of belief and worship unite the spirits of men—and then from the crucible of time and the fermentation of the centuries a nation will emerge.¹³

After this formula is admitted as essentially true, the exception must be noted of the Jewish nation, which has persisted for nearly twenty centuries without a territory, although now the Zionist movement proposes that at least a nominal headquarters be maintained in Palestine.

Ordinarily a national group is also a political *state* with its own machinery of *government*. If a nation is characterized by its cultural unity, a state is known for its political control over a specified area. The folk comprise the nation, but the citizens comprise the state. When the folk and the citizens are one and the same, both state and nation are strengthened. There is a distinct trend in modern history for this to be the case. Following the decay of feudalism, nations have consistently set political autonomy as their all-important goal. The forceful climax to this trend came in Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of the "self-determination of peoples," which gave renewed hope to the tiniest nations of Europe that some day they too could have ambassadors, parliaments, postage stamps, taxes, and kings, if they wished. There have, however, been instances when these two social units did not coincide. The Roman Empire contained many nations which retained their cultural differences after being united under one political sovereignty. Before the World War, the Polish nation was divided under the sovereignty of Russia, Germany, and Austria. The political control of India rests in part with the British Parliament, and until recently the Congress of the United States governed the Philippines.

A nation is more readily unified if all of its folk belong to the same race, or think that they do. We are already acquainted with this tendency of nations to use race as an argument for superiority, but we have also learned that, with a few exceptions,

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 15. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

. . . each nation contains different races—long-heads as well as round-heads; and, again, tall and fair long-heads as well as long-heads who are short and dark. The soil of each country has been washed over again and again by different human species, which have left their representatives in its living population. France is the most homogeneous of nations; but in point of race, as we shall see, France is perhaps more composite than any other.¹⁴

Regardless of what the anthropological facts may be, a nation which thinks itself the descendant of a pure and superior race has in that belief a strong bond of unity. A "race conscious" nation which is also a political state, occupying the same territory, speaking the same language, and reared in the same tradition is a social grouping which in spite of its size becomes closely unified. So strong is the loyalty in such a group that by the use of propaganda, martial music, and brilliant oratory the members can be made ready to sacrifice their lives, if need be, for its preservation and glory.

If one more element, religion, be added, the unity is complete, because religion, in sanctifying the history of the group and interpreting its future as in accord with Divine purposes, adds just those final qualities of emotional tone and rationalization that are needed. Many modern nations have been forced to exist without this added element. The movement for the separation of church and state has also separated the church from the nation, allowing the individual members to go their own ways in religion.

After looking at each of these traits, we can conclude that they all contribute to the development of a nation and are actually present in most national groups, but no one factor is indispensable, except the general element of a common tradition supported by a common sentiment. The specific form this may take varies from one nation to another.

The behavior of a nation and a nationality contrasted. A nation is as it acts. Considered from the viewpoint of its social behavior, a group may be at one time a nation and at another time a nationality group.¹⁵ One behaves like a gentleman, the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁵ The special meaning here given to "nationality" is an instance of the way in which social science sometimes finds it necessary to redefine common terms, giving them specific, technical meanings.

other like a rebel. The difference is this: The nation is a group that has a place in the sun. It has a status that is recognized and respected by others. But a nationality group is, for the time being at least, without that status. It is working against the odds of economic oppression or political domination, or both, enforced by a stronger power.

This distinction in terms points to an important difference in behavior. The member of a *nation* is not constantly concerned about the social status of his group—he takes it for granted. The traveler from Great Britain considers it unnecessary to tell you of the glorious tradition of his country. Confident of the status of his national group, the individual is, therefore, free to devote his principal attention to increasing the status of other groups to which he may belong. Thus, the member of a labor union may not bother to applaud when the American flag is flashed on the screen at the movie, but the next day risks his life in a strike riot, incidental to the struggle of his union for recognition.

The *nationality group*, on the other hand, is highly conscious of its lack of status. Its members are fighting for equality, recognition, independence, or whatever goal they have set as a satisfactory status. The Irish, the natives of India, the Ukrainians, and the Filipinos have for a number of years been in that state of mind. Their behavior reveals the same complex which we found operative in the "race conscious group." When expressed in extreme form, Miller called it the "oppression psychosis." The nationality group reacts violently to insults. It overstates its accomplishments. It withstands persecution, is increasingly unified by oppression, develops subtle ways of gaining advantage over opponents, or plans the final step of revolution. This distinction seems clear enough: *the nationality group is striving for status; the nation already has it.* But, unfortunately for us who would prefer a simple analysis, modern history has complicated the picture.

The recent spread of nationalism. War, imperialism, and other forms of nationalistic economics and politics have made of nearly every nation, a nationality, a conflict group. There was a time when an Ethiopian could mind his own business, follow the simple life of a herdsman, and only at the coronation of a new emperor or tribal chief reflect on the centuries-old tradition of independence which his people had enjoyed. This was all changed when Mussolini sounded the war cry. Individual concerns of

everyday living were overshadowed by the all-engrossing interest of preserving the independence of the state from imperialistically-minded outsiders. Before any movement of troops had been made, the mere prospect of subjugation changed Ethiopia from a self-confident nation to a highly conscious nationality, fighting for the preservation of its position.

Since the World War, Germany and France have behaved as nationalities. Except for a brief interlude when Stresemann and Briand were willing to guarantee the status of each other's nation, Germany and France have been over-sensitive, suspicious, each arming to protect itself and then alarmed by the other's apparent preparation for war. In the Far East, China and Japan have become nationalistic. In the old days the Chinese were content in the knowledge that they were one of the oldest, most cultured nations in all history. At that time they cared little about establishing a strong central government and organizing an army. The family, not the state, was their more important social unit. But when the nations of Europe, and later Japan, began opening the door of China and helping themselves to her valuable resources, she was forced to become a self-conscious group concerned about national rights, political boundaries, treaties, and armaments. Japan's nationalistic urge had a slightly different cause. Her expanding population, her increasing economic needs, her contact with Western civilization, and her national conceit following the victorious war with Russia, awakened Japan to the possibility of making a belated, but none the less energetic, start in the race for world markets and territorial expansion. While in this striving stage the status of the nation was an all-important consideration to the Japanese. They resented our immigration restriction because it hurt their national pride. They resented the 5-5-3 naval treaty because it implied their inequality to other nations. They expressed national resentment when a cartoon appearing in one of our magazines caricatured their emperor.¹⁶

These illustrations suggest that the nationalistic behavior of modern nations may express itself in economic conflict, political reprisals, and military preparedness. Instead of such a situation,

¹⁶ "Japan to Protest New York Cartoon: *Vanity Fair* Caricature of the Emperor Will Be Taken Up by Ambassador Saito," *New York Times*, vol. 84, Aug. 4, 1935, p. 1.

one would have supposed that the recent development of world-wide facilities in communication and transportation would have created an economic interdependence of people as well as a sharing of their cultural possessions. But far from that being true, the nationalistic complex has heightened the political and economic barriers by restricting immigration, erecting tariff walls, and building record-sized navies and armies.

Thus the seemingly innocuous term "nation," when coupled with its near-cousin, "nationality," turns out to be not just another concept, but a realistic characterization of group behavior whose importance in the present day far outranks questions of unity and disunity in scores of lesser groups to which we may belong.

SOCIAL CLASSES

Even though in America, especially in the democratic Middle West, we stoutly deny the presence of social classes, they do actually exist there. . . .

In order to study social stratification in its simplest form, I chose a small Iowa community, which we shall call Shellstone. This community is homogeneous in religion, race and nationality, hence these elements will not complicate the process of social grading. There are no factories, mines, or other economic agencies which bring about the obvious social cleavage between labor and capital. In other words, Shellstone is a simple, agricultural community with a small trading center.

At first sight there does not appear to be a social stratification among the people. When informants are directly approached they inevitably reply, "There are no classes in Shellstone." The organized social activities cut across all class lines. In the cities one finds different classes attending different churches. Formerly this was partially true in Shellstone, where the old aristocracy largely belonged to the Baptist church, and were further set off from the multitude by dress, economic status and refinement. During the course of the twentieth century the social structure of Shellstone has been leveled downward and class lines obscured.

Shellstone likes to pigeonhole individuals, however, and from this tendency develops a loose class system. Social position is largely determined by the function which one fulfills in the economic process,

and the subjective evaluation placed upon that function by the community.¹⁷

Detection of the presence of social classes in an Iowa community may not be a simple task, and the drawing of class lines in the city is not a self-evident procedure. A social class has no officers, no by-laws, no official headquarters, and not even a roster of its members. The absence of these usual characteristics causes one to wonder if there is any such entity as "class" which can be included in the category of social groups. The terms "social class," "class consciousness," and "class struggle" have been flung about freely from soap box and rostrum as though they stood for something that really exists. Our thinking on the problem will be clarified if for a moment we abandon preoccupation with the words themselves and concentrate attention on the type of social behavior for which they serve as labels.

In our ever-present competitive struggle for the good things of the earth—that is, for the things which people think are good: food, clothing, fine homes, super de luxe automobiles, trips to Bermuda, and a college education—we find that not everyone finishes with the same amount of these economic possessions. While some people are on relief, others are enjoying the winter in Florida. Observing this fact, we are likely to comment that one belongs to the wealthy class and another to the poor. Or, making another type of observation of this struggle for goods, we notice that some people work with their hands, punch time clocks, and receive wages, while others sit in private offices and receive salaries, or do not sit in offices at all, but through their brokers make investments and receive dividends. The latter, we say, belong to the executive, the employer, the moneyed, or the capitalist class, and the former to the working class or the laboring class. Although we are not quite clear what we mean when we call someone a capitalist and another a worker, yet if J. P. Morgan and John, the ditch digger, were brought together we would have little difficulty in distinguishing the two, not only by their appearance, but, more important for the sociologist, by their attitudes, their stereotyped notions about each other, their prejudices, antipathies, and loyalties. The

¹⁷ Earl H. Bell, "Social Stratification in a Small Community," *The Scientific Monthly*, vol. 38, p. 157, Feb., 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

"working class man" is a part of a culture complex. His place in the economic struggle gives him common interests with others of low income and with others who work in factories and are dependent upon wages paid by the boss. If they are conscious of these common interests and do something about it, such as supporting each other's strikes, they show signs of becoming "class conscious." And if those who make investments and those who manage industry think that they have a common interest which prompts them to form employers' associations to fight the rise of unionism, or lobby committees to defeat "social legislation," they, too, are to some extent class conscious. The lines are never sharply drawn, because even if employers have some interests in common they also have reason to compete with one another, and there are likewise divisive forces among those of low income.

Furthermore, alignments are not always horizontal, but are sometimes vertical; that is, occasionally a bloc of workers and employers, instead of being enemies, may join in a common cause against other workers and employers. In the construction industry, for example, organized workers and employers frequently constitute a "class" as against the real estate and investment groups. Another vertical alignment occurs in time of war, when the workers and employers of one nation fight against similar groups of another nation. Many efforts have been made to unite the workers of the world in a loyalty to class interest regardless of nationality, but thus far class has become subservient to nation when war was involved. These exceptions show that one cannot naively say that workers and employers inevitably constitute separate classes which are conscious of distinctive interests. On the other hand, that such groupings do on occasion appear to exist cannot be denied.

After approaching the problem with this caution, we can conclude that the term "social class" has utility in describing *the complex of ideas, sentiments, common interests, and similar traditions which differentiate the behavior of some persons in economic competition from that of others*. Here we are following the example set by Marx and Engels in thinking that the fundamental differentia of social classes are economic factors.¹⁸ This much can be agreed

¹⁸ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (with an introduction and explanatory notes by D. Ryazanoff), International Publishers, New York, 1930.

to in their theory without going the whole way in believing that class struggle is inevitable in an industrial civilization. Nor are we precluded from supplementing the economic factor with others of sociological significance. Like a nation, a class must be viewed as a functional arrangement combining a number of factors, some of which are absent in one instance and present in another. Thinking of class from this broad point of view, Morris Ginsberg put down those characteristics which often appear in such a social grouping:

Classes in modern societies may be described as groups of individuals who, through common descent, similarity of occupation, wealth and education, have come to have a similar mode of life, a similar stock of ideas, feelings, attitudes and forms of behavior and who, on any or all of these grounds, meet one another on equal terms and regard themselves, although with varying degrees of explicitness, as belonging to one group.¹⁹

He then explains how this complex of attitudes may still be thought of as related to basic economic factors:

The primary determinants of social stratification are without doubt largely economic in character. Economic conditions determine an individual's occupation, and this in turn is generally a fair index of his mode of life and educational attainments, from which again may usually be inferred the sort of people whom he would meet on equal terms, the range of individuals from among whom he would normally choose his partner in marriage and so forth.²⁰

Social classes in the United States. In a country like the United States, where the social classes have never been thoroughly stratified, there is movement from one level to another. The farmer boy may still dream of becoming President even though statistics based on *Who's Who* give the sons of the prominent the best chances of succeeding their fathers. The expectation of advancement from low to high status has resulted in a kind

¹⁹ From Morris Ginsberg, "Class Consciousness," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, p. 536. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 537. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

of vertical mobility, rather than in the development of horizontal classes, but this condition may not always prevail.

An incisive analysis of why class consciousness has been slow to develop in this country was made by Royal Montgomery in connection with his study of the American labor movement. He explains the lack of class consciousness of the American workers on the basis of the following factors:

Our vast expanse of free land, combined with public policy of making private ownership easily available to him who would undergo the hardships of pioneering, inevitably engendered a tendency on the part of the workers to identify themselves in interest and outlook with the propertied classes. It made, moreover, for a fluidity of social classes, for less consciousness of permanency of status. The economically oppressed envisaged as the way out not concerted action on the part of the whole proletariat, but rather the prevention of those monopolistic tendencies which would result in the solidification of class lines. In brief, we have had in this country, both in group interpretation and in fact, less of a settled laboring population than has England or Germany.

Other factors, some of them closely related to the one just mentioned, have inhibited the development of class consciousness among American workers. The mixture of races and nationalities, the transplanting of old-world traits and antagonisms, has prevented individual viewpoints from becoming crystallized into group attitudes. The early gift of the ballot and the fact that participation in political life has not been reserved for the upper classes have had inevitable effect in retarding the development of class consciousness, while the discouragement to independent party action on the political front, inherent in our governmental system, has minimized the importance of one field of action where the common character of the problem of all labor might be brought into clearer relief.²¹

Class struggle. In countries where such factors have been present to a less degree, there has arisen from time to time a type of group action which seemed to indicate the presence of social classes. The class has taken the form of a loose federation of groups which act together as though they had similar economic interests.

²¹ From an unpublished treatise on labor by Harry A. Mills and Royal E. Montgomery.

Following the World War there was for a time a strong movement toward socialism in Germany. It was supported by a great many labor unions and other workers' organizations which, although they had differences among themselves, united as a class in this one common struggle for a social democracy. They were opposed to the land-owning Junkers, on the one hand, and to the wealthy industrialists on the other. If, in referring to such group action as *class conflict* or a *class struggle* we remember that class cannot be defined as a closely knit, neatly defined group, but rather as a loose type of association of persons and groups as previously stated, then the use of these terms will be meaningful.

The common theory of class struggle may be summarized in its briefest outline somewhat as follows: Since the rise of capitalism in the Western world the interests of the working class have been antithetical to the interests of the class which owned the machines of production. In order to increase their profits the owners attempt to maintain low labor costs. Those who work for wages must therefore organize to protect themselves. This condition results in a struggle for power which is interrupted only by temporary agreements, or by the domination of one class by another. When the latter occurs, the class struggle is replaced by a sort of caste society, which may be only a temporary condition preceding another conflict. If the proletariat becomes sufficiently powerful to overthrow the form of government which protects capitalism, it will attempt to set up a classless state in which economic interests are no longer the determinants of governmental policy but are subservient to the social ideals of the state. Such a sequence is strongly reminiscent of the Marxian philosophy. Many writers are skeptical of its truth, or state the principle in modified terms; others still look to Marx as their prophet. Lewis L. Lorwin expresses his reservations about the theory of class struggle and class conflict when he says:

In modern society the struggle of economic and social groups is fragmentary and intermittent, concentrated around issues of immediate and perhaps only temporary importance.²²

²² From Lewis L. Lorwin, "Class Struggle," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 3, p. 541. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

He refers to the greater prevalence of national loyalties as one explanation for the absence of strong class consciousness:

Nationalism, as both an economic and a cultural phenomenon, tends to offset the formation of classes.²³

And the same author concludes:

The most that can be said is that there is a tendency toward the formation of economic and social groups and that their stratification and stability vary from one society to another in accordance with general economic and social conditions.²⁴

If we should desire a conclusion more inclusive than this conservative statement by Lorwin a prolonged excursion would be required into the fields of economic history and theory. For the present, our inquiry need go no further than the observation that when social classes do exist their members act as though they had common economic and other social interests. They support at least in sentiment the struggles of any sub-group within their class, such as a labor union or an employers' association. They condition their children in the belief that some day their class will fight its way by ballot or revolution to a position of economic control and high social status. And, likewise, those who are now in power, to the extent that they are class conscious, teach their children that their superior status is the result of superior ability and that the welfare of society requires that they prevent the "lower classes" from usurping this power and position. If the demands of the masses become too insistent the "upper classes" make concessions, usually moderate but sometimes drastic, in order to maintain their position and forestall revolutionary change.

Social class and social caste. The behavior of a social class is in some ways analogous to that of a nationality, because it, too, is worried about questions of status. If it has power it is fearful of losing it. If it occupies a low position it wants to climb higher. A time comes, however, when classes, like nationalities, cease overt conflict. As a nationality accepts a given status and begins cooper-

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 541. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

ating with others instead of fighting them, we no longer call it a nationality, but a nation. When a class similarly accepts a position which is accorded it and abandons the struggle for a higher place, it, too, acquires another name—*social caste*. A caste society is one in which the social classes stay in their places. Those of high estate and those of low estate, the masters and the slaves, gradually become accommodated to each other. Not until the spirit of revolt again arises, and the lowly ones strike against their lords, is the caste society replaced by the conflict of classes.

Under the Czarist regime, the serfs of Russia were a social caste. Under the Soviets the proletariat became a social class, fighting the last remnants of an aristocratic and bourgeois society. For centuries the caste system has prevailed in India. It was so rigid that persons born into one caste had no opportunity of participating in the economic, religious, or social activities of another. Not until the coming of Mahatma Gandhi was that system seriously challenged, and if his challenge comes to be expressed strongly enough in organized form, conflict may be expected. But there are two alternatives. Those in high position may so strengthen their power that revolt is quickly suppressed. Or, the "superior" castes may voluntarily lower the bars of separation, admitting "qualified persons" from the ranks below. This is logically a possibility, but sociologically improbable. Only the genius of a Gandhi could cause Brahmans and "Untouchables" to dine voluntarily at the same table, and that was an exceptional accomplishment in his career. It is more probable that when castes become ambitious for a change of status, class conflict will result.

We have now concluded our introduction to social classes and castes, to nations and nationalities, and to races and "race conscious groups." In giving attention to these types and to the earlier forms—crowds, publics, social movements, and the like—we did not mean to imply that the family, the church, and special interest groups are not also important. They will be duly considered, not as isolated groups to be inspected individually, but as integral parts of a social organization. Into this context of social relations will also be placed these groups which because of special complexities required the preliminary study given them in the past three chapters. From this point onward, our attention will be centered upon the changing, dynamic interrelationships of group

life, we shall think in terms of social organization and social processes. Since the local community is the natural habitat of modern man as a social being, its analysis will come first, and will then serve as a point of departure for a description of his other relationships.

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PART IV

COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Chapter 15

THE COMMUNITY AS AN ECOLOGICAL AREA

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF A GOLD MINING TOWN¹

ABOUT TWENTY-FIVE years ago an Indian guide, finding that the party of Americans by whom he was engaged were looking for lumps of bright quartz, showed them some he had picked up in his hunting. Greatly excited, they offered him extra pay if he would quickly show them where he had found it. The guide led them to the spot on the side of the mountain where was soon to spring up the town called Fairmont after the leader of the party. . . . Within a year Fairmont had a main street leveled along the side of the mountain and made to look like an ordinary city street, paid for by the voluntary contributions of merchants, gamblers, and saloon proprietors. . . .

The streets were thronged with a cosmopolitan crowd eager to make their fortunes quickly. . . . Some mining companies sent their own qualified diamond drillers to prospect, others bought up prospects of individual men who wished to sell, so that within a few months after the rush started several American and English companies were on the ground, thousands of dollars' worth of expensive machinery was being installed, and hundreds of men employed as miners. . . . Miners of many nationalities were in the first rush from the United States. . . . Experienced miners from Sweden, Norway, Italy and other European countries were added to the English, American, and French Canadians already there. Each nationality built its own little colony,—the Italians in the eastern part of town, the French Canadians in the western, the Norwegians and Swedes in the northern side. In a little over a year Fairmont was incorporated, and began to elect City Fathers, build roads, and install

¹ The following description of "Fairmont" has been adapted by permission of the publishers from Jesse F. Steiner, *The American Community in Action*, pp. 90-106, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1928.

electric lights and a water system. It had probably three or four thousand people. . . .

This period of rush and prospecting was, of course, highly disorganized.

The American Federation of Labor was one of the few unifying forces in the community. New arrivals who expected to work in the mines were advised to "join up" with the union,

. . . and so, though the national groups were antagonistic in everything else, they were keenly conscious of their unity in this respect. . . . And as the town settled down to more normal life [the union] became the most powerful force in this new mining community. Another unifying factor was Father John. This gifted, scholarly Anglican clergyman with his university degrees made his appearance in the town during the first months of the rush, and went about quietly doing good. No one in distress appealed to him in vain. . . . Father John, as he was affectionately called, was respected and loved by every rough miner in that camp. . . .

Later on,

The various national groups, as they grew in size, raised money and built small community halls which they used for religious services, dances, or for any other purposes. Gradually other churches and a Salvation Army Hall followed.

After two or three years the wildest rush of the boom was over, and it began to look as though Fairmont was going to become a permanent mining town of some four or five thousand people. Gradually more and more mine officials and miners began bringing their wives and establishing homes. . . . With this growth as a "married men's mining town," the various national and economic groups settled down into social circles. And since this was a heterogeneous town dominated by the English with their insistence on social status, there developed different social circles of varying gradations and most of them mutually exclusive.

About 1911 some of the mine owners began to realize that the grade of ore was too low to make the mining and smelting a paying investment. A number of the smaller mines closed down and their employees moved on to other places. The following year one of the

three largest mining companies that had invested too heavily in expensive machinery, went into bankruptcy and threw hundreds of men out of employment. This mine was closed for a year and then sold to another company which conducted it with a much reduced force.

The remaining miners, still over a thousand strong, became increasingly discontented with their situation and finally struck for more pay and shorter hours. The few who did not join the strike were persecuted and their children scorned and called "scabs" at school. The company officials brought in a trainload of Missourians as strike breakers, but they were so pelted with sticks and stones as they returned to their box cars after their first shift that they refused the next day to go back to work. The merchants were compelled to give credit to the strikers lest they incur their ill-will, and this method of doing business forced a number of stores to the wall. During the tempestuous year of the strike, many merchants and miners left town, thus decreasing still further its constantly dwindling population. Finally a new mine manager was sent to Fairmont, a man of strong personality and ability, who renewed negotiations with officials of the Miners' Union and brought about a settlement of the strike. But the town never recovered from that disastrous year.

Fairmont's complete history is as colorful as a personal biography. Its over-night founding and rapid rise to fame, its varied population, its boom period, and its depression are dramatic incidents in the life story of a community. The career of a gold mining town is fascinating because of the extremes in population and in economic fortune. But similar interest may be discovered in the study of any locality—even one's own community. Most people take for granted the place where they live, little aware of the underlying reasons for its growth or decline, for the kind of work its people perform, and for its distinctive traditions. To the sociologist these are important matters which cannot be taken for granted, because, as he soon learns in the study of society, the community, like the family, is a fundamental unit, a knowledge of which contributes to an understanding of many other social groupings.

A person is born into a community in somewhat the same manner as he is born into the social relationships of a family. His mode of dress, his manner of speech, his attitudes toward out-

siders, his vocational ambitions, his religion, his method of having a good time are in a degree patterned after the culture in his immediate environment. In chapters 8 and 9 we saw from the viewpoint of the individual how these conditioning processes operate. The present chapter and the one to follow will also contribute to an understanding of personality and social behavior, but the method of approach is reversed. Instead of beginning with the mechanisms of the individual, we shall begin with the community and its social organizations. These constitute the "ready-made" world into which the individual is born.

The community is a distinctive concept in that it has both a geographical and a sociological connotation, but it shares that distinction with another term important in our study, the neighborhood. The community and the neighborhood together form the locale for a great portion of all social behavior.

COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD DEFINED

The community is a local area (this is its geographical aspect), and the community is an association of persons and groups who live together and influence each other (this is its social or cultural aspect). Unless the two are combined, a community does not exist. If people happen to live in the same territory but have nothing to do with one another, the term "community" does not apply, for they would then constitute only a "locality group." And, on the other hand, if people have a common interest but live in different localities, they do not constitute a community, but rather a special interest group.

An area becomes a community only through the common experiences of the people who live in it, resulting in their becoming a cultural group, with traditions, sentiments and attitudes, and memories in common—a focus of belief, feeling, and action. A community, then, is a local area over which people are using the same language, conforming to the same mores, feeling more or less the same sentiments, and acting upon the same attitudes.²

² Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, pp. 222, 223, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

But since this definition applies almost equally to the neighborhood, a further comparison is necessary to clarify the two terms. The neighborhood, like the community, is both a geographical and a social unit. It is an *area* with a distinctive *culture*. The difference between the two rests upon the related factors of size, type of social contact, and degree of organization. The neighborhood is a small grouping, where the relationships are intimate, and the organization, that is, the institutionalized activity, is at a minimum. On the other hand,

. . . the community is a larger and less intimate unit of organization . . . and differs from the neighborhood in that it makes use of more formal organization and of indirect or long-distance communication instead of the face-to-face sort. The neighborhood is that group in which no introductions are needed.³

Cooley considered the neighborhood a primary group like the family for the reason that direct, personal contacts characterize its interaction.⁴ Neighbors call each other by their first names, exchange bits of gossip, and aid one another in daily living as well as in times of crisis. Contacts in the larger area, the community, tend to be more formal, secondary, in nature. In the following comparison written by M. Wesley Roper this point is mentioned, and also the element of relative complexity and organization.

The neighborhood . . . is usually thought of as a more informal group of families living in proximity, the members of which are intimately acquainted with one another. The neighborhood sometimes grows up around one institution, a church or a school, and furnishes at most only two or three services. On the other hand, the community is often more formally organized, supplies all of the needs of the local inhabitants and is a constellation of all the institutions that function for a group's welfare. The community may be composed of the neighborhoods as interdependent units, just as we have

³ Walter A. Terpenning, *Village and Open-Country Neighborhoods*, p. xi, The Century Company, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴ Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, chap. 3, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1923.

found, in the city, that the communities are the interdependent units of the larger community, the city.⁵

Both the neighborhood and the community are *natural areas* in that they are not the result of planned effort, or legislation,⁶ but have developed in response to certain rather definite geographic, economic, and social factors. A natural social area, as was apparent in our introductory definition of a community, has two characteristics—geographical and social: it has a *physical individuality*, and it has a *distinctive culture*. This is true whether one is talking about a small neighborhood in the open country, an agricultural village, an urban community, or a region. If it holds together culturally, that is, if the people who reside there have some common customs, standards, traditions, and interests which are related to the fact of common residence, it is a *social area*. In his novel, *Main Street*,⁷ Sinclair Lewis described such an area, "Gopher Prairie," a farming community in Minnesota. When Carol Milford married Dr. Kennicott and moved from Minneapolis to "Gopher Prairie" she found the social attitudes and interests of the people surprisingly different from those of her own community, and the townspeople were equally surprised at her strange notions of how things should be done. They especially resented her attempts to reform them according to her "big city ideas." The book and its characters are fictional but it illustrates by the sharp contrasts so typical of its author, the relation between the place where people live and the social life that develops there.

When one stops to consider this relationship, a number of important questions require an answer: How did there happen to

⁵ M. Wesley Roper, *The City and the Primary Group*, p. 40. Private edition distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, Chicago, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the author. For further discussion of the contrast between communities and neighborhoods see: Roy H. Holmes, *Rural Sociology*, p. 230, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1932; B. A. McClenahan, *Organizing the Community*, p. 7, The Century Company, New York, 1925; and James M. Williams, *Our Rural Heritage*, p. 23, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1925.

⁶ Conscious control of community development has begun to appear in recent years in the form of community councils, planning commissions, and zoning ordinances. Cf. Thomas Adams, *Outline of Town and City Planning*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1935; and Russell Van Nest Black, *Planning for the Small American City*, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1933.

⁷ Sinclair Lewis, *Main Street*, Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, New York, 1920.

be a town of "Gopher Prairie" in the first place? What types of people moved there, and why? Why did this community remain small in size while Minneapolis and St. Paul, not far away, had become metropolitan areas? What differences in the social institutions and the culture of Minneapolis and "Gopher Prairie" could be attributed to the differences in their size, in the functions they performed, and in the types of people who moved there? A special field of investigation has arisen to deal with these problems—*human ecology*, the study of the distributive aspects of human relationships. The ecologist is concerned with why people are located where they are at a particular time, and what effect that location, in both *time* and *space*, has upon their social behavior. Robert E. Park was a pioneer in showing the importance of human ecology for the sociologist, and Ernest W. Burgess early stressed its value in the study of communities. The remainder of the present chapter will be devoted to the application of such an approach to an understanding of the community and related social areas.

THE ECOLOGICAL SETTING

Steiner's introduction to the case study of Fairmont suggests the factors to look for in approaching a community from the ecological point of view.


In the rise and development of communities, the fundamental importance of ecological factors is apparent. The topography of the place, means of transportation, types of industry, and the entire economic situation, place their stamp upon the structure of the community, determine the quality of its population, and fix the limits of its future growth.⁸

When Steiner traced the development of Fairmont with these points in mind he was able to understand the vicissitudes which beset the fortunes of a mining community.

From one point of view the rise and decline of Fairmont may be regarded as essentially an economic problem. As a single industry town located apart from the well-established population centers, its fortunes depended on the mines which originally determined its

⁸ Steiner, *op. cit.*, p. 89. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

location. Its rapid development during its early years grew out of a misapprehension of the quality and quantity of its gold-bearing ore. The wild rush for sudden wealth and the accompanying excitement of the people prevented a calm appraisal of the town's possibili-



From W. A. Anderson, *Population Trends in New York State, 1900-1930*, p. 16, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Ithaca, N. Y., bulletin 547, Dec., 1932

FIG. 1. CHIEF TOPOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF NEW YORK STATE, SHOWING THE GREAT L VALLEY SYSTEM AND THE MOUNTAIN REGION


The Great L Valley and the St. Lawrence offshoots form the most favorable economic areas of the state, and in these regions the population tends to concentrate. This map was drawn from Plate III, page 20, Report of the Commission of Housing and Regional Planning to Governor Alfred E. Smith, May 7, 1926.

ties on the basis of its potential resources. As long as the mines could be operated profitably, the town prospered; when the mines closed down, the town could no longer continue.⁹

The ecology of many communities is more complex than that of Fairmont. An understanding of it requires a knowledge of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 90. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

the geography and economics of the entire region. A village in the fertile corn lands of Iowa is influenced in its growth by agricultural conditions throughout that area, and by the still broader factor of the supply of grain in the world market. Its economic and social future will differ from that of the fishing village, the



From W. A. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 25

FIG. 2. DENSITY OF FARM POPULATION BY COUNTIES, 1930

trade center, and the manufacturing city. We need now to study more specifically just what the relationships are between ecological processes and community life. First, what determines the concentration of a population which makes the formation of communities possible? After dealing with this question, we shall examine the ecological forces at work in re-distributing our own population, which now lives in quite different sizes and types of communities than those of a century ago.

Population concentration. No matter what community one is considering, it cannot be thought of as an isolated unit, but rather as an interrelated part of a larger area. An ecological map is a simple device for visualizing the character of the area. Such a map, or series of maps, should show the outstanding topograph-

ical features, transportation lines, climatic conditions, soil fertility, and the location of natural resources. It is obvious that people tend to congregate where climate is favorable for human life and agricultural production, where soil is fertile, power accessible, other resources near at hand, and where access can be had to other communities. These are simple truths which are learned in any course in human geography. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate their application. New York State's topographical features of hills, valleys, and lakes pictured in figure 1 cause one to expect a concentration of farm population in the "Great L" valley and in the lowlands bordering on the Great Lakes, and figure 2 substantiates this prediction.

In his study of population concentration, the human ecologist soon discovers that in addition to the geographical there are other determinants of where people live and how they make a living. Of great importance in modern times are improvements in the techniques of exploiting nature, and changes in economic organization. When steam power was substituted for man power (the technological change), the factory system of production developed (a new form of economic organization), with a consequent shift in population from rural to urban communities (the social result). Every widely adopted technological improvement—the steam engine, electric power, the gasoline engine, steel construction, etc.—has had its effect upon the location and organization of human communities.

The combined effects of environmental, technological, and economic factors on population movement are illustrated in a study of South Dakota communities made by Paul H. Landis. He found that the increase in number of trade centers in that state occurred during a period of abundant rainfall, of railroad expansion, and of general economic prosperity and land speculation. The decline following this boom period came during years when farm prices were low, when production was greatly reduced by drought, and when a general change from horse to motor transportation eliminated the need for many of the smallest trade centers.¹⁰

The growth of cities. The social results of changes in technology and economic organization are clearly manifest in the

¹⁰ Paul H. Landis, *The Growth and Decline of South Dakota Trade Centers*, pp. 34, 35, Department of Rural Sociology, South Dakota State College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, Brookings, South Dakota, Apr., 1933.

growth of cities, especially during the past century. "Fully one half of the people of this country now live within an hour's journey of a city of 100,000 or more."¹¹

As high a proportion of the total population of the nation is now living in places of 25,000 and over as was found in places of 2,500 and over in 1900; and almost as high a percentage of the population is recorded at present in places of 50,000 or more as was recorded in places of 2,500 and over in 1890.¹²

The 1920 United States Census reported that, for the first time in our history, urban dwellers (those living in towns of 2,500 or more) were in the majority. Similarly in 1920, agriculture as an occupation had lost first place to manufacturing and mechanical industries, and by 1930 there was a still greater trend in this direction.¹³ The change in urban population during the past forty years is given in the following table:

TABLE VII

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 1880-1930¹⁴

Class	1930	1920	1910	1900	1890	1880
Total, Number	122,775,046	105,710,620	91,972,266	75,994,575	62,947,714	50,155,783
Urban	68,954,823	54,304,603	42,166,120	30,380,433	22,298,359	14,358,167
Rural	53,820,223	51,406,017	49,806,146	45,614,142	40,649,355	35,797,616
Total, Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Urban	56.2	51.4	45.8	40.0	35.4	28.6
Rural	43.8	48.6	54.2	60.0	64.6	71.4

¹¹ R. D. McKenzie, "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. I, p. 492; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933.

¹² From *The Metropolitan Community*, pp. 27, 28, by R. D. McKenzie, one of a series of monographs prepared under the direction of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933.

¹³ For details of this trend, see *Fifteenth Census of the United States*, 1930, "Population," vol. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Table VIII shows that the larger urban centers have especially benefited by the trend in population movement from rural to urban communities.

TABLE VIII
PER CENT OF TOTAL U. S. POPULATION, URBAN AND RURAL:
1890-1930¹⁵

	1930	1920	1910	1900	1890
United States:	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Urban territory:	56.2	51.4	45.8	40.0	35.4
Places of 1,000,000 or more	12.3	9.6	9.2	8.5	5.8
Places of 500,000 to 1,000,000	4.7	5.9	3.3	2.2	1.3
Places of 250,000 to 500,000	6.5	4.3	4.3	3.8	3.9
Places of 100,000 to 250,000	6.1	6.2	5.3	4.3	4.4
Places of 50,000 to 100,000	5.3	5.0	4.5	3.6	3.2
Places of 25,000 to 50,000	5.2	4.8	4.4	3.7	3.6
Places of 10,000 to 25,000	7.4	6.6	6.0	5.7	5.4
Places of 5,000 to 10,000	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.2	3.8
Places of 2,500 to 5,000	3.8	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0
Rural territory:	43.8	48.6	54.2	60.0	64.0
Incorporated places of 1,000 to 2,500	3.9	8.5	8.9	8.3	7.5
Incorporated places under 1,000	3.6				
Other rural territory	36.4	40.2	45.3	51.7	57.0

In one state, North Carolina, the towns and cities "gained approximately 244,895 people by migration between 1920 and 1930. This is almost exactly the same number which the farms of the state lost during the same period."¹⁶

The population changes of rural and urban areas in the United States are summarized by J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner in the following statement:

The seeming economic and social advantages of the city, expanding urban industries and the mechanization of agriculture, coupled with agricultural depression, swept approximately 15 millions of the farm population cityward in one decade, a number equal to more than

¹⁵ *Abstract of the Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930*, p. 14, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1933.

¹⁶ C. Horace Hamilton, *Rural-Urban Migration in North Carolina*, p. 43, Agricultural Experiment Station of the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and Engineering, and North Carolina Department of Agriculture, co-operating, Raleigh, North Carolina, bulletin no. 295, Feb., 1934.

two-fifths of those on the farms in 1920. This trend was only partly offset up to 1929 by the counter-movement of some 10 millions from the cities to the farms. The decade was thus characterized by a rapid turnover in farm population, an amazing mobility. Migration from rural to urban America is, of course, no new thing. It is estimated that at least half of the rural-born children went cityward in the half century prior to 1920, but in the decade recently closed the migration was far more one of families and less one of individuals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that rural America still has more than one-half of the children of the nation, a fact of major importance to education and to the city.¹⁷

These facts growing out of changes in our economic life provide an indispensable background for the study of either rural or urban communities. The declining community and the expanding community are both to be understood in terms of a general movement, as well as in terms of local factors.

The regional community. Not only are there interesting trends in rural-urban migration, but there is evidence of a new type of population distribution, the regional community. The advent of motor transportation has been a salient factor in the rise of a regional concentration. As R. D. McKenzie conceives it, a region contains a number of nuclei of population. "Independent towns and villages and also rural territory have become part of this enlarged city complex."¹⁸ Formerly, when cities were dependent upon railroad transportation, there was a dense concentration near the convergence of railway lines and at points where shipments by rail were transferred to water. With the coming of automobiles and motor trucks "the large center has been able to extend the radius of its influence; its population and many of its institutions, freed from the dominance of rail transportation, have become widely distributed throughout surrounding territory."¹⁹

¹⁷ J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner, "Rural Life." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. I, p. 502; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹⁸ From *The Metropolitan Community*, p. 6, by R. D. McKenzie, one of a series of monographs prepared under the direction of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Nor is this new type of metropolitan community confined to the great cities. It has become the communal unit of local relations throughout the entire nation. Its development has induced a vast amount of rearrangement of populations and institutions, a process which is still far from having attained an equilibrium.²⁰

In its study of concentrated areas which have one or more cities as nuclei, the United States census arrived at the following conclusions:

Ninety-six metropolitan districts have been established, each having an aggregate population of 100,000 or more and containing one or more central cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants. . . .

While the aggregate area of the metropolitan districts is only 1.2 per cent of the total land area of the United States, the population of these districts is nearly 45 per cent of the total population of the United States.²¹

The exact location and relative size of these districts can be studied in the maps of the Fifteenth Census.²²

This trend may radically change the old dichotomy of rural-urban communities. Instead of compactly integrated cities sharply differentiated economically and culturally from the surrounding area, the new pattern would be a regional community composed of interdependent units of settlement.²³ So conceived, the regional community “. . . comprises a cluster or constellation of centers. Smaller cities and towns tend to group themselves around larger ones somewhat as planets group themselves around a sun.”²⁴ Such a change, if the trend continues, may be expected to exert pressure at many points in our social organization. Already local economic concerns face severe competition with chains of factories and

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. In 1925 Harlan P. Douglass observed changes in rural-urban population and economic rearrangements similar to those reported by McKenzie. *The Suburban Trend*, The Century Company, New York, 1925, describes both residential and industrial regions extending out from cities into what had formerly been considered rural areas.

²¹ *The Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930*, “Population,” vol. 2, p. 16.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²³ R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community*, p. 69.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

stores, many of which are organized on a regional basis. In the field of government, the local autonomy which was inherited from the days when horse and buggy transportation defined the size of the political unit, may be replaced, if certain reformers have their way, by a regional administration organized along functional lines. And in social welfare work there is a trend toward the integration of local agencies under an area program. Stepping over local political boundaries to organize economic and social interests in larger functional units is the objective of numerous regional planning commissions.²⁵

Regional planning in contrast to metropolitan planning is concerned with the technique of community integration in its relation to a family of communities which may share in the natural geographic advantages of a self-contained region of which the individual community is a part.²⁶

The most ambitious attempt to achieve such an integration is seen in the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency which was established not only to provide the Tennessee River Basin with a plan for power development and erosion control, but also to work out an inclusive industrial plan for the region and to deal with problems of housing, as well as other social needs.²⁷ These and similar innovations in economic and social organization may be retarded by other forces, but if and when they come, they cannot be understood apart from their background of ecological conditions.

Changes in the small community. We have spoken of an increase in urban population and the emergence of regional communities as important trends. What, then, is to be said of the smaller communities which for decades held the dominant position

²⁵ Illustrations of such inclusive cooperation are: Port of New York Authority Plan, Niagara Falls International Plan, Philadelphia Tri-State Metropolitan Plan, and the Tennessee Valley Authority Plan. In March, 1937, Senator George Norris advocated before Congress the establishment of regional power and flood control authorities for the entire United States.

²⁶ Carol Aronovici, "Let the Cities Perish," *The Survey*, vol. 68, p. 439, Oct. 1, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publishers.

²⁷ For a statement of the economic and social objectives of the Tennessee Valley Authority see A. E. Morgan, "Bench-Marks in the Tennessee Valley," *Survey Graphic*, vol. 23, pp. 4-10, 105-110, 233-237, 548-552; Jan., Mar., May, Nov., 1934.

in American life?²⁸ Extremists have pronounced the death sentence over the rural community in the belief that it is facing complete decadence. This prediction is not, however, borne out by such scientific research as the recent studies of Brunner and Kolb. In *Rural Social Trends*²⁹ these authors summarized surveys made of 140 agricultural village communities and 26 counties in 1930, and compared the results with earlier investigations of the same areas. They also made an exhaustive analysis of census materials for 1920 and 1930 dealing with small communities. The results of this research are summarized by the authors in the following paragraph:

An examination of the evidence for the 8,900 villages of all types and also for the sample of agricultural villages, therefore, gives no support to the theory that the American villages as a class are a disappearing or declining population type. That is not to say that some villages with their communities do not decline or even disappear. But the evidence indicates that hundreds of villages grow and that thousands hold their own in the general growth of the total population. . . .³⁰

The small community may not be disappearing, but it is undergoing important changes. One noteworthy trend is the steady increase of people living in rural areas who have nothing directly to do with farming. In the nearly 19,000 villages of from 250 to 2,500 population which the United States census listed as rural there is such an increase in persons living in villages who have no connection with farming, many of whom are employed in nearby cities, that the authors think the non-farming, rural dweller may by 1940 or 1950 equal the farming population in rural areas.³¹ This prediction is in line with the earlier observation that rural

²⁸ A world wide analysis of "Rural-Urban Migrations" appears in *A Source Book in Rural Sociology*, edited by Pitirim Sorokin, Carle C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, vol. 3, pp. 458-627, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1932.

²⁹ McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933.

³⁰ From *Rural Social Trends*, p. 85, by Edmund de S. Brunner and J. H. Kolb, one of a series of monographs prepared under the direction of the President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. See also C. Luther Fry, *American Villagers*, p. 24, George H. Doran Company, New York, 1926.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17. See also Fry, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

areas are being invaded for industrial purposes and as places of residence for those engaged in industry and business. This invasion is naturally more pronounced in rural areas located within the orbit of metropolitan centers.

In the more remote regions, where city or factory influence is not remaking the rural community, there are other factors at work. The automobile and motor truck have freed the farmer from dependence upon the nearby trade centers. This was found to be the case in South Dakota where "the mortality of small centers has been and probably will be much greater than of large trade centers."³² In central New York state, Sanderson found more vitality among the larger communities which had a sufficient basis of wealth and population to support community organizations. Although he carefully avoided any absolute generalization, Sanderson mentioned reasons why the larger centers might in many cases be expected to grow at the expense of the smaller village. Principal among these reasons were the ease of transportation afforded by the automobile and truck, and the wider variety of services available in the larger communities.³³ Brunner and Kolb were similarly cautious in their conclusions, but found reason also to suppose that in general a "larger and more modern rural community is emerging, consisting of the village or town as its center and the open-country as its tributary territory."³⁴ In their closing chapter the authors make clear the point of view that

. . . although profound changes have taken place, rural America has not been engulfed in an urban civilization. It has remained distinct and self-conscious, if the results set forth in previous chapters are in any measure a picture of the situation. Rural America in 1929-1930 was revealed as adjusting itself to the new forces let loose in the world rather than as succumbing to them.³⁵

³² Landis, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

³³ Dwight Sanderson, *Rural Social and Economic Areas in Central New York*, pp. 95-97, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, bulletin 614, Ithaca, New York, June, 1934.

³⁴ *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, vol. I, p. 520.

³⁵ From *Rural Social Trends*, pp. 299, 300, by Edmund de S. Brunner and J. H. Kolb, one of a series of monographs prepared under the direction of the President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends; by permission of the publishers. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

ECOLOGICAL TYPES

Anything as complex as a community could be classified according to scores of different criteria. In selecting the ecological type as a basis of classification, McKenzie is not unmindful of the other approaches, but is merely emphasizing what seems to him to be one of the more important. He explains, in terms similar to those we have already used, which ecological factors play a determining role in the development of a community.

The size and stability of the human community is . . . a function of the food supply and of the rôle played in the wider ecological process of production and distribution of commodities. When man makes his living from hunting or fishing, the community is small and of but temporary duration; when agriculture becomes the chief source of sustenance, the community is still small but assumes a more permanent character; when trade and commerce develop, larger communities arise at points of break in conveyance, that is, at the mouths of rivers, junctions of streams, at waterfalls, and shallows where streams are forded. As new forms of transportation arise, new points of concentration occur and old points become accentuated or reduced. Again, as goods for trade are made in communities, still other points of concentration come into existence, determined largely by sources of power and raw material.³⁶

With these different situations in mind, McKenzie presents as a rough classification of communities a four-fold division: (1) the primary service community; (2) the commercial community; (3) the industrial town; and (4) special types without a specific economic base.

The primary service community. From the economic point of view this community serves

. . . as the first step in the distributive process of the outgoing basic commodity and as the last stage in the distributive process of the product finished for consumption.³⁷

³⁶ R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach," in *The City*, by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, pp. 65, 66, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

Translating this definition into simple terms, we may say that a primary service community is one in which raw materials such as farm products, oil, or minerals are first made ready for shipment to the manufacturing centers, and where finished goods, such as threshing machines and factory-made dresses, are delivered to the purchaser through local stores. These relatively simple functions ordinarily do not support a community of more than a few thousand inhabitants. The best illustrations of this type are mining towns, lumbering settlements, fishing towns, and agricultural villages. The classification proceeds from communities which serve a simple function to those whose economic basis is more complex.

The commercial community. This type

. . . collects the basic materials from the surrounding primary communities and distributes them in the wider markets of the world. On the other hand, it redistributes the products coming from other parts of the world to the primary service communities for final consumption. . . . The size of this type of community depends upon the extent of its distributive functions. It may vary from a small wholesale town in the center of an agricultural plain to that of a great port city whose hinterland extends halfway across the continent. Growth depends upon the comparative advantages of the site location.³⁸

Seattle's rise to prominence on the Pacific coast is explained by factors which cause it to be classified as a commercial community. Its location provides a convenient transfer point for shipments to and from both Alaska and the Orient. In the case of some commodities its trade routes cover still greater distances: apples raised in Yakima Valley are shipped by boat from Seattle to many foreign ports, and lumber is sent via the Panama Canal to our eastern seaports. Galesburg, Illinois, is a commercial community of 28,000, situated in a farming area. It serves as a distributing point for manufactured goods consigned to the surrounding communities, and also as a point of assembly for commodities produced in those communities. The Burlington railroad has constructed freight yards in Galesburg for assembling and routing shipments of grain, livestock, and other farm products, as well as for the handling of manufactured goods from outside areas. Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, another type of commercial

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

community, is a distributing center for a section of the anthracite coal region in which several hundred thousand persons reside. Ecologically these three cities may be described as performing important *commercial* functions. Cities of this type vary in size from a "small wholesale town in the center of an agricultural plain" to a "great port city," whose growth has depended upon "the comparative advantages of the site location."³⁹

The industrial town.

[The industrial town] serves as the locus for the manufacturing of commodities. In addition it may combine the functions of the primary service and the commercial types. It may have its local trade area and it may also be the distributing center for the surrounding hinterland. The type is characterized merely by the relative dominance of industry over the other forms of service. There is practically no limit to the size to which an industrial community may develop. Growth is dependent upon the scope and market organization of the particular industries which happen to be located within its boundaries. Industrial communities are of two general types: first, those that have diversified and multiple industries organized on a local sale of products, and, second, those that are dominated by one or two highly developed industries organized on a national- or world-sale of products.⁴⁰

In so far as Hollywood is supported by the cinema industry, it represents the second type just described because of the national and even world-wide market for its products. Chicago illustrates both types, since it has diversified manufacturing for a densely populated local market, and at the same time a number of products which are sold throughout the nation and in the world market.

Special types.

The fourth type of community is one which is lacking in a specific economic base. It draws its economic sustenance from other parts of the world, and may serve no function in the production and distribution of commodities. Such communities are exemplified in our recreational resorts, political and educational centers, communities of defense, penal or charitable colonies. . . . They are much more

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

subject to the vicissitudes of human fancies and decrees than are basic types of human communities. . . .⁴¹

Seldom does a community serve only one economic function. Chicago and New York City may be listed as industrial cities, but they are also important commercial centers. We classified Galesburg, Illinois, as a commercial city, but it also engages in manufacturing, and is a college town. Whether one calls it a college community, a railroad center, or a farm produce market depends upon which function one considers most important. Similar complexity is found in almost any community one might mention. The classification given is useful, therefore, in calling attention to different ecological bases for community development, but cannot be thought of as constituting mutually exclusive categories.

THE INNER STRUCTURE OF A COMMUNITY


Ecology does more than determine the location and type of a community. Its processes operate within community boundaries marking off the areas, setting the pattern of growth, and, in short, building the framework around which social life will move.

The rugged features of a community's framework are its hills, rivers, railroads, and other physical characteristics. The more subtle features are its social areas built around this framework—its business section, "slums," ghettos, and avenues of fashionable homes. These differences in function of sections within a community seem of little consequence, but their importance is all too apparent when later we study the community as a social group. The ecologist prepares the way for such a study by ferreting out the reasons why communities, particularly the larger ones, are so broken up into districts, and what relationship the districts have to one another. In reviewing the ecologist's description of the typical arrangement of areas and the pattern of growth of American communities, we shall begin with the "downtown" business district.

In any community the business section is located at the point of highest mobility, that is, at the convergence of main streets or roads where the largest numbers of prospective customers naturally

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

congregate. In this vicinity are retail stores with their elaborate display windows attracting passers-by, and not far away are hotels, theaters, banks, down-town churches, and similar institutions. Factories and warehouses are usually found along the railroads, rivers, or canals which enter the community. The pre-automobile residential district is near the downtown area, while the newer




From Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," in Park, Burgess, McKensie, *The City*, p. 51, by permission of the University of Chicago Press

FIG. 3. THE GROWTH OF CHICAGO

suburban districts, made possible by the automobile and rapid-transit lines, are at the outskirts. As the business section expands, the residential districts are pushed farther away from the center. Since this transition does not occur suddenly, but extends over a period of years, factories, warehouses, stores, and homes may for a time occupy the same block. Because of the noise and confusion in such a location, and because the houses and apartments are often allowed to remain in a state of disrepair awaiting their

conversion to commercial use, residents who can afford to do so generally move to the newer districts farther away from the center of town. They leave behind them those who cannot pay higher rents or those who because of prejudice are excluded from other areas. This "zone in transition" comes to be known as the "slum," an area physically deteriorated and socially disorganized.



From Park, Burgess, McKenzie, *op cit.*, p. 55, by permission of the University of Chicago Press

FIG. 4. URBAN AREAS IN CHICAGO

In his studies of urban communities, Burgess found that the different social areas often follow a pattern of concentric circles. The inner circle is the commercial zone, which is surrounded by the "zone in transition" (serving a mixture of commercial, industrial, and residential functions); beyond this is a residential area of moderately priced homes, which merges into a higher priced dwelling zone; the outermost circle encompasses the suburban district. This theoretical pattern of growth shown in figure 3 is

based on the principle of the expansion of a community from the center outward equally in all directions. City growth would follow this principle were there not other factors to be reckoned with. Peculiarities of topography, such as Chicago's Lake Michigan which permitted the city to expand in only three directions, zoning ordinances which restrict areas for particular uses, and the street plan, whether it be of the rectangular checkerboard type or of radial design, are all factors that modify the even expansion of a community, and determine the form its inner pattern or structure will take. Figure 4 does not account for all of these special factors in the case of Chicago, but gives one some notion of the arrangement of its different districts. A detailed ecological map of Chicago would show other exceptions to the principle of expansion according to concentric circles.

Without calling special attention to the fact, we have been illustrating a number of ecological processes in our brief analysis of the external relationships and the inner pattern of a community. First we noticed how the process of *concentration* operates to increase the density of population in areas favorable to man's economic welfare. We next discovered that within those areas *centralization* occurs at points of high mobility such as the convergence of highways, or the point of transfer between water and land transportation. Communities come into existence around such points of centralization. We saw that within communities there was a tendency toward *segregation* of functional areas: one area serves as the center of retail selling, and another as a wholesale district or manufacturing center. Another type of segregation takes place when such groups as the recent immigrant and the Negro migrant are *separated* by social prejudice and low economic status into isolated colonies. There are still other specialized areas, particularly within an urban community: rooming house districts, apartment house areas, "hobohemias" where transient men congregate, bright-light districts, exclusive shopping districts, sub-business centers, wealthy residential suburbs, and industrial suburbs. Such a functional division of areas is not maintained permanently. There is a constant transition and overlapping. An area of specialized character may experience an *invasion* from another area. We have noticed how the commercial districts extend into the residential in a rapidly growing community, and there are *invasions* of other types as well. Chicago's South Park Boulevard

district and New York's Harlem have both been invaded by colored people whose earlier locations have become overcrowded. Chicago's "Gold Coast," for years an exclusive residential area, of the single dwelling type for the most part, has been invaded by apartment hotels which enable people of somewhat smaller means to reside on streets of the élite. In turn, many of the old, wealthy families have moved to estates in the suburbs. If an invasion is so complete that an area's function and character completely change, then *succession* has taken place. The operation of these five ecological processes—concentration, centralization (and its counterpart, decentralization), segregation, invasion, and succession—is thus observable in the life history of any large, rapidly growing community.

In this discussion we have illustrated several ramifications of the general principle that physical environment and technological change have much to do with the location and occupation of people. And in turn, where people live and how they earn a living become factors which cast their influence over nearly every social activity in which man participates. The study of ecological areas is a prelude to understanding the culture and social organization of any community.

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Chapter 16

THE COMMUNITY AS A CULTURAL AREA

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN FAIRMONT¹

THE OFFICIALS of the mines and their wives, some twenty or thirty families, lived in beautiful modern homes on the top of Centre Star mountain which was an hour's strenuous climb from the city proper. They enjoyed the highest altitude and the highest social position. . . . The second social group included lawyers, doctors, real estate, and insurance people, about thirty or forty families at first but gradually decreasing in number. Those in this group were occasionally smiled on by the first social circle, especially when their services were needed in putting on a flower show, art exhibition, or other philanthropic effort that required numbers as well as exclusiveness to make it successful. . . .

A third social group, larger than the first and second combined, included the wives of business men, dentists, small manufacturers, clerks, and teachers. There were not such sharp lines of distinction between the second and third social circles as between the two highest groups. . . . The miners and their families which would naturally form the fourth class were as a matter of fact so sharply divided into racial and national groups that social intercourse between them was at a minimum. The men had a common meeting ground in the Union, but the women of one nationality would not associate with those of another. The British and American miners' wives had no use for the snobbish women of the upper social sets and they felt much superior to the women of the non-English speaking nationalities. Among the latter, the Italians held the dominant position because of their numbers and skill as miners. The French Canadians lost caste through their fear of the mines which compelled them to accept jobs

¹ Adapted by permission of the publishers from Jesse F. Steiner, *The American Community in Action*, pp. 97-99, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1928.

on the outside. The Slavonians and Serbians were largely a non-family group who lived in unsanitary quarters and clung tightly to their money so that they could save one thousand dollars as soon as possible and return to their old homes in Europe. While they were Roman Catholics, they had little to do with the church because they did not wish to lessen their savings by contributing to its support. The Scandinavians lived in a small neighborhood of their own on the outskirts of the town where they could keep their cows, pigs, and chickens. . . . In a class entirely to themselves at the very bottom of the social ladder was a small colony of Chinese segregated from the rest of the people. . . .

The groups that were Roman Catholic attended the services of that church, but this common religious interest did not promote social relationships between the different classes. A French Canadian family would live beside an Italian family year after year and still remain as aloof as apartment house dwellers in a large city. Even on the occasion of the Miners' Union Picnic, which was attended by everybody, group lines were rigidly maintained. . . .

Fairmont's significance consists not in the depth of its mine shaft nor in the plan of its streets, but in the social relations and culture of its people. In making the transition from the ecological to the cultural approach, it is important to remember that the two are closely related. The preceding description of the social classes and cleavages in Fairmont is intelligible only against the background of its ecological conditions, which were responsible for the founding of the community in the first place, for the bringing together of such mixed groups in the population, and for the stratification and segregation so prominent in its pattern of organization. Such ecological considerations we shall keep in mind while our attention is turned to the social life of the locality. Burgess, whom we credited with being one of the leaders in ecological studies, recognizes also the importance of the cultural approach to community life when he states:

In the second place, the community may be conceived in terms of the effects of communal life in a given area upon the formation or maintenance of a local culture. Local culture includes those sentiments, forms of conduct, attachments, and ceremonies which are

characteristic of a locality, which have either originated in the area or have become identified with it. This aspect of local life may be called "the cultural community."²

It is typical of human beings residing in the same area that they become aware of common interests and associate for the achievement of those interests. People are not like plants which live side by side, competing for sunlight and nutrition, but sharing in no common life. In a plant community, the competition is free; the struggle for existence is not complicated by social customs and sentiments.³ But the human society is different. One cannot conceive of a purely ecological community in which people are located together because of economic forces, struggle for a favorable living, and have no social contacts. In some respects Fairmont seemed to approach this description, and later we shall find urban communities more impersonal than social, but the general trend toward association is well established.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES

The application of this dual approach to the American scene gives insight into recent trends in community life. The ecological changes described in the previous chapter when thus combined with cultural innovations produce forces which have altered the social organization of the remotest community. As we try to unravel these forces and identify their results, we become ever more convinced of the truth of the conclusion reached by President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends that:

Modern life is everywhere complicated, but especially so in the United States, where immigration from many lands, rapid mobility within the country itself, the lack of established classes or castes to act as a brake on social changes, the tendency to seize upon new types of machines, rich natural resources and vast driving power, have hur-

² Ernest W. Burgess, "Can Neighborhood Work Have a Scientific Basis?" in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, p. 145, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³ The term "ecology" was borrowed by the sociologist from the botanist, who for some time has been familiar with the nature of plant communities.

ried us dizzily away from the days of the frontier into a whirl of modernisms which almost passes belief.⁴

We shall be concerned with the effects of such factors as these upon the organization of American communities. The smallest territorial unit of social organization is not the community proper, but the neighborhood. We shall, therefore, begin with it and proceed to the larger areas. Communities have already been classified according to their ecological functions; at this point the discussion will be more inclusive, touching upon any factors which affect the *social organization of an area*.

Village communities and open-country neighborhoods. The social pattern of American rural neighborhoods can best be described by comparing it with an earlier form of organization once common in Western Europe.⁵ The *village community* may be defined as:

. . . a group of families whose homes are located in a compact village for the common defense and who collectively control the surrounding land, of which some is used in common, and the cultivated land consists of intermixed parcels the sale of which is more or less restricted by the rights of the whole community.⁶

A modification of the old form in European countries is the *modern agricultural village*.⁷ This differs from the village com-

⁴ From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, p. xii; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

⁵ Although the village community was common in Europe, it is incorrect to conclude that other patterns of rural organization did not also exist. Different patterns are described by A. Demangeon in "La géographie de l'habitat rural," *Annales de géographie*, vol. 36, 1927, pp. 1-23, 97-114, which is translated and reprinted in *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, edited by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Carle C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, vol. 1, pp. 266-304, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1930. See also a discussion by the same editors, "Fundamental Types of Rural Aggregates: Evolution of the Forms of Land Ownership and Land Possession," pp. 558-576.

⁶ Dwight Sanderson, *The Rural Community*, p. 432, Ginn and Company, New York, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. Cf. the description of the European and the New England village pattern given by Newell L. Sims in *Elements of Rural Sociology*, revised edition, p. 51, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1934.

⁷ *Ibid.*, chap 11.

munity in that the common ownership of land and the resulting high degree of group solidarity has changed to a system of individual ownership which has been paralleled by voluntary types of association. There still remains, however, the pattern of a group of intimately associated, if not related, families, living in a compact village adjacent to their farms.⁸ They go out from the village in the morning to cultivate the patches of tillable land, and return home to the village at sundown. The similarity of their economic interests, and the frequency of their social contacts in the family, religious, and recreational life of the village, and while at work, produce an intimate association and a characteristic local culture. In a number of European countries this is becoming the primary social unit in many types of recreational, artistic, social, and political organizations. "In Czechoslovakia the Sokol is a strong organization in most of the larger villages and is devoted to recreation in gymnastics, athletics, and drama."⁹

The village community in America. When the early settlers came to America the first of these two patterns, the village community, was still in existence. Because the colonists were familiar with this type of community and also because its compact arrangement of homes afforded protection from Indian raids, it became a common form of rural organization in New England. The farms were often parceled out in long narrow strips radiating from a cluster of homes in the hamlet or village. The intimate relations made possible through a close association of families resulted, as in the old countries, in the emergence of culturally unified village neighborhoods and communities. In the plantation system of the South, a locality group also came into being, but the free associations typical of neighborly relations were inhibited by the caste system of slavery:

Both the social and the economic life were organized about the plantation and carried on as a unit enterprise. It might range in size from six or eight families to more than a hundred. There were the plantation buildings, the commissary, often the school, the large dwelling house, and the coterie of small cottages and cabins. The

⁸ Cf. Dwight Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

planter and his family were, of course, the dominant figures in the group and represented the aristocracy of Southern society.¹⁰

Open-country neighborhoods. In spite of these early trends in New England and the South, the compact residential type of organization was not destined to become the general plan of rural life in America. A new condition arose when pioneering farmers moved westward after the Indian tribes had been subdued, and settled on the fertile prairie lands which, under the Homestead Acts, could be had almost for the asking. A new type of farming, and consequently a new type of social living, resulted. Instead of tiny fields requiring intensive cultivation, the pioneer on the plains owned immense farms unobstructed by hills or forests, ready to be turned by the plow and planted. The grazing lands of the Far West were still more spacious; ranches consisting of hundreds or thousands of acres were not uncommon. Farmers so situated could not group their homes together in a neighborhood hamlet and travel each day to their work.

The inhabitants of the prairie states built their homes along the checkerboard roadways laid out by the county surveyor. On unimproved roads, almost impassable in muddy seasons, and located a half a mile or more from the next house, the farm family had little opportunity to share in the social living of a closely integrated residential neighborhood. Unlike the European type of area in which the social control was almost absolute, the *open-country neighborhoods* of our western states consisted of families separated by such distances that they were to some extent social units unto themselves.¹¹ There was, to be sure, considerable visiting back and forth among individuals, and a good measure of mutual aid in harvest and in times of sickness, but the coming together of all the families in the neighborhood was an event, not a daily routine. That event generally took place on "the Sabbath" when everyone, dressed in his "Sunday best," assembled at the crossroads church for worship and neighborly visiting. Spelling bees at the one-room school, box-sup-

¹⁰ J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner, *A Study of Rural Society*, p. 46, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹¹ That the transition from compact villages to dispersed farmsteads has not in all countries been the direction of change, but that in some cases just the reverse situation obtains, has been pointed out by Demangeon, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

pers, barn raisings, quiltings, funerals, and marriages were other "events" which brought people on adjacent farms together in spite of the distances. Their contacts, though not frequent, were usually primary and intimate in nature because the group was bound together by the common factor of isolation from the outside world, and often also by the factor of kinship or common nationality. The neighborhood culture which developed in this situation differed from that of the early village community in Old England and in New England. It lacked the absolutism of group solidarity which grows out of common residence and common ownership of the soil. Its qualities were more varied, combining the individualism of separate farmsteads and separate ownership with the cooperation of mutual dependence, especially in times of crisis. The open-country neighborhood was a primary group in spite of the distances which separated its members, and because of the distances which isolated it from outside contacts. Although giving only a partial view, the following autobiographical notes taken from Read Bain's doctoral dissertation provide an interesting glimpse of the social and economic setting of a rural section in Oregon.

The writer was born . . . in the fall of 1892. The conditions described in this section still prevailed in most respects during his first years of memory. He never wore shoes regularly till after he was twelve when he moved to Tillamook. Nor had he ever attended school a whole term, being sickly and unable to walk the necessary five miles a day in the stormy winter weather. He went "outside" once, and saw his first train when about eleven years old. He rode on a train first when about fourteen in 1906. The chief source of such articles of clothing as had to be purchased was the mail order house. Flour, salt, sugar, soda and nails were the principal purchases. Smoked and salted salmon, jerked venison, canned fruit (from our garden, orchard, and the hills), bread and milk were the chief articles of diet. The "literary" still flourished; all-night dances with a basket supper were held almost every week during the winter; the Fourth of July, Decoration Day, and the last day of school were the community celebrations. The church was almost non-existent in our community. The nearest village, Woods, with stores, saloons, and town kids was nine miles away. The principal homesteaders had plows and wagons. We had one horse, Dolly, who pulled the "stoneboat," the one-horse harrow and cultivator, and served as our only

means of transportation, other than Shanks' ponies. Our neighbor plowed for us and hauled in our hay, for which my father paid him by so many days' work. Practically all exchange in our valley was by trading work, or swapping articles.¹²

The culture of the country areas across the continent in the Middle Atlantic states of New York and Pennsylvania did not differ as greatly from the western patterns as one would expect. The size of the farms and the distances which separated them were less great and the pioneer elements were absent, but the same general arrangement of local neighborhoods composed of families living on separate farms was in evidence, and produced a primary group culture. William G. Mather, Jr., found that as late as 1900 the culture of farm neighborhoods in Allegany County, New York, consisted largely of typical rural customs.

In Allegany County, the people came to church in buggies and wagons; five miles was an hour's ride over the narrow, rough, steep, and winding roads called "improved" if a little creek gravel had been scattered over them. Each little neighborhood needed its own church, within a half hour's reach of most of the people. One did not travel much in those days, for travel was slow and somewhat dangerous, with obstacles such as mud and high water. Long journeys were usually taken by train, and twenty-five miles was a long journey. When the associational or district meetings of delegates from the various churches of one denomination in an area were held, the delegates generally spent the night at the place of meeting, even if it were but ten miles away, for ten miles was a long drive after dark.

Several fairs were held in the county, for one fair was not enough—the county is about thirty miles wide and forty long, and a man had to get back home at night to milk the cows. In the crowded exhibit halls, labelled "Machinery Hall," "Agricultural Hall," and "Music and Arts," the rough, gay crowds jostled and stared. There were patch-work quilts, bedspreads done by hand and done patiently and well, jars of shivering jelly, cakes under thick layers of melting frosting, pumpkins "that big around," shining apples, twelve-foot corn stalks,

¹² Taken from an autobiographical footnote contained in Read Bain, *The Growth of an Institution; A Sociological Interpretation of the Tillamook County Creamery Association of Tillamook, Oregon*, p. 36, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1926. Reprinted by permission of the author.

enormous bulls, squealing litters of pigs that seemed to be always hungry, squealing children also always hungry, balloons, popcorn, dust, and noise. During fair days the cows were roused early for their milkings, and at night they lowed at the pasture bars until after sundown, waiting for the family to come home. Everybody was tired, and excited, and happy, and irritable. The biggest crowds ever! Aunt Betty took a prize! And there was to be a balloon ascension the next day! . . .

In the winters, sleighing parties jingled merrily on the snow-covered, beautifully winding roads, with an oyster supper or a soft-sugar pan as the evening's goal. In the summer there were hay rides, the tired horses patiently pulling their load of young folk singing "Seeing Nellie Home," or perhaps, if out of the village and with an understanding pair of chaperons, that song that had recently come from the East, with its daring refrain, "While I'm not bad, I'm not too good!" At any time there might be box socials or pie suppers, where boxes and pies were auctioned off to the highest bidder, who had the honor of eating the contents with the girl who had prepared it; earnest young farmers more than once paying as much as two dollars and a half to eat a box of supper with Helen, she of the blue eyes and hair like oat straw, only to discover that Maggie, the buck-toothed maid, had tied her box with green ribbon too. It was rare that a boy managed to take a girl out alone in his shiny black "courtin' buggy" with gleaming red spokes, and she was usually put through the third degree when she returned; for young people took their pleasures in groups then. . . .

In the summers there were the camp meetings. Great tents were pitched in the grove near a village, opera-house chairs were set up in them, and the families drove in with their crowded lumber wagons, set up their own eight-by-tens, and prepared to spend a week or more. Evangelists came from "outside"; leather-throated, big-chested, pompous men, accompanied by their cornetist or vocal soloist, and thundered and sang a fiery gospel of a God who had turned in wrath upon the sons and daughters of sinful Adam, yet who would gather them to his arms like lambs in his bosom if they would "only believe." The farmer folk old and young, weary with the spring plowing and sowing and the summer cultivating and haying, eager for the touch of crowds after the months of almost solitary work, sat in rows, enthralled by the verbal pictures, half hypnotized by the primitive rhythm of the hymns, sung over and over again. Under the sway of the eloquence, sobbing,

they stumbled up to grasp the hand of the preacher—the hand that seemed like the hand of God drawing them out of the waters of sin.

Those of the young people who had “got religion” a year or so before, or were not due to get it until next season, would stroll about the grove in the moonlight, hushing their voices to hear the music coming through the canvas of the big tent, or to catch the voice of an instinct as old as Eve. Here and there, carved on the beeches and maples of those old groves, one may still decipher, “A. H. plus D. C.,” or “I love you.”¹³

Today, the isolation of the rural neighborhood is rapidly disappearing, and with this change are coming new trends in social organization and cultural development. An intimate view of the social changes in rural areas is given by Mather in the same study from which we have just quoted. Social relations in Allegany County as described for the period up to 1900 had undergone such a transformation by 1930 that, although only 30 years separated the two periods, he considered them centuries apart culturally. Improved communication had brought into the formerly isolated neighborhoods such a profusion of urban and world-wide influences that they had lost their distinctive culture of the earlier period and had become the possessors of a mixed culture consisting of certain old traits which still persisted, along with many new elements from the outside.

The point to be made is that the culture of Allegany County is not, today, either the culture of 1900 or 1930. It is a mixture of the two; not only in tools and conveniences, but in habits, conventions, thought, and religion. Thirty years ago, it was *all* 1900; now, there is *some* 1900 left, in spite of the book clubs, the radio, the newspapers, the high schools, the chain stores, and the automobile. The old homogeneity has been broken up, and the new homogeneity, if such there is to be, has not yet arrived.¹⁴

Mather illustrates this point by describing the confusion existing in the religious culture of the area:

¹³ William G. Mather, Jr., *The Rural Churches of Allegany County*, pp. 22, 23, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, bulletin 587, Ithaca, New York, Mar., 1934.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

There is the old deacon down in the left front corner, where he has sat every Sunday for sixty years; he believes in predestination and the fires of Hell. There is the young manager of the Grange cooperative, who is not sure what he believes but knows it is not either of those. There is the young Sunday-school superintendent, a graduate of Alfred University; he believes in Eddington's universe and Cadman's God. There is the middle-aged Mrs. Smith, who divorced her carousing husband last year; and next to her, wishing she were not, is the middle-aged Miss Jones, who was brought up to believe that such actions are definite signs of worldliness and sin. There is the high-school physics teacher, graduated two or three years ago from Houghton, who only yesterday was heard to speak of the Almighty as being, perhaps, the mysterious force which holds together atom and nebula. Next to her sits a woman from the hills; her sister, well along in years, was thrown off the seat of a disk harrow while at work in the meadow last week, and broke her hip—she asked the minister, when he called, how it could have happened, seeing that she had always led a good life, and been regular at church. There are the Jamesons, a young farmer couple with a row of stocky children, who always have an odor of hay about them; and in the far end of the same pew the Green family—with money in oil, who moved to the village just to find a pleasant place to live. In the choir are a half-dozen young boys and girls in high school, hoping for something in the way of ideals and guidance in the new world; in the back pew sits the father of one of them, hoping the minister will damn the new world utterly.¹⁵

The motor car has given the farmer, his wife, and children a new freedom; no longer does the fact of living together on adjoining farms predetermine all social contacts. If the farmer prefers the movies billed for a town 20 miles away to the home talent show in the school house, or if he dislikes the minister at the crossroads church and decides to attend services in the village, there is no physical reason to prevent him from so expressing his newly found freedom of choice. One of the Cornell studies describes the results of such changes in two Tompkins County neighborhoods:

The hamlet of West Slaterville at one time carried on a neighborhood life, but now for most of the social and recreational activities its

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 26.

inhabitants find expression in conjunction with larger centers. No voluntary associations are located in this hamlet; for these it is dependent on Slaterville Springs. Ellis Hollow seems to be in a state of transition from an institutional neighborhood to a topographic locality. A declining Methodist church is the only institution or organization there. A grange existed in the locality for about fifteen years prior to 1926, when it disbanded.¹⁶

A similar tragedy has befallen another New York neighborhood hamlet, which at one time prospered as a crossroads center for trade as well as social life.

Take the little hamlet a few miles from us called The Flats. Thirty years or so ago The Flats was a busy little crossroads with two cheese factories, two stores (one with a hall over it), a blacksmith shop, a shingle mill that took its power from the creek, a school, and a church. They had great times with family reunions, square dances, warm-sugar parties, and the like, and it was known as one of the best communities in our neighborhood.

To-day not a single one of those signs of business life remains. There is only the old church, empty and unused, and the school with only a handful of pupils. One out of three of the houses within two miles of the crossroads in every direction is unoccupied and falling to pieces.¹⁷

Not all neighborhoods are experiencing the same sad plight as that of West Slaterville, Ellis Hollow, and The Flats. Like most social change, the shift has been in several directions. Rapid transportation takes farmers to the movies, chain stores, and social organizations of the villages, towns, and cities, but it also enables the urban worker to reside in rural areas, a trend which has already achieved significant proportions. Whether these new families will share greatly in the neighborhood social relations after they have moved to the country is, of course, another question.

¹⁶ Glenn A. Bakkum and Bruce L. Melvin, *Social Relationships of Slaterville Springs—Brooktondale Area, Tompkins County, New York*, p. 47, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, bulletin 501, Ithaca, New York, Mar., 1930.

¹⁷ William G. Mather, Jr., "Littletown," *Harper's Magazine*, vol. 170, pp. 199, 200, Jan., 1935. Reprinted by permission of Harper and Brothers, publishers.

Noting another counter-trend, Kolb and Brunner observe that the automobile, in some instances, has actually become a factor in stimulating a more intensive local social life. The fact that a farmer can drive far from home in the course of an hour does not necessarily result in his wanting to do so. The car permits more frequent social contacts with friends living nearby,¹⁸ enables children to participate more freely in social activities promoted by schools and churches, and gives the farmer an easier means of attending the dairymen's association and the local Farm Bureau. There may develop, through these contacts, a more specialized function for the neighborhood. "As a growing village or large city draws more and more of the secondary services to itself, a demand seems to arise from country people for some kind of local and convenient centers, close at hand, to supply some of the more primary social services,"¹⁹ such as organized recreation, religious education for the youth, adult education, and local cooperation in selling produce and buying supplies. Or it may be that the decline already observed indicates that the rural neighborhood is "being absorbed by the larger community. This means that the social interests of the people are focusing upon the village centers; that rural areas are superseding the distinctly rural areas."²⁰ Which of these possible trends will ultimately determine the fate of the country neighborhood is still uncertain.

Villages and rural communities. If the rural neighborhood (when and where it exists) is "that first group outside the family which has social significance,"²¹ the village may be thought of as the next larger unit. In the terms of the United States Census, the

¹⁸ In the study of one neighborhood and the territory surrounding it, Kolb and Brunner found that the social contacts to be classified as "local visiting or neighborly contacts" were 2.7 times as numerous as were the special-interest contacts. The latter were slightly more numerous in organizations outside of the neighborhood than those within, the ratio being 3 to 2. These two findings indicate that "locality and special organization or interest-group arrangements may develop together. Modern facilities for communication and travel may increase outside contacts, but they may increase the local contacts at an even greater rate."—Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 62. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁹ Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

²⁰ Sims, *op. cit.*, p. 567. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. "Rurban" is a coined term which describes those marginal areas that possess a combination of urban and rural characteristics.

²¹ Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

village is an incorporated settlement of people less than 2,500 in number.²² The 1930 Census placed within this category 13,433 villages with a total population of 9,183,453 or one villager for every nine people in the United States.²³

Because it was a larger group with a greater variety of functions, the village developed a more complex social organization than the neighborhood. Whereas the latter was primarily based on neighborly relations, seldom possessing more than one or two organized agencies, such as a school, church, grange, or store, the village contained all of the institutions necessary for a fairly complete social existence. It was usually an incorporated governmental unit, had its own schools, churches, and other cultural institutions, supplied its people with manufactured goods shipped from the cities, and had specialists in the trades and professions. There were sometimes such other enterprises as libraries, literary societies, bands, and local promotion committees. With this variety of organized interests the village quite naturally became more institutionalized than the neighborhood, and, at the same time, it was sufficiently small and isolated to retain many qualities of a primary group.

Social change and the village. During a period of some decades when village life in many sections of this country was at least moderately stable, there developed from these primary and secondary relations a culture slightly more complex than that of the neighborhood, but distinctly rural and almost untouched by outside influences. The neighborhoods and villages, together, constituted a quite homogeneous social life, which was remote, culturally, from the urban centers. Consequently, we should expect with the coming of modern conditions, a transformation in the village similar to that in the neighborhood, but even more thorough-going, because its trade connections with the outside made it the natural point of arrival for new ideas. Read Bain's description of the social changes in Tillamook and in the surrounding villages of Tillamook County, Oregon, shows how early rural patterns were replaced by modern ways, many of which emanated from the urban centers.

. . . the frontier conditions which characterized Tillamook county in 1890, and even as late as 1900, have largely passed away. The old

²² *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, "Population,"* vol. II, p. 8.

²³ *Ibid.*

fashioned "literary" is replaced by the "movies"; the County Fair is a modern version of the "Fourth"; the "Grand Balls" of the days gone by are replaced by the beach resort, town club, commercial "jitney," and more or less formal dances all of which seldom last later than midnight and seldom begin before nine. The old-time pedler is replaced by the chain grocery store, department store—and mail-order house. By means of automobiles, the Tillamookers get the morning papers from Portland almost as early as the Portlanders themselves. The old-time "Fourth of July Celebration" is attempted from time to time by the smaller villages, but it lacks the spontaneous elan of the early days. The population is now so mobile, secondary contacts are so prevalent, that the "old-timers" say "They just don't know anybody any more." The children go to college, and come back with strange ideas—and strange brides.

Habits of dress have changed. People wear the "latest things" almost as soon as they appear in Portland. There are several department stores in the county that carry good stocks of all the standard brands of apparel. Many people buy clothing from mail-order houses which is not nearly so shoddy and ill-fitting as it used to be. The day of knitting socks, cutting down father's cast-offs for Billy, quilting bees and rough clothes are about over. Evening dress has even made its appearance in the towns—a far, far cry for Tillamook. A man or woman who might have worn evening dress in 1890 would have been an object of ridicule if not of violence.

The church-going habits of the people show significant changes. The younger people are not interested. The movies, dances, autos, beaches, school parties, and other attractions, out-bid the churches. The parents even show the effects of the same influences. People do not need to go to church any more to learn the news. The papers, the radio, the telephone, the more impersonal communication of business, all have made the church less necessary than it used to be. In the old days all Tillamook was divided into two classes—those who went to church, and those who went to the saloon. There are no saloons, now, and respectable people may play a game of cards or billiards in a pool hall without being considered irrevocably lost.²⁴

May not the removal of the village's state of isolation and its consequent "urbanization" cause it to decline along with the neigh-

²⁴ Bain, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 95. Reprinted by permission of the author.

borhood both economically and culturally? Will not rural people in the future hurdle these local stopping points and deal directly with the larger centers? This is apparently what is happening to communities in an area near Ithaca, New York.

The breaking-up of the community relations has been due to the increased contacts developed with Ithaca. Of the 396 families of the area, 23.7 per cent have members who work in Ithaca; produce is sold mostly in Ithaca; 49.3 per cent of the families in the open country buy most of their groceries there; 31.5 per cent of these families have their garage work done there; and approximately 90 per cent or more patronize the Ithaca furniture, clothing, banking, hardware and machinery, dental, and legal agencies. Thus the area has changed from a limitedly self-sufficing economic unit or units, to a dependent territory of Ithaca.²⁵

The rural community. Sanderson recognizes this trend but maintains that the village still has an adequate economic and social function to perform. In making this statement he is not thinking of the village alone, but conceives of a new unit developing, *the rural community*, which will integrate the interests of the village and the surrounding farmsteads.

A rural community consists of the social interaction of the people and their institutions in a local area in which they live on dispersed farmsteads and in a hamlet or village which forms the center of their common activities.²⁶

Since this close relationship existed only partially in the early days, one wonders how complete an integration can be achieved at present. The village was formerly the trade center for country people, but since they did not live there, much of their social life was confined to the country neighborhoods. C. Luther Fry considers that "on a number of important points village inhabitants differ at least as widely from open-country as from city dwellers," and therefore the question is raised "whether the common practice of combining village and open-country populations under the one

²⁵ Bakkum and Melvin, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁶ Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p. 481. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

head 'rural' is justifiable."²⁷ Sanderson thinks, however, that a closer contact with the village is now possible through improved transportation.²⁸ Other factors also seem to support this trend. The retired farmers who have moved to the village, and the farm youth employed there, relate the village in an intimate way to those who remain on the farms. The consolidation of schools, centralizing education in the village, often brings into close association the children of the entire community. The merging or disbanding of neighborhood churches has sometimes brought farm members into village congregations. To this list of factors which are making for an integrated *rural community*, Kolb and Brunner add three additional categories which they consider noteworthy: community fairs, mutual fire protection, and joint projects involving organized groups.²⁹ They also mention that these activities are sometimes organized through a community council. Such a council in the case of Bernice, Louisiana, was responsible for the erection of a community building which was designated, "Headquarters for Town and Country People."³⁰

To bring all of these favorable factors together, we can do no better than to summarize Sanderson's conclusions regarding the ecological and the sociological functions of the rural community in society:³¹

1. The relatively permanent residence required by an efficient agriculture makes inevitable the development of acquaintance and common interests among people residing in a local area.

2. Even with modern means of transportation, topographical features still exert some influence in defining the areas of association, the locality groups.

3. The history and tradition of a locality group as a rural community has more significance for its people than the history of any of its voluntary associations based on special interests.

²⁷ C. Luther Fry, *American Villagers*, p. 25, George H. Doran Company, New York, 1926. See also pp. 101-111.

²⁸ Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p. 556.

²⁹ Kolb and Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 131, 132.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 133. See also "Town and Country Interdependencies," *University of North Carolina Extension Bulletin*, vol. 6, no. 10, p. 36, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, Feb. 1, 1927.

³¹ The summary is adapted from Sanderson's concluding chapter in *The Rural Community*, pp. 664-666, by permission of the publishers.

4. The rural community is still a unit of defense, not against warring tribes, but against such common enemies to the farmer as plant and animal pests and diseases, the usurpation by the city of control of rural markets and finances, and the social lure of the city. These forces which endanger the security of the people of the land can be dealt with only through the united strength of organized communities.

5. The increased division of labor requires that rural people secure many services from professional and business experts who, because of the factor of accessibility, are most conveniently located at the village centers.

6. "The desire of the people for sociability, for recognition and response, forms a bond of the rural community; for even with modern transportation, association is easiest and therefore most frequent at the community center."

7. "Because of all the foregoing conditions the rural community is the most important group for purposes of social control, with the possible exception of the family."

If the rural community has prospects of functioning in such a variety of ways, its future stability does indeed seem more probable than its disorganization. But the evidence, in the very nature of the case, is still incomplete. Present forces may exert pressure in new degrees, and other factors may enter the picture. The increasing problem of mobility of tenancy, the shift to rural areas of urban people who may not share rural social interests, the specialization of farming with the resulting organization of farmers over large areas, the possibility of large-scale farming with its factory-like organization, and the increase of rural membership in social groups not limited geographically or whose local policies are dominated by regional and national headquarters are other possible factors, some remote, some present, which may prevent today's conclusions from being correct tomorrow. This complexity fosters a cautious attitude in the person who analyzes rural social trends.

Urban communities. If the social solidarity of rural communities is in question, how much more uncertain must be the situation with larger towns and cities. Do the people living in Dallas, St. Louis, or Portland really have a sense of belonging to a community group? Does the fact that they are located together within the same city form a basis for common interests and social life? Are they controlled by local customs, mores, traditions, and social or-

ganizations? These tests of the presence of communal life which were used for rural communities will now provide an approach to the phenomenon of the modern city.

The initial difficulty encountered in answering these questions comes with the discovery that the sociological boundaries of the *community* are not always co-terminous with the political boundaries of the *city*. For example, what justification is there for saying that the suburban dweller who lives just across the city line is not a member of the urban community? The 1930 government census recognizes the futility of observing political demarcations in measuring urban concentrations, and included in the metropolitan districts of large centers, densely populated areas contiguous to the principal city.³² This solution of the problem is quickly followed by another sociological query which we cannot ignore: How can the term "community" be equally applicable to the many different sizes and types of urban places—to the town of 2,500 (just across the dividing line between rural and urban) and to the metropolis of three million? The right of the town to be called a community seems valid enough, but does the term fit the case of the city whose human aggregate is so lacking in social unity and other characteristics of a community? Of course, to some degree, all of the people who live in and near such a city as Nashville, Tennessee, for example, do have pride in their city; most of them are served by the same police force and fire protection; and when there is a special event like a centennial celebration they are all included directly or indirectly in the plan. Ordinarily, however, it would be stretching the term too far to think of the white people and the Negroes of that city, or of the poor who live in the congested areas and the wealthy who reside on suburban estates, as belonging to a single, closely integrated communal life. The interaction of these divergent types is so infrequent that from a practical point of view they are really not members of the same sociological group even though they all refer to themselves as living in Nashville, and take some pride in the fact.

³² "The metropolitan districts for the census of 1930 . . . include, in addition to the central city or cities, all adjacent and contiguous civil divisions having a density of 150 inhabitants or more per square mile, and also as a rule, those civil divisions of less density that are directly contiguous to the central cities, or are entirely or nearly surrounded by minor civil divisions that have required density."—*Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, "Population,"* vol. 2, p. 16.

Ecological areas, stratification, and segregation. Two related factors which will help explain the lack of inclusive community interests in urban centers have already been introduced in the discussion of ecology. First, we must recall the processes responsible for the division of a city into ecological areas. In the second place, we need to remember that the competitive processes of city life differentiate people roughly into social classes. Now let us place these two observations together: city people are differentiated roughly into classes; city areas are divided roughly into residential districts of different cost and quality. These two facts become related through the process of segregation. It is almost axiomatic that the favored social classes will occupy the most desirable places of residence (segregated by their own choice to be sure, but none the less effectively separated from others), that those of the lowest means will be "assigned" to tenements in the "slums," and that those moderately secure will live in one of the in-between districts.

With a city's population so classified and segregated, community life for the *whole group* may be an ideal, but seldom a reality. Few cities have even attempted to establish bridges across the social barriers, and usually where such has been tried the connections are artificial, lacking in communal feeling. This explains why Nashville, and other cities, can in only the most general sense be considered *one* community.

Communities within the metropolitan area. We must, therefore, think of a metropolis as consisting not of a single community, but of a number of *constituent communities*. The term "urban community" will be applied only to that local area which is limited in some way by physical features and which has a distinctive culture. A specially prepared map of Chicago outlines 75 different communities within the political boundaries of that city, and there are others in the suburbs.³³

Now if differentiation and segregation prevented social unity over an entire metropolitan area, they should be the cause of such unity within the communities, because people of similar economic status and similar cultural background have a basis for common interests which would not be present in a heterogeneous population.

³³ The map, which is entitled "Community Areas of Chicago as Adopted by Census Bureau, 1930," was prepared by the Social Science Research Council, University of Chicago, 1931.

The process of segregation operates so effectively that there are within almost every large city some communities whose per capita wealth is high, whose rate of home ownership is high, whose educational achievement is high, and in which there is almost no record of dependency, delinquency, or crime. Scarsdale, a suburb of New York City, is such a community. The similar interests and standards of its people have no doubt been a factor in the development of some community organization and tradition. Its churches and its women's clubs are especially active agencies in the community.

One dare not go from this case to the general principle that segregation fosters community organization. We have previously credited it with being one of the principal disruptive forces in preventing the unification of an entire city. Now we are to see that even within some local areas it plays the same role. The people segregated in the deteriorated, congested districts by the one condition which they have in common, poverty, have little incentive for community organization. Misery may love company, but that love does not always find expression in community improvement associations. The people in the "slums" usually do not own the tenements which they occupy and they waste no love or loyalty on the landlord. Their interest is not to stay in the community and improve it—their poverty would prevent any real accomplishment along this line—but rather, as individuals, to escape from it. Pride in a community is a prerequisite of social unity. There is little basis for pride if one lives in the tenement row which sight-seeing buses select as representative of the poorest housing in the city. Although there is some neighborliness—probably more than in some wealthy, sophisticated areas—there is almost no community-wide organization.

There is a third case in which segregation operates with reference to the community. A national or racial group segregated in a colony within the city often shows some trends toward unity. Its members are bound together by the common culture of the mother country and the common problem of adjustment to American life. It has its own foreign language newspapers, its national churches, and its characteristic social organizations like the Bohemian Sokol, transplanted from the old country. In many respects this type of residential group functions more like a community than any other

in the urban setting.³⁴ But it cannot be considered a permanent community. The people are united by a culture which they are gradually forsaking. The second, third, and fourth generations become "Americanized," and if they improve in economic status, they move to other districts which may or may not be inhabited by their own countrymen. In turn, other people move into the area which they are vacating, and for a time, individuals with quite different cultures live side by side in the same community. One such Chicago area in transition is inhabited by British, Lithuanians, Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakians, Germans, Norwegians, Swedish, Dutch, Poles, Italians, and Irish. Since prejudices and conflict are often built on cultural differences, this situation is not conducive to a unified community.

We have dealt with three of the results of differentiation and segregation in urban areas: (1) the people of high economic status tend to concentrate in exclusive residential districts, forming what might be the basis of somewhat homogeneous communities; (2) the multitude of cultural types segregated by their poverty in the deteriorated areas have the least incentive for group life; and (3) ethnic colonies provide only a temporary basis for unity. This summary must now be rewritten in terms of two other forces whose influence on urban communities is also great: specialization and mobility.

Specialization and community life. Economic specialization has robbed the family of many of its functions and in so doing has struck a blow at community solidarity. In the early rural family every member of the family, from the eight-year-old child to the maiden aunt, had an essential part to play in the domestic economy. The relationships of these stable family units constituted the community. In the city, domestic economy has been destroyed by specialization. Instead of working with his family throughout the day in his own home, the head of the urban household works away from home and often away from his community. The people with whom he has contacts while at work are not neighbors but

³⁴ Cf. Harvey W. Zorbaugh's description of an Italian immigrant community in Chicago, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, pp. 164 ff., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929; Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, pp. 123 and 222, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1928; and Linden S. Dodson, *The Organizing and Conserving Force of the Church in Social Change in South Holland, Illinois*, pp. 1-6, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1932.

acquaintances from different areas. When he returns home at night there is little occasion for discussing his work with his family except to announce a promotion or a salary cut. The other members are either freed of economic responsibility and engage in their own specialized social interests, or, if they are employed, work in such widely separated places and positions that there is little in common. With specialization in recreation and social life now paralleling that in occupation, the interests of five members of a family may go in as many directions in the course of a day, and only accidentally be located within the home community. Rapid transportation and communication have stimulated this specialization. They enable the urban resident to work in an office ten miles from home, associate with friends who come from the other side of the city, and attend concerts and plays in the downtown theater district. Friendships are formed not through neighborly contacts at the place of residence, but through common membership in special interest groups.³⁵ Although it is by no means true of all, there are many city dwellers who live in apartment buildings for years without learning the names of their next-door neighbors. Under such circumstances, neighborhood and community culture does not readily develop. M. Wesley Roper has characterized family life in the modern apartment hotel in the following paragraph:

The apartment house home is vastly different from the old rural homestead. Everything is furnished in return for the payment of rent. Both husband and wife may work in different kinds of work outside the home and build up two sets of friends through their occupational contacts. They may eat their meals in restaurants, but if they do eat at home the delicatessens furnish food ready cooked or the stores furnish ready-prepared foods. The radio may keep them home for an evening but at the same time dance halls, movies, theaters, night clubs, etc.—all public places of amusement—invite them to spend their leisure outside the home. If there is a child the procedure may be varied, at least while the child is young. A nurse-maid may be employed, however, by the more wealthy, or a nursery school used by

³⁵ Of course there is no inherent conflict between proximity and special interest; many contacts of the latter type may actually occur in the local community. When this is true, the fact of proximity strengthens the unity of the interest group by facilitating the contact of the members, and they may even come to know one another as neighbors.

those of lower economic status. The apartment home tends, in many cases, to become a dormitory.³⁶

In the specialized areas consisting largely of rooming houses, family life is even less in evidence, but in the neighborhoods of single houses, and in some apartment areas, the family is an important primary group.³⁷

In the most stable families, however, the interests are not necessarily limited to, or centered in, the community. While the children are young they tend to form friendships in the neighborhood through play or school contacts, but as they grow older their social relationships become specialized like those of their parents. Instead of developing loyalty to a local community they, too, move in social circles throughout larger areas of the city. As E. C. Lindeman explains, social experience tends to become fractional, that is, "the total personality is less known to any group and has less opportunity for expression."³⁸ Extreme social mobility, with the large number and variety of stimulations freed of geographical moorings, makes the community almost non-existent. Even the wealthy districts, made relatively homogeneous through segregation, break down as social units because of mobility. Zorbaugh considered the "Gold Coast," in Chicago, to be as nearly a community "as is any local group, not foreign, . . . found within the inner city,"³⁹ but when he studied the attitudes of people living on one of its principal streets he found that:

. . . many of them did not think of the "Gold Coast" as a community or of its streets as neighborhoods. The majority of them stated that of their interests—social, political, religious, philanthropic, professional, intellectual, and artistic—only their "social" interests were

³⁶ M. Wesley Roper, *The City and the Primary Group*, pp. 82, 83, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the author.

³⁷ Ernest R. Mowrer has found that family life differs greatly in various areas of the city. He describes the following family types and locates each in the urban zone where it predominates: (1) non-family areas, (2) emancipated family areas, (3) paternal family areas, (4) equalitarian family areas, and (5) maternal family areas.—*Family Disorganization*, p. 110, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927.

³⁸ E. C. Lindeman, "Community," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4, p. 105, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931.

³⁹ Zorbaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

centered along the "Gold Coast." And we have seen that "social" interests mean playing the social game, not neighborly contacts. Moreover, . . . without exception these people spend from three to five months of every year outside the city. All of them have their "summer places." Many of them travel abroad, or go to eastern, western, and southern resorts for parts of the year.⁴⁰

Mobility of residence and community life. Another urban factor which is still more devastating to neighborhood and community life is the frequent change in the place of residence itself. The urban family may be moved suddenly from one city to another through changes in the father's employment. Or, if his employment be stable, the family may of its own volition move from place to place within the city, seeking more desirable quarters. October first and May first have become traditional moving days in many cities. Of the 48,017 inhabitants of Hyde Park community, an area of relatively high economic standing, only 10 per cent own their homes. Except for a few streets where single homes have withstood the invasion of multiple dwellings, the typical home is in an apartment or apartment hotel building. The mobility of families living in this district is revealed indirectly through the children's school records. At the time of Roper's investigation four children out of ten moved into or out of the community every year.⁴¹ In one of the neighborhoods within the district only eight out of 205 children in the upper grades had had only one residence. "Ninety-six had had two or three residences and 101 had lived in four to nine different homes."⁴²

Much higher rates of mobility are found in the rooming house districts where rooms and apartments are rented not by the year or the month, but by the week. Since all living equipment is provided by the landlord, one can move one's earthly possessions in a taxi or in the rumble seat of one's car, and be settled in a new home within an hour.

The constant comings and goings of its inhabitants is the most striking and significant characteristic of this world of furnished rooms.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴¹ Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 35. "This does not mean that four out of ten families move every year, for a family may have more than one child."

⁴² *Ibid.*

This whole population turns over every four months. There are always cards in the windows advertising the fact that rooms are vacant, but these cards rarely have to stay up over a day, as people are constantly walking the streets looking for rooms. The keepers of the rooming-houses change almost as rapidly as the roomers themselves. At least half of the keepers of these houses have been at their present addresses six months or less.⁴³

With mobility reaching such a degree, the community has no stable human material on which to build its organization. The face-to-face and intimate relations of its people are replaced by casual, impersonal contacts. Everywhere there is movement and change which is stimulating but not stabilizing. "There arises an extreme individuation of personal behavior that makes of the local area within the city something vastly different from the town or village community. There is within it no common body of experience and tradition, no unanimity of interest, sentiment, and attitude which can serve as a basis of collective action."⁴⁴

Community organization. Are there no counter-trends, no stabilizing influences in this touch-and-go social life of the city? A few may be listed, but it is difficult to gauge their effectiveness. Neighborhood and settlement houses, schools, churches, Y. M. and Y. W. C. A.'s, organizations of local business men, and small newspapers are often located within the community area where the people whom they serve reside, and the leaders not infrequently conceive of their organizations as community institutions. They may unite in safety campaigns, or in an effort to improve the parks and playgrounds, or to prevent the invasion of their area by an "undesirable" population. Such joint action has sometimes culminated in the organization of a community council. The efforts of real estate men and governmental agencies to increase home ownership might be considered another stabilizing influence. Persons who permanently identify themselves with an area are more likely to form primary relations and community institutions than are those who come and go. An ultra-modern phase of this development is the erection of cooperative apartments in which every family is part owner of the building. The increase in home

⁴³ Zorbaugh, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 72. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 251. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

ownership is not, however, startling. Roper states that one of Chicago's communities, New City, inhabited largely by working class families, had an increase in home ownership of from 30.5 per cent in 1920 to 35.2 in 1930, but there was a slight decrease in Hyde Park, an area of much higher economic standing.⁴⁵

The increase in home ownership, the formation of a community council, and similar stabilizing factors appearing in different urban communities prevent us from saying that a city is devoid of primary relations and social organization within its local areas, but in comparison with the rural community (which is, itself, changing) the life of a city is more individualized and specialized so far as voluntary social contacts are concerned, and is far more impersonal and inclusive in that cooperative organization which is essential for the physical maintenance of a large population. Whole personalities, living side by side in local areas, are not the primary basis for a city's organization and culture. The "larger community," that is, the entire metropolitan area which includes and surrounds the principal city (or, if one is thinking in still more inclusive terms—"the regional community,"⁴⁶) is loosely united in sentiment through familiarity with the physical features of the area and through the slogans of its "booster" campaigns when an exposition is being staged. But aside from this, its only unity consists in its political organization—a government which performs the basic services of sanitation, police and fire protection, construction of streets, and the maintenance of schools and other public institutions. Even this impersonal organization is not altogether inclusive, because each suburban district outside of the city limits has its own government.

In most matters, therefore, the urban community is an aggregate of individuals who compete impersonally for economic gain, who voluntarily associate with various groups for special interests, who form friendships through these associations and at the place of employment, and who, incidentally, live in a local area which they may regard as their community or merely as their place of residence. If their children (who are past-masters in primary relations) form friendships with children in the next apartment, the parents may be brought together as neighbors. Or membership

⁴⁵ Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴⁶ Cf. the discussion in chapter 15 of the ecological forces responsible for the trend toward regional communities.

in a Parent-Teachers Association, women's club, or church society may bring near residents into social contact. But beyond this point people who merely live on the same avenue have few relations with one another. They do not respond personally when a family is suffering from illness or unemployment, but send a check once a year to a charity, hospital, or social agency whose bureaus, investigators, and red tape look after such matters. Those who are still more thoroughly immured within the individualism of the city ignore even the appeals of charity campaigns. They let the government raise funds for families who need relief, if it cares to do so. Steiner observes a further development of the trend toward large-scale, impersonal organization during the depression:

There has been a notable shift of interest during the depression from the traditional programs of community organization to more fundamental problems of social and economic security which demand state and federal, rather than local community, action. Furthermore, the feeling of local community responsibility has been weakened by the federal administration of unemployment relief. No revival of the community movement comparable to that which took place at the time of the World War occurred during the past few years. Regional planning, rather than community organization, has become the subject for popular discussion.⁴⁷

This conflict between the emancipating forces which break down community relations and the unifying factors which maintain them, is a constant one. If at a particular time the trend is toward greater individuation, then the community is little more than an ecological area. Whatever corporate functions remain are carried on impersonally, like its economic life, by institutions whose vital connection with the people they serve is lost in a maze of rules and prescriptions. But if the trend is toward a socialized community, its people have regard for one another, cooperate in common tasks, and are sensitive to the ideals and public opinions of those about them. A community which is socialized has its institutions and formal organization, but they are not remote from the purposes of those who created them. Various social agencies of the com-

⁴⁷ Jesse F. Steiner, "Community Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, p. 788, May, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

munity council type have as their objective a socialized community which will be conscious of the persons who comprise it and will plan rationally for their corporate welfare.

In many American communities these opposing trends of individuation and socialization operate concurrently, producing hybrid traits. There is the least mixture of these trends in the two extreme types of communities we have studied: the metropolis, representing the impersonal type, on the one hand; and the New England farm village, representing the social type, on the other. A mixture of traits was more apparent in the modern rural community whose allegiance is divided between the farm and the city, and in the industrial town, like Fairmont, where "big-city" problems are present to disturb the organization of a small community. We might pursue these trends still further by examining another type, such as Muncie, Indiana, an industrial and commercial city made famous by Lynds' *Middletown*,⁴⁸ but there is no need of adding to the list. If one understands the processes involved in community life, if he is familiar with the combined approach of the ecological and the cultural community studies, he will be able to deal, whenever he finds it, with the problem of how people and their culture are affected by the place where they live and the social organization they inherit and develop there.

We have considered the community and its social organization in general. We are now prepared to examine the way particular interests are organized in a society. How does man govern himself, politically? How are his economic activities organized? What are the patterns of family life, of religion, education, and leisure-time interests? These are all special phases of the total social organization. In so far as they develop in relation to natural areas, the foregoing discussion of the community will provide the setting for their analysis, but as they extend beyond local areas in more inclusive relationships, new concepts will be introduced to explain their nature. As always, our interest will consist not in an exhaustive amassing of descriptive data, but in the study of the social processes revealed by current trends.

⁴⁸ Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1929.

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Chapter 17

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

THE ECONOMIC ORDER IN CARICATURE¹

A NUMBER of people are desirous of crossing the ocean. Indeed they must cross. Among them are many talented technicians but no chief engineer.

Everybody sets to work to provide the necessary transportation. One group secures a stout wooden hull and patches it, not very evenly, with heavy steel plates. Another group prepares a monstrous great engine of the very latest design and thermal efficiency. Another puts on a cute little propeller, 1880 model. Another group installs the pumps according to secret formula; another wires the ship with eighty-seven searchlights, all complete. The group providing the fuel hesitates between coal, oil, and wood, ultimately deciding to take all three. Most of it is subsequently thrown overboard. The mast brigade erects the tallest spar known in marine history, equipped with a hoisting device for the elevation and wonder of the passengers. The charge per elevation is one dollar.

The culinary division specializes pretty heavily on caviar and champagne, but has more cereals aboard than it knows what to do with. The stateroom division specializes in suites de luxe, but takes justifiable pride in a bathroom and an electric refrigerator every ten feet. There is an elegant swimming pool, but not enough bunks.

Nobody remembers the life boats.

The expedition has a political leader, but no technical captain and staff, no bridge, no conning tower, no signal system to the engine room, no organized tricks at the wheel. The purser and his men occasionally give the latter a twirl, but mostly they are too busy selling tickets at the mast head. The political leader devotes himself to shaking hands with the passengers and chucking babies under the chin.

¹ Stuart Chase, "You and I and the Big Idea," *Survey*, vol. 67, p. 566, Mar. 1, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publishers.

As the ship leaves the dock, the several groups groom their several specialties with the utmost enthusiasm. The efficiency of any one group is frequently incredible. The engine whirls magnificently, indeed so magnificently that the poor little propeller breaks a blade. The siren brigade lets off such a blast that, like Mark Twain's Mississippi river steamboat, it stops the engine. The pumps revolve madly with nothing as yet to work upon. The searchlights—though it is still broad day—get the jump on the electric ranges, and the cooks have no means of warming the soup. As no course has been set, the rudder drifts where it will. Occasional collisions with harbor traffic are unavoidable.

Once and again, for a few blissful hours, the several crews purely by accident so regulate their specialties that rough correlation is achieved, and a little headway made. Sometimes there is almost enough hot soup to go around, and all the passengers congratulate themselves on their progress. The political leader delivers a stirring address in the main saloon, prophesying bunks and soup for everybody, smiling seas and a record passage. The travelers emerge on deck, and in a frenzy of optimism, all try to mount the mast at once. Dollar tickets are bid up to five dollars, ten dollars. One great-hearted fellow orders the swimming pool to be filled with champagne.

At this point, alas, the stokers so furiously ply the boilers with inappropriate fuels that the crank-shaft snaps. Passengers are shaken from the masthead and some of them seriously injured. Presently—and inevitably—all the crews are out of step again. At the moment the ship is revolving in circles with a nasty gale coming on.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

Three guesses are more than are needed to know what Stuart Chase thinks of the orderliness of economic organization, but his fun-poking analogy somewhat misses the point by attacking a straw man. We have no economic "system" and few people would seriously claim that we do. There is

. . . no constitution for the economic order, no established structure of industries, no prescribed pattern of economic functions, no industrial dictator or council of economic wise men, no program designed to make of wealth an instrument of social welfare.²

² From Walton H. Hamilton, "Organization, Economic," *Encyclopædia of The Social Sciences*, vol. 11, p. 485. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

Nor does an orderliness issue automatically from the rationality of "the economic man," on whom scholars formerly relied, for he, too, has turned out to be a straw man who in real life is lost among the ranks of "rich men and poor men, plumbers and antiquarians, fishmongers and bond salesmen, researchers and realtors and morticians."³ There is no economic order apart from the matrix of social life, itself. What we really have is a society of people part of whose activity is called economic because it centers around the production and use of wealth. "Economic organization is not a thing apart; it is an implication of man's entire life in society."⁴ Like any other phase of social organization, its institutions and patterns of behavior have a natural history; they have emerged out of the corporate experience of people who in seeking an abundant life have developed means of self-control in its achievement. Into their "emergence has gone some foresight, a bit of intermittent tinkering and a lot of undirected development."⁵ We cannot say that the resulting economic arrangements fit together to form a symmetrical, harmonious whole. Social planners would wish it so, but realists see that it is not.

The nature of economic organization. Although in our economic relations we may have no "technical captain and staff, no bridge, no conning tower, no signal system to the engine room, and no organized tricks at the wheel," all economic pursuits are not without organization. Banks, trade associations, tariff commissions, consumer's cooperatives, holding companies, and other organizations are forms of control which regulate the way people earn a livelihood.

Whatever control of economic activity has evolved, is of two general and related types. The first includes such abstract notions as private property, free competition, individual initiative, and production for profit, which for a great many people have become standardized assumptions underlying any economic discussion. They are institutionalized patterns of belief that control attitudes as effectively as do the comparable ideas of monogamy in family organization, monotheism in religion, and democracy in govern-

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 487. Cf., nevertheless, the traditional position of the *laissez-faire* economists who thought that planning was unnecessary if individuals were allowed to compete freely for economic gain. This theory is treated briefly in chapter 18.

ment. The second type of control is the more easily visualized institutionalization of economic activity in the form of trade unions, trade associations, chain stores, and cooperatives. The two forms of control function together in actual situations—the abstract ideas are the rationale of the organization. The American Federation of Labor, for example, is organized to function within the framework—that is, in accordance with the basic theories, the rationalizations, of capitalism.

In calling attention to this dual aspect of social control in economic relations, we are merely applying the sociological principle which pertains to all corporate activity, namely, that in every collective action involving the cooperation and association of persons, there is a common interest, a purpose, or an objective (sometimes clearly defined in a rational statement, sometimes emotionally symbolized in a concept, sometimes only vaguely realized). There is also a structure or an organization which controls behavior in accordance with that common interest. In different societies economic activity has a different organization and a different rationale. The primitive tribal system differs from feudalism, and an agrarian economy differs from an industrial economy. Our intention in making the following reference to a few of these types and giving a somewhat fuller description of current trends in this country is to illustrate how the presumably simple task of making a livelihood may become organized as a complex activity with its rationalizing concepts. We shall deal more with the former aspects—the economic group activities which can be observed objectively—than with the rationale of their behavior, which would take us too far into the field of economic theory.

Our discussion will be further limited by an emphasis upon those forms of organization which reflect the ecological and technological changes of the past century or two. This was the approach we followed in studying community organization and will continue as our unifying point of view in analyzing the structure of government, and of educational and religious organization. For a comparison, we turn first to economic life in societies unlike the present.

Economic organization in other societies. In tribal society, if the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island are a fair example,⁶

⁶ Cf. chapter 6.

there were rudimentary forms of what are now called the basic institutions of private property, exchange, and credit, but we would be projecting our own attitudes and systems into the minds of primitive people, if on the basis of this evidence we attribute to them a preoccupation with "making money," "marketing goods," and "saving" for a rainy day. The individual's sense of possession in his hunting weapons, war regalia, and slaves does not compare with the complicated laws and attitudes which accompany our belief in the institution of private property. Life in a primitive tribe was integrated, not departmentalized into the religious, educational, and recreational categories that cause each personality in modern society to play five or a dozen specialized roles. This characteristic of primitive life has been shared by other societies. Feudalism was not a system of economics; it was a way of living. "In the Middle Ages economic organization was an unrecognized and undifferentiated aspect of a landed and ecclesiastical social establishment."⁷ The differentiation of life into separate compartments is, with some exceptions as in Graeco-Roman times, a modern phenomenon; and even today the compartments are not watertight, as was evident from the interplay of ecological and cultural forces in the social organization of neighborhoods and communities. We need not return to primitive culture, nor to the Middle Ages, to draw the contrast; the agrarian society typical in this country for more than two centuries after the Pilgrims farmed for a living will provide the comparison. It all seems like ancient history now in contrast with the changes that have crowded the decades of the nineteenth century and are not yet ended.

In that agrarian economy everything which people needed, except Bibles, salt, strap-iron, and gunpowder, was produced by individuals and families for their own use. What we now call the fundamental elements in production—land, capital, labor, and management—were not divided into separate functions. The farmer owned the land and such "capital goods" as plows, barns, horses, and a forge. He and his family provided the labor, and they were the managers of the enterprise. Not to over-simplify the picture, we acknowledge there was some trade, even foreign trade, there was a money system, extension of credit, and small

⁷ From Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 486. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

manufacturing, but if these were the forerunners of our present systems, the modern heirs little resemble their ancestors.

Revolutionary changes in economic organization. The changes in the mode of living which came through the industrial and commercial revolutions have been recounted so many times that one familiar with the history of the period could not overlook the important points. A review of their effects on economic organization will not, however, prove a waste of time, when one can find such a compact summary as that made by Walton H. Hamilton. What he has to say can best be applied to our purpose by first studying, and then keeping in mind, his definition of economic organization:

It comprehends all the usages and arrangements, formal and informal, consciously contrived or adventitious, which present so much of an institutional answer as we have to such questions as what is to be produced, who is to share in the productive process, how the resulting goods are to be consumed, where power and discretion in industrial matters are to lie and how fully and to what good ends the human and material resources of society are to be employed.⁸

In reading the following condensation⁹ of recent changes in our economic organization (which many writers have expanded into lengthy treatises) we shall, therefore, watch for all allusions to the "usages and arrangements" which have had their influence in determining "what is to be produced, who is to share in the productive process," and the other phases of organized activity encompassed by Hamilton's broad definition.

In the United States in less than a century the economy of small farm and petty trade was transformed into the great industry. For the most part scientists, inventors and business men were responsible for the innovations; but it is difficult to picture them as conscious revolutionists fomenting rebellion against the established social order. Innocently as it was begun, the machine got the run of the workshop, made a factory out of it and stripped the worker of his skill. Man escaped from his place in the home, found a refuge in office, store or

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 484. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 486, 487. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

factory and quickly forgot that from time immemorial until yesterday his had been a domestic occupation; and, after a decorous period, woman began to follow him. The farmer, the bulwark of the old system, was dragged into the new, began to produce cash crops for distant users and came perforce to be a business man. After the reputable customs of the commercial world he began to speculate upon an increase in land values. Out of bargaining, a manly and loquacious procedure which had served a casual trade well enough, was created an intricate and unarticulated structure of markets, credits and accounts. A cheapening of the cost of transport enlarged trading areas and localized industries. In the wake of the machine came a division of labor as comprehensive as the continent; no longer could any family be self-sufficient; it went to market with its vendible services and property and brought back a living which came from the ends of the earth. An aggregation of farms and crafts gave way to a none too orderly articulation of interlocking industrial activities. It is hard enough to write down the initial date of this transformation; it is impossible to fix the terminal one. At the turn of the century the moving picture and the automobile were engaging toys; at present they are being woven into the very fabric of our culture. The possibilities which lie in such diverse things as quantity production, urban decentralization, the use of the corporate device, the simplification of the structure of ownership, the distribution of the equities in property and the use of hours snatched from an overlong workday are beginning to be explored; and among the folkways of industry, big and little, revolutionary change is imminent. The iron man and the adding machine go their relentless way; and with them things established must patch up the best truce they can.

No time has been taken out for a truce, and, with new inventions continuing to revolutionize production, new wars continuing to play havoc with foreign trade, and new political policies upsetting business predictions, there is little prospect that stability of any type will enjoy a long life. To be kept up to date, histories of economic organization require rewriting not once in a decade, but every six months. We shall not try to scrutinize all of the forces involved in the interplay of economic change—specialists in the field have a difficult time succeeding with this task; rather we shall sample only a few of the changing ways of man's economy, and this with some fear and trepidation, realizing that shortly these

trends may move in a new direction. The ones selected are those that directly affect other phases of social organization. A logical beginning point in this partial survey of economic organization relates to the process of production.

ORGANIZATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS

The statement that power drills, cotton gins, and railroads made a factory out of the workshop and turned the farmer into a specialist becomes concrete when a few recent facts are recited. They concern the increasing productivity which mechanization and the organization of production in mass units have made possible.

While various measures of the productivity of labor differ considerably in detail, there is little reason to doubt that the advances in productivity since 1923 surpass the experience of similar earlier periods of which we have any adequate record. Between 1899 and 1909 the output per worker in agriculture increased 6 percent; in mining 13 percent; in manufacturing 7 percent; and in rail transportation 14 percent. Between 1923 and 1929, a much shorter period, the productivity of manufacturing labor increased 22 per cent; from 1920 to 1929 output per service hour of railway employees rose 22 percent; and from 1919 to 1929 production per man per day of bituminous coal miners increased 30 percent.¹⁰

In the banner year of "prosperity," 1929, we produced in goods and services an estimated total of 81 billion dollars. The well-documented inventory of our productive capacity for that year made by the Brookings Institution showed that this total could have been increased by 19 per cent had our economic organization been such as to provide for its absorption.¹¹ The National Survey of Potential Production estimated a possible output of 135 billion dollars' worth of goods and services for 1929, which would have meant a 45 per cent increase over what was produced, and would

¹⁰ Edwin F. Gay and Leo Wolman, "Trends in Economic Organization." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. I, pp. 234-235; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹¹ Edwin G. Nourse and Associates, *America's Capacity to Produce*, p. 422, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1934.

have provided the equivalent of \$4,400 in goods and services per family for the year.¹²

The technological improvements on which these estimates are based and which therefore occurred before 1929 are impressive enough, but each year adds still other developments in manufacturing, transportation, and agriculture. We are constantly finding improvements taking place in the production of automobiles, radios, and other fabricated commodities; and other technical changes make more efficient the mining of coal, refining oil, and hundreds of such operations. Further improvements constantly increase the farmer's ability to supply the country with foodstuffs and clothing. Irrigation is opening for use millions of acres of fertile land, and improved methods of fertilization and erosion control are making possible the reclamation of marginal land. The state agricultural colleges and experiment stations are teaching the farmer scientific methods of production and management. The modern cow is bred and fed to produce more milk; the modern hen no longer loiters around the barnyard but, fooled by an artificial sun, arises two hours before daybreak and has more time for scratching, eating, and laying eggs; the applications of animal and plant genetics have caused more kernels of corn to grow on every cob, more grain and fewer beards on every stalk of barley, and more bacon and tenderloin on every hog.

While improvements in raising and making what we need have altered the farm and factory, they have also revolutionized the home, especially that part of it where economic activity is centered, the kitchen. The housewife who wishes to interpret her task as something more complicated than the manipulation of a can opener has at her disposal the latest devices for pressure cooking and canning; a multiple-attachment electric gadget that can whip cream, mix a cake, stir the baby's cereal, grind meat, and peel

¹² Harold Loeb, *The Chart of Plenty*, a study of America's production capacity based on the findings of the National Survey of Potential Production Capacity, p. 137, Viking Press, New York, 1935. The estimate of productive capacity which this study makes is much greater than that of the Brookings report, largely because of a difference in purpose and method of the two studies. The Brookings Institution dealt with only the actual capacity of our agriculture and industries to produce with the equipment and under the economic practice and organization existing in 1929, while this report considered our potential capacity in that year limited only by such basic factors as resources and labor supply.

potatoes; and mechanical dish washers, automatic ovens, and improved cleaners, washers, and ironers. If the homestead movement or the Borsodian gospel¹³ of return to domestic production wins a sizable following, the home may regain some of the economic functions it has lost in recent years.

Without indulging in any prediction along this line and without listening to fantastic tales of inventions yet to come, we can safely say that on the basis of skills and techniques now possessed, our potential ability to create goods and services to meet human requirements is phenomenal in comparison with that of previous centuries. Manual power becomes a stone age concept in calculating production. While careful students of economics generally find little merit in the analysis on which the Technocrats¹⁴ based their prediction of the four-hour work day and a life of luxury, the most conservative appraisals leave room for one to marvel at modern means of exploiting nature and fabricating goods.

Now, in returning to the part social organization has played in these achievements, we ask two specific questions: How has organized effort affected the discovery and invention of new techniques and machines? How has it affected their use? Let us consider these questions in order.

Organized research. The first reaction of the much impressed layman who visits an industrial exhibition and sees the miraculous accomplishments of modern science is that this generation and the last must have possessed more than their share of inventive geniuses. As he watches demonstrations of pneumatic drills, magnetic cranes, automatic welders, machine cigaret makers, mechanical calculators, and 24-hour cement he is convinced that this is the golden age of supermen. The explanation which more careful study offers rests less in the figure of the individual genius or in a race of supermen, and more in the organization of scientific research. Although there continues to be plenty of individual achievement, the individual

¹³ Ralph Borsodi, *Flight from the City*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933; and "Subsistence Homesteads," *Survey Graphic*, vol. 23, pp. 11-14, Jan., 1934.

¹⁴ A group of students impressed with our technological advance popularized their theories of how the nation might soon enjoy prosperous living. Their school of thought which attracted widespread attention for a brief time was known as "Technocracy." A brief statement of its position was made by one of its leaders, Howard Scott, in *Introduction to Technocracy*, The John Day Company, New York, 1933.

begins with the accumulated knowledge of science as a background. The typical inventor no longer works long hours in an unheated garret, stalling off the landlady until his patent is sold for a fortune. He is a member of a research staff retained by private industry, by foundations, universities, or governmental bureaus, which expend millions of dollars annually for investigation and experimentation. "In 1927 the National Research Council listed 999 research agencies, company, joint, consulting and trade association laboratories and research services in universities cooperating with industries."¹⁵ And "from organized research in the physical science . . . research is extending into labor management, industrial psychology, sales management and advertising."¹⁶

The only trouble with this organized creativity is that it is unrelated to the rest of our economy. Long before economic and social adjustments can be made to one form of production, another, far more radical, is ushered in, or an entirely new product replaces the old. Millions of farm families are comfortably situated to supply the nation with food and clothing materials when suddenly a third of their number is no longer needed because inventions enable the remaining two thirds to produce more than can be sold. Theater orchestras are displaced by talking movies. Miners lose their jobs when electric scoop shovels, as tall as a four story building, remove ten tons of dirt at one bite and lay open rich veins of coal ready to be loaded into cars, untouched by the miner's pick axe. The problem of technological unemployment may be provided for if certain long-time policies are followed in our economic organization, but temporarily at least this problem has tended to disrupt economic and social relationships. Our first observation is, therefore, that organized effort has a remarkable record of achievement in improving techniques of production, but that this phase of the process has not yet become integrated with other social processes.

Mass production. The second evidence of partial organization is in the units of production themselves. We are all familiar with the fact that many recent inventions call for mass production of goods, leading inevitably to complex industrial organization.¹⁷ This organization, however, has the same shortcoming characteristic

¹⁵ Gay and Wolman, *op. cit.*, p. 236; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 239.

of organized industrial research in that the planning of each unit or group is only with reference to its own immediate problem and not to the operation of the entire system. If we could depend upon the system adjusting itself automatically in such a way as to satisfy the people who comprise it, there would be no need for a conscious integration of the different parts; but that the millions of unemployed, at least, are not satisfied with its operation, is a foregone conclusion. Our second observation is, therefore, similar to the first, that within a limited area man has developed complex and closely coordinated organizations which are often made ineffective through the operation of larger forces. Let us continue this survey of organized economic activity by studying some of the forms of modern business.

ORGANIZATION OF BUSINESS

The order of the day in commerce as well as in production is organized control. It appears in ownership, financing, advertising, selling, and every other business operation. Market day in a native village in Guatemala seems complicated enough to the tourist unfamiliar with the customs of trade, but it cannot be compared with the intricate organization of the boards of trade in Chicago, New York, and London, which determine the price to be paid the Dakota farmer for his wheat. And the way in which companies are financed through the sale of stocks and bonds in the New York market is incomprehensible to the crossroads grocer who inherited ownership of the store from his father. Several special developments in business illustrate particularly well the trend toward organization.

Mergers and combinations. The desire to replace the "vicissitudes and uncertainties of uncontrolled competitive business," and to eliminate waste and reduce cost of operation were, according to Gay and Wolman, the factors which mark the post-war decade as an era of consolidations in business.¹⁸

The record of over 1,200 mergers in manufacturing and mining between 1919 and 1928, involving a net disappearance of over 6,000 independent enterprises by the end of 1928 and some 2,000 more by

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

the end of 1930, is far from a complete record of mergers in all fields. Over 4,000 enterprises among public utilities were absorbed in the same period before 1929 and nearly 1,800 bank mergers caused the disappearance of an unrecorded but probably larger number of banks. Many consolidations have taken place in other fields, such as the movement toward vertical integration in the motion picture industry from film producer to chains of theaters, and the development of chains of retail stores with their extraordinary increase in sales since the war. To meet the new competition in the retail field, the older leaders in large scale retailing, the department stores and the great mail order houses, have been changing in structure, the department stores commencing to join in chains and the mail order houses themselves to operate retail chain stores.¹⁹

The epidemic of chain store selling has spread to every region and to communities of every size. Some of the smaller chains operate within a single locality, while others branch out to cover larger regions or blanket the entire country with their red fronts and bargain counters. One of the largest of the drug chains, the Walgreen Drug Company, owns 500 stores in more than 30 states. Its fifty million dollar a year business has developed within the thirty-five year period since the time when Charles R. Walgreen borrowed \$2,000 from his father for a down payment in the purchase of his first drug store. Other illustrations of remarkable growth in chain store operations can be taken from almost any field of retail merchandising;²⁰ and the same development has entered the hotel business and commercial recreation.

By 1930 sectional and national chains were transacting practically one-fifth of the total retail trade of the country, but in many retail fields the proportion was much higher.²¹

To meet the competition independent dealers have, themselves, organized voluntary chains and appointed central purchasing and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. See also Richard N. Owens, *Business Organization and Combination*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1934.

²⁰ See in *ibid.*, p. 242, what per cent of the total stores in various lines of retailing are chain stores.

²¹ *Ibid.*; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

advertising representatives. "The American Institute of Food Distribution reported as of May 1, 1930 that it had record of 273 of such groups with a total membership of 34,311 retailers."²²

Branch and chain banking. The movement toward combinations has not passed over the conservative field of banking, whose freedom we have thought to be so hemmed in by laws of one sort or another as to be immune from change. In states which have not prohibited it, branch banking, in which numerous branches extend from a parent institution into other localities, has provided a common means of central control over dispersed units of business. Group or chain banking, a second form, which has prospered especially in areas where the first is illegal, provides for the control by individuals of groups of separate institutions through the ownerships of their stock. The number of bank mergers, which is still another form of combination, increased from 20 in 1900 to 126 in 1910, to 172 in 1920, to 735 in 1930.²³

The modern corporation. Mergers, chain stores, and branch banking are in reality special forms of one basic institution, the modern corporation, which occupies the center of the stage in economic organization and is revolutionizing methods of business control, as the machine altered methods of production. The research of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means into the extent and structure of corporate enterprise is considered by many to have set a milepost in economic history. They compare the "typical business unit of the 19th century [which] was owned by individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control," with the modern corporation, a device "whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction."²⁴ Modern economic life is controlled by these great organizations,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 244; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

²⁴ From Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, p. 2, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933. Cf. also the careful study of the same trend made by Paul M. O'Leary, *Corporate Enterprise in Modern Economic Life*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933.

. . . in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control and management.²⁵

The illustration par excellence of such a unit is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company "with assets of almost five billions of dollars, with 454,000 employees, and stockholders to the number of 567,694."²⁶

One hundred companies of this size would control the whole of American wealth; would employ all of the gainfully employed; and if there were no duplication of stockholders, would be owned by practically every family in the country.²⁷

The authors may have given too little attention to small organizations in their preoccupation with the 200 largest companies in the country, but they felt justified in placing the emphasis where they did, after discovering that of the 300,000 non-banking corporations existing in 1929, the 200 controlled nearly one half of the corporate wealth. Their tables and percentages summarize this situation,²⁸ but for the average person statistics do not tell the story as convincingly as the personal picture which the authors also give of the way these giants of modern business become involved in one's daily activities:²⁹

These great companies form the very framework of American industry. The individual must come in contact with them almost constantly. He may own an interest in one or more of them, he may be employed by one of them, but above all he is continually accepting their service. If he travels any distance he is almost certain to ride on one of the great railroad systems. The engine which draws him has probably been constructed by the American Locomotive Company or the Baldwin Locomotive Works; the car in which he rides is likely

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁶ *Ibid.* By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁷ *Ibid.* By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

to have been made by the American Car and Foundry Company or one of its subsidiaries, unless he is enjoying the services of the Pullman Company. The rails have almost certainly been supplied by one of the eleven steel companies on the list; and coal may well have come from one of the four coal companies, if not from a mine owned by the railroad itself. Perhaps the individual travels by automobile—in a car manufactured by the Ford, General Motors, Studebaker, or Chrysler Companies, on tires supplied by Firestone, Goodrich, Goodyear or the United States Rubber Company. He may choose among the brands of gas furnished by one of the twenty petroleum companies all actively seeking his trade. Should he pause to send a telegram or to telephone, one of the listed companies would be sure to fill his need.

Perhaps, on the other hand, the individual stays in his own home in comparative isolation and privacy. What do the two hundred largest companies mean to him there? His electricity and gas are almost sure to be furnished by one of the public utility companies: the aluminum of his kitchen utensils by the Aluminum Co. of America. His electric refrigerator may be the product of General Motors Co., or of one of the two great electric equipment companies, General Electric and Westinghouse Electric. The chances are that the Crane Company has supplied his plumbing fixtures, the American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., his heating equipment. He probably buys at least some of his groceries from the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.—a company that expected to sell one-eighth of all the groceries in the country in 1930—and he secures some of his drugs, directly or indirectly, from the United Drug Company. The cans which contain his groceries may well have been made by the American Can Company; his sugar has been refined by one of the major companies, his meat has probably been prepared by Swift, Armour, or Wilson, his crackers put up by the National Biscuit Company. The newspaper which comes to his door may be printed on International Paper Company paper or on that of the Crown Zellerbach; his shoes may be one of the International Shoe Company's makes; and although his suit may not be made of American Woolen Company cloth, it has doubtless been stitched on a Singer sewing machine.

Corporate ownership is no new thing in world history, but the pattern of organization so typical in the modern corporation is distinctly new. In the Roman *universitates* and the joint stock-

trading companies of the seventeenth century, the owners maintained control of the enterprise. In the modern type-case of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company the control rests theoretically with the 567,694 stockholders (who because of their possession of stock are legally part owners in the business), but because this group is too unwieldy to participate actively in its management, the actual control "may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding."³⁰ The largest single shareholder in this company is reported to own less than 1 per cent of the stock,³¹ a statement which also holds true for the United States Steel Corporation and the Pennsylvania Railroad, both billion dollar enterprises.³² The size of the largest individual holdings and the dispersion of ownership in some of the great companies appeared in 1929 as follows:³³

Company	Size of Largest Holding	Number of Stockholders
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.....	.76%	59,042
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Rd. Co.	1.36	12,045
General Electric Co.....	1.50	60,374
Delaware & Hudson Co.....	1.51	9,003
Southern Pacific Co.....	1.65	55,788
Boston Elevated Ry. Co.....	1.66	16,419
Southern Ry. Co.....	1.92	20,262
Consolidated Gas Co. of N. Y.	2.11	93,515
Great Northern Ry. Co.....	2.12	42,085
Northern Pacific Ry. Co.....	2.13	38,339
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rd. Co.....	2.23	12,693
Union Pacific Rd. Co.....	2.27	49,387
Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co.....	2.56	39,627
Western Union Tel. Co.....	2.74	23,738

Berle and Means found that in actual practice only 5 per cent of the 200 largest corporations were controlled through a majority

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 48. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

ownership of the stock. In 44 per cent of the cases control rested with the management, which owned a small fraction, if any, of their company's stock; in 21 per cent control was secured through some legal device by persons whose share in the ownership was small; in 23 per cent a person or group who owned a sizable minority of the stock secured "working control"; and 6 per cent of the companies were privately owned and controlled, as, for example, the Ford Motor Company.³⁴

This separation of ownership and control is the characteristic of many modern corporations which distinguishes them from earlier forms. The typical investor who buys stock on the advice of a friend, a broker, a banker, or a purchasing syndicate never attends the stockholders' meetings (and because of his limited votes could exert no real power, if he did); seldom, if ever, visits the factories or mines in which he has purchased an interest; has no control over the personnel, dividend payment, labor relations, quality of the product, or any other managerial policy. He is an owner of the company, but he has surrendered active control to those who own larger percentages of the stock (or a type of stock which carries more voting privileges), or to the management. A legal device which has permitted an extreme extension of this trend is the institution called a holding company.

The holding company. Broadly speaking, the holding company may be defined as a company which holds securities in another company or companies,³⁵ but in the light of the foregoing discussion of ownership and control a more adequate definition might be stated as follows:

Any company, incorporated or unincorporated, which is in a position to control, or materially to influence, the management of one or more other companies by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership of securities in the other company or companies.³⁶

Through a relatively small investment and the use of the holding company device, one may secure complete control of another holding company, or of an operating company which is engaged

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³⁵ James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means, *The Holding Company*, p. 10, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1932.

³⁶ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

in the production of goods or services. Trying to understand an explanation of the way in which this can transpire causes many a non-specialist to give up in despair, but if one will take time to go through the following hypothetical case step by step, it will seem simple enough.

Let us assume the existence of a company capitalized by the issuance of fifty million dollars of bonds, fifty million dollars par value of non-voting preferred stock, and fifty million dollars par value of common stock. Let us assume, further, that a group of bankers desires to secure control of this corporation. In order to gain complete control, through the power to elect the board of directors, the bankers must purchase just over 50 per cent of the common stock, and, if the market value of this stock is equivalent to its par value, this will require an investment of about twenty-five million dollars. Suppose, now, that the bankers purchase this amount of stock, thus securing control, but that they do not wish to retain a twenty-five million dollar investment in the enterprise. They therefore form a holding company and turn over to this holding company their own stockholdings in the operating company, receiving in exchange ten million dollars of bonds, five million dollars of preferred stock, and ten million dollars of common stock of the holding company. They then proceed to sell the bonds and the preferred stock of the holding company, together with almost five million dollars of common stock of the holding company. Their investment in this entire enterprise is thus reduced by the total amount for which they can market these holding-company securities; but they still retain over five million dollars of the common stock of the holding company, thereby keeping control of the 150 million dollar operating company.³⁷

Control through holding companies has been more prevalent among railroads and public utilities than among manufacturing concerns. The names of Cleveland's railroad magnates, the Van Sweringens, and of Chicago's public utilities king, Insull, brought holding companies, which had previously been a concern of the financial section, into front page news. As their cases illustrate, this device operates best during a "boom" time when a costly superstructure can be supported by the earnings of the producing

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.


companies which it controls, and when an optimistic public will buy new issues of holding company stock freely. If earnings decline and dividends go unpaid, the structure begins to topple, or at least new stories cannot be added. The following paragraph gives some notion of the proportions of the Insull economic kingdom in these halcyon days, and figure 5 pictures the apex of the pyramid of power, with arrows pointing to the 156 subsidiaries which could not be included on the page.

. . . In December, 1928, Insull Utility Investments, Inc., was formed for the specific purpose of acquiring and holding substantial amounts of the voting stock of the five Insull companies. In October, 1929, the Corporation Securities Company of Chicago was formed for a similar purpose. Between them, these two holding companies had assets at the end of 1930 of over \$400,000,000 and held a dominant, though not a majority, interest in the Middle West Utilities Company (29.2 per cent), the Commonwealth Edison Company (17.2 per cent), the Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Company (28.8 per cent), and the Public Service Corporation of Northern Illinois (11.5 per cent). Since the Midland United Company was jointly controlled by these four, the whole group was under the control of the two investment companies, partly through the latter's stock interest, and partly through the wide distribution of the remaining stock (Middle West Utilities having 85,000 stockholders). Furthermore, the investment companies were, in a sense, Siamese twins. Corporation Securities Company owned 28.8 per cent of the voting stock of Insull Utilities Investments, Inc., while the latter owned 19.7 per cent of the former. That these companies are under the control of the Insulls is indicated by the fact that Samuel Insull is chairman of the board of directors of both companies, while Samuel Insull, Jr., is president of both and Martin J. Insull is a third director in each. The remaining members of the board of Insull Utility Investments, Inc., are, for the most part, presidents or vice-presidents of the five controlled companies or their subsidiaries—eight out of the remaining twelve directors—while several of the directors of the Corporation Securities Company are similarly under Insull dominance. The Insulls are thus able through these two investment companies, each owning a dominant interest in the other, to control a vast system of utility properties. Here pyramiding is shown in its most advanced form.³⁸

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp 112-113. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

FIG. 8
MAJOR ELEMENTS IN THE INSULL UTILITY SYSTEM*


(As of December 31, 1930)
 Combined Assets over \$2,400,000,000



KEY



Holding Company



Operating Company

Majority Control

Minority Control

* From James C. Bonbright and Gardiner C. Means, *The Holding Company*, p. 109. Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Evaluations of an economic organization which permits such centralization of power, and in many cases separation of control and ownership, have included statements of high praise and extreme censure. Berle and Means conclude that ". . . the modern corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant institution of the modern world . . . which can compete on equal terms with the modern state."³⁹ Laboring groups, particularly those of more radical hue, look upon it as an uncontrolled monster whose chief aim is to exploit the working class.

Those who would temper these appraisals point out that both the Berle and Means, and Bonbright and Means studies photographed the modern corporation in its most corpulent state at the zenith of financial expansion, that no one can yet say what trends in economic organization will emerge from the depression. They also build up a case for efficiency of production and management through centralized control, citing cases of reduction in cost of the commodity produced and increase in wages to employees and in dividends to stockholders. They argue that although temptation for exploitation and personal gain exists when power is concentrated and ownership dispersed, the temptation is offset by the management's desire to maintain goodwill among investors and the general public, in order to avoid adverse legislative control and maintain a ready market for their securities. They believe the pressure of this indirect check is an adequate safeguard. They also remind us that giant companies are spectacular and news-worthy because of their size, but do not cover the entire field of economic organization.

Our own interest has not consisted in appraising but in describing these developments. The modern corporation appearing in its many forms of public utilities holding companies, chain stores, branch banking, and a host of other manifestations is a part of the social structure of communities and of national and world-wide relationships. Its influence is felt in every discussion of present-day society.

³⁹ From Berle and Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-357. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers. In recent years several Congressional investigations have dealt with various types of corporate activity; reports are available in the *Congressional Record*.

THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

A board of directors may consider labor one unit in production to be placed along side of raw materials and fixed charges in calculating the cost of operation, but in its more self-conscious moods, labor has insisted that it is composed of human beings whose "rights" are to be protected. From the beginnings of the industrial revolution in England when power looms replaced hand weaving, and skilled workmen saw their jobs jeopardized by the machine, groups of workers have organized for common protection. Their organization to combat power looms in early nineteenth century England took the form of secret societies dedicated to the task of smashing every new machine as quickly as it was installed. Today the trade unions of England have become a powerful economic and political influence in the life of the nation. We have already discussed the reasons why a similarly powerful and united labor movement did not develop in the United States, but we have not described the organizations which do exist.

Trade unionism. During the nineteenth century labor groups made several attempts to organize for political action and also showed some interest in establishing democratic industries controlled by the workers, but after 1850 the trend of their organized efforts was more in the direction of trade unionism, and by the eighteenth-nineties this trend was clearly dominant over other interests.⁴⁰ In 1897 the membership in trade unions was 447,000; by 1900, following a period of prosperity, it had reached 868,500.⁴¹ Favored by the demand for labor during and immediately following the World War and by a restriction of supply through enlistment in the army and limitation of immigration, unionism enjoyed high prestige and power, symbolized by its peak membership figure of 5,110,800 in 1920;⁴² this number declined more than a million during the depression of the next two years, and failed to rally again in the prosperous period preceding 1929. By that time the membership declined to 3,440,000, and after the second year of

⁴⁰ John R. Commons, "The Labor Movement," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 8, p. 693, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1932.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 685.

⁴² *Ibid.*

the depression, the number was barely more than three million.⁴³ "New Deal" legislation and administrative policies considered favorable to unionism stimulated a new growth which greatly increased the size of labor unions throughout the country.⁴⁴ The fortunes and vicissitudes of trade unionism can be explained by the character of its organization and by general changes in industrial and business conditions.

A trade union is an organization of workmen in a particular craft or trade (plumbers, machinists, linotype operators, railroad engineers, etc.) who seek to bargain collectively with their employers regarding such matters as higher wages, more stable employment, seniority rights, better working conditions, shorter hours, and recognition of the union as their representative in all trade agreements. This type of union does not usually try to protect the rank and file of labor, but only the skilled workmen who have completed apprenticeship training. They entrench themselves in this favored position whenever possible by insisting that only union members be employed in a trade (the "closed shop" system) and by regulating the admittance of new members to the union.

This type of organization, which has its historical origin in the early guild system, functioned well enough when industry was composed of small units requiring a high percentage of skilled labor. The leather tanner, the steel puddler, the machinist, the miner, the railroad engineer, the mason, plumber, type setter, and telegraph operator were indispensable key-men in manufacturing, construction, mining, communication, and transportation. Since substitutes could not be trained on a few days' notice to take their places, their threat of a strike humbled many an employer who dreaded the consequences of stopping all operations until an agreement could be reached. Labor disputes were most numerous during the period 1916 to 1921 when unionism reached its greatest

⁴³ Leo Wolman and Gustav Peck, "Labor Groups in the Social Structure," *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. II, p. 832, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933.

⁴⁴ Statistics covering the membership of the American Federation of Labor are given in the *Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor*, p. 32, published by the Federation in Washington, D. C., 1934. Only rough estimates are available for the membership affiliated with the Committee on Industrial Organization.

power. The number of disputes declined from an average during that period of 3,503 a year to 791 a year between 1926 and 1930.⁴⁵

When the unions were not engaged in conflicts or negotiations with employers, some of them found time to expand their activities along other lines. An outstanding example is the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, which has organized programs of adult education, established a workers' bank, erected low-cost housing projects for employees, collaborated with employers in improving methods of production, and on one occasion loaned funds from its own treasury to carry a company through a critical period.

The decline in membership of trade unions after 1920 is explained in part by the militant campaign of employers to maintain an "open shop" policy, in part by the shifting of industry from highly unionized regions to cheap labor, non-union areas (as, for example, the movement of many textile plants from New England to the South, and of clothing manufacturing from Chicago and New York to small centers in Pennsylvania), but possibly the most basic factor is the gradual displacement of skilled workers by improved machines, which the casual laborer, with a few days' training, can operate. Henry Ford's use of the conveyor and belt line assembly in mass production is often regarded as the latest stage of the industrial revolution which has reduced man's work to tightening bolts and tending machines.⁴⁶ Such a system operates to the disadvantage of the skilled worker. Inventions in processing steel made unnecessary the skill of the puddler; in glass manufacturing the work of the highly trained blower is performed by the automatic bottle machine; the automatic stoker displaced the fireman; and the invention of the teletype has almost eliminated the vocation of telegrapher. Such facts as these appear in the more recent chapters of the industrial revolution, and help explain the weakening of a labor organization composed of skilled workmen. The old line unions which remain powerful are those whose skilled workers are still indispensable to industry. The largest groups are in transportation and the building trades. There have been some compensating developments; the invention of the moving picture

⁴⁵ Wolman and Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 841.

⁴⁶ See Stuart Chase, *Men and Machines*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929.

created a need for skilled operators who organized a strong union, and commercial airplane mechanics and pilots have started to unionize, but these new skills are more than offset by mass production in the automobile, rubber, steel, food products, tobacco, and other great industries.

New patterns in labor organization. Two types of organization have made their appearance, partly in response to this new condition. The *company union*, which can hardly be called a part of the labor movement because it is usually instituted, fostered, and often financed by the employer, is an inclusive "vertical type" of organization covering all employees in a given plant, but having no affiliation with other local unions to form a federation. It is criticized by members of independent unions who claim that it is formed by companies to prevent their men from joining genuine labor groups. The employers counter with the argument that it is a legitimate means of including the interests of the worker in the policies of the company and at the same time protecting them from "outside agitators."

The second relatively new type is the *industrial union*, which corresponds to the company union and differs from the trade union by including all classes of workers within an industry, but is unlike the company type and similar to the trade union in its independent control—it is strictly a labor organization. The old trade unionists in the American Federation of Labor have opposed this vertical, inclusive organization as a threat to their horizontal system of specialized crafts, but other leaders of the Federation recognize that the industrial unions are a response to the development of unskilled, mass production, and that only as they are encouraged and admitted to membership will organized labor be able to cope with the changing times.⁴⁷ The difference led to a break in 1936 between the executive committee of the American Federation of Labor and the Committee on Industrial Organization. The unions supporting the policy of the latter committee were expelled from the Federation, thereby reducing its membership by approximately one million persons. Under the militant leadership of John L. Lewis the new industrial organization has greatly increased its membership and

⁴⁷ A few unions which have been members of the Federation for some time resemble the industrial type more than the trade union, as the United Mine Workers of America; but in the past they have been considered exceptions, while today their leaders favor this type as the standard pattern.

has managed several major strikes, including the 1937 "sit-down" strikes in the automobile plants.

Political action in the labor movement. The third expression of the labor movement in the United States concerns political action. Divergence of opinion has long existed among the leaders of labor regarding their relation to government. The political radicalism of the early Industrial Workers of the World ("I. W. W.") and anarchist groups caused many members of the Republican and Democratic parties to look upon labor organizations as sources of radical agitation. Samuel Gompers sought to dispel such attitudes while he was president of the American Federation of Labor by steering his organization away from independent political action and repeatedly bespeaking its loyalty to the Constitution and the government. A temporary exception to this policy came in labor's half-hearted support of the La Follette party in 1924, but

. . . Since then the American Federation of Labor has followed its traditional policy of supporting its friends while refraining from a regular political alliance. Repudiating the central socialist doctrine of class warfare, the Federation has been a vociferous opponent of the program it involves. Many of the most important leaders of the American Federation of Labor and its affiliated organizations are either officers of or are in full sympathy with the activities of the National Civic Federation which in recent years has become one of the outstanding anti-radical organizations. With the onswing of the revolutionary movement abroad and its echo in this country, American trade unions have appeared as a bulwark of the present order.⁴⁸

With the spokesmen of 80 per cent of organized labor taking this attitude, one has to look elsewhere for prospects of a proletarian party movement. Minority groups have in the past made several abortive attempts to form a labor party, and at present such interest is expressed by the Socialist, Communist, and Farm-Labor parties, and the League for Independent Political Action. Such organizations have thus far made little impression on national politics but have won several local offices, among which were those of Farm-

⁴⁸ Wolman and Peck, *op. cit.*, p. 842; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. One cannot yet predict whether the newly formed industrial unions will follow or depart from this traditional policy.

Labor governor of Minnesota, the Socialist mayor and council in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Socialist mayors in Reading, Pennsylvania, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. A concerted effort was made to organize labor politically in New York state for the 1936 election. Each of the above minority parties is making a strong appeal for the united support of labor, but as yet the great majority of workers have shown little tendency to depart from their traditional policy.

THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMERS

The modern housewife, in losing her function as manager in the home production of food and clothing, has acquired the new role of domestic purchasing agent. The family has changed from a producing to a buying unit, and market day has shifted from a weekly event to a daily routine.

In this altered economy the market has learned how to educate a nation of consumers to buy the wares which a factory has made. Movie stars and society leaders endorse complexion creams and bed springs; prize fighters attribute their strength to patented tonics; and radio programs herald the virtues of the latest automobile. Style changes in clothing and new models in cars, trade names and attractive cellophane wrappers on products formerly dispensed by the grocer in bulk, free samples, home demonstrations, sales contests, and instalment buying are the manufacturers', wholesalers', and retailers' methods of reducing "sales resistance" and increasing consumption.

To some extent in England and to a greater extent in Finland and Denmark the consumers through their own cooperative agencies have circumvented the development of these sales methods by taking the problem of buying into their own hands.

All the world knows the story of the twenty-eight flannel weavers of Rochdale who, in 1844, put their pence together to buy and divide among themselves the commodities that they required.⁴⁹

This was the feeble beginning of what has grown to be a significant economic and social movement in England. In 1933 the

⁴⁹ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The Consumers' Cooperative Movement*, p. 1, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1921. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

1,150 consumers' societies federated in the British Cooperative Union included in their membership nearly seven million of Great Britain's eleven million families, and reported total retail sales of over £27,000,000. "The largest retail society in the world is the London Cooperative Society, with 500,000 members, 12,000 employees, £7,600,000 capital, and £10,000,000 turnover in 1933."⁵⁰

Like the British Labor Party, the British Cooperatives have aroused considerable interest in the United States but have not been duplicated. For the most part our labor groups have depended for their economic welfare on private business. There are exceptions to both of these statements; we have minority labor parties, and some consumers' cooperatives. The extent of the latter development can be quickly summarized on the basis of a survey made by Florence E. Parker. The membership in the 1,545 societies from which she received reports totalled 554,954, the number of employees, 5,000, and the business done in 1929 \$225,000,000.⁵¹ Two specialized types have expanded rapidly: cooperative oil associations which bring savings in the purchase of gasoline and oils, especially in farm sections using motor driven machinery; and consumers' credit unions which provide small loans to their members at rates of interest lower than the so-called "personal finance corporations." The credit unions, like all cooperatives, have a democratic procedure: each member has one vote irrespective of the number of shares he holds, the officers are chosen by the members, and savings or "profits" are returned to those who participate.

⁵⁰ James P. Warbasse, "Consumers' Cooperative Methods," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 173, p. 170, May, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁵¹ Florence E. Parker, *Consumers', Credit, and Productive Cooperative Societies*, bulletin 531, p. 1, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., 1931. That this expansion in cooperative activities is continuing seems to be indicated by the following more recent statistics which, however, are not based on as careful survey as the one just cited. "In 1935, the National Emergency Council was able to report that about \$300,000,000 worth of business was carried on by Consumers' Cooperative societies in the United States during 1934. Although the exact number of these societies is not known, it has been estimated at perhaps 7,000, of which some 1,500 societies operate various types of stores. In addition there are 2,500 to 3,000 credit unions, about 1,100 farmers' purchasing associations, 600-800 oil associations, chiefly among farmers, and approximately 900 societies providing housing, restaurant, bakery, mill supply, insurance, telephone service, medical care, and other services."—From *The People's Year Book*, 1936, pp. 301, 302, prepared by The Publications Department of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, Manchester, England, 1936.

Since cooperatives include in their membership such a small number of our population (twenty-five hundredths of 1 per cent), one wonders if the interests of consumers are protected by any other type of organization. Among the professional and non-profit agencies which have emerged to aid the consumer may be mentioned the American Medical Association and the American Home Economics Association, both of which have programs of research and education, the Consumers' Research, Inc., and the Consumers' Union. The last two agencies try to render a service in supplying their members with test results of competing brands of commodities which impartial chemists and engineers have investigated. Their research service is now extended to every major type of consumers' goods. The National Consumers' Advisory Board and the Consumers' Council were established as advisory agencies representing the interests of consumers in the construction of codes under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which was declared unconstitutional.

The summary, which we have completed, of some recent trends in economic organization—in industry, business, labor, and consumers' groups—shows how complexly organized life becomes when a society's functions are differentiated and specialized. It reveals a network of secondary relationships replacing primary groups when production and trade grow from small operations to gigantic enterprises. And it shows that individuals, although less personal in their relations, are more interdependent. The investor, the worker, the consumer, are helpless unless the different parts of our economic organization function smoothly. Since a smooth running economy is a seldom realized ideal, some persons and groups are always suffering from its maladjustment. After they have identified the cause of their problem of unemployment, of low dividends, or of business failure with a current, economic condition, they often try to correct the condition by altering the structure of our economy. They seek unemployment insurance, tariff protection, a new type of ownership, or whatever else they consider efficacious. Instead of trying to achieve these economic changes directly, groups with such intent usually call upon the government to assist in their reform. The relations between economic and political organization are sufficiently close in the modern state to warrant their joint consideration.

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Chapter 18

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

A CONVERSATION between Robert Harley (soon afterwards Earl of Oxford) and William Penn: October 7, 1710:¹

Penn. A few days ago I was turning over the leaves of a small book of maxims I wrote many years ago, and found I had written: "Let the people think they govern, and they will be governed."

Harley. I never supposed you so Machiavellian, Mr. Penn. Was that your method in Pennsylvania?

Penn. I did not find that in practice my maxim held water. I gave all the power nominally in the hands of my people, reserving only the right of veto—for my colony was a child, it needed to be guided in its steps—but the more power they seemed to have, the more governmentish they became. Thou saidst few men desired power; I found they all hankered after it.

Harley. Mr. St. John is for leading men as a huntsman does a pack of hounds; he would show them a quarry and halloo them on to hunt it.

Penn. And what is thy view?

Harley. I have no fixed principles; men must be cajoled at some times, frightened at others, at others again crudely forced. Power comes from knowing when to apply the divers methods. Are you for coercives?

Penn. If lenitives will not do, they must be applied, though with regret. But again thou sayest "power" as though that were the end of government. Power for what?

Harley. For what? Why, to win a war, to pass a Bill, to enrich ourselves—with the community to punish malefactors: one uses power as one does one's legs, to take one where one wishes to go at the moment. Why did you want power, Mr. Penn?

Penn. I wanted it to make men free.

¹ By Bonamy Dobrée in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. 133, p. 254, Feb., 1933. Excerpts quoted by permission of the publisher.

Harley. An odd reason indeed. Then your theory of government has no government at all?

Penn. My ideal; but the crimes of men, the degeneracy of mankind, make government necessary. It consorts ill with persons of my religious profession to meddle with any politics. . . .

The objectives and methods of different governments can be described by no set formula if the divergent views of William Penn and Robert Harley are representative. Beneath these apparent differences, and underlying even the contrasts of the modern communist, fascist, and democratic states, there may be more similarity in basic processes of government than is detected by the casual observer. The task of the sociologist is to analyze whatever processes are constant in the multifarious systems of government man has created. We are looking for the underlying principles that account for all types of social organization, and at this point, of political organization.

GOVERNMENT AS A FORMAL MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

In reality, all forms of social organization, from a trade union to the federal constitution, are means of social control, means of regulating the behavior of persons and groups. All forms of organization are patterns through which social interests are expressed; they are the social structure that changes the anarchy of discrete individuals into the corporate life of social beings; they resolve conflicting interests into joint enterprise, replacing individual strife with patterns of compromise and cooperation.

Every group has some organization, some means of accommodating the individual members to one another. The boys' gang, primitive tribe, or company of castaways on Pitcairn Island soon develop customs and rules, divide responsibility, and punish the erring ones. Such customs, regardless of their content, are forms of group control. Any social attitude, custom, or institution which modifies behavior in the direction of group unity is a form of social control. Government is one of these forms. Government controls through secondary, impersonal measures, in contrast with the personal influences of a primary group, and consequently arises when a society becomes too complex or disorganized to be

unified through primary relations. In general, as the size of a society increases, as heterogeneous cultural elements are introduced through contacts with other groups, and as ecological changes disrupt the stability of its culture, the complexity and formal aspects of its social organization increase.

Emergence of formal control. There was a time when England resembled a folk society in which individual behavior was controlled by folkways and mores, which were "right" and obeyed because they were traditional. Even the emergence of its common law was little more than the recognition of mores which had governed behavior for generations.

It probably would have surprised the early Englishman if he had been told that either he or anybody else did not know the law—still more that there was ever any need for any parliament or assembly to tell him what it was. They all knew the law, and they all knew that they knew the law, and the law was a thing that they knew as naturally as they knew fishing and hunting. They had grown up into it. It never occurred to them as an outside thing.²

. . . It was five hundred years before the notion crept into the minds, even of the members of the British Parliaments, that they could make a new law. What they supposed they did, and what they were understood by the people to do, was merely to declare the law, as it was then and as it had been from time immemorial. . . .³

But when the social structure of England was revolutionized by industrial change and when its empire building brought peoples of the greatest diversity under the control of one government, the law-making of Parliament and the administrative tasks of official agencies increased tremendously. The United States, as its name implies, and as its thousands of laws and political officials substantiate, is a political group, a state, unified and regulated by formal organization. Merriam characterizes this formal, accommodative function of political organization in the following terms:

The functional situation out of which the political arises is not the demand for force as such, but the need for some form of equilibrium,

² Frederic J. Stimson, *Popular Law-making*, p. 6, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1912. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

adjustment, *modus vivendi* between the various groups and individuals of the community, as a substitute indeed for force in many cases.⁴

The accommodation of these groups (and of the individuals within them) produces a situation from which political authority emerges, either in dire distress as a last resort, or as a constructive adjustment of a cooperative type, perhaps rationalized as the optimum condition of life.⁵

In addition to its task of accommodating conflicting interest groups within the territory, the state deals also with outside political groups. Indeed, conflict among nations and groups of nations has often been an important factor in hastening the centralization and the formalization of group control through development of political states. The expansion of trade with its need for new markets and new sources of raw materials creates economic competition among groups occupying different territories. This takes on political significance when one group tries to exclude others from the competition by coercive measures. These economic factors in international conflict are supplemented by the cultural factors of national pride, desire for territorial integrity, and for political independence. When the two sets of forces are combined—and they usually are—there is a great incentive even among small nations for their organization as political states. In time of peace, states adjust conflicting interests through treaties, foreign diplomats, boards of arbitration, leagues of nations, and international courts. The declaration of war between states is an acknowledgment that these means of accommodating conflicting interests have failed temporarily.

China provides an interesting illustration of the way in which contacts and conflict with outside groups speed the development of statehood. There we can observe in process the life history of a society in transition from folk to formal control; from family and clan to government and state; from the rule of the elders and the time-honored mores requiring no ruler, to laws, courts, police, and prisons; from an interest in classical philosophy and religion to the preaching of nationalism and the training of armies; from

⁴ Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power*, p. 21, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

barter and informal devices of trade to a nationalized currency and trade in world markets. China realized the need of pulling together her society of local clan and family groups and forming a unified state with a strong government and a powerful military, when she came to believe that only in so doing could she find protection from the nations in which modern statehood had become the quintessence of "civilization." Stimulated by the threat of war and driven by economic necessity, China is struggling to free herself from the supreme family loyalty which her poets of the past have eulogized, substituting, as the highest virtue, the national loyalty which her war lords of the present deem expedient and necessary.

The state as a social group. When the members of a society are considered with reference to their political behavior, they are called *citizens* or subjects, and the group to which they belong is called the *state*. The state involves a territory, a government, and a people. If the people are unified culturally by common folkways and traditions, they are also called a *nation*. As we have earlier said, when the folk and the citizens are one and the same, when the nation and the state coincide, the greatest group unity is possible. The *government* includes those official agencies and functionaries by means of which the state achieves its ends. The *laws* are rules of the state, codified, enacted, or decreed, and enforced through the machinery of government. The state differs from other social groups within the territory in that it alone may exercise social control by coercive force, but this difference is less significant than is commonly supposed. Although the state is entrusted with coercive authority, it does not rely on that type of control alone, but functions very much as do other secondary groups whose purpose is to facilitate the cooperation of large numbers of people in a common enterprise. Indeed modern states, as we shall later see, have taken over the functions of many private agencies of social welfare, in which the punitive feature is almost negligible. On the other hand, some non-official agencies have types of formal authority over their members which is not far different from that of the state.

Political organization, then, is one phase of social structure, one phase of formalized group control. In some societies it is an undifferentiated phase—the political, the economic, and the religious behavior of the group is an integrated pattern of living;

but with the trend toward specialization observed in other parts of social organization, there have emerged also political institutions which protect or help achieve those group values for which the mores and other informal patterns have proved inadequate. The political organization, with its formal devices of constitutions, kings, presidents, legislatures, courts, police, armies, flags, ritual, uniforms, physical headquarters, official functionaries, medals of honor, and forms of punishment, sets itself to the task of protecting or achieving whatever values those who control the government consider most in danger and most important. Different governments are directed to many different tasks. Some are primarily concerned with the sanctity of the nation's gods; others are devoted to preserving the freedom and personal liberties of their people; and others raise to positions of first importance the protection of property, of the proletarian class, of capitalism, of political boundaries, of "purity of race," "national honor," "cultural development," the position of the ruling caste, or a combination of these and other values.

During the remainder of this chapter we shall be concerned principally with the relation of the political organization within the state to other phases of social organization. To illustrate this relationship we shall consider the reaction of government to the important ecological and social changes which have already been described, and ask specifically the following questions: What is the relation of government to changes in community organization? How has government responded to economic change? How have its functions been expanded to cope with other new social conditions? Although illustrations will be drawn from our own political experience, our underlying interest will consist not so much in reproducing the full factual picture of political trends—that is a task of the historian—but rather in detecting the general principles of social organization which these trends illustrate.

GOVERNMENT AND THE CHANGING COMMUNITY

In a New England township the people directly govern themselves; the government is the people. . . . Once each year, . . . a "town-meeting" is held, at which all the grown men of the township are expected to be present and to vote, while any one may introduce motions or take part in the discussion. . . . The town-meeting is held in the town house,

but at first it used to be held in the church, which was thus a "meeting-house" for civil as well as ecclesiastical purposes. . . .⁶

"Those wards called townships in New England," said Jefferson, "are the vital principle of their governments and have proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its preservation." "Nations which are accustomed to township institutions and municipal government," said De Toqueville, "are better able than any other to found prosperous colonies. The habit of thinking and governing for one's self is indispensable in a new country."⁷

The town-meeting, the closely unified community, a simple economic organization, and stable religious and moral beliefs are all of a type—they are pre-factory, pre-metropolis, and pre-automobile forms of social organization. They are close to the undifferentiated stage when life is personal, not categoric, departmentalized, and mobile. The simple town-meeting way of living was subjected to change when New England farmers became the pioneers of a westward migration in search of cheap land or California gold, but it was disrupted still more by the ecological changes we have previously examined. The coming of the metropolis, the rise of the small industrial city, the new, auto-made rural community, and the new regionalism have confronted old forms of social organization with situations their founders never anticipated.

Resistance to change. The reaction of political bodies to these changing conditions of community life has been typical of institutions generally. Once a pattern of behavior is well established in the habits and attitudes of the people, made rigid by formal documents, rules, and ritual, and supported by functionaries whose economic well-being depends on its continuance, change comes slowly, if at all, even though inefficiency and maladjustment are repeatedly pointed out by the critical observer. In examining the lag of government in making adjustment to new conditions,

⁶ John Fiske, *Civil Government in the United States Considered with Some Reference to Its Origins*, p. 19, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1890. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁷ Taken from editor's note in "Lexington Town Meetings from 1765 to 1775," no. 156 of the *Old South Leaflets*, vol. 7, p. 20, published by Directors of the Old South Work, Old South Meeting-house, Boston.

Carroll H. Woody was especially impressed with the conservative nature of our federal and county forms of government:

The position of government in American society is such that few major alterations in its form or scope may be expected in a limited period of years. Governmental organizations, in the United States at least, display marked resistance to change. Existing structures are supported by rigid constitutional provisions; the sanction of long usage commands a higher public valuation than does adaptability to current needs. The long postponement of the "lame duck" amendment calls attention to the obstacles which must be surmounted before even a minor adjustment in federal organizational arrangements can be effected. States and cities have displayed greater receptiveness to "reforms," but counties and other local bodies have continued for generations without substantial improvement.⁸

Paul W. Wager's study of local government shows that relatively little change has taken place in its original patterns of organization.

We all recognize that the mode of rural life has completely changed in a hundred years, but that very few changes have been made in the structure and machinery of local government. Indeed, we are reminded by the New York Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment (1923 Report, pp. 11-13) that "some aspects of present institutions have not been altered since the English established the provincial government of New York after driving out the Dutch in 1664," that "the main features of country government have not been changed in the 146 years (now 154 years) since New York became a state," and that "where changes have been made they are of a patchwork character." Such statements apply with almost equal force to every other state, for, though many states are younger than New York, each has a form of local government copied from one of three original patterns, none of the younger states having adopted the New England form.⁹

⁸ Carroll H. Woody, "The Growth of Governmental Functions." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. II, p. 1274; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

⁹ Paul W. Wager, "Can Local Self-Government Be Preserved in Our Rural Areas?" *Rural Government: Proceedings of the Fourteenth American Country Life Conference*, Ithaca, N. Y., Aug. 17-20, 1931, p. 54, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

These and similar observations show that ecological change may take place more rapidly than governmental. The redistribution of an agrarian population into the modern types of rural and urban communities, surveyed in a preceding chapter, and the change from local barter to board of trade in economic organization have not been accompanied by a corresponding change in government. The election of local overseers of the poor for each township and the education of thousands of children in one-room, one-teacher school houses are examples of systems persisting long after their original justification has disappeared. There remain 7,000 one-teacher schools in New York State, and 10,000 in the State of Illinois.¹⁰ According to George S. Counts,

. . . the abolition of the rural school district and the one-room red schoolhouse of hallowed memory is one of the urgent tasks of local government. Yet, in spite of years of agitation toward this end, in 1930, according to the report of the Office of Education in Washington there were 148,711 one-room schoolhouses in the United States.¹¹

Pennsylvania operates a plan of poor relief which social workers insist is more in keeping with Elizabethan England whence it originated than with the problems of modern communities.¹² Its 425 separate poor districts, each with independent authority to levy taxes and administer relief, may have functioned in isolated rural communities of the past, but local boundaries lose their significance when industrial workers of an entire region suffer from unemployment, and when the freight car and automobile add to the problem of local dependency a new problem of the homeless

¹⁰ Alfred D. Simpson, "Guiding Principles for Dealing with the Problem of Administrative Units for Rural New York," *Rural Government: Proceedings of the Fourteenth American Country Life Conference*, p. 118.

¹¹ Discussion by Thomas H. Reed, Howard P. Jones, and George S. Counts, "Redrawing the Boundaries of Local Government," in Thomas H. Reed, *Government in Depression*, p. 2, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. See also Emery M. Foster, "Statistical Summary of Education," in *Biennial Survey of Education*, bulletin no. 20, p. 35, United States Department of Interior, Office of Education, 1931.

¹² Ewan Clague, *Seventeenth Century Poor Relief in the Twentieth Century*, Joint Committee on Research of the Community Council of Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, Philadelphia, 1935.

transient. Yet this system of poor relief has successfully resisted proposed changes for many years.¹³

Government lag in urban centers. There is a maladjustment between government and community in urban centers which have outgrown the rural patterns of local autonomy but continue their use nevertheless. A recent study has revealed the confusion and inefficiency that result from the maze of independent and often conflicting units of authority in an area like the metropolitan region of Chicago. Ecologically the region is unified, but politically it is disorganized:

Governments dividing the responsibility for the public affairs of the Chicago Metropolitan Region number 1,642. These include 204 cities and villages, 15 counties, 165 townships, 978 school districts, 70 park districts, 4 forest preserve districts, 11 sanitary districts, 190 drainage districts, 4 mosquito abatement districts, and 1 health district.¹⁴

The 350 police forces of the Region operate without adequate coordination and control, in contrast to the more unified operation of organized criminality.¹⁵

The 343 health agencies of the Region vary widely in personnel, equipment, and standards; are unable to solve the health or sewerage problems of the Region; and fail to unite in a common health program.¹⁶

The 1,000 school systems of the Region range from one-room schools to the most elaborate systems, and fail to develop either equal-

¹³ As was true in many other states, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration established a new administrative plan for the aid of the unemployed which, instead of following the boundaries of the existing poor districts, centralized the supervision and financing of relief in regions or areas each comprising several counties. Local offices for the distribution of relief were then established in every county and in conveniently located towns and cities within the county. The state and federal organization of unemployment relief on the county and area plan has not, however, altered the old poor relief system, which continues to function with its 425 separate districts, nine different types of administration, and approximately 525 laws on the state statute books still in force. See *ibid.*, p. 8, and Arthur Dunham, "A County Welfare Plan for Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania Social Work*, vol. 1, Pennsylvania Conference on Social Work, Philadelphia, Oct., 1934.

¹⁴ Taken from a summary of the findings in a study by Charles E. Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago*, p. xv, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xvi. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

ity of educational opportunity throughout the Region or an integrated educational program.¹⁷

The 74 park and forest systems of the Region are not articulated in such a manner as to promote either economy or the organization of a recreational system useful for the citizens of the Chicago Area.¹⁸

The 167 public water systems of the Region are constructed and operated at costs unnecessary under a unified system of water supply, and with a type of service capable of substantial improvement under a Regional organization.¹⁹

The 556 independent courts of the Region, beginning with the 205 in Cook County, are in their separation a barrier to the speedy and efficient administration of justice and provide almost incredible illustrations of disorganization.²⁰

Governmental adjustment to new conditions. Our report would be misleading if we cited only instances of the resistance of political organization to change, when there are at hand numerous illustrations of the adaptation of government to the new patterns of community organization. In 1931 North Carolina moved far in the direction of consolidating the services of local governments on a state-wide basis as a means of avoiding bankruptcy among the poverty-stricken local governments, and the following year similar changes were made by the state of Virginia. In North Carolina the state government has now assumed the function of building and maintaining the roads, thus dissolving all county and local road districts and road boards; the state is now responsible for housing the male convicts serving sixty days or more, presumably making unnecessary many of the 100 separate county jails; and the state is now the unit of taxation for the support of the minimum school term and is encouraging the consolidation of rural schools. In taking over these functions, the state administrators say that they are not attempting to abolish local government nor to deprive local communities of social responsibility, but are trying to relieve them of some of the most costly services which supporters of the reform believed could be financed more efficiently in larger units, and are thereby freeing the local units for an

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. xvi-xvii. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xvii. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²⁰ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

expansion of their other community activities. Other illustrations of the way government responds to the ecological forces that are redistributing our population in new types of community relationships would include the movements toward county fusion, special districts, joint services, state control of education, state welfare and health departments, state police, state planning for local areas, county welfare unit plan, county unit system of education, county home rule, county manager plan, the city manager plan, regional planning and regional authorities, and the widespread extension of federal services and financial aid to local communities.

Without passing judgment on any particular innovation or trend, we may conclude this analysis with three general observations: First, that any form of government, like other rigidly institutionalized aspects of social organization, is a conservative force, slow to change. Second, that government is inextricably bound up with the rest of the social structure, especially with the distribution of the population in different types and sizes of communities, since the jurisdiction of government is related to territorial units. Third, that as the population and social organization of a community or any territorial group change, the services of the government either suffer disorganization or become adapted to the new pattern. If government has been affected in recent years by distributive readjustments, it is even more profoundly disturbed by the economic trends reported in the last chapter. Let us now examine this relationship further.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT

By giving a decidedly realistic turn to his analysis of politics, Charles E. Merriam, in the following paragraphs, contributes both a summary to our previous study of economic organization and a starting point for an analysis of the relation of government to these recent developments.

The trend toward the growth of the great corporation, the organization of economic life on a large scale, with equipment and powers not unlike those of government itself, rivalling in fact the organized political powers of the community, is of vital importance in American life. . . .

The truth is that the basic nature of the pecuniary order is

changing with great rapidity, the concepts of wealth, of private property, of private enterprise, of profit, of the incidents and concomitants of the productive system of the nation. To assume that nothing is happening in this field is to prepare the student for a rude shock in the actual world into which he is about to enter. Sophistication, therefore, in the trends and tendencies of our emerging social and economic life, particularly in the domain of technology and of economic organization, is fundamental in any scheme of political education. It is not merely the facts and figures learned that may be of value to the citizen, but the habit of viewing these changes and processes in their relation to government that will prove most useful to the citizen in later years. The facts may fade but the trends and the interrelations are likely to continue their operation.²¹

The policy of laissez-faire. Trends in the relation of government to industry, agriculture, and trade lead in several directions. First, there are many persons and groups who contend that it is the function of government to build battleships, maintain a fire department and a police force, but not to be concerned with the affairs of business. These attitudes are institutionalized in the form of planks in the platform of political parties, the activities of political lobbies, and in stereotyped beliefs originally based on an underlying philosophy expressed in systematic form by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century. Adam Smith and the *laissez-faire* school of economists believed that

. . . the economic affairs of society will in the main take care of themselves if neither the state nor any other body armed with coercive authority attempts to interfere with their working as determined by the individual actions of men.²²

Adam Smith was optimistic about the self-directive ability of economic activity because he believed there was "a natural harmony" under which the individual in pursuing his own economic interests mysteriously furthurs the interests of the whole. Starting

²¹ Charles E. Merriam, *Civic Education in the United States*, part 6 of the *Report of the Commission on the Social Studies*, pp. 116-117, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²² From G. D. H. Cole, "Laissez-Faire," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 9, p. 16. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

with the premise that the objective of an economic order is the creation of wealth, he argued "that individuals acting independently are likely to be better judges than any collective body as to the means of producing the maximum amount of wealth."²³ He thought that the individual driven by the desire for survival and success in the business world would, through competition with others, be forced to reach his maximum efficiency in the production of wealth. The less the government interfered, the freer and more effective this competition would be.

The logical argument in Smith's philosophy of *laissez-faire* has been forgotten by many of the modern proponents of "no government interference in business," but they have taken some of its phrases, created new ones, and turned them into stereotyped slogans useful in waging campaigns against legislation which they disfavor. They are not always consistent in their campaigns, however. Many employers who oppose legislation guaranteeing to labor the right of collective bargaining, do not hesitate to call upon the courts for injunctions to aid them in defeating a strike. On the other hand, labor groups oppose court interference in strikes, but favor federal legislation which excludes immigrant labor from competing for their jobs. These and many other contradictory positions taken by various groups bring one to the conclusion that the philosophy of Adam Smith has less to do in the relationship of government to business than do the immediate economic interests of different elements in our population, who become influential in determining governmental policy through a relatively new social pattern, the pressure group, whose characteristics we shall examine shortly.

Collectivism. A second theoretical position is that of collectivism, the opposite of *laissez-faire*. Karl Marx, the leading proponent of this theory of government, contended that the individual should not be free to control wealth, but that the state should be the supreme economic agent empowered with authority over all of the processes of production and distribution. As in actual practice we have not approached the *laissez-faire* position of no control, so also we have not come near the socialistic state of collectivism. The political behavior of a few people may have been motivated by adherence to one or the other of these doctrines, but the more typical situation in our political history has been the

²³ *Ibid.* By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

formulation of governmental policy with regard to economic problems on the basis of the immediate interests of organized groups which may or may not have rationalized in theoretical terms the implications of their demands. If these groups have played such a significant role in politics, their characteristics should now be explained.

Pressure groups and government. Charles E. Merriam likens the influence of pressure groups to that of formal government, itself:

Another important trend in American politics is that of the rise of pressure and promotion groups of various kinds, with wide influence on legislation and on governmental action of all kinds and on many levels. These agencies are often more influential than the formal government itself, and without a clear understanding of them and of their methods of operation it is impossible to understand what happens in this country of ours at many moments.²⁴

A pressure group shares many of the characteristics of other groups, but merits the distinction of a separate name by virtue of its dominant interest in controlling the policy of some larger organization with which it is affiliated. A type of group which clearly expresses this characteristic is the association of persons with a common economic interest who try to influence governmental action in legislation, administrative procedure, or judicial decisions. In his study of "two of the most important economic group organizations in the United States from the point of view of their political and governmental significance,"²⁵ the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the American Federation of Labor, Harwood L. Childs found that although these two groups were often exerting pressure on the government in opposite directions, the techniques which they employed were essentially the same. The labor organization used more direct methods at election time, but both bodies endeavored to create a favorable public opinion for their policies, and after elections they both employed the following methods of influencing Congress:

²⁴ Charles E. Merriam, *Civic Education in the United States*, p. 117. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²⁵ Harwood L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics*, p. 2, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1930.

. . . (1) drafting bills and having them introduced in Congress or the state legislatures; (2) sending communications to individual Congressmen, state legislators, governors, and other public officials; (3) encouraging members to bring pressure to bear upon their representatives; (4) arranging for and appearing at legislative hearings; (5) advising with and influencing the appointment of committee personnel; (6) interviewing legislators and providing them with speech material; (7) holding meetings with groups of Congressional representatives; (8) interviewing the President and urging the furtherance of the group program; and (9) co-operating with other groups in the interest of desired legislation.²⁶

An "inside" picture of the way in which the pressure group may operate is suggested by the following excerpt taken from an address called "Practical Methods in Dealing with Legislative Matters," which was given before the National Association of Commercial Organization Secretaries.

Cultivate your legislators, take them into your confidence and endeavor to establish their confidence in your organization. A dinner to your Mayor and Board of Aldermen, to your County Representatives, to your Congressmen and Senators, will help. Let your representative advise you and make him feel that you appreciate it. Get other organizations to speak for you. Get them to indorse your project and send a representative to present their phase of the case before important conferences or hearings. Get at the big fellows back of the scenes of legislative enactment. . . . Be ready with some alternative and compromise if necessary. After the policy of your Chamber toward certain legislation is clearly defined, plan carefully your program of action. Secure the keenest men in your city to serve on your committee that appears before executive heads and committees of Congress or the general assembly. Prior to your hearing call a conference of your state senators and representatives—lay your brief before them—get their advice and suggestions—invite them to be present at the hearing. If a head of the executive department is to be summoned before the hearing—lay your proposition before him and get his approval if you can. Prior to the hearing supply members of the Congressional Committee with copies of your brief. Release at this time

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 197. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

copies to your local papers—play up to the Washington correspondents of your local and state newspapers. Avoid too frequent appearance before either State or National legislatures, if you want to be successful on important legislation. Pick out the big projects that are worth while and strike hard when you strike.²⁷

Such relationships between economic interests and government were not provided for in the Constitution. They have come into being to overcome the inflexibility of formal government and make it more directly responsive to the interests of groups of citizens. They share this function with political parties, a large part of whose governmental activity is extra-legal.

The party is assuming the responsibility for nominating candidates for public office. The [pressure] group is becoming the agent of the citizen in securing the passage of laws and directing their administration. Periodic elections are turning into periodic competitions between personalities, while the day-to-day process of governing a great nation turns into a continuous balancing of the pressing interests of more and more highly perfected organized group interests.²⁸

When we approach politics from this realistic point of view, it is apparent that the voting of the individual citizen at the polls is only one incident in the total process of government. The party caucus which was influential in selecting the candidates, the organized propaganda which may have conditioned the voter's decision, and the pressure groups which exert influence on the governmental official after election are all a significant part of political behavior. The most effective pressure is exerted by the best organized groups, and since extensive organization involves heavy expenditures, those citizens who are already economically powerful sometimes have an advantage in securing a hearing for their special causes. If groups with conflicting interests each succeed in gaining some control over government, its policies will appear inconsistent when judged by such general principles as the Adam Smith doctrine of *laissez-faire* or its opposite, collectivism. From time to time, an individual administrator will speak out

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 182. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 260. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

against these conflicting influences and act "on principle," a legislature may conduct an investigation of lobbying, and a league of voters or a public forum project may try to develop an independent, critical attitude among the people, but these efforts have not entirely undermined the influence which organized groups bring to bear upon the government directly, and, indirectly through the modern means of mass appeal, upon public opinion.

We have found that government is affected by the same factors of change which redistribute population in new community patterns, and which radically alter economic organization, but that the government's response is retarded by the stability of its social structure cannot be questioned. The structure or its functions change only when sufficient pressure is brought to bear by organized groups. Because these groups represent many different interests, their effect upon the government is to produce conflicting trends. The response of the government to demands for new types of service is further expressed in the following study of its relation to other phases of social change.

EXPANDING FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL WELFARE

The functions of government are much more susceptible of modification than is its anatomy. Despite constitutional limitations, despite the existence of an influential tradition that "the government is best which governs least," it remains true that if active bodies of opinion demand with sufficient urgency and persistence that government render a particular service, or that it impose a particular control, the realization of these group objectives can not be long postponed. Thus the ever moving currents of social and economic opinion tend to produce an unending series of changes in the number and character of duties imposed upon the administration by the law making branch, acting in its capacity as interpreter of the public will.²⁹

A full appreciation of the growth in functions of government can best be had by comparing the nature of government one, two, or three centuries ago and at present. At the beginning of the industrial revolution the British Parliament had no control over

²⁹ Woody, *op. cit.*, p. 1274; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

conditions of employment in mines and factories, problems of unemployment, and public education. In the England which they and their ancestors had known, people had looked after their own affairs. To be sure, the church founded hospitals and similar charitable institutions for the poor, but in most matters the family or village required no outside assistance or interference. The campaign to enact the first poor laws was a long, bitter struggle resulting only in a slight acknowledgment by the government that the thousands who had been driven from the farms by the enclosure movement and who could not yet earn a livelihood through employment in factories were a public problem. The Act of 1536 was soon followed, however, by more far-reaching measures. During the past century as new social problems have arisen with the coming of the industrial city, there has been a noteworthy expansion in the variety and extent of governmental functions, although in nearly every case the expansion has come only after pressure was brought to bear on the government by organized groups of persons suffering from the maladjustment, and their sympathizers. Other industrial countries, including our own, have witnessed a similar adjustment of government to changed social conditions. With this perspective as an introduction, we may now concentrate on governmental expansion in more limited periods.

One index of the increase in functions of government is the record of its expenditures. During the period between 1915 and 1930, the expenditures of the federal government in the United States increased by 1,155 per cent;³⁰ and during practically the same period, 1915 to 1929, the cost of government in the 48 states increased by 150 per cent;³¹ and the total increase for all government, including local, was 100 per cent,³² which, when calculated in terms of the larger population, meant a per capita increase of 65 per cent.³³

Although the World War figured heavily in the cost of federal government during this period, there was also an impressive growth

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1281. This and the following percentages are calculated in terms of the relative purchasing power of the dollar in 1915. If 1929 dollars had been used as a basis of calculation, the percentages would have been still higher because the value of the dollar had declined. We have quoted, therefore, only the more conservative estimates.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1306.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 1324.

³³ *Ibid.*

in state governmental activities as well.³⁴ The construction of highways, the expansion of the educational program, and the increase in welfare services are significant trends.

Education continued to be the largest of the government functions and increased more rapidly than any other save highways.³⁵ . . . nearly one-fourth of the growth of state governments since 1915 arose from the expansion of educational facilities.³⁶

An increasing acknowledgment by the government of its responsibility in providing for recreation and leisure-time activities in the form of parks, supervised playgrounds, and adult education, especially in the crowded cities, is an example of adjustment to changed social conditions and standards, as is also the attention government is giving to its deficient, dependent, and maladjusted individuals: the crippled and physically ill, the mentally ill, the feeble-minded, the dependent children, aged dependents, delinquents, and criminals. All but five states have either established departments of public welfare or made other special provision for these problems. Private social agencies, the pioneers in establishing special institutions and methods of treatment for such problem cases, have been unable to finance through voluntary support a sufficiently extensive program to meet increasing needs. Although the private associations continue to carry a large share of the burden and to provide leadership in experimentation and the maintenance of social work standards, the government has been called upon more and more to assume responsibility for the amelioration and control of these problems.

A rapid expansion of government aid in the alleviation of a social problem came in 1932 and following, when millions of wage earners were unemployed. Personal savings, neighborly help, assistance from private agencies, and relief by local governments met only a fraction of the demands for help. Pressure in the form of food riots, hunger marches, petitions, and forewarnings of serious violence first brought action from state governments, usually in the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1327.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1325; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1302; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

form of subsidies to local agencies. When the credit of many states was exhausted, the federal government responded to the demands made both by state governments and local groups for aid. At first the Federal Emergency Relief Administration provided direct aid to unemployed in the form of food and fuel orders, clothing, and allowance for medical care, but later attempts were made to transfer cases from the direct relief of the agency to government employment. The Public Works Administration was created to provide jobs in the construction of highways, flood control dams, and other permanent improvements. Since these large projects, often dependent upon the cooperation of local and state governments, were slow to get under way, an emergency program of work in smaller projects was begun under the Civil Works Administration. This was later continued by the Works Division of the Emergency Relief and again by the Works Progress Administration. The record peace-time expenditures of these agencies were criticized by taxpayers who objected to the prospect of increased rates, but their pressure for retrenchment did not come soon enough or with sufficient force to prevent the passage of still another social welfare measure, which was designed not for an emergency but as a permanent means of giving security when individual incomes were deficient. The Wagner Social Security Bill provided for the establishment of a permanent system of unemployment insurance, old age pensions, assistance for widows with children, and aid for dependent children.

Summary. These measures illustrate the increased flexibility of government during a period of economic crisis which resembles the situation in war time, when the formal checks and balances of government itself are less effective and when the retarding influence of opposing pressure groups is less great. For a time in either situation, the power of an aggressive leader or of groups which can define the cause of the discontent in persuasive, symbolic terms is surprisingly effective in overcoming the usual resistance of institutions to change. Once the crisis is thought to be over, however, the formal procedures again operate and opposition groups gain support in reaction against changes made during the emergency. At least this conflict of group pressure is typical in governments which tolerate some measure of freedom of speech and the formation of political groups with divergent policies. In states where such action is suppressed, the same processes operate less noticeably under cover, although all

effective opposition to the accepted policy of the government may be overcome temporarily by extreme measures of coercion.

The various reactions of government to social change which we have briefly examined in this chapter, although taken largely from recent trends in our own history, reveal certain basic political processes which might be expected to operate anywhere under similar conditions. Our summary of the nature of that phase of our social organization which we have designated as political may be briefly stated in the following list of generalizations, which may best be regarded as hypotheses:

1. The formal organization of a society emerges when social change has weakened the primary types of control. (The change in the *status quo* may have been caused by ecological or cultural factors, or both.)
2. Government is one type of formal organization which arises as an instrument for the maintenance of order and accommodation of interests both within the state and between states.
3. It employs various forms of control, one of which is coercive authority.
4. The standards or objectives of the state are often related to the mores of the people, but are finally determined by whatever persons or groups have power in determining policies of government.
5. In a complex, industrialized society in which economic functions are performed by specialized groups, those groups often direct their organized influence toward the control of government in order to secure aid in their competition for wealth, power, or whatever values have high status in the society.
6. These politico-economic groups bring pressure to bear directly upon the officials of government.
7. They also influence public opinion in favor of their cause by mass appeals which modern methods of communication make possible. The non-economic groups learn to employ similar techniques in controlling the policies of government.
8. In spite of the persons and groups who constantly exert pressure on the government for the adoption of their policies, it remains one of the more stable phases of social organization.
9. Its stability rests upon the formal, institutionalized devices of constitutions, laws, courts, *et cetera*, which are designed to protect

and make permanent the values which are favored by those in authority.

10. Change in the political organization of the state comes most rapidly during periods of crisis when the old forms are challenged by the pressure of new groups.

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Chapter 19

EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S FATHER AS EDUCATOR¹

YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW something of the person and character of my father. . . . his great excellence lay in a sound understanding and solid judgment in prudential matters, both in private and public affairs. . . . I remember well his being frequently consulted for his opinions in affairs of the town. . . . He was also much consulted by private persons about their affairs when any difficulty occurred, and frequently chosen an arbiter between contending parties. At his table he liked to have, as often as he could, some sensible friend or neighbor to converse with, and always took care to start some ingenious or useful topic for discourse, which might tend to improve the minds of his children. . . . I continued employed in my father's business till I was twelve years old. . . . But my dislike to the trade [of tallow chandler] continuing, my father was under apprehensions that if he did not find one more agreeable for me, I should break away and go to sea, as his son Josiah had done to his great vexation. He therefore sometimes took me to walk with him, and to see joiners, bricklayers, turners, braziers, etc., at their work, that he might observe my inclination, and endeavor to fix it on some trade or other on land. It has ever since been a pleasure to me to see good workmen handle their tools, and it has been useful to me, having learned so much by it as to be able to do little jobs myself in my house when a workman could not be readily got, and to construct little machines for my experiments, while the intention of making the experiment was fresh and warm in my mind. . . . From a child I was fond of reading. . . . I had a thirst for knowledge. . . . This bookish inclination at length determined my father to make me a printer.

¹ Quotations assembled from Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*, by Joseph K. Hart, in *A Social Interpretation of Education*, pp. 37-38, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Education was as truly a part of the social process when Franklin was a youth as at present, but its methods were more informal. Franklin's father was his vocational counselor, the supervisor of his technical training, and the means of his acquaintance with diverse points of view on many subjects which would now be called a part of a liberal education. Whatever autobiography one reads, or whatever group history one examines, educative processes of some type are shown in operation as integral parts of social experience.

Formal schooling, which is often made synonymous with education in common parlance, should be considered as only one expression of the tendency of every group to perpetuate its skills, customs, and ideals through the inculcation of these culture traits in the habits, knowledge, and sentiments of its new members. The informal, unplanned contacts within the family, the neighborhood, and other intimate groups, together with the social experiences that come through travel, reading, and all forms of communication, are included in a broad statement of the educative or conditioning processes of society.² We know how susceptible the individual organism is to these conditioning processes,³ and we have also analyzed some of the characteristics of the learning process,⁴ but we have not examined how societies are organized to perform these functions. This is the problem of our present chapter. We turn first to the tasks of education in relatively stable societies, and later to its functions in the rapidly changing culture of present times.

EDUCATION IN A PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

Informal education in tribal life. Even in primitive tribes education included both formal and informal methods of acculturation. The informal transmission of skills, customs, and folklore through the personal contacts of elders and children was a direct and highly efficient means of education in primitive groups, for reasons not difficult to understand.

² Thus broadly interpreted, the "history of education is the story of the totality of man's efforts to create, preserve, and transmit human culture," according to the statement of Frederick Eby and Charles F. Arrowood in *The Development of Modern Education*, p. vii, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1934.

³ Cf. chapter 7.

⁴ Cf. chapter 8.

Among the uncivilized . . . though children are generally treated with the greatest consideration and allowed the fullest liberty, and though the notion of authority and discipline is not yet developed, they obey willingly or, rather, follow the example of the parent, whose actions are mostly directed toward immediate and concrete ends. In a word, the requisite discipline, for people living so near to nature, is afforded by the immediate experiences of life. Where one of our boys cannot understand why he should study grammar, for example, the savage child knows by personal, immediate, and hard experience that disobedience to the suggestions of an older hunter results in loss of life or injury, or, at any rate, the escape of the game upon which he has hoped to feed. This explains the apparent paradox presented by ethnographers: that the primitive children are not disciplined much or at all by their elders and yet are generally obedient and unspoiled. It is the protection from the consequences of inexpedient conduct that ruins a child's behavior; and in primitive life such protection cannot be extended very far.⁵

Following the ways of the group was an expedient means of avoiding danger and enjoying the satisfactions which were commonly desired. In similar, direct ways, the child also learned the accepted explanations of the phenomena in his environment which aroused his curiosity. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow may have taken liberty with the details of Indian culture in his poem, "Hiawatha," but he caught the significance of primary relations in the transmission of group ways to the young members of a tribe.

Formal education in a primitive group. The other side of the process—the formal means of education in primitive societies—seems surprisingly informal to us who are accustomed to cathedrals of learning, grading systems, and degrees, but it was, nevertheless, an *institutionalized* part of the group life, probably best exemplified by the initiation ceremony which marked the acceptance of the youth as a full-fledged member in the adult society. Whereas the informal learning in his early experience had dealt largely with the folkways of carrying on daily existence, and the folk-lore which explained those ways, his initiation and more formal training in the

⁵ William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. 3, p. 1929, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

societies where it occurred were the group's means of guaranteeing conformity to the mores.

The formal education of the primitive child had a different purpose, that of maintaining the control and dominance of the elders and leaders through inculcating the standards and traditions of the group. It was designed to make men good—that is, to make them conform to the *mores* and to exemplify in their lives those traits of character that the culture held to be noble and right. It impressed the content of the social code: respect for elders, bravery, stoicism, generosity, or whatever behavior traits fell within the group definition. This education was on the whole effective: it produced types of character in conformity with the standards and, as among the American Indians, it often resulted in types of character, marked by dignity, reserve, fearlessness, and the like, that are often considered wholly admirable from other points of view. The method of primitive moral education was in the main that of initiation ceremonies. . . . These ceremonies were often elaborate and involved instruction, ordeal, and periods of trial. The complete education of the youth was often a matter of years. The initiation ceremonies served also to transmit much of the mythology and formal lore of the culture group.⁶

Nathan Miller characterizes the initiation ceremony as marking "the passage of the youth from social childhood into social maturity."⁷ It is the most "serious single occurrence in the individual's life in the primitive culture. . . ."⁸

Coming at a time . . . when the emotions and dispositions are aroused and in ferment, these ceremonies serve to effect the final socialization of the child. . . . The initiation placed the child into his niche in the folk-life and impressed upon him his duties and obligations to his

⁶ Edward B. Reuter and Clyde W. Hart, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 189, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. Margaret Mead has called into question to some extent this interpretation of formal education in primitive societies, pointing to a number of cases in which the initiation and puberty rites are little stressed and have little educational significance. Cf. Margaret Mead, "Education, Primitive," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5, pp. 401-402, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931.

⁷ Nathan Miller, *The Child in Primitive Society*, p. 189, Coward-McCann, Inc., New York, 1928.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

folk-fellows and his restrictions as an individual. Thenceforward he was to do not as he liked, but as was fitting in the light of the mores, as the head of a family, as an active contributor to the food-supply, as a participant in the cult and as a servant and worshipper of the ancestral spirits.⁹

Miller describes some of the techniques employed by the primitive group in effectively molding the character of the neophyte to the patterns of adult life:

An atmosphere is created of continuous excitement and novelty that catches the unabated and fervid attention of all the youth's senses. He is aroused and put on edge so as to furnish a helpless receptivity to the precepts, admonitions and didactic pageantry there set forth. It is all arranged to capture his attention and become engraved indelibly with a severe, unmitigated decisiveness that time will never erase nor circumstance expunge. This is effected by an accumulated discipline of sleeplessness, ingenious torments and trials, nerve-wracking frights and vigils of an amazing variety. The child's will is rendered supine; his mind is rendered hypersensitive and photographic to the impressions which the headmen and elders wish to transmit to the new generation. The primitive man discerns little efficacy in the subtler, longer-continued and reiterated moulding of the personality. Crude, objective and gross measures are employed, particularly as this is the only type of treatment which can be of avail in the society where strength and physical prowess are of the greater moment for success in life. In addition, the absence of a written language that could convey the customs, traditions and lore left no other way open to induce the needful personal sentiments and to immortalize the deeds of the ancestors. The text is therefore acted graphically and symbolically in pageant and pantomime.¹⁰

The whippings and torments are sometimes of incredible severity. They also attest to the crude "impressionistic" manner in which the culture is brought to bear upon the young. The Bechuana boys are arrayed in a state of nudity, each morning. "The men of the town, all armed with long thin wands of a tough, strong, supple brush . . . are engaged in a dance named '*K'hoa*,' in which questions are put to the boys, as, 'Will you guard the chief well?' 'Will you herd the cattle

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

well?' and while the latter give an affirmative answer, the men rush forward to them, and each aims a full-length blow at the back of one of the boys—causes the supple wand to descend and bend into his back and every stroke inflicted thus makes the blood squirt out. At the end of the dance, the boys' backs are seamed with wounds and weals, the scars of which remain through life. . . ." Thus arises the common saying that the neophyte learns the law while he is thrashed.¹¹

The immense accumulative force of these ordeals, privations, admonitions and instructions which in some instances are protracted for months, if not years at a time, is astounding in its effect upon the character of the youth. He emerges truly recast into a new mould, that of the mores of his folk. No longer indifferently interested in the life about, but keenly alive to the seriousness of his duties and the solemnity of his responsibilities, he emerges inwardly transformed.¹²

Both the informal and formal education of the primitive child serve the function of fitting him into the accepted ways and organization of the group, and he in turn transmits that culture through a similar process to the new members who succeed him. Invention, discovery, and critical thought are not fostered by this type of education.

As in the primitive tribe, so in all stable societies education adjusts individuals to the *status quo*. Isolated groups continue the use of the same techniques for tilling the soil, hunting, fishing, preparing food, and providing shelter which their ancestors employed generations ago, and there is a similar stability in their beliefs, ritual, and tabus.

Although no group is entirely static—minor changes are always in process—yet such stable societies as the tribe, the medieval manor, and the early New England farm village seem to have possessed¹³ a rigidity of organization quite foreign to the social

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 201. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. Miller is here quoting from David Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, p. 147, London, 1857. For illustrations of primitive groups in which initiation rites play no such dominant role compare once again Margaret Mead, *op. cit.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 218. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹³ Although we are accustomed to speaking of primitive tribes and other stable societies in the past tense, we should remember that modern anthropologists have no difficulty in locating many isolated groups little touched by the social mobility of the Western world.

mobility with which we are acquainted. In the modern setting of movement and change, the methods and objectives of education are in a constant state of flux, responding to the same forces we have seen at work in the other parts of social organization. Whereas education in the static society consists quite obviously in the preservation of the social heritage, its function when that heritage is, itself, undergoing radical change, is not so obvious. We cannot put down any one generalization as a valid summary of the function of education in a changing society, and, consequently, we have no other alternative than to describe the several trends which have thus far appeared and which are together working out the pattern of educational organization in our country, a pattern certain to contain some inconsistencies because the trends themselves are conflicting.

EDUCATION IN A MODERN SOCIETY

Whenever the functions of a society become differentiated or specialized there is an increase in the formal aspects of its organization. We have found this principle to be true of community life in general, of political and economic organization in particular, and it is now equally true of education. The first and most generally acknowledged characteristic of education among a people who are changing from an integrated folk society to a specialized, technological society is the increasing dependence which they place upon the formal methods of training their youth. In tribal society, the greater part of the group's knowledge was transmitted through a natural, personal relationship between children and adults, but today we depend upon a formal system of schools to impart all manner of learning, from Latin grammar to methods of cooking. The increase in formal instruction is such a prominent characteristic of a group whose life has become specialized and highly organized that a study of this trend is an appropriate introduction to our analysis of modern educational organization.

The expansion of formal education. Thomas Jefferson would marvel at the increase in formal means of education which has come in the historically brief period since his youth, and even a list of the changes during the much shorter interval of the past sixty or seventy years is an impressive record:

Since 1875 the educational system of this country has undergone a transformation. Better equipped elementary schools have been erected; free secondary schools have been established in large numbers; public normal schools for the training of teachers have been organized by the states; and the opportunities for college education have been enlarged and made accessible to young people from all classes of society. Furthermore, schools have assumed responsibility for many phases of child care and training which formerly were thought of as belonging wholly to the home. Schools are doing much to promote the intelligent care of health. They are training youth in the proper use of leisure. They are adopting special devices to equip everyone whom they can reach for success in vocations and participation in community activities.¹⁴

The rate of expansion in formal education has been especially rapid since 1900. At that time there were 284,683 students in American universities, colleges, and teacher training institutions. By 1930 the number had reached 1,178,318 or an increase of 314 per cent. During the same period attendance in secondary schools was increased by nearly 800 per cent.¹⁵

In 1930 one of every seven persons of college age was in college and one of every two persons of secondary school age was in a secondary school. Never before in the history of the world has there been such a development at the upper levels of an educational system. . . . The total enrollment in American schools and institutions of higher education is approximately 29,500,000. More than 1,000,000 teachers give instruction in these institutions. In other words, approximately a quarter of the population of the United States is directly engaged in educational activities.¹⁶

The increase in number of children in school has been paralleled by an expansion in both the curriculum and functions of formal education. The subjects generally taught in the secondary schools of 1890 were listed by the United States Office of Education in

¹⁴ Charles H. Judd, "Education." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, vol. I, p. 325; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. See also the *Biennial Survey of Education*, bulletin no. 20, United States Department of Interior, Office of Education, 1931.

nine different categories. In 1928, forty-seven different classifications were required.¹⁷ The function of the schools once confined to the teaching of the three "R's" has been broadened to include many of the following:

- Vocational guidance
- Personal adjustment of the child in home and school relationships
- Supervised recreation
- Special supervision in dramatics, athletics, forensics, journalism, and music
- Medical examinations and corrective health work
- Home economics, vocational training, and agriculture
- Post-graduate courses and adult education
- Evening classes for employed persons
- Special classes for mentally and physically handicapped
- Nurseries and kindergartens for the pre-school age group
- Home study courses
- Parent education
- Vacation or summer schools
- Community library service

Expansion in scope of the school program, however, has taken place at such an unequal rate throughout the country that not a single generalization applies to all cases. In the 148,712 one-room, one-teacher schools still remaining in 1930,¹⁸ there were almost none of the above listed special functions, while in many private

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330. One of the most recent innovations in the school program is the series of Public Forum Projects sponsored by the United States Office of Education in cooperation with local boards of education. Even in the beginning stages of the experiment, when only ten communities were selected as demonstration centers, the idea of mass adult education on social, economic, and political questions aroused so much interest that it was heralded by some educators as the next great step in expansion which our schools must take. For a description of this new plan of adult education, see J. W. Studebaker, *The American Way*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1935; J. W. Studebaker and C. S. Williams, *Education for Democracy*, bulletin no. 17, United States Department of Interior, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1936; and *A Step Forward*, bulletin no. 16, United States Department of Interior, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1936.

¹⁸ Emery M. Foster, "Statistical Summary of Education, 1928-30," in *Biennial Survey of Education*, bulletin no. 20, p. 35, United States Department of Interior, Office of Education, Washington, D. C., 1931.

and public city schools and consolidated rural schools organized activities were claiming a large proportion of a child's total social interests.

Educational influences outside of school. Paralleling the modern trend in education toward institutionalization has been the expansion in new types of social contacts not included in formal education, as well as the continuance of many primary relations which have long been basic factors in acculturation. Both of these influences become a part of the total picture.

Primary contacts and education. Primary contacts in home, play-group, and neighborhood may not be a modern counterpart of informal education in tribal society, but their influence is no insignificant factor in the transmission of culture patterns, especially those patterns of behavior which affect an individual's emotional and moral adjustments.

The influence of the family in determining a child's attitudes and interests is now generally recognized, but somewhat less attention has been given the social processes operative in the play-group, the gang, and the neighborhood. Clifford Shaw has demonstrated both statistically and through life history documents that the culture patterns of the neighborhood and community groups to which a child belongs are among the most potent conditioning factors in his experience. In each of his studies of personal behavior Shaw first inquires, "What . . . are the traditions, moral standards, activities, and sentiments prevailing in the community?"¹⁹ In culturally disorganized areas he and other investigators have found high rates of personal disorganization expressed in delinquency and crime. The significance of these correlations is illustrated in the life history of one of the cases, "Sidney," who was reared in such an environment.

Sidney's first social contacts outside the home were with a group of delinquent boys most of whom were considerably older than himself. His association with this group marked the beginning of his career in delinquency. . . . Soon after the first stealing experience (pilfering fruit from a local store, at the age of seven) Sidney became involved in a burglary episode. . . . The next step in the development

¹⁹ Clifford R. Shaw, *The Jack-Roller*, p. 33, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930.

of Sidney's delinquent trend, perhaps the most important, was his participation in the shoplifting activities of his play group. This type of delinquency was obviously an accepted tradition of the group as indicated by the fact that three of its members had been involved in a number of instances of shoplifting prior to Sidney's initial contact with the group. . . .

Along with his early stealing experiences Sidney began to play truant from school. . . . It is clear that school attendance interfered with Sidney's participation in his play-group activities which were far more thrilling, enticing, and stimulating than the formal routine of the school. From Sidney's point of view the school "was a necessary evil that grown-up folks expected little children to endure." It is significant that truancy from school was rather a common practice among his older companions. On the whole Sidney's truancy seems to have been a response to the play-group situation rather than to any conflict or difficulty within the school. Despite his repeated truancy, his school report shows a record of good scholarship.²⁰

This statement indicates that informal, unsupervised social contacts may in some cases successfully rival the influence of the schools, and these factors are to be classified as educative just as much as the school for they also involve the creation and transmission of culture patterns. Similar processes of acculturation, although yielding different results, are in operation in every primary group and in every social area, from the "slum" to the suburb.

New types of secondary contacts. A second competitor of formal education appears in the mass dissemination of social patterns by daily newspapers, magazines, radio, and movies, all modern devices for secondary contacts, based on technological inventions. Although not controlled as public agencies of education, their cultural influence reaches millions of persons each week. The movies have become an especially effective instrument of education; not, however, in the sense that one might expect. Herbert Blumer's conclusions in his research study on the relation of movies and conduct bring out this distinction.

These remarks should make clear that motion pictures are a genuine educational institution; not educational in the restricted and

²⁰ Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, pp. 230-231, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

conventional sense of supplying to the adolescent some detached bit of knowledge, some detail of geography or history, some custom, or some item of dress of a foreign people—but educational in the truer sense of actually introducing him to and acquainting him with a type of life which has immediate, practical, and momentous significance. In a genuine sense, motion pictures define his role, elicit and direct his impulses, and provide substance for his emotions and ideas. Their modes of life are likely to carry an authority and sanction which make them formative of codes of living. Despite their gay and entertaining character, motion pictures seem to enter seriously into the life of young men and women, particularly of high-school age.²¹

In his summary volume of the Payne Fund research studies, Henry J. Forman refers to the movies as a school of conduct, a sort of supplementary system of education, the content of whose "curriculum" differs considerably from formal education.

If, for instance, as Dr. Dale shows in his analysis of 115 movies, winning another's love is a principal goal in at least seventy per cent of those pictures, it becomes obvious how great a proportion of the spectator's attention will be focussed upon that particular emotion. If seventy-five per cent of all pictures deal with love, sex and crime, then, obviously, the curriculum of this particular school demands wise, discriminating and urgent attention.²²

In continuing his discussion of movies and conduct, Forman summarizes the testimony of high school students on this subject and quotes from several of their autobiographies.

From a sampling of nearly 500 autobiographies written by high-school students, thirty-three per cent report definite imitation from the pictures of ways of love-making. Nearly forty per cent did not give information. Knowing, as we do, however, the self-consciousness of adolescent girls and boys upon this particular subject, at once so intimate and so new to them, it is reasonable to assume that the

²¹ From Herbert Blumer, *Movies and Conduct*, pp. 196-197. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²² Henry J. Forman, *Our Movie Made Children*, p. 147. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

percentage of love-technique copyists from the movies is considerably larger than the thirty-three per cent mentioned by Blumer.

"I soon lost my enthusiasm over western pictures and developed a sudden appreciation of love pictures," is the way one he-man explains it; and another, towering at eighteen in the dignity of a high-school senior, states it squarely thus:

"The first interest in love pictures came when I was about fourteen. . . . I became more interested in girls and began to love them. I sometimes practiced making love to my friends after I had seen a love scene. I have seen plays of love and passion where children were not admitted and from these I got ideas of how to make love to a girl." "The technique of making love to a girl received considerable of my attention," reveals another square-shooter, "and it was directly through the movies that I learned to kiss a girl on her ears, neck and cheeks, as well as on her mouth."²³

"When I had my first 'puppy' love affair," confides a young miss, "I was very much disillusioned in my Prince Charming because he merely pecked me when he kissed me. In fact I was quite disgusted—I thought him bashful and a fool for not knowing how to kiss after seeing so many movies."²⁴

The name of these young scholars in the school of love is legion, and how lavish is the instruction! No wonder intelligent foreign observers have more than once expressed the idea that, judging from our films, we as a nation must be largely, if not wholly, given up to eroticism and sex. We have seen the figures arrived at by Dr. Dale. The statements of young people in this and subsequent chapters appear as at once elucidations and confirmations of these figures. Over and over the young testify to their schooling in life by means of the films.²⁵

Forman summarizes the educational significance of the movies in the following paragraph:

The aim here is neither to argue for motion pictures, nor to moralize against them. It is merely to convince the reader that what the last quarter century has really given us is another educational system, alluring, persuasive, cogent and appealing, which involves all

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 149. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁵ *Ibid.* By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

the childhood and youth of the country as completely, as thoroughly, in effect, as our long-built up educational system itself. We often express deep concern about text-books, about whether or not they would instill patriotism, belittle or whitewash national leaders and heroes; whether school teachers should be married or single; whether spiritual and character instruction should or should not be included in curricula, and so on, endlessly—because education is of vital interest, perhaps the most vital of all. Here, however, is another educational system equally vital and perhaps more far-reaching in its results than any we call by that name.²⁶

Blumer indicates the relation of the movies to standards which our older institutions strive to maintain.

[The movies may] challenge what other institutions take for granted. The schemes of conduct which they present may not only fill gaps left by the school, by the home, and by the church, but they may also cut athwart the standards and values which these latter institutions seek to inculcate. What is presented as entertainment, with perhaps no thought of challenging established values, may be accepted as sanctioned conduct, and so enter into conflict with certain of these values. This is peculiarly likely in the case of motion pictures because they often present the extremes as if they were the norm. For the young movie-goer little discrimination is possible. He probably could not *understand* or even *read* a sophisticated book, but he can *see* the thing in the movies and be stirred and possibly misled. This is likely to be true chiefly among those with least education and sophisticated experience.²⁷

An inclusive view of educative factors. Studies of the influence of the radio, the influence of newspapers and other printed means of broadcasting ideas, and even the effect of suggestions contained in modern advertising upon conduct all tend to strengthen the conclusion that the schools are not the exclusive acculturating agency in a modern community. More correct is the generalization that "every aspect of community life is an educative

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

²⁷ Blumer, *op. cit.*, p. 197. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

agency.”²⁸ From this point of view, the behavior of every social group may be considered both in terms of its nominal function, and in terms of its indirect educative value. For example, the corruption of a political party may be far more significant in its effect upon the attitudes of persons toward government than in the immediate result of a shortage of cash in the treasury. “And so every agency in the community may well be put to the double test of immediate social value and future educational influence.”²⁹ The author of this opinion, Harold S. Tuttle, has in mind the many types of community influences which may have no direct connection with the schools. He is expressing the broader view that, “busy with its own on-going, society educates its children unconsciously but irresistibly,”³⁰ and, in support of that view he lists many of the less academic educative influences.

News items, magazine covers, shop windows, street corner gossip, treatment by elders, conversation in the home, comment in the school, and countless other influences are constantly pressing upon the consciousness of the child, giving him meanings and standards out of which he constructs his philosophy of life. In his very tastes, and standards, and ideals, the child is in a large measure the victim of society.³¹

It is evident that we cannot change either the imitateness or the dependence of the child. In the next generation, as in the last, children will speak the language they hear, be influenced by their economic surroundings, and absorb the thought fashions of the day.³²

The surprising observation in this view of education is yet to be made. How does it happen that a society (officially organized through its government) expresses great concern about the management of its schools, but for the most part ignores the educative influence of these other social forces? Very few communities in planning an educational program include in their analysis the influence of home conditions, of the movies, newspapers, and radio,

²⁸ Harold S. Tuttle, *A Social Basis of Education*, p. 280, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1934.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 131. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³² *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

of the boys' gang, Y. M. C. A., American Legion, Boy Scouts, and the Navy League, of general economic conditions, and of the other active forces which either support or undermine the objectives of the schools. These facts may be known to research workers, but are seldom the basis of educational planning in a given community; and yet any program which does not take them into account can expect to achieve only limited control over the education of youth. By pushing our analysis one step further the situation will not, however, appear so surprising.

Educational problems compared in primitive and modern society. The conflict of group purposes and social influences of which we have spoken would never exist in a primitive society, or in any stable society. The very essence of stability is the complete integration or accommodation of the various component groups. The standards of the family, the religion, and the other associations are consistent with one another and together create a homogeneous culture. The individual reared in such an environment does not learn anti-social patterns, for all of the patterns which influence his development have the support of the group. Never experiencing social disorganization, he automatically acquires personal traits and attitudes in accordance with the accepted ways of society. Under such conditions there are no educational "problems."

On the other hand, in our own country and in every modern nation, cultural stability is something one reads about as history, but seldom experiences. We have felt the impact of too many strange cultures, of too many changes in population, and of too severe economic maladjustments to find social groups peacefully supporting one another's ideals, integrated as a unified society. Our use of the term "society," itself, is somewhat gratuitous, for what we really have are many small societies or groups, many divergent social interests, but few inclusive bonds which justify reference to an entire people, except in the most superficial matters, as a culturally unified body. And consequently, modern life can be studied more profitably not in terms of crystallized social structure, but in terms of conflicting trends.

When the culture of a people is thus fluid, education has quite a different task to perform. It cannot reproduce the old culture in the personalities of a new generation as was the practice of primitive groups, for there is no single culture to serve as the pattern. This social disunity is reflected within formal education by

the prevalent criticism that the schools lack a common objective, and it is even more clearly reflected in the other educative forces we have described. One method of studying the multiple and often conflicting trends of educational organization in a modern, unstable society is to compare the objectives toward which the educational leaders of that society are directing their efforts. Each school of thought which has thus far developed deserves a hearing if an understanding is to be had of the directions of change in modern education. Our analysis will be limited to the objectives of the organized schools, because as yet little effort has been made to control the other agencies to which we have attributed educational significance.

DIVERGENT OBJECTIVES OF MODERN EDUCATION

Preservation of the classical tradition. The steadfastness of an institution to its original purposes in defiance of the demands for change made by radically different social conditions is well illustrated in the attitudes of those educators who conceive of the schools primarily as the guardians of an Old World culture. This tradition was well rooted in Colonial schools, whose teachers knew only the classical subjects which were central in the curriculum of the English universities where they had been trained. To become a learned gentleman, the American clergyman, for whose training many of the schools were first founded, had but to follow the example of his prototype in England by mastering several languages, including Latin and Greek, and by developing familiarity with classical philosophy and literature, with the theological masterpieces of the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages, and with the work of more recent scholars who were carrying on a similar tradition. The utility of such learning for pioneer America was little questioned. People did not then depend on schools for learning the essentials of daily living—how to hunt, farm, and rear families. Once a week they could indulge themselves in the luxury of contact with a learned minister who would expound on the Greek derivation of a New Testament text, without seriously questioning the relation of the culture which he represented to their everyday interests. The reasons for this early trend in formal education are explained by John Dewey and John L. Childs:

Old-world culture was not deeply embodied in the customary indigenous arrangements of our daily life. It did not transmit itself vitally and unconsciously as it had done in the Old World where it originated and was at home. Hence there was a great, almost a superstitious, faith in schools as the special and almost exclusive organs for keeping intact the borrowed culture. Just as our excessive dependence upon law-making is the correlative of absence of stability in our exceedingly mobile community life, so our dependence upon schools has been the reflex of the precarious state of traditional culture.³³

The authors then show how this trend produced a program of education largely unrelated to the problems of a New World society.

The schools, devoting themselves to mastery of distinctively intellectual tools, operated through the medium of a reverence for books, while life outside shaped character. Of course, something of this work is characteristic of school education wherever it exists. But the peculiar conditions of American life rendered attachment to the bookish tradition and to the importance of the mere mastery of the linguistic tools of culture both thinner and firmer than it was elsewhere. Life in the open, in the neighborhood and local community, through participation in the duties of the home and the farm, through contact with industries . . . was the force which shaped character and which counted in the development of personality and power.³⁴

Although the tradition of the learned gentleman who has mastered subjects cast in the classical mold is still of some influence in our secondary schools, and is even more carefully perpetuated in the curriculum of many colleges, it has been challenged repeatedly by other trends whose strength has increased with the social changes of the industrial revolution.

The trend toward vocational education. One of the newer elements least compatible with the old is the trend toward voca-

³³ John Dewey and John L. Childs, "The Social-Economic Situation and Education," in *The Educational Frontier*, edited by William H. Kilpatrick, p. 44, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 45. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

tional training which has arisen as a practical means of preparing workers to operate and increase the new technology of production. When the school performs this function it becomes an adjunct of the factory, the business office, and the farm, a substitute for the old apprentice system. Classrooms of the traditional student-face-teacher type give way to shops and laboratories equipped with printing presses, drafting tables, turning lathes, typewriters, and accounting machines. The emphasis upon preparation for employment alters the status of the older disciplines, and those that are retained are adapted to the vocational objective. The study of English grammar is justified as an aid to intelligible communication in any vocation; a knowledge of scientific German is especially valuable to the medical student; Latin may aid the lawyer in understanding the vocabulary of his profession; and a sampling of literature, art, and history have prestige value in giving one the earmarks of refinement and "culture." Needless to say, the vocational emphasis in education is lamented by the scholars of the older tradition, who consider that the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake, regardless of its dollar value, is a justifiable endeavor.

The scientific emphasis in education. Another organizing principle came with the introduction of the scientific objective in education. If much of the intellectual activity of the Middle Ages can be characterized by the metaphysical approach to theological problems, the intellectual preoccupation of the present period can be written in terms of modern science. The methods, instruments, and attitudes of the scientist have so increased our understanding of the physical and social problems of the universe that, as was to be expected, the schools have become a center for scientific study and the principal agency for the dissemination of the results of that study. Long before manual training shops and sewing rooms had entered academic halls over the protests of the classical scholars, scientific laboratories had been admitted, at first reluctantly, but later as indispensable centers of learning. Courses purporting to be scientific were organized to impart knowledge of the laws of man's physical environment, of his own biological nature, and of his social relations.

Most of our institutions of learning now contain a mixture of the three elements we have described, the traditional classroom subjects influenced by Old World conceptions of education, the rapidly growing body of scientific knowledge, and training in the

vocations. The proportion of one or the other element in the mixture varies with the type of school.

Dissatisfaction with these three emphases in education was clearly evident when critics found that with all our knowledge and skills we had made little headway in overcoming the problems of war, recurring periods of unemployment, "slum" conditions in cities, inequality of wealth, crime, insanity, and scores of other forms of maladjustments. They argued from the premise that education should not only describe physical and social conditions but should train leaders in the control of those conditions. Recent developments in education represent in a large degree different reactions to this problem.

The progressive education movement. The first answer came from those educators who believed that schools were ineffective in training persons who could assume social responsibility not so much because of what they taught, as because of their methods of instruction. With the transmission of knowledge as their objective, schools had overlooked the social development of the individual who was being educated. The substitution of the child-centered for the subject-centered school became the objective of a movement known as "progressive education." As opposed to the compartmentalization of learning under the old system of separate subjects, the new movement advocated a more "continuous reconstruction of experience for the child." It further maintained that

. . . this reconstruction of experience, if it is to have any significance, must take the form of actual living and doing. Consequently the school must be transformed into a place where pupils go, not primarily to acquire knowledge, but to carry on a way of life. That is, the school is to be regarded as, first of all, an ideal community in which pupils get practice in cooperation, in self-government, and the application of intelligence to difficulties or problems as they may arise.³⁵

Only a small number of our schools have been thoroughly reorganized according to this new principle, but almost none have

³⁵ Boyd H. Bode, "The Confusion in Present-Day Education," in Kilpatrick, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 19. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. The ramifications of this movement in education may be followed in the articles of a monthly publication, *Progressive Education: A Review of the Newer Tendencies in Education*, Progressive Education Association, Washington, D. C.

escaped its influence altogether. In the newly formed departments of education in our colleges and in the special teacher training institutions, great attention is given to the mental and emotional development of the school child, to the "project" as opposed to the "subject" method of instruction, and to the socializing influence of all contacts within the child's school experience.

The critics of this movement do not find fault with its rediscovery of the individual, nor with its emphasis upon socialized education, but with what they consider its inability to produce well-adjusted persons in a society which is itself disorganized. The classroom experience in cooperation and social living can be controlled, but when the child leaves the school he is overwhelmed by the competition and conflicts of modern life:

. . . the school environment is of necessity more or less isolated from the larger environment. In the life of the school, at least as hitherto conceived, there is not only no place for the struggle to make a living, but none for the basic conflicts of economic, political, social, nationalistic, and religious interests and creeds that harass our present civilization. In fact, one reason why the school is regarded as an ideal environment is precisely that the pupils are protected against these conflicts and struggles. In other words, the environment created by the progressive school does not provide automatically for the reinterpretation or integration of those major values which are kept asunder by the present nature of our social organization. . . .³⁶

Implied in such a criticism is the belief that schools must enter this larger arena of social conflict and become controlling agencies in organizing a new culture. The school as an outright instrument of control in determining the direction of social change is a somewhat unorthodox idea. In primitive society education exerted social control by teaching compliance to the status quo; and in the educational trends previously described in modern society the schools may have been confused about what culture they should impart to the youth or the method of impartation, but they were safely removed from any serious responsibility for initiating a new social order. Persons accustomed to education in its more orthodox

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. The progressive education movement is itself broadening its objectives in such a way as to make many of these criticisms less and less applicable.

forms will therefore be somewhat startled by the appearance of the two most recent trends in educational objectives.

The schools as agencies of indoctrination. According to the first proposal, the schools should play a leading role in social reform by setting about methodically to indoctrinate youth with a particular social program. Such has become an important function of education in Russia, Germany, and Italy, and the advocates of this principle recommend a similar policy for the United States.

This proposal runs counter to the liberal principles of "progressive education" which encourage youth to arrive at his own judgment on social questions after having examined all phases of a problem. And it runs counter to the presumably well-established democratic ideal that universal, liberal education will produce an intelligent citizenry capable of efficient self-government. The proponents of the plan admit that it is not in keeping with these ideals, but declare that the ideals themselves have been proved impractical. Some of them contend that the average citizen is neither intelligent nor free of self-interest in his social judgments. That he is not intelligent in spite of popular education is demonstrated by the ease with which the masses are swayed by emotional symbols manufactured by the clever propagandist. That he is not free to make unbiased judgments is clear from the fact that in our highly organized industrial society he is a member of economic groups which are seeking to control government for their own ends. Therefore, instead of allowing these divergent self-interest groups to continue their irrational tug-of-war over policies of government, we should, according to those who believe in indoctrination, permit a few intelligent leaders to formulate a consistent plan of action both in strictly governmental matters and in other phases of social organization as well. Then by the use of propaganda through the schools, newspapers, radio, and movies we would control the masses of the people in accordance with this program. Those who hold this view contend that if a revolution occurs whatever group wins will use this method to develop uniform adherence to their program, citing as examples the way schools in Russia, Germany, and Italy performed this task when the new regime went into power. Rather than wait for a revolution, we should anticipate the needed reform and prepare for it gradually by indoctrinating youth with new concepts of government and of economics. So runs the argument. Often in actual practice it is more implied

than stated. The educator responsible for the following statements would not agree with every step in the preceding argument, but he arrives at substantially the same conclusion regarding the present task of the schools.

My contention is that in the present complex social organization education must take on the responsibility of consciously molding public opinion in support of a predetermined set of social-economic goals and policies, when these goals and policies are set forth by a council of experts in whom education has confidence.³⁷

The question is whether we shall leave the matter of molding public opinion entirely to the agencies with a personal or commercial interest to serve, or whether we shall ask those agencies with only social and public interests to take a hand in the game too.³⁸

My proposal is that there shall be constituted under the auspices of the educational agencies of the country a social-economic council. . . .

Making blue prints of the social structure is the service expected of a council of social-economic experts.³⁹

Social guidance as a function of education. That the work of the schools should become consciously integrated with all social organization to the end that *educational objectives may determine the direction of social change* gives a somewhat different emphasis from the plan just described, but it is also similar to it in at least three respects. First, this proposal, like the previous one, seeks to bring order and some degree of cultural consistency out of the present conflicting forces:

Direction would be given to an aimless situation; unity would grow in a system now distracted by a multiplicity of special movements that are not held together by any single purpose. . . .⁴⁰

Second, it is in agreement in advocating education as an agency of social control:

³⁷ Fred J. Kelly, "The Place of Education in Social-Economic Planning," *School and Society*, vol. 36, pp. 551-552, Oct. 29, 1932.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 552.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 549.

⁴⁰ Dewey and Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

The desired education cannot occur within the four walls of a school shut off from life. Education must itself assume an increasing responsibility for participation in projecting ideas of social change and taking part in their execution in order to be educative.⁴¹

Education can gain vitality only as it deals with the specific affairs of modern technological, scientific, economic, political, family, and religious life. The young whose lives are to be lived in the society that is now in process of formation have a right to demand that the school which seeks to educate them shall be oriented primarily to that which lies ahead, rather than to a culture that is in process of disintegration and disappearance.⁴²

And, in the third place, it agrees that education cannot remain altogether objective and impartial with reference to the way in which society is organized:

Admit that education is concerned with a development of individual potentialities and you are committed to the conclusion that education cannot be neutral and indifferent as to the kind of social organization which exists. Individuals develop not in a remote entity called "society" at large but in connection *with one another*. The conditions of their association with one another, of their participation and communication, of their cooperation and competition, are set by legal political and economic arrangements. In the interests, therefore, of education—not of any preconceived "ism" or code—the fact is emphasized that education must operate in view of a deliberately preferred social order.⁴³

If there are these three areas of agreement in the two positions, what, then, is the point of difference? It, too, was suggested in the preceding quotations. Whereas outright indoctrination involves the propagation of a preconceived social philosophy, the new proposal would place education in charge of social planning without stating the particular program that is to be evolved and propa-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 319. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴² John L. Childs, "Should the Schools Seek Actively to Reconstruct Society?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 182, pp. 1, 2. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴³ Dewey and Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 291. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

gated. Furthermore, it anticipates a constant changing of the plan as social conditions change.

We believe profoundly that society requires planning; that planning is the alternative to chaos, disorder, and insecurity. But there is a difference between a society which is *planned* and a society which is continuously *planning*—namely, the difference between autocracy and democracy, between dogma and intelligence in operation, between suppression of individuality and that release and utilization of individuality which will bring it to full maturity.⁴⁴

The principal tenet of this position is that since the social conditions responsible for group conflict, exploitation, and confusion of standards so counteract the efforts of the schools in teaching group cooperation and in surrounding students with conditions favorable to their personal development, these conditions, themselves, can no longer go unregulated nor be left to the control of private interests. The formulation of new culture patterns in their place is “preeminently an educational task,”⁴⁵ not in the sense that school teachers should be called upon to operate government and business, but in that whoever is responsible for the future control of government, business, and other phases of community life should project policies motivated by educational and social ideals rather than by interest in class, special group, or private gain.

The immediate task of the schools in bringing this condition about, according to the proponents quoted, is to prepare this generation of youth for the substitution of collective, social planning in the control of our institutions for our present attitude of *laissez-faire*. Although they contend that this involves no more indoctrination than the present teaching of the schools, which by its very lack of interest in social control supports the *laissez-faire* policy, yet they freely admit it rests upon definite assumptions. These presuppositions do not take the form of a ready-made plan of social reform concerning which students are to be indoctrinated, but they do involve agreement as to the objectives of education.

. . . The implication of the foregoing is not that the educator should draw the blueprints of the new society and take advantage

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 72. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

of his position to impose them upon the young. The difficulties of the social situation, and the requirements of his educational office, both alike preclude this type of procedure. It does mean, however, that the educator should frankly recognize that all educational programs rest, in the last analysis, upon a set of social presuppositions.⁴⁶

Their first presupposition is that individuals can be educated in the intelligent social control of their institutions. Their second assumption, which is also related to the democratic ideal, states that the freedom and development of the individual is the highest objective of society. And, in the third place, they assume that this end can be reached only by the substitution of public, group control of social change for control by private interests. This, in short, is their "doctrine."

Summary. In our review of modern educational organization we have not been surprised to find its problems more complex than those faced by the elders of the primitive tribe. Modern schools have been baffled in their attempt to perform the age-old function of transmitting to the next generation the traditional culture of the group by the fact that there now exist many different cultural traditions. They have also been baffled by the lack of integration between their work within the classroom and the other educative forces of society. Out of this confusion have arisen several movements each of which is attempting to control the direction of educational change. The differences in their objectives are implied in the following questions: Should the schools perpetuate what remains of the traditional culture as their principal task, should they concentrate upon the dissemination of the new scientific knowledge, or should they train youth in the technology of the new vocations? Or, is there a need for an entire shift from subject-centered to child-centered education in which the development of personality is the objective? And, if this latter is the desired end, how can the conditioning influences in the child's social environment outside of school be made consistent with educational objectives? Is it to be achieved by a general reform in social organization initiated by the indoctrination of the masses through schools, newspapers, and other agencies which control public opinion? Or is it to be done by propagating an attitude generally favorable to

⁴⁶ Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

"experimentation in social management" in all social organization, in which educational objectives will replace narrow group or private interests?

These problems have not been presented in sufficient detail to give a definitive analysis of trends in education. Our purpose has rather been to use the present situation as a general illustration of social behavior. We have observed once more the resistance of institutions to change. We have observed the interrelatedness of all organization which makes social change in one part disrupt the equilibrium in the other. And finally, we have observed how, when society is in a disorganized condition, many forces operate, sometimes in harmony with one another, sometimes in conflict, to determine the form which reorganization will take. Education has been an especially useful illustration of the nature of social organization because in it are reflected many processes of change whose influences have extended to all aspects of society.

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Chapter 20

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

RUSSIAN MOLOKAN RELIGIOUS SERVICES¹

A VOLUME of song assailed us as soon as we had entered the courtyard, and increased measurably as we stood at the door, waiting to enter. After several moments' hesitation, all who had gathered at the door, entered the room, hesitated again a moment in silent prayer—the singing by the congregation proceeding full voice—then, men and women separating, moved to vacant seats. The assemblage, which had been standing, then sat down . . .

The order of the service is simple. Alternate singing and Scripture-reading occupy the first part of the service. Two different men read Scripture passages, with a full, free, resonant voice, with much speed and clear pronunciation.

The singing is a peculiar chant, with a distinct rhythm and clearly distinguishable refrains. The entire congregation sings with an expression which leaves the listener in no doubt as to the depth of meaning which is found in the chant. At times the song is simple, a mere humming, with little attempt to enunciate words, the voices untrained, and those of men predominating. There is no musical instrument, yet the full effect of the singing is at points overpowering.

Indeed, during the service, a woman seemed to be overcome by the singing. Suddenly she stretched her outspread hands over her head. Her eyes partly closed, an ecstatic look spread over her countenance. Her lips filled and softened, and her face flushed red. The outstretched arms trembled slightly; her head moved gently; she seemed on the point of falling. She retained this posture while the song went on for a few verses, increasing meantime in intensity. She dropped her arms suddenly and in turn kissed three or four of the women seated in the row before her. Throughout the service she

¹ Pauline V. Young, *The Pilgrims of Russian-Town*, pp. 31-33, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

seemed much stirred. Little attention was paid to this demonstration, and she finally sank back into her seat, sobbing. Singing continued. An older man, after a number of nervous shrugs and movements, threw his hands suddenly over his head and began to explain how thrilled and happy he was and how much he loved his brothers. He talked very rapidly but briefly, and finally, kissing the elders nearest to him, sat down, seemingly much relieved. Two or three other members swung their arms with short, jerky movements, talked rapidly though quietly, trying to explain to the rest of the congregation how happy and inspired they felt by the presence of the Holy Ghost. Several of the singers, particularly those who were most energetic in their chanting, kissed the "affected" members, seemingly in full understanding of their emotions. This entire procedure was carried on in a quiet, orderly, and dignified manner.

At a word from the elder the benches were moved back to the wall, the congregation hardly disturbed in their former relative positions. Next in order is the offering. By two's and singly, men and women moved to the table, quietly depositing small contributions, a total of ten or twelve dollars. The elder dropped to his knees and prayed in a full, smooth voice, heavily tinged with emotion. Many in the congregation fell prostrated on the floor, audibly weeping, their faces buried in the palms of their hands; others, kneeling, prayed solemnly. The elder rose to his feet. A few people, laden with emotion, stepped forward for special prayer, bowing alternately to the elder and to the congregation, then falling to the floor in devout prayer, begging for mercy and forgiveness and deliverance from the predicaments facing them. The elder dropped to his knees once more, blessing the afflicted and leading the congregation in prayer.

The exchange of the "brotherly kiss" was then in order. The congregation, both men and women, moved slowly and quietly toward the elders, bowing respectfully, and kissing them first and then their brothers and sisters. After a final song, more cheerful and animated, the congregation dispersed.

Our study of religious organization begins with those groups, like the Molokan sect whose service was described, which have arisen in protest against a worldly society and have united their members in a strong emotional loyalty to a new cause. Most specialized religious groups begin as just such dynamic, emotional fel-

lowships.² This was true of the early Christian sect, of the Protestant reform groups at the close of the Middle Ages, of the "Holy Rollers" and similar pentecostal sects of pioneer days, of the Mennonite and Amish groups which still retain many sectarian characteristics, and of other religious protest groups which have arisen from time to time even in recent years. The later development of formal churches and denominations can be understood better if we start with the religious group in the dynamic stage of its inception. Although the particular patterns vary from one religious fellowship to another, the sense of mission and loyalty to a new cause that has religious sanction is generally characteristic of all sects. The Molokans will serve as an illustration of the way such groups are formed and the typical stages in their behavior.

The description of the Sunday morning service in a Molokan church in Los Angeles cannot be understood apart from a history of the conditions which brought this religious sect into being. The members of the congregation described, who now reside in one of Los Angeles' areas of transition known as the "Flats," originated as Russian peasants exiled in Transcaucasia. In the seventeenth century their ancestors deserted the Greek-Orthodox Church of Russia because of opposition to changes in the ritual which had been instituted by one of the high ranking scholars of the Church, and also because of oppressive social and economic conditions for which they held the Church, as well as the government, responsible. In turn, both the Church and state tried to suppress this movement of dissension, but "neither torture, fines, imprisonment, nor banishment were able to stem the tide of desertion from the official church. The persecutions endured served to bind the sectarians into more closely knit groups, developing a high degree of solidarity and devotion to religious principles."³ Out of these common experiences the Molokans developed as a well-unified sect capable of persisting in the face of severe oppression and in the midst of conflicting cultures.

² Religious sects were not typical of primitive societies, whose entire social life was so well integrated that religious interests and activities could scarcely be distinguished from the other phases of its life. Sectarian movements did not appear until religion had become a somewhat specialized function. At the close of this chapter we shall find religion once again taking its place as one phase of a larger social organization.

³ Pauline V. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 67. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. See also pp. 61-69.

Active and continuous opposition grew as new converts to the sect multiplied. The more violent and relentless the attack upon them the more they found it necessary to organize and discipline themselves. Individual members were called upon to make greater sacrifices for the "Cause"; the leaders were urged to put forth their highest efforts; the aims and ideals of the movement were formulated more carefully; and most important of all perhaps, the adherents of the faith were brought into more personal relationships, while their common sufferings developed within the group that *esprit de corps* which produces a "united" people.⁴

TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

The origin of a religious sect. The origin of the Molokan brotherhood at a time when the people were suffering from adverse social conditions and when they were convinced that the leaders of the official church had forsaken the true religion, sounds curiously like the circumstances which caused Jesus and his followers to contest the established society of their day and form a movement which later became a new religion. Religious history contains many other similar examples. That is to say, religious organization is no exception to the generalization that *institutions tend to disintegrate and new social patterns to originate during periods of unrest and social change*. The first expression of dissatisfaction with the existing order often takes the form of spontaneous, crowd-like protests which may in time be defined and loosely organized as *social movements*. If the movement meets with severe opposition and if its work instead of being quickly accomplished extends over a period of time, it may become organized as a religious *sect* with a more permanent, institutionalized structure. Although a sect represents a higher degree of organization and permanency than a movement, it retains the attitude of a reform group that is in conflict with the established society.

A sect is a religious organization that is at war with the existing mores. It seeks to cultivate a state of mind and establish a code of morals different from that of the world about it and for this it

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

claims divine authority. In order to accomplish this end it invariably seeks to set itself off in contrast with the rest of the world.⁵

Sects have their origin in social unrest to which they give a direction and expression in forms and practices that are largely determined by historical circumstances; movements which were at first inchoate impulses and aspirations gradually take form; policies are defined, doctrine and dogmas formulated; and eventually an administrative machinery and efficiencies are developed to carry into effect policies and purposes.⁶

The sectarian society. As a sect is intolerant of divergent beliefs in outside groups so it is intolerant of differences within its own number. In its efforts to set itself off in contrast with the rest of the world, it often adopts distinctive forms of dress and speech which become the outer symbols of its inner differences in attitude and belief. The extension of the religious control over what are often considered secular matters transforms a religious sect into a *sectarian society*, which seeks as complete isolation as possible from the influences of outside culture. Although during the past two hundred and fifty years the Molokan group has in a limited way participated in the economic activity of the country where it has resided, it has consistently refused to take part in the politics of the larger community, and has maintained a staunch pacifist attitude with reference to the question of war. The extent to which the mores of the "in-group" determine the attitudes of the members on all concerns of their daily living is suggested by the following common rules of conduct and folk sayings:

A good Molokan must not receive pay for personal services rendered to a "brother."

He must not sue a "brother" in court.

He must not reject the customs of his forefathers.

He must not fight or go to war.

He must not receive charity from outside groups.

He must not make an image of himself.

"It's a sin for one man to hold himself superior to his brother."

⁵ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 872, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 873. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

"We have no classes, castes, or titles."

"We don't tolerate intoxicating drinks of any kind."

"Food must be simple food, nourishing but plain."

"We condemn luxury, extravagant dress, elaborate house furnishings. We believe in utility."

"Married life is sacred once it is consummated, and breach of marriage bonds is an unpardonable sin."

"We don't tolerate idle folks—everybody must work."

"Dancing, drinking, playing cards, going to theaters and moving picture shows are sins."

"Work with us is a religious duty."

"We are not gentle-folk and don't wish to be such. We are peasants."⁷

In its tendency toward the development of a self-consistent culture, this Russian group runs true to the form of the early Christian sects whose conflict with the established society and whose mode of social organization are described in the New Testament letters of Saint Paul. The permeation of all aspects of a group's life by religious ideals, which was true not only of the Molokans and the early Christians but of all sectarian movements, has the effect of creating a close unity and a high degree of homogeneity.

In a word, the older Molokans identify themselves so fully with the attitudes, sentiments, and institutions of the group, and are so intimately a part of the brotherhood, that in many respects they are but little differentiated from each other. In fact, the Molokans take pride in their ability to be "of the same mind" and to place the brotherhood above the individual; "You can recognize a Molokan by the dress he wears, by the language he uses, by the life he lives. When he does a good deed, you know who did it. Similarly, the fear of being recognized as a Molokan keeps him from evil deeds."⁸

Transformation of sects into denominations. We have observed that the unity of a sect rests upon a two-fold relationship—inner loyalty to a common cause, and conflict with "out-groups" who hold different beliefs. A sect is transformed into a denom-

⁷ Pauline V. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

ination if the second factor is removed. This generally occurs when the groups which opposed the sect cease their persecution and give it a recognized place in the society. Such was the situation greeting the Molokan groups which migrated to the United States. When they found themselves no longer opposed by a government or an established church and free as all other groups to follow whatever religious practices they chose, the reason for their conflict psychology ceased to exist. It was only natural that this oppressed sect regard America as a haven, but

. . . America . . . by her very tolerance, is a more insidious danger to sectarianism than the most relentless persecutions known to Europe. The strict discipline within a sect, the unquestioning loyalty of the members to its leaders, its ideals and its goals, its cherished traditions and its organized defenses, slowly weaken when the enemy without the walls ceases to attack the sect or even assumes an indifferent attitude toward it.⁹

A recent arrival from one of the Molokan villages in Transcaucasia could not understand the changes in culture which had come to his religious brethren who migrated to America.

"The old people are still faithful Molokans, but the rest have changed. . . . Oh, how they have changed. . . . They don't even speak a good Russian any more. They use 'truck,' 'Ford,' 'auto,' 'rubbish,' 'show,' 'boss,' 'court,' 'ice-cream,' 'sure,' as if these terms were a part of them. And the children I can't understand at all. . . . And look how some dress—fine materials, silks, laces, pumps. Why, they dress and live extravagantly. Their houses resemble those of the (country) nobility (before the war). . . . Their foods are different. . . . They think differently. . . . The only thing that has not changed is the *sobranie* (the religious assembly), but the people don't get together as much as they used to in Russia. They are too busy here. They are not attached to each other as much as before. The greatest change I notice in the children. They are hardly Russians. They are too citified. And how they talk back to their parents! The parents don't have 'much say' any more."¹⁰

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 274. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

The adjustment between the old and the new cultures does not occur quickly nor easily. There are efforts to fortify the original faith and there are concessions to new standards. In time, the latter force becomes dominant, providing the group continues to live in the midst of a different but not hostile culture. *Accommodation to other groups replaces conflict as the sect is transformed into the denomination.* That is to say, the moral fervor and revolutionary character of a group declines as its desire for status in relation to other groups increases. "The period of extreme isolation, conflict, and high morale is followed by a more ironic era when conformity with the outside world gets increasing approval."¹¹

[When a sect has succeeded in] accommodating itself to rival organizations, when it has become tolerant and is tolerated, it tends to assume the form of a denomination. Denominations tend and are perhaps destined to unite in the form of religious federations—a thing which is inconceivable of a sect.¹²

Among religious groups which have been in this country for a greater period of time, the process of adjustment is much more advanced than with the Molokans, who show only traces of change from sect to denomination. With the longer established groups, the formation of church councils, the federation of churches, and, most surprising of all, denominational mergers, reveal an attitude quite different from the sectarian intolerance so characteristic of the early history of American churches and of their Old World religious heritage. In several of our large cities, comity commissions have been established to facilitate the cooperation of denominations in planning for the religious needs of the entire community. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is a nation-wide cooperative enterprise supported by many of the largest denominations. The National Conference of Jews and Christians is at least a gesture in the direction of cooperation among the three great

¹¹ Ellsworth Faris, "The Sect and the Sectarian," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 22, pp. 154, 1928. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

¹² Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 873. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

religions, Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism, whose differences in the past have prevented all thought of united action.¹³

Relation of churches to other social organizations. The sect was not only at war with other religions, but with all social organization outside its own group. The denomination is not only at peace with other religions, but with other phases of social organization as well. The denomination is generally in support of the government, permits its members to protect the country in time of war, supports the prevailing economic system, and includes in its religious heritage many of the cultural elements of society. This integration is, however, seldom complete, as was the separation of the sect seldom absolute; the sect has some relations with other groups, and the denomination has occasional conflicts with some phase of its social environment. But the general differences in the two types of religious organization and their corresponding social attitudes are clear.

The significance of the contrast is apparent when the control of the religious group over the life of the individual is analyzed. All of the interests of a sectarian are confined to his group and controlled by its mores. Religious ideals become the organizing principle for the entire society. Referring to this inclusive aspect of their religion, one of the elders of the Russian sect which we have described, states:

There are two main things about our brotherhood: First, we are of the same mind and we do the same things together; we suffer and rejoice together. And second, our civil society is the "church," to which all *faithful* members belong. We don't even have lodges or benefit societies, or any other organizations not open to the whole brotherhood.¹⁴

In denominationalized religion, on the other hand, the church has only a limited claim over the interests of its members, for it

¹³ Cf. also H. Paul Douglass, *Protestant Cooperation in American Cities*, Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York, 1930; H. Paul Douglass, *Church Unity Movements in the United States*, Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York, 1934; Charles S. MacFarland, *International Christian Movements*, Fleming H. Revell Company, New York; and Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, *Urban Organization of Protestantism*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934.

¹⁴ Pauline V. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 70. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

follows that if the church cooperates with other social organizations, its members become members also of other groups. They join business organizations, patriotic orders, lodges, and recreational societies. When a person plays these multiple roles he can no longer be identified solely by the name of his religion; in addition to being a Baptist he may be also a Rotarian, an Elk, a Legionnaire, and a member of an athletic club. His membership in a religious group tends to become, therefore, only one of a number of specialized interests, and the church represents but a minor part of his total experience. This constitutes no problem for the individual or for society, as long as the mores of the different groups are consistent with one another. When, however, social changes alter this close integration of an organized society, differences in group standards create a conflict of loyalties within the individual.

Religious organization in the United States has now reached this point in its cycle of change. The permeation of all life by religious ideals so characteristic of the sectarian society has been replaced by a secularization of society in which religious groups are only one part of an organized social life. As we found forces outside of the school room becoming important if not dominating factors in the education of youth, so now we find social conditions outside of the church becoming important if not dominant factors in determining the individual's moral standards and personal philosophy. In analyzing education we examined these competing forces and the reaction of the schools to them; now we shall outline the types of response which organized religion is making to the new conditions which it finds both within its own groups and in its relation to the rest of society.

THE CHURCH IN THE CHANGING COMMUNITY

On a corner of one of the world's most famous streets stands an old brownstone church. At noon on any day in summer one finds an outdoor religious meeting at its side doorstep. As the clock strikes, a choir in cap and gown appears in the doorway. Within, a little cabinet organ gives the key. A woman begins to play on a trumpet:

Break thou the bread of life, dear Lord, to me,
As thou didst break the loaves beside the sea . . .

The trumpet's tones are smooth, sonorous, satisfying. The woman's

black-robed figure, trumpet raised aloft, briefly challenges the attention of the speeding traffic. To some the sight or the sound rouses childhood memories. Almost immediately the street yields an audience. It is an oddly assorted one. A tank of the Armored Car Corporation pauses with its load of money, and the two eyes of the guard peer through the aperture through which he will shoot in case of a bandit attack. A taxi-cab—the driver's registration card says he is Peter Olinsky—draws up at the curb. A coal truck rumbles through without stopping, but the chauffeur turns around to hear. Two Negroes, perched on a wagonload of second-hand furniture, sing the words as they slow up for traffic. A dozen stenographers and clerks, out for the lunch hour, idle against the palings of the churchyard. Here and there is a woman of the genteel sort; a street-cleaner leans on his broom; two Western Union Telegraph messengers teeter on the curb. Watching from across the street but apart from the crowd stand a score of steel workers from a building under construction. Knots of Hebrew garment workers saunter by listlessly. A tall, expensively dressed man from a hotel near by inspects the novelty. Such is the group which hears the trumpet. On this busy corner of the metropolis a circle of attention is suddenly drawn; within this circle men are subtly conscious of the mood of song and prayer.

This is an old church, founded by the disciplined and steadfast race which settled the city. When they chose this site, it was far uptown in the direction of the open country. The most elegant clubs and restaurants, the theaters and the opera house, were well below it, and the most prosperous people lived in large brownstone houses in the vicinity. No one lives in the vicinity now except transients in hotels. The locality has seen much change, has undergone many phases of evolution. First apartments followed single family houses. Retail business gave way to wholesale business. Now the district as a whole has been absorbed in the manufacturing area; it is a part of the world of coats, dresses and suits, with the realm of furs near at hand.

The side street reveals the well-known marks of an area which has seen better days, and which now waits in a run-down and disheveled state till the pressure of the city shall call it back into more up-to-date uses. Opposite the church is an old building which rents desk space and mail addresses to tenants by the month. This indicates a floating population of business beginners or failures, one which changes every few months. On the first floor is a cigar store, a

laundry where a Chinaman irons without looking up, and a stall where an Italian arranges oranges.¹⁵

What happens to organized religion when the community in which it functions undergoes a radical transformation, when a church parish changes from a culturally homogeneous neighborhood to an area of machines, commercial establishments, and human beings of all types? How does the church make real to the captain of industry, the taxi driver, and the ten-cent store clerk its gospel of brotherly love and of the Kingdom of God on earth? What place does the song of the Psalmist, "He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; He leadeth me beside the still waters; He restoreth my soul . . .," have for the mechanized modern whose speed equals that of the machines he operates and whose solitude is interrupted by blaring radios, sensational headlines, and the insistent appeal of the bright lights?

The church in a changing community, like all other institutions of an unstable society, is undergoing moderate or radical readjustments, depending upon the rigidity or the flexibility of its organization. The task of relating its traditional objectives to present conditions of life is a difficult problem in any community, for change has come to the crossroad hamlet and the industrial town as well as to all areas of the city. If the church still conceives of itself primarily as a religious fellowship, an intimate brotherhood, how can that ideal be realized in communities whose relations are categoric and impersonal? If the church thinks of itself as custodian of a moral code laid down twenty-five centuries or more ago on Mount Sinai, how can its Ten Commandments be enforced in a population which thinks in terms of an impersonal, corporate economy, a relativistic morality, and a patchwork philosophy of stereotypes? Or, if the church aims to control all aspects of a society as it did in its sectarian youth, how can that purpose be accomplished when specialization has assigned its members to places of employment, places of residence, and places of recreation over which it has little control? Let us examine in some detail the effects of such conditions upon the social organization of religion.

¹⁵ H. Paul Douglass, *The City's Church*, pp. 1-3, Friendship Press, New York, 1929. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Ecological change and religious organization in urban communities. The two major population movements—the rapid influx of immigrant groups particularly during periods of industrial expansion, and the redistribution of people within our own boundaries with the development of cities—have already been traced in their general effects upon the culture of communities, but will now be considered with reference to their influence on religious organization in particular. The general principle that when groups move to a new location they carry their old culture with them explains what would otherwise seem a most curious mixture of religious institutions in the changing community. When the farmers of Massachusetts moved from country to city they brought with them their Congregational, Presbyterian, or Episcopalian beliefs and practices along with their rural minister. When, at the close of the World War, a half million rural Negroes migrated to the cities, their Baptist, Pentecostal, and Methodist religions came with them. Their crossroads meeting houses reappeared as store-front churches in the deteriorated sections of the cities. And when Irish, Italians, Russians, Swedes, Finns, and Germans came to America, the Catholic Church, the Synagogue, or the Protestant religion that they had known in their native lands was the organization to which they remained loyal in the new environment.

According to H. Paul Douglass, who has engaged in more research on this problem than anyone else in this country, religious groups tend to conserve their old forms, try them out in their new community life, and yield to change only reluctantly when altered conditions impel them to do so.¹⁶ He finds, for example, in cities whose growth has been rapid, that no small proportion of the people and of their institutions behave as though they still belonged in a rural setting or in a foreign country. Gradually, however, both people and institutions undergo change as they are forced to make adjustments to new conditions of living. This we found true of the Russian peasants in the Molokan sect who had settled in Los Angeles, and it would also be true of any group we might examine. During the period of transitions, there are many evidences of maladjustment both in the personalities of individuals and in the social organization, which, in spite of new conditions, perpetuates old forms as long as possible.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Ecological distribution of people and of institutions. What are some of the types and stages of adjustment which we find churches making in the city community where change has been most rapid? The transplanted, unadapted churches are located in the sections of the city where the migrant groups first settle; these are usually in the zone in transition and interstitial areas where the lowest rent and the least discrimination against newcomers are found. Since the new arrival is generally one of many from the same cultural origin, he joins with fellow countrymen or villagers in perpetuating the old institutions.

If we follow the group of newcomers as they begin to make adjustments to the city, learn its language, its rules for success, its favored places of residence, and its form of recreation, we find that the processes of specialization, segregation, and stratification have begun to distribute its members into different areas, different types of work, and in other ways are breaking down the primary unity which formerly prevailed. By this time their churches have been affected by the same urbanizing forces, with the result that there is an *ecological pattern for institutions* as well as for the people.

Institutional adaptation to community change. The original churches near the heart of the city where the migrants first settled are closed, sold to new groups, perpetuated by the "old guard" who for sentimental reasons return to the neighborhood on Sunday, or they become specialized types of institutions serving the needs of the people at present in that area, who may be quite different from the original church members. If the area was at the time of first settlement Protestant and is now Catholic, the church may no longer conduct religious services because of the charge of proselyting members of another religion, but through the support of its home missionary board or city society,¹⁷ may conduct a program of community activities very similar to that of a settlement house. If the area has become a rooming house district, the city society of the denomination may convert the church into a social center. If it has become a "homeless man" area, the "hobohemia" of the

¹⁷ See Wilbur C. Hallenbeck, *Urban Organization of Protestantism*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934, for a discussion of the work of city societies.

city, the church may serve as a mission, ministering to both the physical and spiritual needs of this special group.¹⁸

In the meantime the original members of the church, who have acquired some of the wealth and culture of the city, may have moved to higher rent, better organized sections, coming in contact with more completely urbanized culture groups. Their contact with these new influences produces different reactions. Some abandon their old religion; some remain loyal but modify the old practices; and others join churches which they consider more in keeping with the conditions of their new life.

The churches most advanced in their degree of urbanization are often the "downtown" churches, whose specialized types of religious service attract people from all parts of the metropolitan area. To maintain the interest of a widely distributed membership, the downtown church must surpass in some manner the work of the local community church. The competitive relationship of the two is somewhat analogous to the competition between the downtown stores and the shopping districts in the local communities. In both cases the downtown institutions must offer services of a different type or of a superior quality if they are to attract people from a distance. The downtown churches which succeed in this competition have emphasized the grandeur of their church architecture (the cathedral type of church) or have specialized in great preaching, distinctive musical services, or outstanding lecture-ships and forums. Also downtown are found religious groups which are distinctive because of a new type of theology or worship not represented in the local community churches, as is true of the humanist societies, ethical culture groups, and other departures from the more conventional religions.

In the exclusive residential areas, and particularly in the wealthy suburbs, another type of religious organization is found. Here the conventional community church is perpetuated but in a form that is in keeping with the wealth and sophistication of its members. It is still a family and community institution, but

¹⁸ Cf. the analysis of different types of adaptation of city churches to community changes made by Samuel C. Kincheloe, "The Local Church and Its Community," in William C. Bower, ed., *The Church at Work in the Modern World*, pp. 36-42, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1935; also Samuel C. Kincheloe, "Major Reactions of City Churches," *Religious Education*, Nov., 1928.

unlike its prototype in the early history of the city or in the small community whence the forebears of its present members may have come, this church has a modern theology which is friendly to science, employs a minister with as broad a training as that of the best professional leaders in the community, has a church school whose quality and type of instruction corresponds to the more "advanced" week-day schools, and offers a general program of activities that reflect the growing interest of its members in art, dramatics, and current social problems.

From this analysis we must obviously conclude that there is no single type that can be described as "the city church." Religious organization has responded to the same forces of differentiation and specialization that we earlier studied as the principal determinants of the different types of communities in every metropolitan region. We could continue to analyze the response of religious organizations to these forces of change by studying their increase in formal structure with the decline of primary relations, by examining their attempts to re-establish primary group relations in the midst of the anonymous, secondary contacts of city life, and we could also analyze the developments in cooperation between churches themselves and between churches and other social institutions of the city. If we had time for this fuller investigation we would find additional evidence of the change which institutions are forced to undergo when the ecological and cultural conditions of their environment have been radically altered.

Religious adaptation to the changing ecology of rural life. Religious organizations in smaller communities have also undergone change but often in a more moderate degree. The open-country churches have shown a tendency to yield to the rural community church located in the village, the sectarian and denominational lines among the churches seem to be less sharply drawn than formerly, and there are signs of increasing specialization and cooperation, sometimes even on a regional basis, in which the modern techniques of survey and area-wide planning are utilized. As early as 1923 scientific surveys of rural communities demonstrated the relationship between ecology and religion by showing the inability of churches to carry on their program of work when the population was sparse or the financial condition of the people poor. At that time 42 per cent of all town and country communities in the United States had church buildings but no resident pastors, and only 21

per cent had full-time resident pastors.¹⁹ The *open-country* churches were most handicapped in this respect, as well as in many others. They had the smallest average membership—46 as compared with 84 in the village churches and 144 in the town churches—and they were least able to support such activities as Sunday Schools.²⁰

The *larger parish movement*, one of the more recent patterns of adjustment to this situation, illustrates the problems in organization which ecological and cultural changes have brought to rural communities. The leaders of that movement advocate consolidation of resources as a means of bringing new vitality to struggling churches whose former parish has been depleted by shifts in population, or whose members now travel by automobile to larger centers. It provides for the pooling of resources of a number of communities in the support of a more complete church program than any one of them could maintain alone. Although there are many different plans of organization,²¹ they can in general be classified under two main types:

. . . the closely integrated type that ministers in many ways to all the people of a sociologically recognized area, and the type that groups churches together more or less loosely regardless of sociological factors.²²

Brunner found that the larger parish, especially of the first type, had an advantage over the former system of independent churches because:

The pooling of the religious resources of a sociologically homogeneous area make possible specialized and better trained leadership, just as the centralization of schools in a similar area offers better educational leadership.²³

¹⁹ H. N. Morse and Edmund de S. Brunner, *The Town and Country Church in the United States*, p. 41, George H. Doran Company, New York, 1923.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43. These and other statistical summaries to follow apply only to Protestant churches.

²¹ Edmund de S. Brunner, *The Larger Parish*, pp. 13-21, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 10. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 66. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. For a case study of a larger parish in operation, see James Myers, *Religion Lends a Hand*, pp. 72-81, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1929.

In describing such adjustments of churches to new conditions in rural communities, Brunner is not suggesting that in actual practice consolidation of this type has gone very far. In fact he repeatedly raises the question as to whether or not the larger parish plan is really a movement or just an enthusiasm.²⁴ Jesse M. Ormond found that at least in North Carolina rural churches were still unadjusted to the needs of their communities:

The multitude of poorly equipped, inadequately financed, and unsuitably located country churches are hopeless so far as rendering a satisfactory service to the country people of modern times is concerned.²⁵

One would judge from the remark by Douglass and Brunner, "country churches are closing at the rate of perhaps 1,000 to 1,500 a year,"²⁶ that the North Carolina situation is typical of many other areas.

If the country neighborhood is losing both in population and as a center of interest for rural people, and, if at the other extreme, cities are expanding so rapidly that their social organization is also poorly adjusted to new conditions, where can we find any community in which the church and similar social agencies have weathered the storm? The answer, made with reservations, seems to be found in the villages and the towns. They have lost some functions to the cities, but they have also gained some from the rural neighborhoods and hamlets. Whereas the proportion of adult population who are members of churches declined both in the country and in the large cities during the past decade,²⁷ an increase was made in villages, towns, and small cities.²⁸ Even they, of course, face problems of social reorganization.

The status of religious groups in the more specialized industrial village type of community could afford another opportunity to

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁵ Jesse M. Ormond, *The Country Church in North Carolina*, p. 350, Duke University Press, Durham, N. C., 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²⁶ H. Paul Douglass and Edmund de S. Brunner, *The Protestant Church as a Social Institution*, p. 67, published for the Institute of Social and Religious Research by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1935. See also page 40.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

trace the effects of change upon social institutions, but it is evident that we cannot deal with all sub-types.²⁹ We shall conclude the analysis with a summary statement and move on to the final problem of the chapter.

The general principle regarding social organization which obviously derives from our study of the church in various types of changing communities is that institutions which originated in one situation when confronted by ecological and cultural changes either remain static and gradually lose status or try to maintain their status by making adjustments in their organization.

ORGANIZED RELIGION AS AN AGENCY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

In a recent Peace Service in Riverside Church, New York City, the Christian Cross and the Jewish Tablets of the Law and the Star of David were carried together up the aisle, followed by 200 ministers and rabbis in their official robes. Rabbis and ministers spoke; peace hymns and prayers were used and the following Covenant of Peace was publicly subscribed to by the clergy and the audience: "In loyalty to God I believe that the way of true religion cannot be reconciled with the way of war. In loyalty to my Country I support its adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which renounced war. In the spirit of true patriotism and with deep personal conviction, I therefore renounce war and never will I support another."³⁰

That organized religion has been subject to the influence of new conditions in its social environment was the conclusion in our analysis of the church in the changing community. We shall now turn this principle about and ask if it is still valid when stated conversely: *Do organized religious groups initiate or prevent change as well as make adaptations to it?* Are they agents of social control as well as its object? Specifically, do religious groups influence public opinion and national decisions on such questions as war, race relations, and family standards; do they condition attitudes

²⁹ For a development of this phase of the problem see Edmund de S. Bruner, *Industrial Village Churches*, Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York, 1930.

³⁰ James Myers, "Churches in Social Action," *Social Action*, vol. 1, p. 21, Nov. 15, 1935. Originally published by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, New York, 1935.

with reference to economic change; and are their voices heard in community politics?

The answer to these questions is in the affirmative unless religious groups constitute an exception to the theory that persons and institutions located in an area tend to become interrelated.³¹ In order to achieve its own objectives, a group often finds it necessary to modify the conflicting purposes of other groups. The American Legion, for example, could not succeed in its desire for a soldier's bonus until other political factions were conditioned in favor of spending public funds for this purpose. In the preceding chapter we found certain schoolmen saying that educational ideals could not be realized until other factors in the child's social environment were consistent with the same ideals. The examples of such interdependence are rapidly multiplied as the functions of a society become increasingly specialized. In other words, *interdependence is a corollary of specialization*.

Reactions of the church to social change. Let us translate this bit of theory into the terms of concrete cases. The Molokan sect did not worry greatly about the standards of other social groups as long as it was isolated in its own society in Transcaucasia. But, as we have seen, when the sect was transplanted to the heart of Los Angeles its independence was quickly changed to interdependence. Economic necessity forced its members into other group relationships where they inevitably came in contact with culture which differed from their own. Their possible reactions to this situation were limited. They could retire to rural isolation once again, they could passively submit to the changing ways of a modern community, or they could attempt to control that change in accordance with their own objectives. Every group which decides against withdrawal and isolation, tends to alternate between the last two forms of behavior. At one time the group, rather than face extinction, yields to social change. It accepts the community's economic practices, its morality, its prejudices, its ideals. That is to say, the other specialized relationships of its members—their business, their recreation, their family life—modify the mores of the church until

³¹ There are exceptions in which some groups remain socially isolated, so far as their religious thinking is concerned, for a surprising length of time. H. Paul Douglass has listed the conditions under which religious institutions fail to respond to changes in their environment. See *The Church in the Changing City*, p. xv.

its critics condemn it for "selling out" to other interests. In this situation, the minister tries to "please the congregation" and avoids any pronouncement which is in conflict with the other group practices of his members. He does not criticize them for playing golf on Sunday, he does not peer into their family morality, and he is careful not to mix religion and politics or religion and economics. The only function remaining to him is to serve as custodian of ancient forms whose vital meaning has long been forgotten and, playing the role of good fellow, to bless those who come within his doors, and ask no questions of them.

Many ministers and churches, rebelling against this domination, pursue the second course of action by insisting that religion become a more aggressive force, and that its principles be established as criteria for judging the mores of the rest of society. Such a seven-day-a-week religion enters the factory, the school, the legislative assembly, the home, the social agency, and the international conference. Religious groups which seek to play this role commonly express their purpose in such phrases as the following:

"The great task of the church: 'The cultivation of the spirit of Christ in *every* area of human life.'"²²

One church leader illustrates his conception of the task of religion by citing an instance from his own experience:

For five years I was pastor of a church in a town more or less dependent on some great smelters and steel works. Common labor in the steel mills was at that time employed twelve hours a day seven days a week. It seems now almost incredible that such a time ever existed, but it actually did. Now as pastor of a church I was pastor of a very sensitive social institution. The long days and the constant labor isolated people from my institution, prevented them from participating in the tasks of citizenship, disorganized their home life, and left them broken and devastated in body and spirit as a result of the hard terms under which they must make their living. I knew that. Practically everybody in the community knew it. You could have asked the man on the street and he would have confirmed this judgment. As a minister of a church I was at least as intelligent as

²² The motto on the title page of a denominational social action leaflet.

the average man, and as a pastor of a church I was under obligation to discover, define, and defend the spiritual and ethical development of the people of that community. Now unless one is to accept a position of absolute futility he is going to have something to say about a situation of that kind. As a matter of fact, it was what the church did about such conditions which was partly responsible for the fact that men are not working twelve hours a day seven days a week in those steel mills at the present time.³³

While attempting to alter the practices of other groups in conformity with religious ideals, many churches have developed special techniques of control. In the following partial survey of these methods it will be interesting to notice how they reflect the complexity and secondary nature of social interaction which we found to be characteristic of modern communities.

Techniques employed by religious groups in the control of social change. Instead of regulating social behavior by methods of open coercion, as may have been possible when church and state were united, religious groups now function more through indirect means of changing social attitudes.

Conditioning social attitudes. Besides the traditional services of preaching, prayer meetings, and Sunday Schools, religious groups have developed additional methods of conditioning the attitudes of their members. Study and discussion groups and public forums have been organized for the consideration of current problems from the point of view of their ethical implications. Every year the American Friends (Quaker) Service Committee arranges a number of institutes which, under the leadership of prominent social scientists and religionists, analyze current social problems. The following announcement is an illustration of this technique:

The Fourth Annual Mid-West Institute of International Relations; a Twelve Day Course for Teachers, Ministers, Program Chairmen, College Students, Others Interested in Promoting World Peace. Classes in the Morning, Discussion Groups and Recreation in the Afternoon, Public Lectures in the Evening. Northwestern University, Evanston,

³³ Arthur E. Holt, "Social Action—Past and Present," *The Chicago Theological Seminary Register*, vol. 26, pp. 6-7, Jan., 1936. Reprinted by permission of the author.

Illinois. Arranged by the American Friends Service Committee, Northwestern University, and a Local Committee.

The youth conferences arranged by churches and religious agencies such as the Y. M. C. A. and the Y. W. C. A. include in their programs the study of social problems. Study guides for local groups are prepared by the social service committees of several denominations. The following, quoted from a title page, is an illustration:

Social Action in the Church Program. Practical Suggestions for Church Groups in the Crusade for the Abolition of the War System, Justice for the Worker, Fair Play for the Farmer, Equal Citizenship Rights for the Negro.

When the dairy farmers of Wisconsin were on strike protesting the low price paid by wholesalers for their milk, church leaders sponsored a series of public hearings in different rural communities to which civic leaders and newspaper reporters from the cities were invited for the purpose of carrying back to the urban consumer their interpretation of the grievances voiced by the farmers.³⁴ A similar technique has been used in making public the social problems of the unemployed. In one case the stenographic reports of these meetings were forwarded to local, state, and federal governmental officials. An especially ambitious attempt to arouse the interest of church members and civic leaders in the social problems of their area is the cooperative project entitled, "Re-Thinking Chicago," whose purpose is to

. . . build a new program of civic reconstruction upon a basis of social facts, social education, and social intelligence which will be more genuine and more enduring. . . .

A realistic understanding of social psychology, however, tells us that facts alone are barren. Along with social facts must go the arousal of social conscience and the direction of social will. Re-Thinking Chicago is essentially a religious movement. It originated among churchmen, and it has spread through the co-operation of the churches and synagogues.³⁵

³⁴ See Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁵ *Chicago Problems*, p. 4, published by Shirley E. Greene, Chicago, 1935. Reprinted by permission.

Other techniques used by church groups for arousing interest in social questions include plebiscites, resolutions, petitions, official pronouncements, and the formation of joint committees with other agencies.

Special committees for social action. The technique of churches for dealing with social problems which best reflects their tendency toward specialization is the appointment by individual churches, by denominations, or by inter-denominational bodies of special committees whose purpose is to investigate areas of social disorganization, to discover which of the trends toward reorganization is in closest accord with the religious ideals of their group, and to devise means for concerted action in the support of those trends. The Commission on the Church and Social Service of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is an example of such a specialized committee functioning as the representative of many denominations. The breadth of its interest in modern social conditions is illustrated by the seventeen planks in its program of social reform, a few of which we shall quote:

Practical application of the Christian principle of social well-being to the acquisition and use of wealth; subordination of speculation and the profit motive to the creative and cooperative spirit.

Social planning and control of the credit and monetary systems and the economic processes for the common good.

The right of all to the opportunity for self-maintenance; a wider and fairer distribution of wealth; a living wage, as a minimum, and above this a just share for the worker in the product of industry and agriculture.

Social insurance against sickness, accident, want in old age and unemployment.

Protection of the family by the single standard of purity; educational preparation for marriage, home-making and parenthood.

Extension of the primary cultural opportunities and social services now enjoyed by urban populations to the farm family.

Application of the Christian principle of redemption to the treatment of offenders; reform of penal and correctional methods and institutions, and of criminal court procedure.

Justice, opportunity and equal rights for all; mutual good-will and cooperation among racial, economic, and religious groups.

Repudiation of war, drastic reduction of armaments, participation

in international agencies for the peaceable settlement of all controversies; the building of a cooperative world order.³⁶

Many of the denominations and some individual churches also have committees charged with the task of investigating social problems and recommending lines of action. As investigators they learn to utilize modern methods of social research, and in so doing demonstrate a practical relationship between scientific analysis and religious objectives.

If churches generally were as actively interested in problems of social change as are the leaders who have sponsored the previously described procedures, we would have in our midst a unique type of social institution, one which had replaced a static structure by a flexible organization capable of intelligent self-direction and of effective control over changes in its environment. That such is not entirely the case is the undeniable conclusion in any realistic summary of organized religion. In general, religious organization has been slow in its adaptations, possibly slower than some other phases of organization we have earlier discussed. This is to be expected since religion deals with values which are written in cosmic terms which many people consider fundamental to life itself.

But we have observed that in the churches, as in all organization, there are forces of reform as well as of conservatism. The contact of church members with other parts of culture which have changed more rapidly often creates a tension or awareness of conflict which is relieved only when the religious group adjusts to the new conditions. The reformers who lead in this adjustment may be considered marginal persons who, though not divorced from the tradition of the past, have also experienced the needs of the present and try to achieve an adjustment between the divergent cultures.

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Chapter 21

THE FAMILY

THREE TYPES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FAMILY

1. *An Ozark Highland Family*

THIS OZARK Highland family on an owner-operated farm of 375 acres is probably the most prosperous family in the region from the standpoint of wealth. The farm is located half a mile from Horseneck, in Izard County, Arkansas. . . . The family buys much of its groceries, clothing, furniture and household equipment at Horseneck. Here also are located the doctor, the bank, the high school, and the church. The nearest railroad is at Lovetown, eight miles away. The one-half mile road to Horseneck is a clay mountain trail, but the remainder to Lovetown is gravel. A member of the family goes to town twice a month in the summer and once a month in the winter.

This family at home consists of husband (Elbert) and wife (Fannie), five children, a son-in-law, and a granddaughter, nine members in all. Three daughters are married and are living on nearby farms. . . .

The family is very proud of its name and reputation. All the children have been taught from childhood to respect parental authority—to obey without question and adhere rigidly to the moral code of the community. The girls are early taught to beware of seducers of young women and the boys are schooled in the protection of women's honor. The virtues of honesty, frugality, justice and kindness are the chief objects of parental instruction. . . . The children are taught to respect the home, and are warned against the "furriners" who would lead them astray, or who make fun of things sacred to them. . . .

¹ From *Family and Society*, pp. 221-230, by Carle C. Zimmerman and Merle F. Frampton. Reprinted by courtesy of the publishers, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

The children are devoted to the home. This fact accounts in a large measure for the success with which this Highland father has kept the family unified. . . . Elbert's virtues of thrift and hard work and his strong religious belief have been the controls of conduct for parents and children alike.

For many years Elbert and Fannie had no time for any sort of formal recreation. . . . The only social and recreational activities of that period were a few "hawg-killins," an occasional political meeting, or funerals. Until five years ago they had never been out of the township, but since that time have gone to Batesville to a farm meeting. . . . Last year the family attended one 4H club meeting at Horseneck and two church socials. The parents have never seen a movie nor heard a radio. . . .

All the members of the family share in the work of the farm, including the cultivation of the fields, the management of the barn and chores, and special tasks about the farm.

The work of the husband regularly includes the feeding and care of the horse and all other stock, the repairing of buildings and machinery, the cutting of wood for home use, work in the fields, and taking of produce to market.

The women and girls do the milking, feed and care for the poultry and small barnyard stock, take care of the garden and attend to the regular household duties, such as housecleaning, preparation of the food, and care of the children. During the season of planting and cultivation, the women also take an active part in the work in the fields. . . .

During the summer the wife begins work in the morning at 4 a. m. and ends at 8 p. m. In the winter she begins at 5 a. m. and finishes at 7 p. m. Elbert begins work in the summer at 4 a. m. and stops at 7 p. m. The other members of the family including the children follow the general routine of the parents.

2. *The Carter Family*²

Mother's ancestors were sturdy, hard working New Englanders of English descent, and she was born and spent her girlhood in a small New England town. . . . Father is of Scotch-Irish ancestry. . . . Their first child died in infancy; I—Nora—was born a year later; and Phillip, three years after my birth. . . .

² Lemo Dennis Rockwood, *Pictures of Family Life*, pp. 62-65, American Home Economics Association, Washington, 1935. Reprinted by permission.

After Grandfather Carter's death we moved from our bungalow into the old family home and lived luxuriously there for a number of years. We all enjoyed the friendly atmosphere of the small town. Our income was always adequate, and as Father's many executive positions did not require a great deal of work or time, the family took frequent hunting and fishing trips together and made several trips to Florida. It was, therefore, a great change for us all when we moved ten years ago to a small, rented, seven room bungalow in the suburbs of a large middle-western city, where we knew only one family and where our uncertain income from Father's new work became a matter of increasing concern. Our vacations, too, changed from frequent ones to an annual two weeks' camping trip in the mountains. Five years ago, however, we bought our present home—a very satisfactory, nine room house in the suburbs—and once more felt the satisfaction that comes from living in a home of one's own. Relatives have never lived with us.

Since the economic depression began, all of us have contributed to the family income. Father now earns a modest salary in a brokerage house; Mother makes enough for household expenses by tutoring one and a half hours a day; and Phil and I work during the summers to help pay my college expenses. Our total income of some \$3000 is carefully budgeted and every penny accounted for.

The work at home is shared by all of us. Mother and I attend to the house, and Father and Phil look after the garden and car and help with the heavier household work. When not too tired, Mother enjoys doing the housework. At present there is no hired help, even for the laundry.

Mother and Father understand each other and have always been congenial, cooperative and affectionate. Neither dominates. Since the family income has become such a matter of concern, all decisions about expenditures are made by both parents after sufficient discussion. . . .

3. *Jane Smith*³

Graduated from the state university, 1917. Worked on the local paper, 1917-18. Got an humble job on a city paper, 1918-19. Married Richard Roe, rising young journalist, 1919. Got a raise. So did

³ Beulah Amidon, "Ann Brown and Jane Smith," *Survey*, vol. 57, p. 305, Dec. 1, 1926. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Richard, 1920. Took a staff position on a weekly magazine. Richard got another raise, 1921. Daughter arrived. Jane took four months off, two before and two after, and then worked part time two months, 1922. Jane got a raise. So did Richard, 1924. Son arrived. Four months off again and two months part time, 1925.

Jane is now earning \$250 a month, Richard \$350. They have a sunny six room apartment in an unfashionable neighborhood with the use of the backyard. Their daughter is in nursery school, 8:30 to 5, daily, under the best modern care, physical and intellectual. Cost \$50 a month. A housekeeper who has had two years' hospital training cares for the baby and does the general housework at a salary of \$80 a month with board and room. Laundry and heavy cleaning are done by Mandy, one day a week, \$4 and carfare.

Here are three pictures of quite diverse types of family life. One might have added others to illustrate still further the variability that characterizes familial behavior in America, but the fact that a diversity of family types exists within any culture area is well known. In chapter 5 it was pointed out that the family as a form of grouping comprising at least two parents and a child is a cultural universal. It was also shown that there are wide differences in both forms and functions between locally co-existing family types.⁴

In this chapter it is proposed to examine the family from the point of view of its relation to general social organization, the topic of this section of the book. We wish to learn something more about the *structure* of the family group as we find it in modern society; even more do we need to discover its *functions*. What individuals comprise the American family group? What does family membership do for them and what do they as a family group do for society? If the family is, as has been frequently asserted, the basic social unit in community organization, then it behooves us to study it, especially in its relation to community life.

THE CHANGING FAMILY PATTERN

The minute we focus attention on the modern family pattern we discover that our picture is going to be blurred, not only

⁴ For instance, polygyny and monogamy are often found in the same tribe; also some husbands "rule the roost," while others are henpecked.

because of our yet inadequate technique of observation but even more because the pattern itself is undergoing rapid change. The family mores are at the present time in what may be described as

TABLE IX
CHANGING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY FAMILY	THE FAMILY TODAY IN URBAN AREAS
<i>Patriarchal and authoritarian</i>	Tending to become <i>individualistic</i> and <i>democratic</i> , but with many patriarchal survivals
<i>Stable</i> , little divorce	<i>Much less stable</i> , much more frequent divorce
<i>Relatively large size</i> ; many children and relatives under the same roof	<i>Much smaller in size</i> ; fewer children; a two-generation group only
<i>Non-mobile</i> ; family domicile rarely changed	<i>Mobility greatly increased</i> ; domicile frequently changed
<i>Women in the home</i> , engaged in housekeeping and child rearing	<i>Women frequently work outside the home</i>
<i>Puritannical on sex matters</i> ; tabus on feminine sexuality, "double standard" of morality, little planned sex education, adultery infrequent	<i>Increasingly liberal on sex matters</i> ; feminine sex needs admitted, tendency toward single standard of sex morality, formal sex education, increasing extra-marital sex freedom
Relative homogeneity in family type	Greater variability in family type
Multi-functional	Procreation and personality functions the only major ones surviving.

a state of flux; consequently we have various degrees of radicalism and conservatism toward ideals of family life all finding adherents in the same society. The change from an old and toward a new set of family norms does not proceed at the same pace in all parts of the country or in all social classes or occupational groups. The

family system in the Ozarks, as described in the first case document at the beginning of this chapter, differs from the middle class urban Carters in the second and the ultra-modern intellectual Smiths in the third. These in turn differ from the family pattern of Greenwich Village or of Hollywood.

Perhaps the changes that have taken place may be attributed largely to increasing urbanization, but how far the logic of metropolitan life is to be carried it is impossible to tell. All one can do at this stage is to note certain trends that have already manifested themselves. These trends have been summarized in short phrases in Table IX. We must expand a bit on this summary, and justify a few of the statements contained in it, in order to get a satisfactory picture of the changing pattern of modern family life.

The decline of patriarchal authority. The husband and father has traditionally been the head of the American household and the wielder of authority. The rights of the wife and children were in law clearly subordinate to his rights. He was in control of his wife's antenuptial property as well as all property acquired subsequent to the marriage. His was the guardianship of the children, and their earnings, and those of his wife went into his pocket. Both wife and children must live in the domicile he chose for them and depend upon him for "support."

These conditions have changed greatly. One justice, lamenting the passing of the good old days, describes the new status of the wife thus:

The foundations hitherto deemed so essential for the preservation of the nuptial contract, and the maintenance of the marriage relation, are crumbling. The unity of husband and wife has been severed. . . . She no longer clings to and depends upon man, but has the legal right and aspires to battle with him in the contests of the forum; to outvie him in the healing art; to climb with him the steps of fame; and to share with him in every occupation. . . . His legal supremacy is gone, and the sceptre has departed from him.⁵

The last phrase is not strictly true since the husband still retains some of his old prerogatives, but he is now a strictly constitutional

⁵ Justice Thornton in *Martin v. Robson* 65 Ill. 129 (1872); quoted in Chester G. Vernier, *American Family Laws*, vol. III, p. 3, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1935.

monarch, not an absolute one. The wife can now make separate contracts, she "retains for her enjoyment the property which she brings to the marriage and the property which she acquires thereafter,"⁶ and in general she has the right to control and manage it. She retains her earnings for services rendered outside the household to persons other than the husband, in all but two American jurisdictions.⁷ In forty-two states the two parents are given equal rights in the custody of children.⁸

While the legal status of husband and wife does not always accurately reflect the actual situation in any single family, the modifications that have been made in the laws do fairly indicate the *trend* of change in family relations. The modern woman expects and usually obtains a greater voice in family decisions than did her mother or her grandmother. Democratic governance of the family, the important decisions made (as the Carters made them) after careful consideration by both parents jointly, is coming to take the place of arbitrary male rule. The decision may still be one based on the man's judgment, especially in the fields where he is most expert or has most at stake, but other interests and other backgrounds of experience will be acknowledged; so also will other ambitions and needs.

As yet, however, only in a relatively few instances has the democratic family ideal been completely put into practice. The patriarchal tradition survives in a multitude of ways, and is accepted as desirable by the woman who still wants to marry a "strong" man, and by the man whose standing among other men still depends, or at least so he thinks, upon assuming a dominant and authoritative role in the household. As Elliott and Merrill point out:

[The man] often finds the cooperative type of marriage which his wife insists on diminishing to his ego. His role may be particularly difficult if he is married to an unusually able woman whose achievements overshadow his own. While women traditionally have been proud to be pointed out as the wife of a distinguished surgeon, statesman, lawyer, or banker, there is scarcely a man who takes vicarious

⁶ Vernier, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol IV, p. 4.

pleasure in assuming a similar role with respect to his wife's attainments.⁹

The decline in family stability. The Ozark family described earlier is almost certain to persist as a social unit so long as Elbert and Fannie survive. Even on their death the household will continue to function as the eldest son and his wife take over the reins. Such stability of family life characterized our Colonial ancestors generally but is found much less often today. Families are more frequently on the move now, there is more temporary renting of homes or apartments, and only seldom are three generations (as in Elbert's family) under one roof. The ideal of a family mansion, persisting through generations as a home for a son and then for one of his sons, as a symbol of family ties and loyalties, is passing. The modern urban dwelling-place is often a place "to hang one's hat" temporarily. One hopes to move on and upward to a home with more bathrooms and garage space as soon as possible.

Not only is the family unstable by reason of mobility, which breaks off continuities of tradition; it is also even more impermanent because of changing attitudes toward divorce. While the laws on divorce have changed relatively little (and that little in the direction of further strictness¹⁰), the tendency for unhappy couples to resort to the divorce court has greatly increased. Whereas in 1887 there were only 55 divorces for each thousand marriages, in 1932 there were 163.¹¹ It is now estimated that something more than one in six of the marriages that are solemnized this year will end in divorce.¹² This means countless broken families to add to the normal number brought about by death and to those resulting from desertion. It means that if the family is the basic social unit, then that unit is becoming more like the TNT molecule, unstable at best.

⁹ Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, p. 445, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁰ Cf. J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, A Social Interpretation*, p. 171, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1931.

¹¹ *Marriage and Divorce*, 1932, p. 2, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1934.

¹² William F. Ogburn in *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, p. 693, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1933.

The decline in the size of the family. The family is becoming a smaller unit than it used to be,¹³ as well as a less permanent one. Two factors have been chiefly responsible for this change in family size: (1) There are fewer relatives and in-laws under the family roof than there were a generation ago, and (2) the family raises fewer children.

It is now the general feeling, except perhaps in some rural areas, that a young couple should not live with either parental family but should set up housekeeping for themselves. Whenever possible, then, the couple will avoid taking in aged parents or aunts or cousins and will confine the household to parents, children, and servants. How has this change in attitude come about? Folsom¹⁴ suggests that "economic changes" have forced the decrease in the size of the household and that we have rationalized this change, calling relatives in the home "a danger to be avoided" rather than "a duty to be cheerfully performed." He adds:

While gaining certain values in the marital relation, we have lost other values of the old-time household where grandfather or aunt oftentimes had a personality which held the group together in a rich and beautiful social life.¹⁵

Society is beginning to be much concerned about the growing tendency throughout the Western world to decrease the number of children in the family. The falling birth rate (it has probably been declining in the U. S. since 1890) was at first regarded as a blessing because of fear of overpopulation; now we hear much talk of the dangers of race suicide. How much of the decline in child bearing is due to a possible increase in involuntary sterility of married couples and how much is due to deliberate birth limitation through abortion or the use of contraceptive methods is as yet uncertain, although there are strong indications in favor of

¹³ It is estimated that the average size of the American household (including servants and boarders as well as children and relatives) has decreased about a quarter since 1790 and about 13 per cent since 1900. The decline in the size of the average metropolitan household, based on a sample from Chicago, was 21 per cent in the period 1900-1930. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 682.

¹⁴ Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family*, p. 188, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1934.

¹⁵ Reprinted by permission from *The Family*, by Joseph K. Folsom, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

assigning the major role to the latter factor.¹⁶ Children are coming to be regarded not as inevitable concomitants of married life, to be cared for, like the relatives just referred to, as a duty. They are now increasingly viewed as luxuries, to be budgeted and planned for just like a new motor car or a trip to Europe. They often lose out in competition with other items, and child bearing is put in the category of "future expenditures awaiting an increase in income" and postponed without date. The result is an increase not only in childless families, but also of one-child and two-child families at the expense of those with four, five, or even more offspring. Of course, child bearing and rearing is today much less fraught with health hazards for mother and child so that more babies live to adulthood and more mothers survive to bear more children, but this improvement in "procreative efficiency" is not enough to counteract the "birth strike." The small family is in danger of getting too small to maintain the population. This fact explains the frantic efforts being made to induce, almost compel, mothers to do their "duty" today in Italy, Germany, France, and (recently) Russia.

Changing attitudes toward sex. Sex tabus bore heavily on our nineteenth century ancestors. Conversational prohibitions and rules of modesty were enforced rigidly against women and with considerable strictness even against the more irrepressible male. Now sex has been allowed to come out into the open. Women as well as men may confess to having sexual urges; sex physiology and psychology can be seriously studied and much more unembarrassedly discussed. While there are still many manifestations of lack of balance and of faulty adjustments in relation to this new freedom, much more has undoubtedly been gained than lost as the result of the more naturalistic attitude now taken toward sex and sex problems.

The family has been greatly affected by the change in sex mores. Women have made their claims to marital sex satisfaction heard along with those of the men. On the one hand this has led to more divorce and family instability, where patriarchal husbands refused to concede feminine rights or where mutual adjustment proved impossible. On the other it has almost certainly bettered the marital sex relations and increased the happiness of many mar-

¹⁶ Cf. Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, pp. 255-279, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

ried couples, who are now able to work out their sex problems in knowledge instead of in ignorance.

Another probable effect of the new attitude toward sex experience is to increase somewhat both premarital sex intercourse and adultery. How great the change has been it is as yet impossible to say since these are private acts and not easily susceptible to enumeration.¹⁷ Certainly there is still much more conservatism with regard to extra-marital (if not to premarital) sex exploits than one would suppose from attending the contemporary dramas or moving pictures or examining the modern novel. But that there has been some relaxation of tabus in some circles, with corresponding tendencies to depart from the ideal of marital fidelity, it is hard to doubt.

Jobs for married women. The new industrial system has taken a large share of women's work out of the home and put it in the factory. Women have increasingly found it necessary to go to the factory and labor there for a wage in order to help "make both ends meet" at home. The extent of this exodus from the household can be grasped only from the actual figures of married women's employment. The following table¹⁸ contrasts the situation in 1890 and 1930.

	1890	1930
Number women over 15 yrs. of age in		
U. S. population	19,602,178	42,837,149
Gainfully occupied	3,712,144	10,632,227
Gainfully occupied and married.....	515,260	3,071,302
Proportion of all women over 15 yrs.		
of age gainfully occupied.....	18.9%	24.8%
Proportion of gainfully occupied women		
who are married	13.9%	28.9%
Proportion of all married women over		
15 yrs. of age who are gainfully oc-		
cupied	4.6%	11.7%

¹⁷ Some preliminary attempts to discover the current frequency of adultery and premarital sex intercourse have been made, however. See G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage*, pp. 77-83, Albert and Charles Boni, New York, 1929; Katharine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-two Hundred Women*, pp. xviii-xix, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1929; M. W. Peck and F. L. Wells, "On the Psycho-Sexuality of College Graduate Men," *Mental Hygiene*, vol. 7, pp. 697-714, and vol. 9, pp. 502-520.

¹⁸ Data from *Fifteenth Census of the United States: Population*, vol. 5, p. 272, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933.

These data show a marked trend toward the employment of married women but also indicate the large proportion of those who still "work only for their husbands" as housekeepers. Most of the women who are "gainfully occupied" are away from home most of the day and return to it as fatigued at night as the average male does. Since housekeeping duties, lightened but by no means eliminated in the modern household, have still to be performed, there is little time and energy left for the important task of child rearing. Children are left largely unsupervised during the out-of-school hours, and see their parents only during the morning rush, in the evening, and on holidays. Truancy and delinquency problems are among the almost inevitable results.

In the upper economic classes where it is possible to employ a housekeeper and nurse, the household with both husband and wife holding outside jobs may function much better. The case of Jane Smith illustrates a more or less ideal adjustment of this type. The modern college woman often resents the form of economic serfdom that she may be subjected to in a patriarchal household and is only too glad of an opportunity to acquire professional status through paid work outside the home. If she does not do so she is in danger of discovering, when the children no longer require her care, that she has not enough to do to keep herself busy. Then, according to Folsom, she occupies her spare time in one or more of five ways:

(1) further elaboration of the home; (2) "social" activities such as women's societies, bridge, teas, and so on; (3) political activities; (4) philanthropic and church activities; (5) creative artistic and literary activities with occasional financial gain therefrom.¹⁹

Much of the work done by married women in politics, social work, and religious activities is of great social utility, but if started relatively late in life it does not yield rewards in the form of status that go to the professionally trained or the long experienced. The woman often feels herself an amateur dabbler in a field where the positions of importance are held by professionals who have not tried to combine the careers of parent, homemaker, and social servant in one.

¹⁹ Reprinted by permission from *The Family*, by Joseph K. Folsom, published by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

It must not be forgotten that the large majority of married women still find their time almost completely occupied with house-keeping and child-rearing responsibilities, just as did their mothers and grandmothers, and that nearly all the women who hold remunerative employment do so because they have to, not because they want to. The married woman with children who has time to take a job and who does so simply for self-expression is still a very special case.

Variability in modern family life. Preceding paragraphs have indicated some of the new ways in which families may now organize themselves. We still have the closely knit, relatively permanent, largely self-sustaining household in which husband, wife, and children live and labor. But as variations around this ancient form we have such socially approved arrangements as the family in which the wife works outside the home, the family in which the children are sent away to boarding school, the family without a household (living in a hotel²⁰ or with husband and wife living separately), the family with adopted children or with step-children, and the companionate or "arrested family" with no children at all. Variability of this sort makes for confusion in family ideals at the same time that it reflects confusion already existing. It is an inevitable concomitant of social change.

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE MODERN FAMILY

The changes in the structure of the family are associated with correlative changes in *function*. In any society certain essential things must be done for and by the members if that social group is to persist as an aggregate. Provision must be made for (1) procreation of new generations, (2) socialization of the new human material as it appears, (3) satisfying certain economic wants for food, shelter, clothing, etc., (4) protecting community members from dangers to life and limb and from disturbances which upset peace and order, (5) arranging for leisure time and supplying opportunities for recreation, and (6) satisfying human desires for adventure, recognition, and response. In a certain sense these responsibilities are a primary charge on the *community* and are delegated to other groups like the family, the business corporation,

²⁰ Cf. Norman Hayner, *Hotel Life*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1936.

and the religious denomination to be carried on under general community control and supervision. The family, however, has always had a special position, almost coordinate with rather than subordinate to the community, in the carrying out of some of these social functions. At present there is an apparent tendency for the family group to lose some of this independence and to lose or give up functions that it has traditionally performed. This is obviously true of protection, for instance, for justice is not now a matter of a family blood feud, nor does safety from such hazards as riot, rape, burglary, and murder, or disease, accident, old age, and insanity depend so much upon the family as it used to. It is equally true of recreation, which now tends to be organized on a community-wide basis, where it is organized at all, and in any event takes place outside the home much more than it used to. As to the other functions the situation is somewhat more complex, and needs more careful examination.

Procreation and the family. The family, as we have defined it, must include children. While there are a few cases of adoption and of children placed in foster homes by social agencies, in general the younger generation members of the family were born into it and cared for by it through their years of helpless infancy. This is a basic biological function which the family has been performing, a function absolutely essential to the survival of any human or animal society.

The community for the most part has been content to delegate this function to the family. It is only recently, when the supply of babies has been seriously diminishing, that the community has attempted to interfere in what has been a family duty and prerogative, and this interference has been in the direction of stimulating the family to perform the procreational function, rather than to shift the function elsewhere. Efforts (largely ineffectual) have been made to deny married couples access to birth control methods, on the grounds of society's need for children.²¹ Money has been spent in large amounts to get parents to follow sound rules

²¹ The usual justification for laws suppressing contraception is the obscenity or the unnaturalness of interfering with procreation processes. But the proponents of repression are now employing the population argument also. See, for instance, Cardinal Hayes' sermon reported in the *New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1935, p. 29.

in the hygiene of pregnancy and infancy.²² Propaganda has been disseminated urging families to do their duty to the next generation and rear plenty of healthy children. Various subsidies have been offered to make child bearing at least a little less unattractive from the economic point of view.²³ All these measures have been predicated on the assumption that married couples are still the best people to bear children, and the few proposals to turn procreation over to a group of selected women breeders or to "decant" babies out of a bottle in laboratories²⁴ have not yet received serious consideration. In the future the community will doubtless have to increase its subsidies and make more forceful its appeals to the family members, relying less on the natural sex urge than it did in the past. But it will still for some time to come want its children to be born of married mothers and into a family-created home.

Economic functions of the family. That there has been a decline in the economic functions performed by the family since the Industrial Revolution is a fact apparent to all who have even thought upon the matter. One has only to recall the many activities of a productive nature that went on in the Colonial or the pioneer household or that go on today in backwoods families like that of the Ozark Highlander to realize how greatly things have changed. It is true, of course, that there are still many commodities produced for home use in any rural farmstead, but there is increasing resort to the village store and to the mail order catalog for things our ancestors would have fashioned for themselves or grown in their own soil. In cities nearly all the basic production activity, in the economic sense, has left the home. Even such traditional household activities as canning and preserving, baking, laundering, sewing, minor repairing, and home heating and lighting are now more and more done for the family by outside

²² Under the new Federal Security Act, approved Aug. 14, 1935, a sum of \$1,580,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, was appropriated to the Children's Bureau for grants-in-aid to states for maternal and child health services.

²³ In the United States, income tax exemptions. Family allowances, maternity grants, bonuses for large families, tax exemptions in various countries abroad.

²⁴ Cf. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World*, pp. 1-32, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City, New York, 1932.

agencies.²⁵ City women still do some light cleaning and cooking, still knit or crochet sweaters for themselves or for their husbands or sew on "little garments," but much even of this latter activity is on a "fancy work" rather than a utilitarian basis. Suburban husbands cultivate uneconomic garden patches "for exercise" or mow a lawn no respectable farm house could afford to own. There is, of course, still sweated home industry, but this is a projection of the factory into the family circle. In the poorer classes there is still also the "sweated housewife" who labors long hours for no pay at routine and back-breaking household chores. These phenomena are passing, however. Both women and men have had to go outside the household in order to find a full-time productive function. In the most modern urban households there is perhaps about a half-time job (including child rearing) left in the home.²⁶

Economic production may have been diverted from the family, but as a consumption unit the household still has real importance. The father, mother, and children still eat at least two meals at the same table (although it may be in a restaurant), they live under the same roof (although it may be only an apartment house ceiling), and they use the same home furnishings. Because there are still so many commodities and services consumed on a family or household basis rather than by individuals on the one hand or hotels on the other, most advertising campaigns are aimed at Mrs. Housewife, and her tastes, preferences, and weaknesses are sedulously exploited. She is the purchasing agent of an important consuming unit; the husband and children will spend some of the family income, but the large part of the individual purchases will be made by her. She may go so far as to buy her husband's tobacco, liquor, shaving equipment, and, on occasion, even his clothes!

Economically, then, the family is still an important consuming

²⁵ Cf. William F. Ogburn, "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, pp. 664-672, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933, for data on the flight of household occupations from the home.

²⁶ When this is not true it is often because home standards have been elaborated; the time which used to go into basic household activities is now taken up with serving meals in several courses, tending an enlarged wardrobe, supervising and managing servants. Cf. Hazel Kyrk, *Economic Problems of the Family*, pp. 90-107, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933.

unit but of declining importance in production. Its total economic role is not as vital to community life as it once was, and an adult can now function independently of a family group if necessary as far as economic matters go. Indeed, as Elliott and Merrill suggest, "Marriage may actually entail a sacrifice of economic advantages, frequently of both husband and wife."²⁷ But the mores are still in favor of family living, even at some cost to the parties concerned.

The family as a socializing agency. Socialization is the process of adjusting the biological individual to his human environment, of teaching him to function successfully in the human society in which, by accident of birth, he is placed. The family, as we have already learned,²⁸ has been in the past and is today the group having the greatest influence on this process. It is the most important socializing agency.

There have, of course, been significant changes in the family's socializing role in the last two generations. In order to get along in an increasingly complex society, the individual has had to acquire more and more specialized information and more different skills. It has been increasingly impossible for the family to supply within itself the resources or the energy necessary properly to orient the young in the new world of science and industry, and this task has been more and more turned over to the school. The school day, the school year, and especially the span of years in the normal child's curriculum have all been lengthened. The school no longer confines itself to "book knowledge" although there is more of this for the student to digest than ever. Citizenship attitudes, character traits, physical and mental health, recreation habits, and vocational skills are now a concern of the school authorities as well as of the parents. With the kindergarten and nursery school a part of the modern school system, the child is under some controlled out-of-home influences from an early age.

But while the family has given over some of its socializing functions, at least in part, it retains still the premier influence. The family contacts with the child begin so early and during the all-important first three or four years of life are so exclusive and absorbing that nothing which occurs later can equal them in importance. The all-important traits of temperament are especially con-

²⁷ Elliott and Merrill, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

²⁸ Cf. *supra*, chapter 8, pp. 199 ff.

ditioned by the relationships with the parents. A nervous parent conditions a nervous child; a demonstrative parent accustoms the child to outward display of emotion; a domineering parent develops submissiveness or an overcompensating resistance to all authority. Parental attitudes and wish-goals are also taken over almost unconsciously, and so are those of older brothers and sisters. In fact, the family stamps the general type of personality out of the material furnished by heredity. The school, the church, the play-gang, the community shape and mold many important details of personality structure, undoing some of the family's mistakes in part and making others. But the family remains the real architect; it lays down the basic plan of the personality.

The family is the chief of the agencies preparing the new generation for life in the community, but should it be? Could some other agency, say a scientifically created child-rearing institution run on the lines dictated by modern child psychology, perform the task of socialization better? No answer can be given to this query since no such institution as yet exists. The institutions we have at present, run largely for the orphans and usually by the state, exhibit many serious defects and for child placement are regarded by social workers as clearly inferior to a well-selected foster home. So while there already are many institutions for child care and training which supplement the family (day nurseries, nursery schools, kindergartens, boarding schools, summer camps), there is no disposition on the part of the community to displace any but clearly bad families from their function of child rearing and socialization. The Children's Charter, a statement of aims for the children of America evolved at the White House Conference in 1930, pledges itself to secure:

For every child a home and that love and security which a home provides; and for that child who must receive foster care, the nearest substitute for his own home.²⁹

This is an expression of continued faith in the family.

Wish fulfillment through the family. It is not enough for the family to perform services for outsiders organized in the community. To have survived as long as it has it must also be a useful

²⁹ *White House Conference, 1930, Addresses and Abstracts of Committee Reports*, p. 45, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1931. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

instrument of wish satisfaction for its own members. The community has an interest in this wish satisfaction, since the quality and completeness of it affects the personalities of citizens and influences their usefulness in community life.

Under ideal conditions all four of the Thomas basic wishes for recognition, response, adventure, and security find some satisfaction in and through family life. Perhaps above everything the family is for its members an institution for mutual response, an association based on mutual affection. One's best friends are the members of the family; one counts on their sympathy and understanding and relies on their loyalty. When, as between husband and wife, the affectional tie is bound up with romance and sex emotion it attains a level that transcends ordinary human relationships and provides unique satisfactions for both man and woman. Affectional ties between parents and children are also similarly rewarding.

Of course one must admit that these ideal relationships are not always found in families and that intimacy brings with it almost equal possibilities of personality conflict, of petty irritations, of pain and disappointment. Where affectionate relations do exist, however, the setting is right for some satisfaction of adventure, security, and recognition also. The whole experience is in one sense adventure, since the intimacy in the family experience provides opportunities for plumbing the depth of human personality that no less permanent or more one-sided contact offers. Security from a world of stress and struggle is also provided by the home and the familiar human relationships within it. Ideally the family is a sort of psychological relief station in which one can safely relax and slough off the cares of shop or office. Finally, recognition comes from family contacts; the children and the mate appreciate one's virtues and respect one's abilities even though the world may be sadly myopic in this regard. A home in which tension is at a minimum and in which there are real affectional ties binding the members is therefore a powerful agency for mental hygiene.

Summary. Even from this cursory survey of the family and its functions it is possible to draw at least three fairly definite conclusions. The first of these is the continuing importance of the family as a biological group for procreation and for the physical care of the offspring. The second is the very considerable decline

in what Ogburn calls the "institutional functions"³⁰ of the family, economic, recreational, protective, and (in the formal sense of the term) educational. The third is

. . . the resulting predominant importance of the personality functions of the family—that is, those which provide for the mutual adjustments among husbands, wives, parents and children and for the adaptation of each member of the family to the outside world.³¹

The general view of the modern family which emerges is of what Burgess has called "a unity of interacting personalities"³² set in a cultural framework, responsible for a limited number of social functions and for a biological function which it is more and more reluctantly performing, but existing chiefly for the development and mutual gratification of its members. As an association of personalities it can exhibit all the variability that personalities themselves exhibit, relatively unconstrained by community sanctioned prescriptions. The community needs the family less, it lets it alone more. The family is held together by internal cohesion rather than external pressure; it is more unstable and yet more free to fit the variations in human personality.

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

While the community may seem less concerned about the form and function of the family now than in past generations and be willing to tolerate more variations from the traditional norms, it still has a vital interest in the quality of family-member interaction. Out of the crucible of twenty-four hour a day intimacy that is family living come all sorts of personalities, some of whom play useful, others wasteful and destructive roles in community life. In an earlier chapter we discussed the social costs of personality deviation and noted the distorting effects of bad parent-child relations.

³⁰ Ogburn, *op. cit.*, p. 661.

³¹ William F. Ogburn, "The Family and Its Functions." From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, p. 661; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

³² Ernest W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, vol. 7, pp. 3-9, Mar., 1926.

Bad husband-wife relations cause personality deviations and social maladjustment, too. In fact, the family has a whole pathology of interpersonal attitudes and reactions which, now that the mores control conduct less rigidly, are coming to the surface. To complete the picture of modern family life and the family's role in the community, we must now study some of the family failures, some of the cases of *family disorganization*. How and why do families "go bad," family relations become harmful to personality balance and integration instead of promotive of them? What lies back of desertion and divorce?

Family disorganization as a process. While the final decision that family relations are intolerable and must be severed may come as the immediate result of a quarrel or some other sort of crisis, back of the decision there is always a history of increasing discord, of the accumulation of irritations, of an increase of disorganization in the group. Actually the roots of domestic discord are to be found in the personalities which husband and wife bring to the marriage relationship and in the attitude patterns they develop in their children. Harriet Mowrer describes the situation aptly and explains how the family unity is always subject to the push and pull of attractive and repulsive forces:

Every individual enters marriage with certain potentialities and impediments to adjustment. These "assets" and "liabilities" consist in general of the ideas of the person as to what constitutes marriage, of habit complexes, and of dominant trends in the personality. The result is that if two persons marry having opposite or contradictory views or expectations, conflict is inevitable. And since complete resemblance in attitude and ideas in two persons is never found, some conflict arises in every marriage.

To achieve any degree of accord, therefore, some adjustment has to be made to these inevitable conflicts. If the conflict is not too sharp, assuming some degree of plasticity in the persons themselves, they will tend to work out some sort of an accommodation. This accommodation may be of the type in which conflict is repressed in the interest of accord, or it may take the more complete form of solution in which conflict is dissolved and disappears.

. . . Since adjustment is never a finished product, marriage requires a continuous series of accommodations and reaccommodations to be successful. This is equivalent to saying that in marriage there

is always both accord and discord, though little attention is given to the discord so long as it has its compensations in accord.³³

The "plasticity" of the personalities involved, the techniques which they have worked out for compromising differences, and the previous accumulation of unresolved tensions are all factors in determining whether a given marriage is in danger of serious disorganization or not. Basic to all these factors, however, are the specific wishes which the persons involved cherish and the degree to which these wishes are incompatible with each other. Especially important are the underlying wish-patterns which the family members have acquired in childhood, the dominant personality *roles*.

Roles and marital adjustment. This concept of the role is one that sociologists have found useful in getting an organized view of the diverse attitudes that make up a personality. The role is essentially the person's own organization of himself, his conception of his relationship to or his part in a situation involving others, but individual roles can often be objectified and described by outsiders without serious inaccuracy.

The earliest role of the child is the one he plays in his family group. There he is pampered and petted and assumes the "spoiled child role"; he is harshly treated and develops the idea that he is unwanted (the "nobody loves me role"); he is regarded by parents and comes to regard himself as the bright child or the dull child, the capable child or the clumsy child, the self-reliant child or the dependent child, in relation to other siblings in the family. As we have seen earlier³⁴ these early conceptions of the self tend to persist and to color adult behavior. The husband may expect his wife to be a mother to him and play toward her the same role of "irresponsible but lovable big boy" he played toward his own mother earlier. Some of the other marital roles that have at least partial root in childhood might be listed as follows:

the dominating husband (the he-man role)

the henpecked husband (always persecuted at home or in the play-group)

³³ From Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 35, 36. Copyright, 1935. Used by permission of the American Book Company, publishers.

³⁴ Cf. *supra*, chapter 9, pp. 211-214.

the husband who is a devil with the ladies (the Don Juan role)
the husband who is a stern parent
the husband who is a hypochondriac and who married to get constant sympathy
the husband who wants to be worshiped (inferiority feelings)
the wife who wants to be a good housekeeper (because her mother was or wasn't)
the wife who "collects" other women's husbands
the wife who wants to be swept off her feet
the wife who wants to keep up with the Jones'
the wife who wants to be her husband's equal
the "clinging vine"
the wife who doesn't want children

Role concepts defined in culture concerning the ideal wife or the ideal parent are also important, and some of the roles in the list just given are in part culturally determined. A wife may regard marriage as an opportunity for her to play the role of the romantically adored and faithfully served heroine she has read about in a novel or seen on the screen. If the husband's marriage ideal is a wife who plays the role of housekeeper and tender of his comfort, then acute frustration is inevitable for both parties and tension will soon set in.

As Cottrell points out, a member of a family does not usually confine himself to a single role in relation to the others. Several childhood roles may be played in alternation:

For instance, a wife may play a much depended upon mother-role, a hated sister-role, and a loved brother-role at different times for her husband. The husband may in turn be for his wife her distantly respected father, her hated younger brother, and her loved older sister. . . . Of course it is not at all necessary nor even likely that either husband or wife will be aware that he is playing such roles.³⁵

Sometimes these various roles of the individual are incompatible to the degree that serious conflict arises between them. The family

³⁵ Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "Roles and Marital Adjustment," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 27, no. 2, p. 108, May, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

problem then is the disorganized personality of one of its members, which in turn produces family disorganization since an individual at war with himself seldom makes a good family member.

Causes of family disorganization. This leads us to make a somewhat more systematic classification of the causes of marital failure, in which personality defects, such as the lack of integration just mentioned, and incompatible roles as between husband and wife will be properly distinguished from each other. Such a classification has been provided by Folsom.³⁶ His four categories of causes of marital conflict are: (1) circumstantial or non-personality factors such as bad physical health, economic circumstances, interference of relatives, the unwanted arrival of children—in other words, *bad luck* of some sort; (2) *personality defects* in one or both mates, such as psychopathic tendencies, alcoholism, sterility, definitely abnormal sex tendencies, or other symptoms of personality distortion serious enough presumably to cause failure in *any* marriage; (3) *personality differentials* or disparities in intellectual, social, religious, or artistic backgrounds or sensibilities, without any implication that either party is generally unfit for marriage; and (4) *incompatible roles*, interfering wishes, specific frustrations that arise because of the failure of the marriage to meet some particular expectations of one of the parties to it. Causes in all four of these categories interact on and either enhance or (sometimes) neutralize one another.

Many marriages would have been successful had it not been for some unhappy circumstantial factor, even though there were serious differentials in interest and differing expectations concerning what marriage would bring. A family has always to deal with some disharmonic personality traits and with a good deal of disillusionment and disappointment, and it is usually only when there is either a personality definitely unsuited to the strain of married life or else a concatenation of unfavorable circumstances that the tension becomes too great to bear.

FAMILY ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION

Divorce statutes are at best only indirect and incomplete indices of the amount of family disorganization which exists. But taken in conjunction with other indices (reports of social workers, plots

³⁶ Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-441.

of novels and plays, research into family life by sociologists)³⁷ they have presented an impressive enough picture of disharmonies in family life to arouse wide social concern. As a result there is a rapidly growing movement to try to improve the quality of family interaction by better preparing the young to assume marital responsibilities. There has also been greatly increased emphasis on proper treatment of domestic discord when and as it presents itself.

The preventive program against family disorganization, better termed perhaps a program of family *organization*, is primarily an educational one. Such terms as sex education, social hygiene instruction, and marriage preparation are used to describe what is now being done through schools, parent-teacher associations, child study groups, churches, lecture series, and young people's conferences in order to supply information and develop attitudes that will improve the chances of success in marriage. Sex education is still regarded as first of all a parental function, but parents have in the past been too inhibited and too ignorant properly to discharge their responsibilities in this regard. Consequently the school and the other agencies earlier referred to have stepped in to supplement parental instruction. Sex information appropriate to the needs of the grade-school child is likely to be supplied through the indirect channel of a course in nature study. At the high-school level a course in "life problems" would include some discussion of the relation between the sexes and of marriage and mating. In college, social hygiene instruction comes in courses in general hygiene, in human biology, in psychology, and in sociology. A recent survey³⁸ showed well over a hundred college courses devoted to a study of the family and family life, but there are not yet many courses open to all students without prerequisite, and devoted frankly and solely to marriage preparation. There is, however, a growing literature

³⁷ For a summary of sociological research bearing on the point see Folsom, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-438.

³⁸ See "Report of the 1934 Conference for Marriage and Family Social Relations," especially appendix D, reprinted in the *Journal of Social Hygiene*, vol. 22, pp. 26-34, Jan., 1936. See also Cecil E. Hayworth, "Education for Marriage Among American Colleges," *Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges*, vol. 21, pp. 478-481, Nov., 1935.

on the subject adapted for the person of college age.³⁹ Reading is probably the best way to become informed at present.

The clinical or counseling approach to the treatment of marriage problems is in one sense an old one, for people have often turned in the past to friends, parents, ministers of the gospel, priests, and doctors for advice and comfort when problems of love and marriage have seemed particularly difficult and pressing. Today, however, as a part of the social hygiene program there is increased emphasis on skilled personal counseling both for the adolescent who has unsolved sex and courtship problems and for married persons who are the victims of domestic discord. A survey made in 1935 listed thirty-two family consultation centers, located for the most part in the big cities.⁴⁰ No superficial work is done at these centers, but only the most delicate and intelligent handling based upon a thorough analysis of the whole background and of the circumstances which have led up to the crisis in each case. Both husband and wife are interviewed separately whenever possible, and life histories are elicited in order to get insight into the different roles that are being played in the marital relationship. After a diagnosis of the causes of the discord has been made, then comes the problem of treatment.

In a domestic maladjustment serious enough to be laid before a marriage counselor there is usually a good deal of tension and much resentment against "injustices" and "ill-treatment" on both sides. Simply "talking out" the situation helps to dissipate some of these feelings, and catharsis is by no means the least important of the counselor's techniques. But basic difficulties cannot be so easily resolved. If circumstantial factors or personality defects are at the root of the disorganization, then at least an effort may be made to remove them or minimize them. The family may be encouraged to "turn out the in-laws," the man may be helped to find a job, he or his wife may be referred to a competent sex hygienist,

³⁹ Among the best books available are Hornell and Ella B. Hart, *Personality and the Family*, D. C. Heath and Company, New York, 1935; Ernest R. Groves, *Marriage*, Henry Holt and Company, 1933; Kenneth M. Walker, ed., *Preparation for Marriage*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1933; and Gladys H. Groves and Robert A. Ross, *The Married Woman*, Greenberg Publisher, Inc., New York, 1936.

⁴⁰ *Journal of Social Hygiene*, vol. 22, pp. 35-36, Jan., 1936. For an excellent summary of the history of the family consultation center and the methods it employs, see Meyer F. Nimkoff, *The Family*, pp. 490-503, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1934.

the wife may be given an opportunity to get instruction in cooking or household management, or the couple may be tided over a temporary financial stringency with a loan. Usually, however, the problem is complicated by a lack of compatibility between the couple; they have different interests and no broad common ground to meet on, or they have differing expectations concerning matrimony. The problem in such cases is one of changing the basic personality pattern at least enough to permit of marital readjustment, and this is extremely difficult and often impossible. The counselor must somehow induce the client to *change himself*.

Harriet Mowrer suggests two processes whereby some change in the personality pattern may be brought about through the aid of the counselor. These are the "redefinition of situations" and the "reinterpretation of the individual's experiences."

The process of redefinition of situations consists of giving new meaning to old situations and can probably be best illustrated by the following simple illustration. A woman who has been married several years maintains that sex is unclean. In the process of treating this attitude, the social therapist may place sex expression in the same category with other natural functions, such as eating. He then proceeds to point out the inconsistency of taking one set of attitudes toward one function and an adverse set of attitudes toward a similar function. In other words the situation is redefined on a rational rather than an emotional basis.⁴¹

A new setting for the experience is often not enough, however, and

. . . it may be necessary to tie up the redefinition of the situation with a *reinterpretation of life processes*. He may need to show the wife how her attitudes toward sex fit into a general pattern which is characteristic of a particular person with such experiences. For example, a woman's present attitudes toward sex may be the outgrowth of her pampered and protected role as a child, her lack of association with boys, her retreat into a dream world with a dream lover, her shock upon the occasion of first intercourse, etc. Her withdrawal from sex experience is thus but a part of the larger pattern of avoiding

⁴¹ From Harriet Mowrer, *op. cit.*, p. 241. Copyright, 1935. Used by permission of American Book Company, publishers.

all contacts which call for adjustments along lines to which she is not accustomed.⁴²

It is of course one thing to furnish the client with a redefinition or a reinterpretation and another to get him to accept it in place of the interpretation he has already made to rationalize or justify his present conduct. Therein, however, lies the skill of the interviewer. He must inspire the client's confidence by his sympathetic but objective attitude and convince by the cogency of his reasoning. He must not expect to get results without patient probing into the personalities of the married pair, and he must be content with slow progress. For people cannot change life-long ways of thinking and acting over night.

The future of the family. Whether the agencies and techniques just described can, as they are developed and used more widely, succeed in arresting the decline in family stability is one of the great questions. If the family mores have changed so greatly in recent years, will they not change even more in the next two or three decades, and in the direction of still further decline in the family's stability and influence? There are not lacking today prophets of doom for the family,⁴³ at least as we have known it, and there is an even larger group who preach its fundamental reconstruction. Certainly we shall for some time remain in a period when the *raison d'être* of the family institution in its various forms and aspects will be widely debated and experiments in new types of family organization will be tried. Historical perspective, however, would seem to indicate the ultimate survival of the marriage tie and the family group, although perhaps in new patterns as yet unpredictable. Family relationships are still capable of providing unique satisfactions to human beings. And there is still the biological function of procreation and of tending the helpless infant to be served.

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⁴² *Ibid.* Used by permission of American Book Company, publishers.

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PART V

SOCIAL INTERACTION

Chapter 22

SOCIAL INTERACTION

SOCIAL EXPERIENCES OF AN IMMIGRANT ¹

MY PARENTS WERE peasants living just a little way out from Vienna. My father came from a Bohemian family; had lived there for many years. We talked Bohemian in our home most of the time. My mother came from a Slovak family. They were married in Austria and came over here when I was just five years old. I was the oldest girl in the family but I had a brother who was older. We came over steerage, and arrived in Ellis Island during the winter of 1913. I still remember how I looked. We came to Chicago because my father had some friends here. We got a house out near West Twenty-sixth Street where other Bohemians live.

When I was seven I started to school. I don't remember just how it was, but at any rate I started to the Catholic school. My father never had much use for religion. He was a Bohemian and always used to associate with freethinkers and atheists. He hung around the saloon a lot and would often come home drunk. I remember how he used to laugh at all religion and make fun of churchgoers.

When I went to Catholic school I began to see and hear things I never knew before. I learned to read and write and to say the prayers. When I was eight years old I took communion for the first time. . . . Before long I got to having religious feelings and I decided to be a nun. I began to write religious poetry to Mary, the mother of Jesus.

But somehow I never felt satisfied with the religion they taught me. I now think I was so much influenced by the Sisters because they were more refined than the people I met around home. It seems to me all my life I've been trying to get away from the low drinking and carousing I saw when I was young. Most of those early friends

¹ Excerpts from a case record in Paul G. Cressey, *The Taxi-Dance Hall*, pp. 64, 65, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

seemed to be satisfied with that life, but never since I started to school have I wanted to live like they did.

I can hardly remember when I didn't know a lot about sex. Where we grew up we heard a lot and most of it wasn't so very good for us. When I started to high school my mother took me in hand and tried to keep me closer than ever. I couldn't go out at nights and I had to come right home from school. I never had a date with a boy until I was sixteen years of age. And then I had to get in early.

We children were ruled by fear in our household. I was whipped once or twice almost every day I lived. When I got to going to high school I was ruled by a cat-o'-nine tails. Each of us kids got it whenever we didn't do just what our parents wanted or whenever my father got drunk. I stood for the whipping until I was sixteen. One night I went to a party and didn't get home until nearly three o'clock. My father got up when I came in and gave me an awful beating. He had been drinking and that made it all the worse. The whipping was the worst I'd ever had. My back was black and blue and sore for months. It bled some at the time. I cried and cried and finally went to sleep right there on the kitchen floor. But the next morning when I woke up I told my folks that if they ever gave me another whipping I'd leave home. They never beat me very hard again.

But my mother and I couldn't get along very well. I wanted more money for clothes than she would give me. So I finally quit school and went to work in an office in the Loop. But we didn't get along any better. We were always fighting over my pay check. Then I wanted to be out late and they wouldn't stand for that. So I finally left home and got a room a little way north of the Loop.

The preceding abridged account of the varied experiences of an immigrant girl which culminated in her "career" as a "hostess" in a "taxi-dance hall"² illustrates one of sociology's most basic terms, "social interaction." No geneticist could have predicted, on the basis of this girl's inherited nature alone, to what set of social standards she would adhere, of what groups she would become a member, nor to what method of making a livelihood she would turn. Full insight into her personality comes only after

² This type of dance hall is one in which the women partners are provided by the management for the men who are its patrons.

one has brought into the picture the entire range of her social experiences: the culture and economic conditions of the peasant family into which she was born, the personal relationships among the members of that family, the strange differences in culture which she encountered after coming to the New World, the conflict between the religious and moral attitudes of her father and the standards of the church of which she became a member, the informal contacts through which she acquired knowledge of sex, the conflict between the social customs of her youthful friends, and the restraints placed upon her behavior by foreign-born parents. These experiences and scores of other instances of social contact and interaction which a complete social history of the case would reveal were basic factors in the development of her personality. This is, of course, no new truth. We have already discovered that any "George F. Babbitt" or "John Jones" becomes a distinctive personality partly because of traits in his original nature, but also because of the conditioning effects of constant interaction with other people.³ Our previous study has acquainted us with these social products of interaction, but we have not adequately examined the process, itself.

Before we do this, however, we must be reminded that the term "interaction" applies to large groups of persons quite as well as to a few individuals. A history of the relations between Germany and France during the past century, or of the contacts between workers and employers in a given industry, may be analyzed in terms of the different types of interaction involved. Wherever one turns his attention—to an examination of labor unions, literary societies, religious groups, or college fraternities—he is face to face with the processes and the results of personal and group interaction.

Because the concept with which we are dealing is applicable to such varied forms of behavior, its definition must be exceedingly broad. Accordingly, we refer to *social interaction* as that *dynamic interplay of forces in which contact between persons and groups results in a modification of the behavior of the participants*. The key-terms in this definition are *interplay of forces* and *modification of behavior*. In the preview of group interaction given in chapter II, we saw that the *interplay of forces* within a group *modified*

³ Cf. chapters 7 and 8.

the behavior of the different members to produce a dynamic, changing relationship, which, in varying degrees, is everywhere typical of social life. Whenever we wish to determine whether or not interaction has taken place, we need but ask: Has there been a change in behavior, that is, a modification in the personality of individuals or in the culture of groups as a result of social contacts? This definition is sufficiently broad to make interaction the basic process in all personal and social organization and change. As Park and Burgess express it:

A person is a member of society so long as he responds to social forces: when interaction ends, he is isolated and detached; he ceases to be a person and becomes a "lost soul." This is the reason that the limits of society are coterminous with the limits of interaction, that is, of the participation of persons in the life of society.⁴

The first glance at a term as general and basic as interaction could hardly be expected to reveal its full significance. Since the process is fundamental to all that has been said about culture, personality, and social organization, we can expect its theoretical importance to be grasped only after patient analysis. At the outset this task will seem remote from the problems of everyday living, but later we may discover that abstract theories are sometimes exceedingly useful tools in penetrating to the causes of the "practical problems" of social life. This looking behind the scenes may well begin by our calling attention to four important aspects of the process: (1) social contacts are a *prerequisite* of interaction; (2) *communication* by means of *symbols* provides the *medium* of interaction; (3) the *elements* or *social forces* which interact are the attitudes of the individual and the social values of the group; and (4) the different ways or *modes* in which these forces are related constitute the *types* of interaction. The meaning of each of these statements needs to be amplified.

SOCIAL CONTACTS A PREREQUISITE OF INTERACTION

It seems obvious that there can be no society unless people have social relations and that these relations cannot be established

⁴Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 341, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

unless individuals have contact with one another. The feral children whose cases we have studied were poor candidates for society because throughout their lifetime they had had no opportunity for meeting other people. Isolated tribes in remote sections are also poor candidates for membership in a larger society because their cultural world has been limited to the boundaries of their immediate locality. The "limits of society are coterminous with the limits of interaction," and social interaction is limited to persons who have *contact* with one another.

Contact, as the term is popularly used, simply means a coming together of independent units. Since the sociologist is not interested in contacts in general but only in those which have social significance, he finds it necessary to qualify this popular conception. This narrowing of the term, first of all, limits his interest to contacts between human beings, and, in the second place, to those human contacts that are really social—that is, that *modify the attitudes and behavior of persons*. As we saw in the study of crowds, the *physical* contacts among a mere aggregation of people may involve such slight interaction as to be of little social significance. Prisoners sentenced under the old Pennsylvania system of solitary confinement came into contact daily with their keeper, but there was no interaction of personalities. As the keeper unlocked the hole in the cell door and inserted the tray of food he neither looked at nor spoke to the inmate. Similarly, the contact between workmen in some modern factories is so nearly deprived of social meaning that those who work side by side are more like the machines which they operate, than like persons. Although in these cases human beings have contact with one another, it is limited to the physical level.

In contrast with these illustrations of physical contact, we may say that the coming together of human beings is truly *social* only when there is *a mutual response, an inner adjustment of behavior to the actions of others*. This is another way of stating that interaction cannot begin until a condition of rapport exists among people, not until the keeper is willing to communicate with his prisoner, not until the workman thinks of his colleague as another human being. With this meaning added to the popular conception, we find that *social contact* is a useful term in calling our attention to the initial events which *set the stage for a social response* between human beings. *Interaction* is a useful term in

describing the *interplay of forces* which determines the nature of that response and of the subsequent social relationship which may be established. Obviously the terms are close together in their meaning since they describe related aspects of the same process. Social contacts are the starting points for social interaction. Eubank well summarizes the point when he says:

Where there is contact of human minds, there association exists; where there is no contact, there is a state of isolation. The group cannot be defined apart from the psychic interaction of its members, because without it the group does not exist. Mental interchange, reciprocal influencing, mutual modification—these are the *sine qua non* of collective life.⁵

COMMUNICATION AS THE MEDIUM OF INTERACTION

Since only those contacts lead to interaction which involve an exchange of *meaning*, it is important to study the conditions under which such an exchange is possible. In general we may say that there can be no sharing of experience among persons or groups of persons unless they can *communicate* their ideas and sentiments to one another by means of commonly understood symbols. Naturally we think of language as the richest storehouse of such symbols, but we must also include the physical gestures on which primitive man depended for much of his communication, and which have not entirely disappeared in modern society. As was noted earlier,⁶ the raised hand and bent thumb of the "hitch-hiker" has as much meaning for the motorist as would a long statement to the effect that "I am desirous of securing free transportation to the next city and request that you give me a ride in your car!" In most circumstances, however, words have developed as man's most efficient symbols for the communication of ideas, especially complex ideas. Only as individuals have invented such means of communication as a language provides have they been able to organize societies and create and transmit culture.

To summarize: Social interaction is the basic process through which human nature and society develop and are changed. The

⁵ Earle E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, pp. 289, 290. Reprinted by special permission of D. C. Heath and Company, publishers.

⁶ Cf. chapter 8, p. 190.

process can take place only when the contacts between people are social. Contacts are social only when ideas are communicated between persons by the use of symbols. Symbols constitute the medium for communication by virtue of the fact that they are social products. Symbols are summaries of past experiences which provide the basis for a common understanding of present situations.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES AS THE FORCES OF INTERACTION

Precisely what takes place when two ward politicians "exchange words" on election day? As the argument becomes increasingly involved and bitter, words fly, fists shake in threatening gestures, and a crowd of curious bystanders closes in to see what it is all about. We know that there is interaction between ward leaders Smith and Jones because each responds to the words and gestures of the other. We are not quite certain, however, just *what* is interacting. Next summer when these same two men meet on the street they may discuss in the friendliest manner the homecoming celebration which the community is planning. Consequently, just to say that *Smith* and *Jones* are *interacting* gives little insight into the two situations. But if we look beneath the appearances in their political squabble for a moment, we can describe the interaction which is taking place as basically a conflict of *attitudes*. The actions of Smith can be explained by his attitude of hatred for the Republican party and his favor for the Democrats, while the opposite attitudes account for the gesticulations of Mr. Jones. Now we should recall that *attitudes are predispositions to act in a certain way with reference to specific values*. "Attitudes are the mobilizations and the organizations of the wishes with reference to definite situations."⁷ These tendencies of the individual to act in a certain way may have been built up through a long process of conditioning. Once they become established as forces in his personality they are important determinants of conduct. Park and Burgess have named them the elemental forces in interaction because:

⁷ Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

. . . being tendencies to act, they are expressive and communicable. They present us human motives in the only form in which we know them objectively, namely, as behavior.⁸

In the light of this analysis we may re-interpret the illustration of the political argument by saying that not Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith *but their attitudes are the real units of interaction.*

We already know that attitudes are the subjective expression within one's personality of values which have an objective reference.⁹ A value is any object or objective which a person or a group considers desirable and strives to obtain or preserve. Social values often become formalized in the institutions of a society. The temple at Jerusalem and the elaborate religious ritual which centered there were an expression of the value which the Jews placed upon monotheism. The many laws and court procedures which in this country protect the "rights" of the individual reflect the value which we place on "freedom" and "private property." The government of modern Germany expresses the supreme value which the leaders of that country attach to the state.

There is a close connection between the *values* which thus become objectified in social patterns and the subjective *attitudes* of the people who support those values. When we are thinking of the individuals involved in interaction it is convenient to regard attitudes as elemental, but when we direct our attention to the interaction of groups or the contact of different cultures we think in terms of their social values. Both attitudes and values may, therefore, be considered the *elements* or the basic *forces* in interaction. Our understanding of the process may be increased if we review the different concepts by applying them to the case with which we opened the chapter.

The parents of the immigrant girl had been reared in a culture which placed great value on a strict discipline of children. In the old country, especially, the social contacts of a daughter were rigidly supervised by her parents and regulated according to the prevailing mores of the community. When this family moved to America and settled in Chicago in a neighborhood populated by many other immigrant families, their Old World standards came in conflict with a different set of customs. The immigrant colony,

⁸ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁹ *Cf.* chapter 8.

its churches, its family groups, and its clan organizations possessed *values* which were being undermined by the conflicting patterns of the rest of the community. Many individuals in this process were torn between conflicting attitudes. They were predisposed by early training to obey their parents and be loyal to the values in the old culture, but their attitudes were also being conditioned in favor of the customs of the new society in which they were striving to achieve status.

In this case, as in all interaction, attitudes and values are different ways of looking at the same process. When *groups* interact in migrations, in wars, or in cooperative enterprises their social values are the forces involved. When *individual* members of those groups are seen at close range their attitudes become the subjective manifestations of those social forces.

TYPES OF INTERACTION

An attempt to reduce the multitudinous forms of social interaction to a few categories is likely to involve over-simplification. For example, how would one set about classifying the following instances of social behavior? Glance first at the "crap game" in the back room of a pool hall, and then at lovers parked in a lonely road; at the President's cabinet pondering problems of state; at the housewives gossiping over the garden fence; at their husbands attending the horse races; at a board of directors deciding the next dividend; at mourners gathered by a bedside; and at a stadium filled with "fans" watching a ball game. Multiply this list a thousand times to envisage the complexity of social processes. If the sociologist is to bring order out of this apparent chaos, if he is to describe all social interaction in its simplest terms, he must abstract from all particular cases a few inclusive generalizations. There are four such broad categories into which most examples of interaction seem to fit. They are: *competition*, *conflict*, *accommodation*, and *assimilation*. Many other types of social processes,¹⁰ that is, of forms of interaction, have been suggested by different students of society—such as association, dissociation, differentia-

¹⁰ The term *social process* is synonymous with *interaction* and, therefore, any social change or relationship may be described as involving one or more social processes or forms of interaction. Competition, conflict, accommodation, etc., are often referred to in sociological writings either as different types of social processes or as different forms of interaction.

tion, cooperation, compromise, stratification, subordination, segregation, et cetera—but many of these may be considered sub-types under the four headings already given.

Of these four, competition has possibly received the widest attention from the several divisions of social science. Its most thorough-going treatment has come from the economist, but the political scientist, the historian, and more recently the sociologist have also made extensive use of the term. *Competition* is that all-pervasive *struggle for existence in an economic order* with which most people are occupied such a large share of the time. If competition is a struggle for existence, *conflict* may be defined as a *struggle for social status*. It, too, is so pervasive that it finds its way into the life of almost every group. *Accommodation* is the process by which competing or conflicting forces become *adjusted to each other* and form working relationships. In *assimilation* a *thoroughgoing fusion of attitudes and culture traits* takes place resulting in a close unity among the members of a society. Every example of group behavior may be analyzed in terms of one or more of these four processes. Each with its sub-types will be analyzed further in the chapters to follow.

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Chapter 23

COMPETITION AND CONFLICT

EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES OF ERNEST HANDEL¹

I FIGURED with a thirteen-year work record behind me there'd be no trouble in *me* gettin' a job in a big city like Pittsburgh. Of course, sometimes I'd get work—good work I thought would last, like that time the Standard Floor Company hired me. Me and a lot of others got took on at the same time. But would you believe it? In two weeks we was all laid off again, not for anything we done, but because *they* run out of work. And that's the way it is in this town and the way I had it for a year and a half. And there was hundreds of men just like me—dying to work—willing to do anything—took on as though for a permanent job and then laid off without any warning or any pay. Sometimes it would be for a day or two—like when a cool spell would come and the ice company I was working in turned off forty men till it got hot again. If you had a job like that you didn't dare give it up to look for another, for you might find it even worse.

Of course, even them jobs was better than nothing. To my dying day I'll never forget the weeks when I couldn't find no work—not even for a day. I remember one night when I'd been out of work a whole month and the rent was four months due, one of my friends told me he heard they was hiring men over to Spang-Chalfants—six miles away. I didn't even have the price of a car-check and I'd borrowed all I had the nerve to—and more—from my relatives. So I got up the next morning before five o'clock and walked all the way over there across the river without any breakfast—only to be told at the mill that they hadn't taken on a man in three months. I pretty near jumped off the bridge on my way home that day. If it hadn't been for the wife and kid, I guess I would have.

¹ Clinch Calkins, *Some Folks Won't Work*, pp. 80-81, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1930. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

COMPETITION

Ernest Handel was only one of thousands who during the first years of the depression were struggling to maintain themselves in a society whose security had been badly shaken. He and others in the army of the unemployed competed for the few jobs available, and those who were fortunate enough to have their names on a pay roll strove to retain their advantage. The struggle for existence and for the maintenance of a desired standard of living is so prevalent in our experience that most persons will already have some understanding of what is meant by *competition* even before the term is defined. Competitive forms of interaction are, of course, not limited to our society. The aborigines in a tropical jungle may not compete for jobs and they may not even compete for breadfruit, bananas, and other necessities of existence, but if these are not the objects of their competitive activity they have other values which serve the purpose. They may place a high value on the possession of elaborate ornaments of dress, or on returning from battle with the largest number of trophies of the enemy, or on the ability to relate the greatest amount of tribal lore, and the person who achieves these ends is duly accorded a ranking position in the group.

Naturally, there is no struggle or competition unless the supply of the object which is sought, is limited, or unless for some other reason only those who exert special effort or show distinctive ability manage to achieve their goal. One competes for a five thousand dollar a year position, for a favored cabin site in the mountains, for the presidency of an organization, for a place on the Olympic teams, for the lowest score in a golf tournament, for the control of a labor union, and for hundreds of other values which will increase his security and enhance his position in a given group. And *groups* compete for many things: for a Big League pennant, for a larger share in the earnings of industry, for lucrative contracts in business, for legislation favorable to their interests, and for any other objective which they and other groups desire. Although many examples of competition are familiar to us, we are generally unaware of the basic nature of this process in preparing the way for all other types of interaction. Probably its importance can best be comprehended by first learning more about the

characteristics of the process itself, and second, by examining some of its social results.

Competition an unconscious, impersonal process.² In the illustration already cited, Ernest Handel was not *conscious* of the many competitive forces responsible for his insecurity. He merely knew that he wanted a job and none was to be had. So it is in many cases; those who compete are so concentrated upon their own efforts that they know little of the total situation which surrounds them. The Kansas wheat farmer realizes that he wants a bumper crop and high prices, but he is not aware that the farmer across the way is his competitor, as is also the wheat grower of the Ukraine or the Argentine. He does not realize that the oats farmer and the rye farmer are also his competitors. Nor does he see that general business conditions, the flow of credit, the value of the nation's currency, tariff restrictions, and many other factors bear upon his problem of personal security. These are factors of which he is little aware and over which he has little control, but they constitute the complex web of competitive relationships which limit the results of his efforts.

If people are generally unconscious of these forces which surround them, it follows that as they take part in the struggle for a favorable position they generally do so in an *impersonal* way. Ernest Handel did not even know the men who held the jobs he was after; the wheat farmer could not have *personal attitudes* toward all other wheat farmers in the world nor toward the people and conditions which determine prices, credit, and the value of the dollar; and the resident of Las Vegas is not personally resentful because his community does not have the competitive advantage of a seaport city. The impersonal character of competition is seen best of all in the modern corporation. To the workers, the stockholders are merely a figure of speech, and the stockholders may take more personal interest in their dividends than in the men who operate the factories. Each individual or group tries to get as much

² If competition is impersonal and therefore non-social in the strict sense of the word, by what right is it included as one of the forms of social interaction? Its inclusion is not precisely logical; we should really call competition a non-social form of interaction, which provides the ecological foundation on which the social structure of a group arises. In practical analysis, however, no serious difficulties are met because, as we shall soon discover, competition seldom appears alone, but is nearly always found in company with some personal form of interaction which makes the situation a social one.

as possible from the process, having little regard for the other parties involved. Punching the time clock and answering by number instead of by name are symbolic of the impersonal character of modern business. When occasionally personal sentiments intrude into economic life they may be brushed aside with the rationalization that "business is business," or "friendship and business should not mix."

In fields other than business, competition also shows its impersonal character. Contending lawyers in a trial may engage in the friendliest conversation at luncheon, and when they enter the courtroom each strives to convince the jury that the other's case is wrong; or two friends who are competing for the same position on a football team do not exert less effort because each regrets seeing the other lose.

Competition a continuous process. In saying that competition is continuous, we mean that the position which anyone occupies in a given society is *constantly* subject to the operation of competitive forces. It is subject to the desires of other persons, to changes in the supply of goods or other values that satisfy those desires, and to basic inventions which dethrone one set of persons as the masters of the new technique rise to power. The highly paid "puddlers" in the steel industry found their skills of no value after automatic machines were introduced; orchestra players lost out in competition with the talking movies; and telephone operators were not in demand when the automatic dial system was installed. The secure position of thousands of people, both those who were actively engaged in vocations and those who had retired to live on accumulated savings, was rendered insecure by the multiple factors which produced the depression of 1929. In any society which is not altogether static, one's position relative to the other members of the group is ever subject to such competitive forces as have been mentioned. As long as people desire objects which others also want, struggle in some form will occur. "Only in such a non-economy as heaven, where celestials are free from wants or there is a surfeit of all good things, can it be absent."³

We are now ready to summarize, in a concise definition, the characteristics of the process we have been analyzing. *Competition*

³ From Walton H. Hamilton, "Competition," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4, p. 147. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

is an impersonal, unconscious, continuous struggle between individuals for satisfactions, which, because of their limited supply, all may not have.

"Free" or "pure" competition seldom existent. Now we say, as if to contradict ourselves, that in real life the process in the pure form, as defined, seldom if ever exists; that competition is always modified by other factors.

Personal elements in the struggle. First, instead of always being an impersonal, unconscious process, the struggle may become conscious and personal, with the result that its intensity is either heightened or lessened. In actual practice we find that although business men are competitors they occasionally allow personal elements to modify the principle that "business is business," and sometimes football players or lawyers permit sentiment to affect their competitive behavior. In such cases the presence of friendly interest lessens the intensity of the struggle and makes for social unity.

The following story (the authenticity of which is not here attested to!) illustrates how the personal element may also *heighten* the struggle, converting competition into open conflict. When Merchant X saw that the two competitors who occupied sites on either side of his store were displaying huge posters announcing drastic reductions in "closing out sales," he retaliated by placing between their signs and above his own door the equally large poster bearing the words, MAIN ENTRANCE HERE. The fight was on! "Cut-throat" competition involving intense personal rivalry was the expected result. Direct conflict of a highly conscious and personalized variety had replaced impersonal, indirect competition.

In a similar way, social prejudice, especially racial prejudice, renders free competition impossible. In many vocations, colored employees know that they are prevented from competing for the higher positions. They may serve as porters, janitors, or stock-room attendants in a chain store, but they are not permitted to rise to the position of clerk or store manager. If they are lawyers or doctors, their business is almost exclusively limited to their own racial group.

Nationalistic attitudes also change competition from a mechanical process to a personal affair. Trade ceases to be purely competitive when such slogans appear as "Buy British," or "Buy American," or "Support Home Industry," and when outside forces enter to aid one party, such as governmental subsidies or tariff protection.

Cooperation involved in competition. Not only is the struggle for security and position lessened or increased by the appearance of personal and social elements, but it is also modified when complex "rules of the game" arise to govern its operation. Human competition is never simply a struggle. It is always regulated by custom or laws. The ritual and rules which surround athletic contests define the terms of the competition. In a similar manner, lawyers contesting a case are regulated by rules of the court; physicians' codes of ethics describe the limits within which they may compete for patients; colleges agree upon legitimate methods of recruiting new students; church bodies avoid proselyting in their campaign for more members; and governmental laws set down standards of competition in both domestic and foreign trade. Floyd N. House has described this tendency of individualistic struggle to be modified by conscious, social control:

Since competition perforce takes place within an existing social order, and since it is a struggle which takes place with reference to ends determined by society, it is natural that there should arise in some cases a definite group consciousness of the ends in question, and a collective plan for the attainment of those ends. Such a collective plan for the attainment of social ends—a social technique—may involve the placing of limitations upon competition, or even its entire elimination. Socialism, strictly so-called, is an example of such a technique; custom and moral tradition likewise restrict or eliminate competition between members of the same family. Law and morals are more deep-seated, pervasive, and spontaneously evolved social forces which likewise operate to restrict competition, particularly as regards the means which competitors may use in their struggle. Competition also generates in some cases forms of self-limitation on the part of the competitors, as in the case of price-fixing agreements and similar arrangements entered into by competing producers or merchants.⁴

When the restraint is self-imposed by the competing units, it is done through a process of mutual agreements or cooperation.

⁴ Floyd N. House, *The Range of Social Theory*, pp. 94-95, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

In cooperation, strictly individualistic behavior is replaced by joint action toward a common goal. This tendency of competitors either to follow their own "rules of the game" or to be governed by the sanctions of a third party, such as government, indicates that human competition is seldom an unrestrained struggle.

In addition to this first form of cooperation which determines the rules of competition, there is also a second, more highly developed form. Human beings early learned the lesson that in numbers there is strength. Individuals with similar interests customarily pool their efforts in order to compete more effectively. A single business man in Washington is impotent, but the United States Chamber of Commerce, representing hundreds of thousands of business men, is a power to be reckoned with. Every political lobby is a cooperative attempt to secure an advantage over competing interests. Churches cooperate in a common battle against commercialized vice. One bloc of nations cooperates to obtain economic advantage over others. Communist groups in all countries may work together in furthering the "class struggle."

The relative influence of these *unifying* and *divisive* influences in a given situation is interesting to observe. The same persons who at one moment are cooperating in a common struggle against an opposing force, are the next moment competing with one another on a different matter. The various war veterans' organizations compete with each other for members and prestige, but cooperate in a common drive for the bonus payment. The managers of movie theaters compete for customers, but cooperate in combating the efforts of reform agencies in passing censorship laws. Patent medicine interests compete for the chance to cure human ills, but unite to defeat a pure food and drug act. In any society there is this constant interplay of forces. People cooperate so they can compete more advantageously, and every time they cooperate they remove competition from its pure state of individualistic struggle. The extreme of this trend appears in the socialized state in which human competition has been eliminated so that man may "compete" more effectively with the forces of nature. We may conclude by saying that cooperation is really the child of competition, but that as the child increases in stature the importance of the parent declines. The paradox is simple: competition in itself is a disunifying force; it breaks down the unity of groups in the struggle

of individuals to survive. But individuals in order to compete more successfully cooperate, and cooperation restricts competition.⁵

Results of competition. *Effect of competition on geographic location of persons.*

The Millers of Pittsburgh, after four years of a marriage which started out propitiously, are now, after ruthless demotions from their first estate, expecting to place their children in a Home. Theirs is the sad and oft-repeated tale of the department store, which sends out its unheralded tidings on Christmas Eve, a dismissal to take effect at once. Miller was a salesman, and his wife too had been a saleswoman before her marriage; all her savings had been used to furnish their home. With their furniture paid for, she could even afford to stay home after marriage and keep house, which she did, very thriftily. During successive depressions, Miller was put on part time. Part-time employment being productive mainly of debts, the Millers had no reserve with which to meet a lay-off. They moved to cheaper quarters. On the plea that he was too young and strong to accept charity, he refused aid and the furniture was levied upon by the landlord. After the sale the pair moved into one furnished room at \$15 a month. He paid \$2 down on this rent and promised the rest within a week.⁶

As the Miller family lost out in its competitive struggle for a livelihood, it was forced to move to less and less desirable quarters, ending in a district of cheap furnished rooms. This case is illustrative of a general principle: the placing of people spatially or geographically is largely determined by competition. People, like

⁵ The relative influence of competition and cooperation throughout human experience has been the subject of much debate. Kropotkin vigorously contended that cooperation was a persistent pattern in all life, while Darwin maintained that the basic principle was struggle and the survival of the fittest. In our analysis we have acknowledged the presence of both forces without taking sides in the controversy as to which is more important. For a development of these theories compare: Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, chap. 6, pp. 309-356, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928; Floyd N. House, *The Range of Social Theory*, chap. 27, pp. 389-407, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929; Cecil C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning*, chap. 5, pp. 87-106, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1932; Petr A. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution*, revised edition. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1922.

⁶ Calkins, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

plants, tend to live in an environment which is favorable to their welfare, but, unlike plants, man is able to move when too keen competition in one location makes existence impossible. As this shifting and sorting process continues, certain individuals who win out in the competition establish themselves where they are or move to still more favorable places, while those who lose move to poorer districts where life can be maintained on a lower standard.

The results of this process are familiar, for we have already watched the ecological patterns of community life take form. We have learned that the distribution of the world's population in zones of concentration, the location of communities within those zones, and the location within communities of functional areas are all a part of the ecological pattern which has resulted from a struggle of peoples for survival and for a satisfying livelihood.

Effect of competition on vocational placement of persons. If people live where they can compete to advantage, it would follow that they also tend to engage in a type of work which assures the best livelihood. Individuals try to rise above their present status, competing with one another for superior positions, for greater wealth, and for more prestige. Those who lose in the struggle sink lower in the vocational scale. Presumably, the ones on top are of superior ability and everyone finds the niche where he can function most successfully. According to this theory of the classical economists, competition is the magic wand which distributes people vocationally solely on the basis of ability.

Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* seems to describe a perfect division of labor, although in this case the competition was not so much individualized, man against man, as it was group against nature. According to her account of a typical day in the life of the village, the young men set out in their boats for a day's fishing under the torrid sun, the older men journey inland to till the plantation, "women carry piles of washing to the sea . . ." ⁷ "the older girls go fishing on the reef . . .," ⁸ "the carpenters begin work on the new house . . .," ⁹ and "the families who will cook today are hard at work." ¹⁰

⁷ Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, p. 15, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1928.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

The classical economists assumed that free competition in an industrial society functioned as effectively in dividing labor as did the communal arrangements of this primitive village. As an adequate description of modern economic life their theory has been seriously challenged. There are many who question whether those in power are always there because of superior ability or because of favorable family or political connections, and whether those on relief are there because of their inefficiency. If people were to be placed vocationally solely on the basis of merit, we would need to eliminate all special favors, to provide employment opportunities for everyone, and to facilitate movement from position to position so that a person could easily find where he was most efficient. Since none of these conditions has been fully met, we may conclude that competition *tends* to distribute people vocationally according to ability, but that the results are often complicated by other factors.

Indirect effect of competition on social placement of persons. Social climbing on the "Gold Coast" illustrates another effect of competition on the *social* rather than on the economic placement of persons:

But if we look more deeply into the life that goes on within these luxurious hostleries, these "exclusive" clubs, these stately and forbidding mansions, the picture is less clear. For what, after all, is "society"? At the question social leaders and society editors shake their heads, look bewildered, smile helplessly.

A generation ago the question would have been promptly answered: "Social position is a matter of family, breeding, aristocracy." The old "society" was a caste—very nearly, indeed, a clan. The old "assemblies" were almost a hereditary institution. The dowagers of the older families were the heads of the clan and the arbiters of social destiny. An invitation to the assemblies was a proved title of social rank. If one was received at the assemblies, one was received everywhere in "society."

But the growth of the city with its monetary standards and its economic organization, its startling mobility, and its very force of numbers was to change the nature of "society" just as it was to change every other phase of social life. The old "society," based on heredi-

tary social position, has passed, to be replaced by a "society" of cliques and sets, of wealth and display, and above all, of youth. . . .¹¹

The "social game" is a constant competition among those who are "in" for distinction and pre-eminence; a constant struggle upon the part of those who are not "in" to break into the circles of those who are. . . .¹²

In some societies competition is a more important factor in placing one socially than in others. It is important in such highly mobile societies as the modern industrial community, where class lines can be crossed with relative ease. Economic success carries with it the social advantage of residence in exclusive areas, membership in costly clubs, education in private schools, and habits of living which set one apart from those who cannot afford lavish expenditure.¹³ In societies of greater social stability, such as India, in which movement from class to class is impeded by well-established cultural barriers, ancestry may be much more important than competition in determining one's social standing.

There are also in-between types of society in which competition is one of many factors in determining social standing. The status of one's family, one's personal achievements in politics, science, the arts, or other branches of culture, together with economic standing, all play a part in establishing social position. Such a combination of factors is found in many of our more stable American communities.

Summary. Competition in its pure form is an impersonal process which distributes people geographically and vocationally, and in so doing affects also their social position. But pure competition is seldom encountered. The introduction of such personal elements as friendship, or prejudice, and mutual agreement expressed in cooperative activity distort the process and modify its results. Competition, therefore, only tends to classify, distribute, and segregate a population. In practice, this tendency is strengthened or weakened by the other social processes, one of which is social conflict.

¹¹ Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, p. 47, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 49. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹³ Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty, "A Further Study of the Social Status of Occupations," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, vol. 5, pp. 101-112.

SOCIAL CONFLICT

In 1913 about 2,800 hop-pickers—men, women, and children—were camped in the shadeless fields near Wheatland, California. The earnings were low, and the sanitary and housing conditions were viciously bad. Some of the pickers who were members of the I. W. W. had assembled the entire throng in an effort to call a strike. "Ford had taken a sick baby from its mother's arms, and holding it before the eyes of the people, he had cried out, 'It's for the kids we are doing this!'" Not a quarter of the crowd was of a type normally venturesome enough to strike, and yet when the sheriff went after Ford, he was knocked down and kicked senseless by the infuriated men. . . . A deputy sheriff at the most critical moment fired a shot into the air, as he stated, "to sober the crowd." In the events following, two deputies and two workers were killed.¹⁴

For years prior to this violent outburst the Wheatland hop-pickers had been competing for a larger share in the profits of production, but instead of rising to a higher economic level, they gradually became aware that they were slipping ever lower in the scale. As this awareness increased and as leaders arose who could define the cause of their plight in personal terms, the unconscious and continuous process of competition gave way to periods of intermittent conflict. This case illustrates the characteristics of the second basic form of interaction. In contrast with the first:

Conflict is always conscious, indeed, it evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort. Both competition and conflict are forms of struggle. Competition, however, is continuous and impersonal, conflict is intermittent and personal.

Competition is a struggle for position in an economic order. The distribution of populations in the world-economy, the industrial organization in the national economy, and the vocation of the individual in the division of labor—all these are determined, in the long run, by competition. The status of the individual, or a group of

¹⁴ E. T. Hiller, *The Strike*, p. 58, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1928. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

individuals, in the social order, on the other hand, is determined by rivalry, by war, or by subtler forms of conflict.¹⁵

Conflict prevalent during periods of change. When the structure of a society remains stable for a time, the pursuit by its members of common values is largely on the impersonal level of competition. When, however, the established order is undermined by general ecological and cultural changes, its many constituent groups tend to become conscious of their status and vie with one another for a point of vantage in the new order. During and following a depression, for example, many such tensions appear within family life, and within religious, educational, and political organizations. The same was true during the period of instability in Germany after the World War. Highly personalized strife was rampant within the nation, and the conflicts were not resolved or suppressed until the rise of a dictator. Conflicts not only arise during periods of change but they, in turn, increase the change by challenging and upsetting many of the old relationships. The process, therefore, becomes circular: change begets change. Conflict functions as a process of social breakdown which precedes reorganization.

Conflict a unifying as well as a disorganizing process. Paradoxically, conflict results both in greater unity and in greater social disorganization than does competition. If people cooperate in order to compete to better advantage, they have an even stronger tendency to *unite* within their own group in time of conflict because the status of the group is more seriously at stake. While competition affects one's social status indirectly by determining his place of residence and his occupation, conflict affects his status very directly. In competition two people want the same object, but not until their interaction changes to conflict do they attack each other personally in order to get it. Once the attack is started the combatants may forget the original value in their pre-occupation with annihilating each other or at least reducing the other's status. Because each individual is conscious of the other's intent and of the danger involved, he has the strong motive of self-preservation as a basis for unifying his forces.

¹⁵ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 574, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

For the very reason that conflict is recognized as an attack on one's personal security and position, it also becomes a more *disorganizing process* than competition. Business concerns, athletic teams, and nations may *compete* with each other and remain friends, but if, and as, the struggle results in conflict, antagonism and other hostile attitudes remove all possibility of inter-group cooperation. Conflict unifies within a group while it destroys the larger social unity between groups. Conflict strengthens the "we-sentiment" of the in-group while it heightens the barriers separating it from the out-group. *Conflict always alters the relative status of the participants.*

Conflict groups and conflict patterns. Every person and every group may at some time engage in conflict. The so-called "conflict groups" differ from other groups only in that their behavior so frequently follows the conflict pattern that that pattern has come to be identified as an outstanding characteristic. This, in general, applies to nationalities, "race conscious" groups, labor unions, employers' associations, social classes, sects, gangs, factions, and parties.

These groups and any groups in conflict follow roughly the same patterns of behavior: (1) They are highly self-conscious in respect to their status and welfare. (2) They strengthen their position by marshalling their forces and organizing for the encounter. (3) They designate special functionaries who plan the strategy and lead the group in the conflict. (4) Other special functionaries serve as propaganda and morale experts whose three-fold task includes maintaining unity of attitude within the conflict group, undermining the morale of the opponent, and gaining the support of neutrals. (5) Conflict groups claim victory prematurely for themselves, and admit defeat only with the greatest reluctance when further resistance is futile.

Patterns (3) and (4) help explain major phases of our present-day social organization. The army, the navy, and, in fact, all members of the military machine and their "war cult" serve as leaders of the nation when it turns to conflict. Party committeemen have a similar function in political campaigns, as do union agents in strikes, and race leaders during interracial conflict. These functionaries, however, do not wait for the conflict to begin before organizing their people into an efficient fighting machine; they prepare for the conflict in advance during periods of peace by train-

ing personnel, laying plans for campaigns, and securing instruments of combat.

The morale experts who perform their three-fold task are of special importance in the process. They must find ways of justifying the behavior of their group both to its own members and to outsiders. They must so dramatize and personalize the issues that loyalty to the group becomes more important for the individual than loyalty to any other of his personal or group interests. They accomplish these ends by relating the present objective of the group to some already accepted moral principle, by securing prominent persons and neutral organizations to endorse their cause, and by appealing to the basic desires in the individual, especially to his desire for security, for prestige, and for adventure. The enemy is handled in just the opposite fashion; his cause is identified with evil motives, prominent non-participants are called on to condemn his behavior, and his own members are shown that for their security they should abandon the struggle. The invention of the radio, movies, and other techniques of communication have greatly aided the propagandist in presenting these unifying and conflict symbols to great masses of the people.

The specific forms of group conflict are varied and changeable, but we may include the following as the more standardized patterns: feuds, revenge murders, honor suicides, riots, gang fighting, strikes and lockouts, boycotts and embargoes, war, revolution, terrorism, passive resistance, and racial or social discrimination. The fact that persons and groups in conflict often follow some pre-existing pattern shows that one is seldom entirely free of social control even in one's periods of greatest passion.

The end of conflict. Although conflict is a far-reaching process participated in, in some form, by all persons and groups consciously concerned with their status, yet any given conflict is terminated or at least interrupted after a time. Unlike competition, conflict is not a continuous process, but is intermittent. The struggle is so intense and direct that those engaged in conflict reach a point of exhaustion. Or, realizing that their cause will not succeed, one side may ask for a settlement to avoid further loss of status and complete disorganization.

In carrying our analysis of group interaction one step farther, we now want to know what happens after conflict ceases; through

what process can interaction be resumed, and how can a society be reestablished?

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Chapter 24

ACCOMMODATION AND ASSIMILATION

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS ¹

THE HART SCHAFFNER AND MARX principle of dealing with labor is not a patent medicine which can be applied under any and all conditions. Rather, it is an attitude of mind and faith in certain principles of right dealing which once were regarded as a matter of faith, but which experience has demonstrated to be sound and profitable.

After a prolonged and costly strike in 1910, which came as a great surprise to this company, they accepted the principle that the good-will of the employes was as necessary and desirable as the good-will of customers, and that henceforth every effort should be made to cultivate this valuable asset. Accordingly, a new department was created which should have charge of all the relations of the company with its employes, and nothing should be done which affected their interests without the consideration of this department. A very brief agreement for arbitration had been signed with representatives of the employes. After the decision of the Board of Arbitration was reached concerning the wages and hours and certain matters of demands, it was decided to continue the board and make it a part of the permanent scheme for adjusting complaints. . . .

Government is nothing more than an effort to remove conflicting interests from the arena of brute struggle, and to submit them to some rational and disinterested agency for adjustment. Whether the agency be a court or a legislative body it still represents a common or public interest as against the individual interest of claimants or contestants.

Experience has shown many times in situations where a conflict of

¹ Earl Dean Howard, "Experience of Hart Schaffner and Marx with Collective Bargaining," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 69, pp. 197, 198, 202, Jan., 1917. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

interest appeared inevitable that a plan could be devised whereby the interests of both parties might be served without loss to either. It happens more frequently than would naturally be supposed that one or both parties are mistaken as to their own best interests, so that the solution of some difficulties is often much easier than appears at first. . . .

During this five-year experiment, most of the fundamental issues which arise in the employer-employee relation have been met and adjudicated. These typical cases have revealed principles which may some day help to form an established code of governing rules for industry and supplant the present method of competitive bargaining and conflicts settled by economic strength.

ACCOMMODATION

Boys' gangs, unions, and armies fight, but not continuously. They stop when one shouts "down," when they both decide the conflict is futile, or when a big-policeman third party intervenes to suspend hostilities. Since after the fight is over contenders must still live in the same world (unless one or all have been annihilated), some readjustment in their relationships must be made. The working out of these adjustments between groups and within each group to the new situations which have been created by competition and conflict is known as the process of accommodation. It is a process by which persons or groups who are separated by social distance can, nevertheless, function as units of the same society.

In the foregoing illustration of industrial relations, the workers and employers had agreed to abandon violent conflict and settle their differences through peaceful negotiations. After each conference, which was really a conflict under social control, both reported back to their members any change in their industrial status and any new adjustments that must be made for the coming period. This case will serve to illustrate a number of the characteristics of accommodation.

External and internal aspects of the adjustment. Workers and employers do not abandon industrial warfare and resume negotiations because they have suddenly learned to love each other, but because continued fighting would involve one or both sides in too severe losses. The agreement which they reach is, therefore, a formal, impersonal, and external adjustment to con-

flict. The same is true of nationalities at war. Officially admitting war guilt in the signing of the Versailles Treaty did not change the Germans' conviction that their cause was right. In this light, accommodation may be thought of as subdued conflict which may later break forth in overt expression.

Under some circumstances, however, the accommodation may be of a more lasting character, permanently altering the internal life of the group. If, for example, the parties to an agreement recognize each other as equals and if the agreement provides for the satisfaction of many of the interests which were in conflict, those concerned tend to support the new pattern and adjust their way of living in accordance with it even though the liberty of each is limited by so doing. With the exception of their conflict during the Civil War, the forty-eight states have been loyal to the Constitution, which is an accommodative document that defines their rights and obligations.

Accommodation may also be relatively permanent in its effects upon attitudes and social customs if one group is sufficiently powerful to enforce its decrees. In the caste system of India and in other cases in which the accommodation lasts for a long time, the attitudes of the classes become adjusted to the arrangement. This implies that accommodation is more than a purely external relationship and has become a conditioning force in shaping the social attitudes of the individuals. When a social reformer, even a Mahatma Gandhi, faces such a condition, he finds that his first and possibly most difficult task consists in awakening the masses to an awareness of their plight, so thorough-going has been their personal and group adjustment to an originally unfavorable situation.

Types of relationships to which groups become accommodated. *The coordinate relationship.* When groups recognize each other as equals they become accommodated on the basis of a coordinate relationship. Neither tries to dominate or subjugate the other, yet each negotiates for a favorable position in minor matters when settling differences. The process is one of give and take, calling for adjustments in the interests of all parties. Such is the accommodation made by nations represented at a naval limitations conference, or by labor unions attending the annual meeting of the federation, or by the forty-eight states whose representatives meet in the Senate, or by members of a modern family who are working out their joint budget for the year. The different par-

ties in these relationships expect differences to arise and have worked out techniques for settling them without seriously altering the status of the groups involved.

In a democracy a major portion of all governmental machinery has just this as its purpose. The courts adjust differences between parties who under the law have equal rights, and the legislature with its committees, joint conferences, and special hearings is an arbiter of the many interests held by its citizens. The rules conferences in athletics, denominational meetings in religion, and the trade association in business serve a similar accommodative function in other phases of our social life.

Subordinate and superordinate relationships. When conflict has resulted in an unequal status between the groups, the forms of accommodation are quite different. An industrialist will refuse to arbitrate with his workers about wages and hours if he has succeeded in crushing their attempts at organization, and they must become accommodated to whatever terms he lays down or else seek other employment. The defeated nation in a war does not take part in the peace conference on an equal status with the victors. It may plead for mercy when its possessions are divided as spoils, but it has no "rights" in the matter. It must become accommodated to an inferior position and listen to the dictates of others or return to the battlefield.

Accommodation on the basis of inequality results in social stratification and segregation. A stratified society is a caste society in which groups have become accommodated to a low or a high position and in which the contacts between the levels are strictly regulated. In the army, officers form a high caste and privates are of low rank:

The hierarchy of the army is so rigid that it carries over into the social life at an army post. The captain's wife, for example, would not think of including the sergeant's in the list of invitations to a social function any more than a Brahman in India would invite a low caste to dine with him.²

A stratified society has two outstanding characteristics. The first is the development of objective conventions and rules which

² Taken from a student's description of life in an army camp.

make movement from one level to another difficult if not impossible. The second, a subjective expression of the first, is the development of typical attitudes by those occupying the different social levels. In the process of *subordination* the lower group acquires an attitude of deference to authority. They learn "to know their place" and to accept the role which has been defined for them by their superiors. In John Drinkwater's play, *Bird in Hand*,³ the innkeeper would not consent to his daughter's marrying the son of the lord who occupied the nearby estate because he did not believe in mixing the classes. He had always been a commoner and thought it was not fitting for his daughter to rise to a higher position than that to which she was born. He had become thoroughly accommodated to his subordinate status.

In a similar way, those who become accommodated to a high position through the process of *superordination* express attitudes of assertiveness and dominance. They assume that they have a "right to their position," that it is evidence of their superiority, and that it is natural for them to be served by those of lower estate. That such attitudes become firmly embedded in personality is seen in the tragic disorganization faced by some individuals in our own society who, during the depression, were suddenly catapulted to the other end of the economic scale.

Although there is no paucity of cases of persons and groups in our society who, because of wealth, race, or family position, try to "lord it over" those below them, and although there are many others who have accepted and become accommodated to a low position, yet the movement and social change which are constantly disrupting the *status quo* are relatively much greater now than has been true in many periods of history. Today those who find themselves in subject positions are more likely, if they become accommodated at all, to consider their unfavorable status only a prelude to a new conflict in which they hope to emerge with power. The prevalent unrest among political, racial, and economic groups clearly reveals the trend of the times. And yet our society is by no means a thoroughly disorganized one. If change is prevalent, so also is adjustment to change and to the social organization whereby the adjustment is stabilized.

³ John Drinkwater, *Bird in Hand*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1927.

Accommodation as a basis of social organization. The maintenance of the *status quo*, which is the function of accommodation following conflict, requires, as we have seen, social organization. The complex arrangements which developed in medieval society to hold each class in its place and to regulate their interrelationships show how attitudes, customs, and institutions become organized as a pattern of social control. The history of our institutional development as a nation is written largely in terms of this process of adjustment. The establishment of a representative system of government was our method of becoming accommodated to a newly won freedom; subsequent increase in centralized control was an adjustment to new social and economic problems which overreached state boundary lines; the development of social insurance was an adjustment to the problem of periodic unemployment; and the growth of adult education was both a response to changes in leisure time and to the increasing responsibilities of citizenship. In its broadest outreaches, accommodation includes any adjustment which a person or a group has made to a changed status, and as such, it is the basis of all social organization. Or as Burgess defines the concept:

Social organization is the sum total of accommodations to past and present situations. All the social heritages, traditions, sentiments, culture, technique, are accommodations; they are acquired adjustments that are socially and not biologically transmitted.⁴

ASSIMILATION

BEHAVIOR SEQUENCE OF AN IMMIGRANT GROUP ⁵

TROUBLE ON CAR WILL BE AIRED

Suit Growing Out of Finn's Ejection from
Street Car Will Be Heard Tonight

What is expected to result in an interesting hearing will be heard in Squire Jas. A. Watkins' court this evening when a case grow-

⁴ From Ernest W. Burgess, "Accommodation," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 1, p. 403. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

⁵ The following selections are taken from Toimi Kyllonen, *The Local Newspaper as Helping Form the Conception of an Immigrant Group in the Minds of the General Reading Public*, a Master's thesis, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., 1936.

ing out of some trouble between a conductor on a local car line and a number of foreigners will be aired. The trouble occurred Saturday night near the East Charleroi ferry when a Finn was ejected from the car for refusing to pay his fare. Several of his friends are alleged to have come to his assistance. The foreigners claimed that the man had paid his fare and that the conductor was trying to collect a second one. There is considerable feeling among the participants and an interesting hearing is sure to result. Assault and battery is the charge brought.⁶

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MONESSEN SUFFRAGE DAY PROVED A GREAT SUCCESS

Fifteen Hundred People Took Part in the Observance
and Program Was Well Carried Out

The suffragists of Monessen are very much pleased over the success of the first public suffrage demonstration. . . .

At five o'clock the Finnish people headed by their excellent band of 28 pieces, marched through the streets and on to the appointed corner, followed by a crowd of interested people. It seemed only fit and proper for the Finnish people to open this demonstration because their progressive little country has already demanded equal suffrage and wrested same from the clutches of the Russian bear and for years the women of Finland have worked shoulder to shoulder with the men to secure better conditions for their people and better opportunities and environments for their children.

When these people learned that the progressive men and women of this country were working for the same end here in Pennsylvania, with pride for the example set for this great nation by little Finland and patriotism and loyalty to their adopted country and its interests, they came with their music and their speakers to help and inspire us. This is surely the spirit that builds a great democracy.⁷

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With the passing years the amount of inter-marriage between the Finns and other nationalities in Monessen has increased. Finns themselves are conscious of this; and they realize that the Finnish-American

⁶ Monessen, Pa., *Daily Independent*, Sept. 4, 1907. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁷ *Ibid.*, May 4, 1914. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

icans will soon be lost as a group among the larger numbers of heterogeneous, mixed-Americans.⁸

When the Finns first settled in the steel town of Monessen, near Pittsburgh, they had the disillusioning experiences typical of immigrants who are surrounded by an alien culture. The street car incident is one of many cited by Kyllonen illustrating how easily conflicts arose at that time between the "foreigners" and the older inhabitants. Another story is reported of a Finnish girl who, having come to Monessen to join her "old country" lover, found that he no longer wanted her. Stranded in a strange country without friends, finances, or a knowledge of the language, she suffered the disorganization of an isolated person.⁹ Another case is cited of a Finnish home owner who came into conflict with the "law" because he thought the city officials discriminated against him and his countrymen.¹⁰

Such conflicts between groups of different culture decline as the processes of accommodation and assimilation become operative. Gradually the Finns were adjusted to their new environment, learned how its politics operated, acquired enough English to get along at the mill, and joined the community's benevolent and insurance associations.¹¹ When the second item quoted appeared in the newspaper, they were so much a part of the common life that their Louhi band was invited to lead the suffragists' parade, and symbols from their "old country" traditions became a part of the common cause of women's rights. According to the concluding quotation from the author's summary, assimilation to the new culture had gone so far that the newcomers were already losing their identity and merging in the life of the larger community.

In greatly abridged form, these illustrations show a group moving through the processes of conflict and accommodation to assimilation. In conflict the groups are suspicious of each other's motives and ready to attack at the slightest provocation. In accommodation they have learned how to become adjusted to each other through superficial relationships and at the same time main-

⁸ Kyllonen, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Reprinted by permission.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 49 f.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

tain their social distance. But in assimilation the social distance tends to disappear, and the trend toward unity becomes more complete. These basic changes are implied in the following classic definition, by Park and Burgess, of the process:

Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a cultural life.¹²

Assimilation as one outcome of social interaction. Merely bringing persons of different backgrounds together does not assure that a fusion of cultures and personalities will result. Investigations of culture contacts indicate that the outcomes often cover a wide range of possibilities. One set of conditions may lead to conflict rather than fusion between the contiguous groups. Under other circumstances, temporary accommodations may be worked out or a more permanent adjustment made on the basis of segregation. And in still another case, assimilation is the outcome. Furthermore, these processes may merge, one with another, and there may also be a reversal of the sequence as the trend toward assimilation is interrupted by new conflicts or as renewed efforts are made to preserve social distance through accommodation. And, finally, assimilation, itself, may advance through various stages. One can say that the Finns are assimilated to American culture when they are no longer discriminated against socially and economically as "foreigners," and when they participate in the varied social organizations of the community. But unless they actually think and feel "like Americans," respond to the common sentiments and traditions, remain loyal to the larger group when it is in conflict, and become the perpetuators of its customs and institutions, the process of assimilation has stopped short of its final stage.¹³

¹² Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 735, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹³ Donald R. Taft has listed the following criteria as a means of determining when assimilation has taken place: "(1) the adoption of common practice, evidencing a common culture; (2) admittance to native primary groups in relationships of increasing intimacy; (3) behavior evidencing loyalty to the new group, especially perhaps in time of crisis; (4) amalgamation; and (5) naturalization."—Donald R. Taft, *Human Migration*, pp. 251-252, copyright 1936, The Ronald Press Company, publishers.

Factors retarding assimilation. *Extreme differences in cultural background as a barrier to assimilation.* If there are no common elements in the two cultures, the groups may remain near each other physically but far apart socially; they may struggle for supremacy in intermittent conflict; or one group may suffer disorganization through its inability to make an adjustment to the conflict. This last has frequently been the result of the white man's attempt to "Westernize" primitive peoples. Edwin R. Embree recounts an experience with the Samoans in which a native chief rejects the offer of an American commission to establish modern schools in his villages because of his fear of the outcome.

"Your tools of wisdom," he said, "should be of great benefit to primitive people if they were presented and accepted simply as tools. But somehow they are not. Instead of helping us, instead of strengthening and magnifying our lives, all contact with the industrial nations simply destroys us. I don't think you mean to destroy us. I don't hold with those who say you are terrible vampire people who stalk up and down the earth determined to kill everything and everybody before you. The Americans whom I know are for the most part kindly people. Anyway you are not devils. You naturally want money and power but I don't think you love to kill and destroy. Yet you do destroy native people everywhere you go. You kill all their pride and self-respect. You leave them gibbering before your mechanical gods, not understanding the mechanics but worshipping the godhead, abandoning their own ways and ignominiously crawling toward a blind imitation of your ways."¹⁴

In this case, it seems apparent that so long as the cultures were from such different worlds and so long as the dominating group could see no value in the other's heritage, any attempt at a mixing of the two would be a one-sided process resulting in the disorganization of the borrower.

Prejudice as a barrier to assimilation. Prejudice is the attitude on which segregation depends for its success. As long as

¹⁴ Edwin R. Embree, "Samoa Offers an Exchange," *Social Forces*, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 567, 568, May, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the University of North Carolina Press, publishers.

the dominant group pre-judges those who have been set apart, neither they as a group nor their individual members can easily become assimilated to the general culture. Prejudice also impedes assimilation between constituent elements within a given society. Religious groups often allow the social distance created by prejudice to maintain their separateness when both would benefit by a united effort in community undertakings. Prejudicial attitudes based on a few unpleasant experiences may perpetuate town and country conflicts long after other factors are propitious for an integrated community. Prejudice within a community, within a family, or within any group plays into the hands of factions who prefer disunity to a fusion of interests.

We know now that prejudice, when analyzed more basically, appears not as an elemental factor in itself but as the expression of a general defense reaction of one group in its efforts to keep itself intact from the economic competition or the cultural influences of another.¹⁵ George H. Danton found this to be the explanation for much of the ill-will manifested by the Chinese toward white missionaries and tradesmen:

We may leave aside, as justifiable, a dislike for drunken and lecherous sailors, for opium smugglers, and for dishonest merchants. But there must be added all the dislike for foreigners in general, for the free mixing of the sexes, for the type of food eaten [and] a contempt for foreign clothes, which in the early nineteenth century, were not distinguished for comfort, especially not in a hot climate. In fact, in dozens of small ways, the Chinese found foreign manners barbarous and crude. They failed to see, as the foreigners on their part also failed to see, the development of the civilization behind any individual custom. . . .

Now, at the basis of all this contempt and dislike, and even hate, there was a final reason. . . . No foreign group had previously made a definite, resolute, courageous, and determined effort to break down the wall of Chinese superiority. . . . If one wished to make a somewhat mystic explanation of the matter, one might suggest that the Chinese, for the first time in their history, realized that they were face to face with elements for which their traditional formulæ had no

¹⁵ Cf. chapter 13.

solution, and that their self-protective instinct was immediately and intuitively aroused.¹⁶

When other cases are analyzed, such as the prejudice of many in our country toward the Japanese, the attitudes of white groups toward the Negro, the discrimination shown certain European immigrants, and the hostile attitudes held in some countries toward the Jews, we generally find that prejudicial attitudes are the immediate reason for retarding assimilation, but that back of these attitudes are other factors including fear of losing a superior social status, dread of economic competition, or some form of a collective phobia.

Physical differences as a barrier to assimilation. People do not instinctively withdraw from those of a different physical appearance, but they do employ this label as a means of making their discrimination effective. It is easy to eliminate a set of people from competition or place them apart as culturally undesirable if every member of the group can be identified, no matter where he is, by the color of his skin or some other physical feature.¹⁷ After a time the habit of discriminating against all who bear these marks becomes so ingrained in the folkways of a people that the physical traits, themselves, constitute a barrier after the original reason for segregation has disappeared. This is Park's explanation of the social distance which still holds the Negro at arm's length from white society.

In a vast, varied cosmopolitan society such as exists in America, the chief obstacle to assimilation seems to be not cultural differences but physical traits. . . . The Negro, during his three hundred years in this country, has not been assimilated. This is not because he has preserved in America a foreign culture and an alien tradition, for with the exceptions of the Indian and the Appalachian mountaineer no man in America is so entirely native to the soil. . . . To say that the Negro is not assimilated means no more than to say that he is

¹⁶ Reprinted from George H. Danton, *The Culture Contacts of the United States and China*, pp. 5-7, by permission of the Columbia University Press, publishers.

¹⁷ Cf. the more complete analysis of the physical basis of prejudice as applied to race relations in chapter 13.

still regarded as in some sense a stranger, a representative of an alien race.¹⁸

When physical barriers prevent assimilation, members of the different groups may live together in a sort of *symbiotic relationship*. That is to say, they exist side by side, even become accommodated to each other in superficial ways, but remain discrete entities, never really members of a common life. Park uses as illustrations of this the Chinese colonies located within our cities, as well as the foreign settlements which have affixed themselves to many of the cities of China:

An alien may, as in the case of the Chinese in America or the European in China, accommodate himself to the conditions of life in a foreign country without learning the native language and without adopting, except to a very slight degree, the native customs. In that case the relation of the alien to the native may be described as symbiotic rather than social.¹⁹

Donald R. Taft further characterizes such a situation in terms of the prevailing type of contact. In a symbiotic relationship the

. . . contacts between the native and segregated groups are secondary rather than primary. That is, the immigrants under these conditions are not admitted to families, schools, churches, recreational groups, or other forms of face-to-face relationships. Under such conditions the segregated immigrant group may retain much of its culture for some time even though it is quite without prestige. This is true if the foreign group maintains constant contact with the homeland, and if it takes pride in its own culture which it looks upon as superior in spite of the attitude of natives.²⁰

Factors conducive to assimilation. Logically the absence of the hindrances to assimilation should create a situation in which the process would function. Further insight may be had, however,

¹⁸ From Robert E. Park, "Assimilation, Social," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 2, p. 282. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 281. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁰ Taft, *op. cit.*, p. 246, copyright 1936, The Ronald Press Company, publishers.

if we go beyond this negative description to state in positive terms the conditions which hasten cultural fusion.

Attitude of the groups toward innovation. E. T. Hiller has developed the point that "attitudes toward alien usages are themselves a culture trait and therefore vary from one group to another, quite apart from any practical obstacles in the way of harmonizing two divergent systems."²¹ He illustrates this principle by reminding us that:

The Romans, during the later part of their history, prided themselves upon their readiness to take on the ways of other people, and the Japanese likewise have lately been inclined to concede the advantages of foreign methods and to adopt them both at home and abroad. On the other hand, until recent years the Chinese, Hindus, and Gypsies showed the opposite attitude.²²

The attitude of hospitality toward innovation is no doubt the result of many forces, a list of which might include: the tradition of change itself, in some societies; a liberal emphasis in education; and freedom from tabus against change. In very recent times an interest in all types of people and culture patterns has also been stimulated by the growth of the social sciences, and, indeed, of all science.

Self-gain as a motive in assimilation. Going from the general to the particular, we next observe a very immediate and expedient reason for an attitude on the part of some groups favoring culture borrowing and assimilation. For example, the interests of self-advancement and security are important forces impelling many immigrants to become assimilated to their new world culture. They learn the language, change their names, acquire a new social etiquette, and perfect themselves in vocational skills in order to compete with the other groups on an equal footing. If they do not fully attain these goals during the first or second generation, they instill the ambition in their children and grandchildren. Cases of extreme sacrifice on the part of immigrant parents so that their children may receive an education and achieve success in their new environment are not uncommon.

²¹ E. T. Hiller, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 361, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²² *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

In turn, the dominant culture group may find an economic advantage in acquiring some of the immigrant culture traits. Although at first the "foreigner" may have been desired only as a labor supply, more recently certain of his customs have been popularized and commercialized. This applies to such items as food customs, national costumes, special skills, and art forms. This motive explains the white man's assimilation of traits from Negro culture. The Negroes' spirituals, jazz music, and folklore have become a part of the general culture through the medium of the radio, the stage, the movies, the night club, and other commercial interests. It is to be granted that assimilation prompted only by such a motive is too impersonal and fragmentary to reach the higher levels of interpenetration of personalities and fusion of sentiments, but it is one factor which, when in conjunction with others, may be important.

Collective representations and assimilation. If the final stages of assimilation cannot be reached until conflicts have been replaced by common interests and until impersonal accommodations have been superseded by unity in sentiment, then it is true that we must look for influences more subtle than economic motives. In our earlier study of the crowd and also in the chapter dealing with social groups in general, we found that unity comes only through interaction directed toward a common objective. Furthermore, we discovered that people with different cultural backgrounds could best be unified through the dramatic symbolization of whatever interests they held in common. Such symbols or "collective representations" have the selective effect of minimizing differences while they magnify similarities. This was the technique employed by the editor of the Monessen *Daily Independent* when he published the account of the suffragists' rally. His readers were unwittingly encouraged to forget past animosities toward the Finns while they shared in his eulogy of their cultural tradition which for years had supported the cause that was now of general community interest. The effectiveness of such a technique in hastening assimilation is, in general, dependent upon two conditions.

Unifying symbols can most easily be found for groups whose cultural heritage is not too dissimilar at the outset. The various British dominions respond to the "collective representations" of the Empire because so many of their inhabitants have been reared in a common tradition. Likewise, we have little difficulty in making

common cause with Canadians (in spite of political boundaries), so numerous are the cultural bonds which draw us together.

In the second place, unifying symbols are most effective in time of conflict when a common foe calls for a united front. The conflict may be a war, a revolution, a social movement, or any situation in which a consciousness of group welfare is heightened. After the struggle has subsided, minority differences may again loom important, but they usually do not entirely obliterate the spirit of brotherhood which was engendered.

Conscious control in assimilation. Not only is assimilation furthered by such natural processes as those which we have been describing, but also under some circumstances assimilation, itself, consciously sought, becomes a social value. These circumstances are usually of two types.

If those in authority conclude that internal unity is essential to an orderly society, they may plot ways and means of bringing this condition about. In their "Americanization" campaigns they often mistake outward uniformity of behavior for a genuine unity of interest, and in so doing limit their efforts to such formal goals as teaching all groups to speak one language, discouraging the use of Old World customs of dress and social manners, and requiring formal oaths of allegiance to their new land. These methods were typical of our early efforts to make sure that all who entered the "American melting pot" would come out images of the same mold. They seemed also to be implied in the early determination of Italians to Romanize the Ethiopians after Mussolini had declared his "Roman Peace" in the conquered land. A series of postal cards which circulated widely in Italy at the time pictured an Italian child making a gesture of friendship to an Ethiopian child, then scrubbing him clean, instructing him in Italian, giving him a uniform and watching him make the Fascist salute, teaching him to work with modern tools, and finally, showing him how to play as Italians do.²³

Another type of conscious effort toward assimilation is not based so much on the desire for uniformity as it is on the desire of groups to be stimulated and enriched by each other's cultural differences. It is a dynamic, creative type of unity, based on the utilization rather than the suppression of differences in heritage.

²³ *Time*, vol. 28, pp. 26, 27, July 20, 1936.

Horace M. Kallen has given the following characterization of this process of conscious assimilation as it applies to national cultures in America:

Its form is that of the Federal republic; its substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common language of the commonwealth, the language of its great political tradition, is English, but each nationality expresses its emotional and voluntary life in its own language, in its own inevitable æsthetic and intellectual forms. The common life of the commonwealth is politico-economic, and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each *natio* that composes it. Thus "American civilization" may come to mean the perfection of the coöperative harmonies of "European civilization," the waste, the squalor, and the distress of Europe being eliminated—a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind. As in an orchestra, every type of instrument has its specific timbre and tonality, founded in its substance and form; as every type has its appropriate theme and melody in the whole symphony, so in society each ethnic group is the natural instrument, its spirit and culture are its theme and melody, and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all make the symphony of civilization, with this difference: a musical symphony is written before it is played; in the symphony of civilization the playing is the writing, so that there is nothing so fixed and inevitable about its progressions as in music, so that within the limits set by nature they may vary at will, and the range and variety of the harmonies may become wider and richer and more beautiful.

But the question is, Do the dominant classes in America want such a society?²⁴

This ideal of cultural assimilation has been implicit in the settlement house movement which had its founding in this country with Jane Addams at Hull House. When she and her colleagues decided to live as neighbors to the recent immigrants in one of Chicago's most congested areas, they became exponents of this new

²⁴ Horace M. Kallen, "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot—A Study of American Nationality," *The Nation*, vol. 100, p. 220, Feb. 25, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

type of "Americanization." They learned much in music, art, and ways of living from their new neighbors and in turn shared with them the elements of their own culture. The ideal of a creative type of inter-group relationship has also been supported by a number of leaders in the general field of adult education, by exponents of the discussion and the forum methods of social analysis, by the proponents of folk study, and by leaders in the modern missionary movement. It also appears to be the policy of the Russian government in its attitude toward the assimilation of diverse cultural groups within its boundaries.

Summary. In this chapter, accommodation and assimilation have been presented as the two organizing and unifying processes in social interaction which are often related to and follow competition and conflict. We learned that competition, which is really the sub-social process of the four, constantly affects the distribution of people geographically and vocationally, and in so doing provides the setting for all social contacts. Conflict is the personalized form of interaction which separates and redefines the relative status of diverse groups while at the same time it cements into closer unity the members within a group. Accommodation is the process underlying social organization which enables those once in conflict to cooperate in common enterprises. Assimilation proceeds further toward social unity by bringing personalities and culture into such intimate association that an interpenetration or mutual influencing results. Although these processes frequently appear in the above sequence, one form may revert to another, creating different sequences and combinations. In fact, all processes may be operating at once in a complex society. In our study we have also analyzed other related processes, including cooperation, segregation, stratification, subordination, and superordination.

The social results of these processes of interaction were earlier observed in the survey of groups and in the analysis of community and social organization. Now that we have become more conscious of the forms of interaction, themselves, we may watch their operation once again, this time in the complicated patterns of social change. Long time trends, the type which those who discuss social evolution have in mind, will be considered first. Their analysis will then be followed by a study of the nearer-at-hand changes which often give a society the appearance of disorganization.

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PART VI
SOCIAL CHANGE

Chapter 25

SOCIAL CHANGE IN LONG-TIME PERSPECTIVE

A THEORY OF EVOLUTION—IN MULTISYLLABLES

EVOLUTION is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.¹

The many facts contemplated unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show *integration*, both by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and recalescence of masses. The change from *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity* is multitudinously exemplified; up from the simple tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of structural and functional unlikenesses. With progressing integration and heterogeneity goes increasing *coherence*. We see the wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds; the tribe with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a political plexus under a chief with subchiefs; and so on up to the civilized nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more. Simultaneously comes increasing *definiteness*. Social organization is at first vague; advance brings settled arrangements which grow slowly more precise; customs pass into laws which, while gaining fixity, also become more specific in their applications to varieties of actions; and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, slowly separate, at the same time that each within itself marks off more distinctly its component structures. Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution.

¹ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 367, D. Appleton and Company, sixth edition, New York, 1924. Reprinted by permission of D. Appleton-Century Company, publishers.

There is progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness.²

THE EVOLUTIONARY POINT OF VIEW TOWARD SOCIAL CHANGE

These almost absurdly formidable quotations taken from the works of the great English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, epitomize one of the most famous of the many attempts that have been made to bring the life of human societies under cosmic law. What Darwin did for biology with his theory of organic evolution Spencer, Comte,³ Tarde,⁴ Lester F. Ward,⁵ Giddings,⁶ and numerous others have tried to do for sociology. Each sought for and each thought he had found general principles or laws which would explain the social changes that have taken place during man's long past and predict those that were to come.

Most of the really well worked out theories of social evolution were products of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Today the sociologists are inclined to look on these time-binding generalizations as curiosities representing an early and optimistic stage of a new science. The theories are so broad and sweeping, the "principles" and "laws" stated in such general terms, that they are of little value for detailed explanation or prediction. Furthermore, the great cultural variability revealed by modern anthropological studies has enabled the sociologist to find concrete exceptions in some human society some place on the earth's surface to nearly every evolutionary theory advanced.⁷

The sociologist now knows that when adequate social evolution principles do come they will be of much more limited scope than

² Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. 1, pp. 596-597, D. Appleton and Company, third edition, New York, 1923. Reprinted by permission of D. Appleton-Century Company, publishers.

³ Auguste Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, tr. by Harriet Martineau, Trübner and Company, London, 1875-90.

⁴ Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, tr. by Elsie Clews Parsons, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1903.

⁵ Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883.

⁶ Franklin H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1896.

⁷ For instance, it is easy to show that some primitive tribes were less coherent, to use Spencer's phrase, than are modern civilizations, but others were much more so. Many primitive groups had a family institution not less definite, as Spencer would have it, but more so, than our own.

the Spencerian doctrine quoted, or else they will be infinitely more complex and involve many more terms. At present the data are not available upon which to base more than the most platitudinous of long-time generalizations. Sociologists, therefore, have largely abandoned the term "social evolution" and are employing the more non-committal term "social change." They are also concentrating more on the study of short-time and relatively local changes instead of long-time and universal ones. This represents a strategic retreat perhaps, and there is always the hope that the whole history of society "can be brought under law" sometime in the future.

Unfortunately, while the social scientists have come to eschew social evolution theories which span epochs, the same may not be said of other writers and thinkers or of the general lay public. People are always talking about "the lessons which history teaches" and drawing very rough analogies between some carefully selected portion of the historical past and the immediate present. They are constantly giving what the sociologist regards as a naive adherence to some fascinating but unsound theory of culture cycles or to evolutionary doctrines of the class struggle, the inevitable dominance of some racial type, the ultimately emergent form of some social institution, or the growth of some particular technology. Undoubtedly a case can be made for some of these theories, but the social scientist knows that there must be selection of certain portions of history to do so, and either an ignorant or a deliberate neglect of certain socio-evolutionary factors. The whole picture of man's past is too complex and too little known for any such easy unraveling. The factors which determine the destinies of classes, races, nations, and social institutions are too manifold to be dealt with in any simple formula.

It is because of the constantly recurring interest in the topic, even though conclusive results may not be hoped for from present data, that it is worth while to devote two chapters to long-time social change and its analysis. If we can acquire something of the sociologist's sophistication with respect to social evolution theories through a more concrete realization of the complexity of historical processes, this alone should justify the time spent. There is the added advantage of acquiring a framework for thinking about the problems of past and future change in human culture that will be useful when we later turn to short-time analysis.

TABLE X

FACTORS WHICH MAY PRODUCE CHANGE IN THE CULTURAL PATTERN OF A GIVEN AREA

General Class	Sub-Class	A change in any of the factors listed in this column will lead to a corresponding adaptive change in culture
INORGANIC or Geographic		Rainfall (annual total and seasonal distribution)
	Climate	Temperature (daily and seasonal range and variation)
		Relative humidity (daily and seasonal)
		Prevailing winds
	Electromagnetics of the atmosphere	Electromagnetics of the atmosphere
		Sunshine
	Topography	Mineral resources, Soil composition, Water power sources, Surface (contours, bodies of water)
		Density of population of animals and plants regarded as food sources, as enemies, or as materials for use in production
ORGANIC or Biological	Sub-human flora and fauna	Character of plants and animals in the area
		Density of human population within the area
	Human population	Relative density of population in surrounding areas
		Human original nature
SUPERORGANIC or Cultural		Eugenic quality of the population (as affected by [1] dysgenic or eugenic breeding or [2] by hybridization with peoples outside the area)
		Attitudes toward invention
		Opportunities for borrowing through culture contacts outside the area

The factors of social change. For the sociologist, social change is a product of the interaction of many factors, but these factors may be grouped conveniently in certain broad general classes. When investigating the cause of any socio-historical phenomenon, such for instance as the rise of the Inca culture or the loss of functions in the modern family, the sociologist uses these classes as tools for analysis. Table X gives a skeleton outline of the major social change factors. They fall into three general classes, the *inorganic* or geographical, the *organic* or biological, and what Spencer was the first to call the *superorganic* but which we know better perhaps under the name of the cultural. Under each of these three main heads come various sub-heads which in turn might have been further subdivided *ad infinitum*. The important thing to remember in connection with these groups of factors is that they not only act in combination to produce social change but that in doing so they act and react on one another.⁸ From the relatively long-time perspective in which we are viewing them they are both modifying and modifiable factors in relation to human social life.

Let us assume that we are on some sort of sociological Olympus looking down on a particular culture area to which for convenience we will give the name Sociopia. Within Sociopia there are certain institutions enmeshed in a network of folkways and mores, the whole constituting a sort of pattern. At first glance this pattern seems relatively stable, relationships more or less fixed and unalterable, but if we look long enough we discover that changes are taking place. The minor and fluctuating changes are too small to be within our range of vision, so that what we see are slow and basic changes in social institutions. Each change affects not only the institution in which it centers but causes readjustments in the whole related cultural structure. We are now to analyze some of the factors which bring this *cultural change* about.⁹

⁸ Cf. L. L. Bernard, "The Interdependence of Factors Basic to the Evolution of Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 177-205, Sept., 1926.

⁹ "Social change" and "cultural change" will be used synonymously in this chapter. For an attempt to make a distinction between the two terms see Paul H. Landis, "Social Change and Social Interaction as Factors in Cultural Change," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 41, pp. 52-58, July, 1935.

THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IN SOCIAL CHANGE

The geographic factor comprises all those inorganic (non-living) phenomena which exert an influence on human life. Theoretically such a definition would include even the physical state of other planets in our solar system, since the world in which man lives is linked to other worlds in a system of cosmic equilibrium. Practically, however, the geographic factor may be limited to the climate of the earth and to those factors in the outer crust of the earth's surface which condition man's livelihood. The climatic influences include temperature (daily and seasonal range and variation), sunshine, rainfall (annual total and seasonal distribution), relative humidity, prevailing winds and the possibility of tornadoes and cyclones, and the electromagnetics of the atmosphere (lightning hazards, conditions for radio reception, compass deviation, etc.). The topographical factors include the chemical composition of the soil (for agriculture), the existence of such mineral resources as coal, iron ore, and petroleum, the possibility of developing water power on streams and rivers, and the general contour of the country as it affects transportation possibilities. Not all these factors are significant at all stages of cultural development, but taken together they make up the human habitat. A given group of people living in an area like Sociopia become ecologically adapted to the local geographic conditions. While these conditions rarely change in any cataclysmic manner so as to destroy completely the culture of the inhabitants, neither do they remain perpetually the same. In addition to man-made changes in the geographical environment, there are slow changes in climate and topography that are not under man's control. In time these changes directly and indirectly force cultural adaptation. Let us consider four ways in which changes in geographic factors may lead to readjustment in the Sociopian culture pattern.

Modification of physical type through geographic influences. A change in the geographic environment may lead to the development of a different physical type of human being who is physiologically adapted to the new conditions. This new hereditary type will create a different culture. While this sequence of events may well take place the process will be a very slow one.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a criticism of the anthropogeographers who attribute more rapid and more important modification in social type to geographic influences see Pitirim

Generations of selective influence will be required to weed out the strains unadapted to the new conditions and leave as survivors only those that are, and by that time there will have been new geographic changes which require still further adaptation. The process is a continuous one, but only over very long time periods is it perceptible to an observer.

As an illustration of the way the selective influences of changing geographic environment operate, it has been suggested that the supplanting of Neandertal man by the Cromagnon in Europe was at least to some extent due to a changing climate. If so, then the late Paleolithic culture was in part an adaptation to geographic factors through the medium of a change in physical type. As another example pointing to the slowness of this form of adaptation, we may note the inability of the white race to establish itself in tropical lands, except through hybridization with the natives.¹¹ Given ten thousand years it might be possible to develop a pure blood and tropically adapted white type, but this feat cannot be accomplished in a few generations.

Geographic influences on physiological functioning. Geographic factors affect the way a given physical type of human being behaves by influencing physiological functioning. We all know that the same man will behave quite differently on warm, muggy days than on cool ones. Following out this line of thought, we might suppose that if the climate changed in Sociopia there would be more or less immediate and corresponding changes in the physical and mental energy and in the emotional stability of the Sociopians. This would not be a change in the hereditary characteristics of the inhabitants but a modification in the functioning of the organic structure already existing. An "improvement" in the climate would lead to the display of more energy and creativeness and to the development of a more complex culture.

One can set up the same line of reasoning to support the view that geographic changes affect the food supply, leading to new dietary habits, and that the new diet forces physiological adjust-

Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 129-137, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928.

¹¹ Cf. Ellsworth Huntington, "Acclimatization," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 1, pp. 401-402; Robert De C. Ward, "Acclimatization of the White Race in the Tropics," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 201, pp. 617-627.

ments which in turn modify temperament and behavior. The chain of reasoning in both cases seems plausible, but it has proved extremely difficult to demonstrate its correctness in detail. Long-time changes in climate are hard to measure, and the theory of the existence of periodic cycles of change in temperature, rainfall, humidity, etc., has still a somewhat uncertain status.¹² Furthermore the effects of climate or diet on behavior are so overlaid by more important cultural influences that meaningful correlations are difficult to establish. A good deal of research has been done on the short-time effect of weather on human conduct but the results are still mostly inconclusive.¹³ It is safe to assume that a relationship exists but not safe to describe it in detail or estimate its importance.

Geographic influence on human migration. The geographic factor may influence human migration. As geographic changes take place Sociopia will be able, with no changes in technology, to support either more or less people than it did before. If conditions grow worse there will be a tendency for human emigration from the area to lands where more favorable conditions obtain; if conditions grow better there is likely to be an influx of immigrants coming into Sociopia from outside. The geographic change upsets the population equilibrium, and readjustment takes the form of migration.

Ellsworth Huntington has written a book, *The Pulse of Asia*,¹⁴ to show how successive cycles of desiccation on the grasslands of central Asia have led to waves of migration of nomad peoples into Europe. Then, too, what is now the Sahara desert apparently once supported a human civilization; depopulation there doubtless took centuries, and may, over that long span, be attributable to geographic changes. Other illustrations of this sort can be

¹² Cf. Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, pp. 220-250, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1915; Ellsworth Huntington and Stephen S. Visher, *Climatic Changes*, pp. 16-32, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1932; C. E. P. Brooks, *Climate Through the Ages*, pp. 400-418, R. V. Coleman, New York, 1926; Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-193.

¹³ Cf. Ellsworth Huntington, *World Power and Evolution*, pp. 26-86, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1919; Ellsworth Huntington, "Weather and Health," *Bulletin of the National Research Council*, no. 75, Washington, 1930; Edwin G. Dexter, "The Influence of the Weather on Human Conduct," *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 23, pp. 322-330, Oct., 1926; Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-175.

¹⁴ Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1907.

adduced, but in general the same difficulty arises here as in the preceding paragraph: the climatic factor is only one of many that operate to produce migrations, and frequently it is much less important than such cultural factors as the development of new means of transportation, the ideal of military conquest, or some form of official persecution.

When migration does take place, from whatever cause, the route taken by the migrants will be chosen with a view to avoiding geographical barriers. This will be especially true during the early stages of cultural development.

Direct influence of geographic change on culture. If Sociopia were faced with slow desiccation, the inhabitants could migrate; but they need not do so if they could develop some cultural form of adjustment, such as new food plants that could be grown in arid soil or some method of irrigation. The changing geographic environment does not, however, force any specific cultural trait on the Sociopians. All it does is to set certain conditions which must be met for human survival, but human ingenuity can meet them in a thousand different ways. The climate and topography of northern Arizona and New Mexico are the same for the Hopi, the Navajo, and the white man, and yet each group has developed his own economy. One has only to contrast the sedentary agricultural culture of the pueblo-dwelling Hopi with the culture of the nomadic sheep-herding Navajo and the stock-raising, copper-mining, tourist-exploiting Arizonian to see what different dramas can be played with the same geographic stage-setting. Man is and must remain a child of nature, but he can be "brought up" by his mother in many different ways.

✓ **The importance of the role of the geographic factor.** We have now discussed four ways in which the geographic factor influences the cultural pattern, but we have not really attempted to evaluate the importance of that influence. There is a doctrine called *geographic determinism* which makes climatic and topographic factors primary or "determining" with respect to human behavior and cultural development. Such a view would attribute the backwardness of the Eskimo almost wholly to the inhospitable climate and would find some factor of climate, of location, or of soil fertility to "explain" the development of each of the great civilizations of the world. One writer has even gone so far as to attribute:

... a highly wrought imagination and gross superstition to all people, like those of India, living in the presence of great mountains and vast plains, knowing nature only in its overpowering aspects, which excite the fancy and paralyze reason.¹⁵

Whether the Swiss and the Coloradans would subscribe to such a theory is doubtful; in fact, the whole attempt to explain culture as determined by geography is now recognized to be an exaggeration. Wallis dismisses the geographic determinist's position thus amusingly:

To attribute social advance to geographical environment is to place ourselves by the side of the old lady who marvelled at the providential way in which big rivers were made to run past big towns.¹⁶

If geography does not determine cultural development at least it often quite profoundly *conditions* it. This latter is especially true in the fields of human activity concerned with the satisfaction of man's most basic needs. According to Jean Brunhes, French human geographer, there are six series of social phenomena where geographic agencies are especially limiting on human creativity.¹⁷ These six series are: human habitations (where and how men shelter themselves), the direction and character of transportation routes, exploitation of minerals, cultivation of plants, breeding of animals, and "devastation of plant and animal life" (hunting, fishing, trapping, "seizing" wild fruit and eating it, etc.). Beyond these "six essential facts" affected by geography (and biology) there are the social institutions and literature, science, law, and religion in which geographic influences are much less likely to be effective. That they do enter even here, however, to color human thought and behavior is illustrated by a study of the conceptions of Heaven and Hell that have been developed by different peoples. As Ellen Semple notes:

¹⁵ Henry Thomas Buckle, paraphrased by Ellen C. Semple, *Influence of Geographic Environment*, p. 18, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1911. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁶ Wilson D. Wallis, "Geographic Environment and Culture," *Social Forces*, vol. 4, p. 705, June, 1926. Reprinted by permission of Williams and Wilkins Company, publishers.

¹⁷ Jean Brunhes, *Human Geography*, trans. by T. C. Le Compte, pp. 48-52, Rand, McNally and Company, Chicago, 1920.

The cosmography of every primitive people, their first crude effort in the science of the universe, bears the impress of their habitat. The Eskimo's hell is a place of darkness, storm and intense cold; the Jew's is a place of eternal fire. Buddha, born in the steaming Himalayan piedmont, fighting the lassitude induced by heat and humidity, pictured his heaven as Nirvana, the cessation of all activity and individual life.¹⁸

One final fact concerning the role of the geographic environment needs to be noted, obvious though it must appear to those who live in the age of science. As man's culture has developed from its primitive beginnings he has been able to get along in an increasingly wide range of geographical conditions. Not only has he been able more and more to defend himself against the rigors of the environment and to live secure in it, but he has also acquired an increasing power to alter it to suit his needs. Modern man can produce or prevent erosion; he can himself change the course of rivers; through irrigation he can make the desert blossom as a rose. It is therefore safe to say that whatever the influence of geography on the Sociopian culture pattern may have been in the past, it is much less in the present and will be still less in the future. But it will never cease to be important. Man cannot yet change the climate (unless he can persuade the gods through magic or prayer to do so), and while he can find substitutes for many of the resources found in the earth's surface he cannot dispense with all of them or remain unconcerned about their depletion. The geographic factor will continue to remain a basic element in all his calculations for generations to come.

THE BIOLOGICAL FACTOR IN SOCIAL CHANGE

The biological factors which affect the life of Sociopia are (1) the plants and animals in the area and (2) the Sociopians (who are, after all, organic entities) themselves. The non-human fauna and all the flora constitute what may be called the biological environment. The human fauna, that is to say the Sociopians, constitute each a part of the biological environment of the other, but since they behave differently from animals (or think they do!) they had best be treated as a factor by themselves.

¹⁸ Semple, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

The biological environment affects the human cultural pattern in much the same way as does the geographic environment just discussed. Man utilizes the available plant and animal life in ways determined by his culture, and he wards off enemies (bacteria, poisonous plants, insect pests, dangerous animals) with the best means he has been able to invent. Furthermore, the biological environment is constantly changing as one animal species gains ground at the expense of some other, while the struggle for existence goes on. Changes in geographic conditions profoundly affect this struggle. A colder climate, a change in soil composition (as after a lava flow), the drying up of lakes or streams, all spell the doom of some organisms and mean new opportunity for others. These changes in turn affect the status of man and alter the nature of his struggle for existence. But as he learns to domesticate other organic species (after first domesticating himself) he produces a sort of controlled stability in some parts of the biological environment which most affect him. There are, however, always enough uncontrolled elements left in the biological environment of modern man (disease-producing bacteria, for instance) to present constant new problems of adjustment.

Human population density and social change. The density of population among the buffalo of the western plains was undoubtedly a factor of vital importance in the life of the Plains Indian. Of equal and perhaps even of greater importance was the density of Indian population which subsisted to such a large degree on the buffalo. Too many Indians would mean too few buffaloes and a scanty food supply. If the food supply were not then increased from other sources, there would soon be fewer Indians. This relationship between human population density, environment, and culture is a fundamental one in relation to social change, and we must subject it to further analysis.

Nature has endowed all organic species with great excess fecundity and, given an indefinitely expansible food supply and an absence of enemies, any plant or animal is capable of increasing in numbers with great rapidity until it densely populates the whole earth. Because the food supply never is unlimited and because enemies always are present, the actual population is held down to a more or less constant figure which represents adaptation to existing life conditions. Usually there remains a great annual surplus

of births above that necessary to keep the population constant, but this is counteracted by a high infant mortality and a generally high post-infancy death rate.

Man "in a state of nature"—that is to say, without culture—would find himself no exception to the general rule outlined. Our early ancestors, a few struggling savages fighting for existence, certainly possessed all the procreative power necessary to produce the huge population of today. The actual birth rate of Neandertal man was undoubtedly high enough to turn the trick, for Neandertal women probably had babies about as fast as the gestation cycle permitted. But the average life span was much shorter than it is now; the Neandertaler's food supply was too precarious and his enemies too numerous and powerful to give his potential powers of increase much sway. As man developed culture, however, he enlarged the food supply and decreased the external hazards of existence; people lived longer and had more time to bear more children, who in turn had a better chance of survival. The population increased, slowly at first, and then by leaps and bounds during the period since the Industrial Revolution.¹⁹ It was chiefly the decline in the death rate that brought about this change; the birth rate remained high until about fifty years ago.

Along with this population increase has come urbanism and all the new patterns of living that the urban way of life brings about. But it is incorrect to assume that population increase is the cause and urbanism the result. The biological factor of fecundity does not of itself produce large populations; it only makes them possible. It takes human inventiveness working in a favorable geographic environment with a fecund organism to bring population increase as a result. Even then such cultural phenomena as war, celibacy, suicide, and infanticide, or such geographic factors as drouth, floods, and earthquakes, may for a time hold population in check. Today population increase is practically disappearing in the Western world in spite of increasing food supply and improving means of combating disease. The new factor which is so greatly modifying the old relationship between conditions of life and population

¹⁹ According to Willcox's estimate the population of the earth in 1650 was about 465 millions; in 1929 it was 1,820 millions. Cf. Walter F. Willcox, ed., *International Migrations*, vol. 2, p. 78, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1931.

density is birth control (contraception and abortion).²⁰ Thus the birth rate, no longer a direct function of the biological sex urge but now determined also by "prudential" factors, becomes even more than the death rate subject to human control.

Population quality and social change. Not only the gross number of biological units in the population of Sociopia but also the quality of those units must be considered as a factor in social change. People are endowed with certain hereditary characteristics which, as we have seen, are limiting factors in personality development and in the achievements the individual will be able to make. While the cultural factors playing upon the individual are perhaps more important factors than heredity in determining his adult behavior, still we cannot escape the fact that original nature does play an important role.

It will perhaps help in explaining the part which biological quality plays in social change if we resort to an analogy. Let us assume that each hereditary factor which an individual carries with him is represented by an ordinary playing card. Every person then will be the possessor of a "hand" of these cards dealt to him as his inheritance and differing from the hand held by any other. Suppose now that we make one huge pack of cards out of all the hands held by all the people who reside in Sociopia; this pack will represent the stock of hereditary potentialities and disabilities that the Sociopian population has collectively available. From the pack, hands for new individuals in succeeding generations are dealt repeatedly, and hence the new additions to the population manifest the hereditary characters (although in different combinations) that are already in the germ plasm of the parent group.

The question that concerns us is whether the group biological inheritance changes enough to bring about changes in culture. In terms of the allegory, the issue is whether the large pack of cards belonging to the whole culture area population can have cards subtracted from it or added to it, or whether it always remains the same. If the contents of the pack can be modified,

²⁰ Of course, both abortion and contraception are techniques that have a long history; various methods of preventing conception or of abortion were known to primitives. But it is generally agreed that the widespread use of these arts dates from the middle of the last century. It is even now largely confined to the western European nations and their colonies and to America. Cf. Norman Himes, *The Medical History of Contraception*, Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1936.

how is the process accomplished, how important are the changes which result, and how rapidly do they take place?

There appear to be two methods whereby new cards can be added to the pack. One is by cross-breeding with persons outside Sociopia who bring new cards with them. The other is through the somewhat mysterious process which the biologists call mutation.²¹ A mutation is simply a name for the sudden appearance of a new hereditary factor and is analogous to slipping a new card from up the sleeve into the pack while dealing. How often this sleight-of-hand occurs in the human species is still much in dispute. There is no clear-cut evidence of mutation for an improvement in *homo sapiens* in the last ten thousand years, and yet there doubtless have been mutations too small to be noticed or too radical to survive.²² In general, however, mutation does not appear to be a large factor in cultural change. New cultural achievements are not the result of the sudden appearance of new hereditary potentialities but are due to the better use of capacities already present in the racial strain.

But while the hereditary quality of a group changes only very slowly by addition, the same may not be said of subtraction. Loss of hereditary factors, both good and bad, takes place whenever the possessors thereof fail to have offspring. If the birth rate of any particular group possessing special hereditary characteristics is less than the average for the rest of the population, then in time the special traits will be lost; the general pack of cards will no longer include them and will contain more cards from the high birth rate group to take their place. Some selective influences of this sort are always at work in any population, animal or human, but in the absence of culture they are likely on the whole to be beneficial for the survival of the race rather than otherwise. Man, through

²¹ A third possibility, the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters, cannot altogether be ruled out, although the large majority of the biologists would deny that there is any present evidence to support this type of variation. According to Hooton, "The situation is that no orthodox and self-respecting biologist can, in the face of the evidence, admit the transmission of acquired characters as a factor in evolution, and no kind of a biologist can give a satisfactory explanation of evolutionary phenomena without such an admission." —Ernest A. Hooton, "Doubts and Suspicions Concerning Certain Functional Theories of Primate Evolution," *Human Biology*, vol. 2, p. 224, May, 1930.

²² Cf. H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, pp. 324-325, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1930; Edward M. East, *Heredity and Human Affairs*, pp. 119-120, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1927.

his culture, has introduced new selective influences, however, that many biologists are shaking their heads about. They fear a reversal of "beneficial natural selection" with consequent race deterioration. Many of them are preaching the need for more social control over the birth rates of different classes to the end that the good, *eugenic* traits in the germ plasm be conserved and the undesirable, *dysgenic* traits eliminated.

Lorimer and Osborn²³ have made what is undoubtedly the most careful study of population trends in the United States. They state:

Present reproduction tendencies seem to be having especially serious effects at both extremes of the scale of intellectual development, tending disproportionately to reduce the number of individuals with unusual ability to be expected from any given number of births, and significantly to increase the proportion of individuals of low-grade intelligence.²⁴

If what these two suggest is true, then there would appear to be much point to the eugenicists' position. But the matters raised by the eugenic biologists are among the most controversial in the whole field of social science,²⁵ and the eugenic program, except for the segregation or sterilization of the clearly defective elements in the population, is far from commanding unanimous scientific support.

Because of the current debate over the effects of differentials in the birth rate of various social classes, it is hard to maintain the long-time perspective that was to be the point of view of this chapter. It will help to regain the Olympian outlook if we stop to recall that the Sociopian pack of hereditary characters is very large and that an almost infinite variety of hands can be dealt from

²³ Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 346. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁵ For discussions of the pros and cons of eugenics see Samuel J. Holmes, *The Eugenic Predicament*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1933; James W. Woodard, "The Biological Variate and Culture," *Social Forces*, vol. 9, pp. 10-20, Oct., 1930; Raymond Pearl, *The Present Status of Eugenics*, The Sociological Press, Hanover, N. H., 1930; Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, pp. 362-387, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, second edition, 1935.

it. If it is true that some of the good cards in the deck are being abstracted, there are many others there that may still be dealt to individuals. And quite possibly the process of throwing away aces is only temporary. While there is no doubt that cultural change has far outstripped biological change in its rapidity and that man now possesses the power to interfere in his own process of biological evolution, the situation is hardly an emergency one. What is one generation or so in man's history? We may be able to produce human mutants with new forms of genius before another century has passed.

Summary. Biological factors influence cultural developments, as we have seen, in a number of ways. These may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Plants and animals form a part of the materials which culture may utilize to improve man's plane of living and a part of the hazards which culture must help to protect man against.
2. Man is himself an organism, and each man is a part of the environment of every other. The number of human beings in any area is a function of a relatively constant fecundity and a highly variable complex of food supply and hazards of existence. This complex comes more and more under man's control as culture develops but is never completely so. Consequently, population pressure is a factor to be reckoned with in any group that does not control its birth rate.
3. Any human group is endowed with a certain set of capacities which may be utilized to develop culture. Adding to these capacities is a process not yet under human control; subtracting from them appears to be possible and is quite likely going on. If culture building capacities are lost faster than they are developed, cultural accumulation cannot permanently continue, but there is considerable leeway provided through the relative slowness of biological as compared with cultural change.

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Chapter 26

SOCIAL CHANGE IN LONG-TIME PERSPECTIVE (Continued)

SOCIAL CHANGE IN EAST AFRICA¹

THE OLD FAMILY among most tribes is a patriarchal institution. . . . Polygamy is a matter of social distinction and economic advantage. The bride is given in exchange for cows, sheep, goats, hoes, etc. The important factor in "bride price" is the payment in kind, gathered from the nearer kin of the young man and distributed among the relatives of the bride. Thus both families are involved. Generally the payment is made in instalments, especially if high values are at stake, as in the case of a chief. . . . The full amount is not paid before the birth of the first child. All is more or less conditional up to that event. In fact the so-called "bride price" or "bride wealth" has the character of a security for the woman's bearing children. It is not the woman that is bought, but her children and her working power.

The introduction of money, however, has shattered this state of things. The process still goes on it is true; but there is undoubtedly a general drift toward conditions as they already exist in such big places as Daressalaam, Tanga, Mombasa, Tabora, etc. Modern money is the great stimulus for individualization. What is going on is the individualization of the bonds of kin and family, especially in regard to marriage. The laborer on the plantation, the house-boy or office boy, the clerk, the native teacher or preacher today all draw their salary in money. This makes them independent of their relatives. The young man and the girl no longer depend on the choice made by their parents. They make the choice for themselves. By so doing they are exposed to all kinds of impulses that lead to dissolution as quickly as to union. The man now "buys" a wife himself without

¹ Adapted from Richard Thurnwald, "Social Transformations in East Africa," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 38, pp. 179-180, Sept., 1932. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

regard to his father, and the girl gets the money herself without paying attention to her father or mother. Couples may remain together as they please, and they very often please only a few weeks or months. The boundary line between this kind of marriage and prostitution can hardly be drawn.

THE CULTURAL FACTOR IN SOCIAL CHANGE

A study of the geographic and biological factors in social change would explain only in small part the change in the family pattern just described. While the geographic and biological factors have presumably remained constant, there has been a transformation in culture. If one is to understand this change one must turn aside from consideration of factors external to culture and examine the influences toward change that arise within culture itself. In the two succeeding chapters this question will be considered from the point of view of an observer located close to the process, who can note details and describe the push and pull of forces favoring or hostile to the change in prospect. In this chapter, however, we shall adhere to the long-time point of view already adopted. We should then get an historical perspective on cultural change and accumulation that is denied to the observer concerned with immediate events.

The cultural base for innovation. At any given historical instant there are not only geographical and biological environments and the native ability of the population as determining factors in social change; there is also the existing cultural pattern itself. What has gone before in cultural accumulation conditions what is to come after; the appearance of any new culture trait depends always on the previously existing *cultural base*.

This fact can be illustrated in any realm of culture. It is obvious of course that mechanical inventions must come in a sort of logical series and that the American Indians without the wheel or a good draft animal could not produce the Conestoga wagon of the pioneers. It is almost equally evident that a nomadic non-agricultural people would hardly develop the plow or the grain mill until the basic economic pattern was altered. One can note also that natural resources like iron ore and petroleum are meaningless in a pre-industrial stage of culture.

Even in immaterial culture, where achievements do not pyra-

mid so logically, any new invention is dependent on and must fit into a previously existing cultural framework. Thus in America we were ready to adopt the athletic bathing suit for women since that was consonant with a cultural trend toward women's freedom and the outdoor life. It is not possible, however, to adopt the simple grass skirt for formal occasions, for that would not only contravene the modesty mores but would upset the whole industry of manufacturing and styling women's wear. In other cultures it is the same way. The folkways can be changed but not too rapidly and usually only in a direction that fits in with the general cultural pattern.² The previous culture history is therefore an extremely important factor in determining the course of present social change.

Invention. Cultural change in Sociopia can come about in only two ways. One is through the agency of an individual or a group within the area; the other is by borrowing ideas from surrounding areas and making them a part of the culture at home. Whatever the innovation may be, a new device for polishing flints, a new method of cultivating corn, a new way of marcelling hair, or a new type of college examination, it is a product of someone's ability to see new relationships between ideas or customs already familiar. An invention never contains all new elements; it is a recombination in some new pattern of elements already present in the cultural base.

Inventions are like mutations in that they are not subject to immediate human control,³ but while one can seldom tell from what quarter a new scientific discovery, a new machine, a new form of city government is coming, it is sometimes possible to foretell that a given invention will soon be made. To do this one must understand the factors which make an invention possible as well as those which make it probable. The following factors are

² This is the result of what Sumner calls a "strain toward self-consistency" in the folkways. Cf. William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 5, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906.

³ Nowadays one can say, "So and so is working on a new type of all-metal umbrella," and predict the probability of success. Nevertheless the achievement may not be made, for any invention is an adventure into the unknown where one may meet with unforeseen obstacles. For an interesting account of an invention made to order, see the story of the creation of the Liberty motor, in Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 162-164, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1926.

those which determine the likelihood that a given invention will be made in Sociopia at a given period in its cultural development.

1. *The cultural base.* The importance of this factor has been already indicated. Invention Z cannot be made until after inventions A, B, C, D, etc., which logically precede it. Winston⁴ distinguishes between *primary inventions* like the telegraph, the automobile, or on a lower level the domestication of the dog or the art of horticulture, and *secondary inventions*. Each primary invention gives rise to a host of secondary inventions which perfect the primary invention and exploit its more obvious implications. Thus, horticulture leads to a growing of more and more different crops; and after the dog has been domesticated, the next logical step is to try one's hand with other animals. Secondary inventions also precede primary inventions. Sometimes a long period of experimentation and slow discovery is a preliminary to the big achievement.

2. *Inventive genius.* There can be no invention without an inventor. There must be someone with intelligence enough to see the significance of new relationships as they appear by chance in nature, and the energy and persistence artificially to combine elements in repeated experiment, if the problem can be solved in only that way. Perhaps, too, the first requisite is the ability to see the problem, to define the need, for many inventors are prophets and reformers as well as idea-shufflers and synthesizers. In the realm of social invention the factor of prophetic vision is especially important. A person steeped in the present ways of doing things, a conformer, may be a useful citizen, but it takes a person who can see at least a few flaws in the social order to be a leader and an introducer of ideas for social change.

One of the oldest of debates centers around the question of the proportion of inventive geniuses in different societies. An easy way to explain social stagnation is to deny the society its share of creative minds. While there are not lacking social scientists who take this view,⁵ especially with respect to Negro cultures, the general tendency among American anthropologists and sociologists is

⁴ Sanford B. Winston, *Culture and Human Behavior*, p. 71, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1933.

⁵ For a conservative statement see Frank H. Hankins, "Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 17, pp. 27-39.

to discount heavily this type of explanation.⁶ There may be some differences between races in the number of individuals of high endowment, but there is no conclusive evidence as yet to prove it. Meanwhile it is fairer to think of races as differing in kind of mental ability, rather than in degree, and concede that probably all cultures have had genius at their disposal.

3. *Social attitudes toward innovation.* The most important factor in explaining cultural retardation is likely to be the group's own unwillingness to allow free scope to inventive genius. Most societies have persecuted, or at least ridiculed, their inventors and reformers. "The good old ways are best, to change them is impiety" is most often the prevailing viewpoint even among the elect. Today we have as one of our culture traits an attitude of expectation of future inventions and of approval for the inventor. At least this is true so long as he sticks to the realm of mechanical appliances and pure science. Even we are not friendly toward social invention; we label most attempted innovation in this field as dangerous radicalism.

4. *The run of attention.* In different cultures inventive impulses are directed along different lines. In Samoa, as Margaret Mead points out,⁷ a great deal of ingenuity is lavished on minor innovations in ritual and design, but inventive impulses, thus easily sated, are not led toward any fundamental changes in material culture or in social organization. In our society, as we have already seen, the rewards go to Thomas Edison for the electric light rather than to Judge Ben Lindsey for companionate marriage or to Ralph Borsodi for the subsistence home. At any given time there is a certain run of attention or interest in new ideas of some special type, and society is eager for and prepared to accept inventions in that special field while remaining apathetic or antagonistic to improvements in other quarters. During war time any invention which will help to attain victory along orthodox lines is eagerly seized upon, but since military discipline tends to stamp out initiative the inventions are usually made by civilians. Anything that

⁶ Cf. Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples*, pp. 419-445, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1935; A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, pp. 70-86, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1923; and Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 1-29, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1911.

⁷ Margaret Mead, "The Role of the Individual in Samoan Culture," reprinted in A. L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman, *Source Book in Anthropology*, pp. 545-561, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, revised edition, 1931.

is unorthodox and does not fit in with the traditional way of waging war is likely, at first at least, to be frowned on.⁸

Usually there are some special fields of inquiry in any culture where inventions are encouraged. The necessary training is made available for creative minds in these fields but not in others, and as culture accumulates each invention implies a greater and greater need for previous study. Thus if one knows the "run of attention" of a culture one can predict, at least roughly, the course of future social change.

Culture borrowing. Most peoples have found it easier to take over the ideas of others than to invent for themselves. Even in the earliest primitive times there was a great deal of *cultural diffusion*, of the spread of inventions from one tribe to another. While with primitive methods of travel the radiation of new ideas and new artifacts was likely to be slow, there were enough inter-tribal contacts through trade or warfare or migration to pass on outstanding inventions. Given the long time-span of early cultural history, it was possible for new culture traits to cover whole continents. The anthropologists have even collected a number of instances of probable inter-continental migration of culture. The classic story is that of the tobacco complex:

Originating in Middle America, the custom [of using tobacco] spread very anciently to its farthest native limits without being able to penetrate to the Eskimo. As soon as the Spaniards appeared on the scene, the custom started on a fresh career of travel and rolled rapidly eastward about the globe until it reentered America in the hitherto non-smoking region of Alaska. . . . In short, smoking reached the Eskimos only after having made the round of the globe.⁹

The theoretical expectation would be that a trait invented in Sociopia would spread radially in all directions at an equal rate to surrounding culture regions which did not have it. Actually the area covered by a migrating trait will not be a circular one with Sociopia at the center, because geographic barriers on the one hand and natural avenues of travel and communication on the other make for much more rapid diffusion in some directions

⁸ Cf. Joseph Rossman, "War and Invention," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, pp. 625-633, Jan., 1931.

⁹ Boeber, *op. cit.*, p. 213. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

than in others. Accidents of migration may leave nearby tribes unacquainted with the new idea while more distant strangers learn of it through travelers or through captives taken in warfare and passed on in exchange as slaves.

More important still in determining the course of diffusion are the cultural patterns with which the new trait comes in contact. Neither a foreign trait nor a native invention will be adopted unless there is a cultural base that gives it meaning and usefulness. A primitive society cannot take over a modern device like the alarm clock except as a toy and curiosity, both because there is no background of experience with complicated machinery and because there is no felt need to make such an accurate account of time. Often the trait is greatly modified to make it fit into the new environment, and it is safe to say that it always suffers some change in inter-cultural transmission. Christian missionaries often find to their horror that their one-and-only God has simply been added to the native pantheon of deities by their converts. European Socialists often lament the fact that Marxian doctrines have had to suffer a sea change in order to play any role at all in the American scene.

While diffusion generally proceeds from the "higher" or more complex culture to the "lower" or less complex, there is always some interchange whenever two peoples come in contact. Frequently the dominant culture comes to owe much to the more primitive culture, and this is especially true when the people bearing the "superior" culture traits have to settle down in the environment to which the primitives are already adapted. The taking over of Indian methods of cultivating corn by the invading colonists is a good illustration of this type of borrowing:

Our farmers formerly planted and often yet plant, maize in hills; this was the universal Indian mode, four to five grains being dropped at one place at regular intervals of about three feet. . . . In cultivation the Indian hoed the earth up around the growing stalk, which is still the principle of the mechanical cultivator. For husking, our farmers use a husking pin, which, while now of iron, was not so very long ago of bone and wood, precisely like those still in use among our surviving eastern Indians. . . .

The Indian planted beans and squashes among the corn. This has always been a favorite custom of our farmers. He also under-

stood the art of testing his seed and of preparatory germination in warm water. Where fish were available they were used for fertilization, the rule being one fish to a hill. . . .

The one important innovation of the white man was the substitution of the mill for the mortar.¹⁰

When maize was taken back to Europe, however, it went as a single trait and not as a trait-complex. Maize was planted in Europe in rows, in accordance with the European cultivation pattern. It was just another cereal, to be treated as other cereals had been before it.

The process of fitting borrowed traits into a native culture is a fascinating one to analyze, but it has already been dealt with in many of its aspects under the head of assimilation.¹¹ As means of transportation and communication improve, culture contacts grow more frequent, and problems of assimilation bulk large. A multitude of assimilation problems is a good index of rapid social change.

Diffusion vs. independent invention. The relative importance of diffusion and local invention as factors in the development of culture is a matter about which there is still some dispute. There is a group of anthropologists¹² who stress the unlikelihood of twice duplicating the same invention and attribute practically all similarities in the cultures of different peoples to borrowing by one from the other. Elliot Smith and his followers have developed an elaborate historical theory¹³ which places the origins of nearly all of the great inventions of civilization in a culture center in ancient Egypt. Other civilizations, including the pre-Columbian American culture, are supposed to have been derived by borrowing across the Atlantic and the Pacific, and independent invention is supposed to have played a negligible part even in the high civilizations of Peru and Yucatan.

¹⁰ Clark Wissler, "Aboriginal Maize Culture as a Typical Culture Complex," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 21, pp. 657-658, Mar., 1926. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

¹¹ Cf. chapter 24, pp. 603-607.

¹² F. Graebner, Pater Schmidt, W. H. R. Rivers, G. Elliot Smith, et al.

¹³ Cf. G. Elliot Smith, "The Influence of Ancient Egyptian Civilization in the East and in America," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, vol. 3, pp. 48-77; G. Elliot Smith, *The Migrations of Early Culture*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1915; W. J. Perry, *The Children of the Sun*, Methuen and Company, London, 1927.

This view of the origins of American culture is not regarded as tenable by the large majority of anthropologists, and the emphasis on diffusion at the expense of invention is regarded as extreme.¹⁴ There are many cases where a hypothesis of duplicate invention in two separate areas better fits the available facts than that of borrowing one from the other. Thus the appearance of bronze in the metallurgy of both the old and the new world might seem to be explainable in terms of diffusion. But the fact of the restricted Peruvian area in which the bronze was made in America and its isolation from the sea coast, coupled with the absence of bronze in Maya, Chibcha, and Aztec cultures—which should certainly have benefited by any very ancient migration from Egypt—points strongly toward independent invention. After all, once the arts of metallurgy have advanced to a certain point, the alloying of tin and copper to make bronze is not such an unusual discovery that it could not have been made twice over. If the cultural base for an invention is present and the run of attention is not unfavorable, there is a good chance of duplicate invention even within the same culture. Ogburn and Thomas have listed¹⁵ a series of over a hundred instances out of our own scientific history where the same invention has been made independently by two or more workers. Civilization does not depend on the appearance of a single "Great Man" for each step forward. Had Edison died in infancy there would have been others to take his place.

One must not fail to recognize the great importance of diffusion, however. The fact that most of the really backward cultures are to be found in geographically isolated areas is at least negative testimony to the importance of culture borrowing. And on the other hand, many of the great civilizations of the world have developed at world crossroads where culture contacts were many and frequent. Civilization building is seldom the result of the creative genius of a single people; it is nearly always a collective enterprise.

¹⁴ Cf. Roland B. Dixon, *The Building of Cultures*, pp. 241-264, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1928; G. E. Smith, B. Malinowski, H. J. Spinden, and A. Goldenweiser, *Culture: The Diffusion Controversy*, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1927.

¹⁵ W. F. Ogburn and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, "Are Inventions Inevitable?" *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 37, pp. 83-93, Mar., 1932. See also G. Spiller, "The Dynamics of Greatness," *Sociological Review*, vol. 21, pp. 218-232, July, 1929.

LIMITING INFLUENCES IN CULTURAL CHANGE

It is now time to try to piece together some of the part factors in social change that we have been discussing and see if they can be made to fit into any synthetic theory. We may begin by formulating several propositions which have emerged from the previous analysis:

1. Cultural change, once cultural accumulation really got under way, has been much more rapid than either geographic or biological change.
2. Culture changes in response to the slowly changing geographic and biological environments, which in turn are in part changed by culture. But the most important influences making for social change arise within culture itself.
3. The direction and rate of cultural change at any given time depend upon the cultural base primarily, and upon the currently existing attitudes with respect to innovation. There is apparently no lack of genius to improve on the current folkways and technologies, if there is encouragement to do so.
4. Contacts with outside cultures will also be stimulating to local cultural development but may result in loss of local cultural identity through assimilation to the culture of a more dominant group.

A summary like this gives some idea of the relative importance of the roles played by different social change factors, but it leaves culture free within the broad limits set by geography and biology to develop in almost any direction. Are there any limiting factors *within culture itself* which in any sense predetermine the course of cultural development? Is there any logic of cultural accumulation other than that of the pyramiding of one culture trait on another and of combining simple elements to make more complex ones? One can answer categorically that there is no demonstrated universal principle of great determining importance that can be offered in answer to this question. There are, however, a few theories which it may be worth while to pass in brief review.

The principle of limited possibilities. Man has certain organic needs that must be taken care of in any culture. Observing the bewildering variations in different cultures, the anthropologist might well conclude that there was no limit set on possible ways

of meeting these needs. Further analysis would show, however, that the number of solutions are not infinite, and that there are some basic similarities among cultures, as well as variations. Some form of family system is universal; so is some type of language, and so are tools for aiding the arm and hand to perform some of the simple functions of cutting, pounding, pressing, etc. Wissler's rather crude attempt to formulate a "universal pattern of culture"¹⁶ bears testimony to the fact of world-wide unity in some of the basic cultural forms.

How far this similarity extends is a matter of classification, chiefly. So long as one talks in general terms, the universal cultural affinities seem great; but as soon as one gets down to particulars, then all seems variation. There are, however, some similarities in cultural detail that appear upon examination and that are not due to borrowing or to sheer accident in duplicate invention. They result from the operation of what Goldenweiser calls "the principle of limited possibilities."¹⁷ As an illustration of the principle at work in cultural development, he analyzes the factors which determine the character of an oar:

Arms can be used as oars. Also all kinds of materials, stone, bone, bark, even metal. Oars can be long or short, light or heavy, circular in cross section or flat, wide or narrow, of even width and otherwise. . . . Most of these materials and shapes have been used for oars at one time or another and are still being so used, in a pinch. But if you want a *good* oar—and this is what you do want, at length—the end result is limited by the conditions of use. The oar must not be so short as not to reach the water or only barely so, or too long; it must not be so heavy as to be unwieldy, or so light as to preclude the resistance desirable in measured rhythmic movement; it should not be brittle or so pliable as to render it unfit as a lever in a dense medium. . . . The blade, in order to offer proper resistance to the water and thus enhance propulsion, must be flat. . . . The butt end, on the other hand, must be adjusted to manipulation; it must not be flat but circular in cross section, not too bulky nor too slight. . . . The limitation imposed by conditions of use is here so drastic that every oar is

¹⁶ Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 73-98, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1923.

¹⁷ Alexander Goldenweiser, *History, Psychology, and Culture*, pp. 35-55, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1933.

emphatically—an oar, implying numerous points of similarities between all oars. Now, no one but a wholly myopic diffusionist would believe that the oar has been invented only once in the history of culture. It would be equally absurd to assume that the precise stage, initial and subsequent, in the development of oars in different localities were identical or even markedly similar. But sooner or later, in one way or another, they all had to come about, to result in the *good* oar, a tool with certain relatively fixed features determined by conditions of effectiveness.¹⁸

Other illustrations from the realm of material culture can be easily adduced and the effectiveness of the principle in standardizing the solutions to some of the common human technological problems easily demonstrated. It is somewhat more difficult to see the limited possibilities in immaterial culture, but the principle apparently operates also, at least in many instances, in that realm.

Successive stages theories of cultural growth. A much more extreme and much less tenable application of the same idea of a limitation on the possibilities in cultural development is found in the concept of successive stages of cultural evolution. Every society must, according to the theory, develop in accordance with an evolutionary pattern and pass through one by one an inevitable series of growth stages. Not only in technology, but also for all social institutions, there is a series of consecutively developing forms.

The nineteenth century anthropologists were sure they had discovered a number of these evolutionary sequences. Thus Lewis H. Morgan¹⁹ taught that social organization began in a chaotic stage of promiscuity in which society was unorganized and sex intercourse was subject to no social control whatever. This was followed by a stage called “group marriage” during which a person had a number of sexual partners chosen in accord with the rules of clan exogamy. Clans were later superseded by gentes, in which descent was shifted from the maternal to the paternal line. Group marriages also gave way first to temporary pairing, later to patriarchal polygyny, and finally to monogamy. All tribes, anywhere on the earth’s surface, were supposed to be able to develop only

¹⁸ Reprinted from *History, Psychology and Culture*, p. 46, by Alexander Goldenweiser, by permission of and special arrangement with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.

¹⁹ *Ancient Society*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1878.

through this series of stages. To demolish the whole impressive theory, it only sufficed, however, for more careful field workers to discover that many of the simplest tribal cultures possessed the family but not the sib (clans and gens), that the condition of promiscuity did not exist anywhere, and that in some tribes the gens or patrilineal sib organization had developed directly without any intermediate stage of clan organization.²⁰ Similar refutation of successive stages theories in art, morals, economics, and religion has also taken place. The successive stages doctrine has hardly a friend among social scientists today.

Cyclic theories of cultural growth and decline. While, as Sorokin points out,²¹ social thought of the last half of the nineteenth century was dominated by the *linear* or successive stages conception of social change, there is now a growing tendency to be concerned with historical rhythms, repetitions, and *cycles*. The doctrine that "history repeats itself" has always been a fascinating one for broad philosophic thinkers, and there have always been plenty of predictions of the destiny of modern civilization, or some part of it, based on the fate of Rome, of Greece, or of some other civilization of the past. Most of this type of reasoning remains, however, in the realm of the superficial and the speculative with little effort made to compare the supposedly similar epochs, representing the same stages in a historical cycle, in detail. One of the more serious efforts along this line, the work of the German, Oswald Spengler,²² has received wide attention because of the vast amount of erudition marshalled in support of a grand panoramic theory of cultural growth and decay. Spengler describes the current "decline" of Western civilization on the basis of parallels drawn from the history of Egypt, China, and Greece and Rome. The Spenglerian theory is ridiculed by sociologists²³ because of the pretentious scientific claims made for it when actually only superficial analogy is employed.

²⁰ Cf. Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 147-185, Boni and Liveright, New York, 1920.

²¹ Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 728, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928.

²² Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, translated by C. F. Atkinson, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1926.

²³ See for instance Albion Small's review of *The Decline of the West* in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 26, pp. 623-627, Mar., 1920.

There have been literally hundreds of other attempts to formulate cyclical theories of social change,²⁴ but with the exception of those periodic variations in social phenomena that are keyed to the rhythm of the seasons (births, deaths, suicides, unemployment), little progress toward the establishment of any scientifically valid cycle theory has been made. In recent years most attention has perhaps been paid to what has come to be called "the business cycle," but this has proved to be a function of so many variables that its periodicity has been difficult to establish. A revolution in economic organization, like that which has occurred in Russia, upsets the presumably established rhythm completely.

Evidently a cyclical theory of social change must be a very complex one if it is to describe the complicated reality of social processes, and such a theory, once formulated, could not be proved or disproved by the data it is now possible to command. It is useful, however, to have even an abstract conception of what an adequate cyclical theory would be like, and this has been provided by F. Stuart Chapin.²⁵ He suggests that every cultural form (a machine, a form of government, a fashion) has its own law of change which is "probably cyclical and may be periodic."²⁶ When the cycles or periods of a number of the most important cultural forms in a given culture area are synchronous (are in rhythm), then we have discernible fluctuations in the vigor and vitality of the culture as a whole. Thus when a majority of the cultural forms are on the up-side of their cycles, the civilization which contains them is in a state of efflorescence; when a majority have passed their peak, then we have a culture in decay. Chapin suggests that growth, temporary equilibrium, and disintegration is the normal life history of culture traits, and that cultural advance and decline, the result of the inevitable advance and decline of its component trait complexes or institutions, is unescapable. This is an hypothesis based largely on an organic analogy, as Allport and Hartman

²⁴ For a comprehensive list of cycle theories see Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 730-738.

²⁵ F. Stuart Chapin, *Cultural Change*, pp. 207-214, The Century Company, New York, 1928.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

have pointed out.²⁷ We are in no position either to prove or disprove it today.

The hypothesis of cultural lag. While some of the changes in cultural forms may proceed synchronously, there is no reason to suppose that this will be true of all culture traits. Undoubtedly there will be differing rates of change in different parts of the cultural pattern; some branches of human activity will be in a period of rapid modification while in others there will be relative quiescence and stagnation. Since the total cultural pattern is composed of interlacing folkways and institutions, a change in one portion of the fabric will produce stresses and strains in other parts. Sooner or later adjustments must come, at least in the closely related part of the web, but these adaptive changes may not be immediate. Tension may persist for some time, and there may be considerable time lag before there is a return to equilibrium.

W. F. Ogburn has pointed out²⁸ the fact that in our own rapidly changing civilization the maladjustments due to differential rates of change are considerable and the cultural lags conspicuous. The most obvious and the most considerable of these lags are those between parts of the material culture, which is increasing by leaps and bounds and changing conditions of life with great rapidity, and certain portions of the immaterial culture. The immaterial parts of culture seem to be held back by a sort of inertia, and changes that would appear to be obviously called for on functional grounds (i.e., in order to promote human life aims) are strongly resisted.²⁹

Many examples can be cited to illustrate this tendency. Modern industry has demanded great quantities of lumber, and we have been denuding our forests to meet the demand. Yet in spite of the obvious fact that the timber resources will not last forever, we have

²⁷ Floyd Allport and Dale Hartman, "The Prediction of Cultural Change: A Problem Illustrated in Studies by F. Stuart Chapin and A. L. Kroeber," analysis 22 in Stuart A. Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science*, p. 349, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931.

²⁸ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 200-213, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, 1922. See also *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, vol. I, pp. viii-xiv, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1933.

²⁹ Cf. Hadley Cantril, "A Psychological Reason for the Lag of 'Non-Material' Culture Traits," *Social Forces*, vol. 13, pp. 376-379, Mar., 1935; and James W. Woodard, "Critical Notes on the Culture Lag Concept," *Social Forces*, vol. 12, pp. 388-398, Mar., 1934.

been allowing lumbermen to continue to exhaust the available resources with no requirement of replacement. Society is apparently unable to develop the necessary form of social control to cope with the new situation created by the demands of industry. Reforestation is just beginning to be put into effect, years after the need for it was manifest to anyone who stopped to think.

Another example of the lag in the immaterial culture is the failure of political organization to keep pace with advances in transportation. As H. G. Wells points out,³⁰ the boundaries of the European states were laid down in the days of coach-horse travel; they are much too close together for the age of the railway and the airplane, especially when each boundary means a tariff wall that interrupts the free flow of goods. Analysis of social and economic problems in terms of the region, which is the geographico-economic unit geared to modern conditions of livelihood and modern transportation agencies, is only just beginning and has had little or no effect on obsolete political units so far.³¹

One might go on indefinitely citing illustrations of cultural lag in our own society. This, however, would soon raise the question of how society eventually becomes conscious of these maladjustments, and what steps it takes to eliminate the lag and effect a new adjustment. These last are topics which belong in the field of short-time rather than long-time analysis.

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³⁰ H. G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization*, pp. 54-55, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922.

³¹ Cf. chapter 18, pp. 467-469.

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Chapter 27

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION¹

FROM TIME TO TIME communities and regions experience such catastrophes as fire, flood, earthquake, or tornado. Property is destroyed, lives are lost, persons are maimed, families are divided, the orderly processes of business and of government are upset or wholly stopped. The initial shock may be followed by extended uncertainty and fear. Then come various makeshifts, spontaneous and uncoordinated efforts to supply immediate needs, followed perhaps by unification of emergency measures. Through it all individuals rush into the limelight; agencies seek institutional glory; public officials and private organizations battle for leadership; local, state, and national groups struggle for control of the program of relief and reconstruction. Of the victims some are disheartened, some are humiliated by having to accept aid, others expect reimbursement for losses and demand their "full rights." If long periods must be spent in refugee camps, idleness may add to the demoralization.

Less obvious is the unrest which may accompany economic insecurity and business changes. When rumors spread that banks are about to fail and when some of them close their doors, tension becomes great, people gather to gossip and re-enforce their fears. It seems impossible to settle down to any orderly activity; there is just milling about, movement without direction. Sometimes such unrest develops out of long-continued industrial conditions. For years in the coal mines work has been irregular and hazards have been great; intermittent conflict has arisen over recognition of union or weighing of coal; struggle for control has gone on between operators and miners, between rival unions, between organized and unorganized fields. Out

¹ Adapted by permission of the publishers from Stuart A. Queen, Walter B. Bodenhafer, and Ernest B. Harper, *Social Organization and Disorganization*, pp. 33-35, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1935.

of this perennial insecurity has grown chronic discontent, but little concerted action, and no program of reorganization. . . .

The raging of many conflicts indicates the absence of any generally accepted code of morals. For many years we have had constant fighting over control or prohibition of the liquor traffic; even now it is quite uncertain what the outcome may be. There is an eternal battle between religion, the conservator, and science, the innovator. In recent years there has come to be widespread questioning of the right of states to conscript citizens for military service; university students sometimes challenge the R. O. T. C. A bitter contest rages between the advocates of public ownership and the defenders of private control of railroads and utilities. Some communities are almost torn asunder by competition between chain stores and "independents." Heated controversy is heard everywhere over the merits of birth control. Regardless of the merits of any of these issues, it is evident that ours is a civilization in which harmony and stability are not undisturbed. Of course, the picture is incomplete without those factors which promote cohesion and integration, but for the moment we are concerned only with the evidence of disorganization.

If the Olympian observer who was watching the long-time changes enumerated in the last chapter were to come down from his heights to mingle with the people of Sociopia, he might find a society as confused and disorganized as our own, as described by the foregoing quotation. What had appeared to be orderly trends judged from a long-distance and long-time point of view might seem like utter chaos when one is close enough to see the disruptive changes occurring at any one moment. With the breadth of view that comes from thinking of human life in terms of centuries and of eras, we shall now enter into a near-at-hand participation in the problems of a people whose society is beset with disorganization. In so doing we shall be studying *social change in short-time perspective*.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AS A PROCESS

The organization or the disorganization of a society, even in short-time perspective, is a relative matter. Although it is true that many changes involve the disunifying factor of conflict, they may also introduce new forces leading toward integration. On the

one hand, life never becomes so disorganized and individuated that all social controls are gone. On the other hand, life even in its most stable moods is too dynamic to allow any social arrangements to remain static for long. Since neither organization nor disorganization is an absolute condition, we might be more accurate in referring to both as *social processes*, one tending toward unity and the other toward disunity, one possessing more elements of conflict than of control and the other containing more stability than change.

Such is the characterization of social disorganization made by Thomas and Znaniecki in their impressive study of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*:

Social disorganization is not an exceptional phenomenon limited to certain periods or certain societies; some of it is found always and everywhere, since always and everywhere there are individual cases of breaking social rules, cases which exercise some disorganizing influence on group institutions and, if not counteracted, are apt to multiply and to lead to a complete decay of the latter. But during periods of social stability this continuous incipient disorganization is continuously neutralized by such activities of the group as reinforce with the help of social sanctions the power of existing rules. The stability of group institutions is thus simply a dynamic equilibrium of processes of disorganization and *reorganization*. This equilibrium is disturbed when processes of disorganization can no longer be checked by any attempts to reinforce the existing rules. A period of prevalent disorganization follows, which may lead to a complete dissolution of the group. More usually, however, it is counteracted and stopped before it reaches this limit by a new process of reorganization which in this case does not consist in a mere reinforcement of the decaying organization, but in a production of new schemes of behavior and new institutions better adapted to the changed demands of the group; we call this production of new schemes and institutions social reconstruction.²

Concurring in this general theory of disorganization as a social process, Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper make application of it to many types of social relationships:

² William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. 4, pp. 3-4, Richard G. Badger, Boston, 1920.

If social organization means the development of relationships which persons and groups find mutually satisfactory, then disorganization means their replacement by relationships which bring disappointment, thwarted wishes, irritation, and unhappiness. This generalized concept of disorganization is equally applicable to family, neighborhood, gang, trade union, political party, religious denomination, nation, or League of Nations.³

Symptoms of disorganization. When a society is ailing, tell-tale symptoms betray the presence of the malady just as surely as in physical disease.⁴ The quotation at the beginning of the chapter gives a common-sense picture of such a condition, but the sociologist, like the doctor who tries to be systematic in his diagnosis, prefers to classify in more exact terms the behavior traits of a society when disorganization has set in. What are some of these easily recognized symptomatic traits?

Conflict of mores and of institutions. In the stable village communities of early New England, the standards and objectives of the church, the school, the government, and the family were for the most part in harmony with one another. The various institutions and organized groups were bound together by common economic circumstances and by similar moral traditions into a consistent culture pattern.

One of the first symptoms of disorganization is the breakdown of this harmony and the emergence of conflicts between the mores and the institutions. Such internal disharmony was everywhere manifest during the civil war in Spain in 1936 and 1937. The liberal government and the Catholic Church were at swords' points, the socialists and the conservatives were trying to annihilate each other, and the monarchists were vying for power with those who favored a democracy. Individuals, families, and organizations faced the necessity of choosing one set of mores or another and entering the conflict on the basis of that decision. With institutions pitted against one another and with the mores of one group directly opposed to the standards of another, internal breakdown of a

³ Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁴ The sociologist does not consider disorganization a malady, but rather a natural process related to all social change; but because it is temporarily disruptive, the near-at-hand observer often expresses concern and describes it in terms of pathology.

disastrous type was the natural result. Peace could not be re-established until one set of interests was subjugated or until some other accommodation could be worked out whereby a consistency of objective would be restored to the social organization.

Transfer of functions from one group to another. Since a given complex of social organizations exists for the purpose of serving the needs of a people, one can be reasonably sure that disorganization is in process when their functions are transferred to other agencies. No better illustration of this symptom can be found than in the shifting of social functions which accompanied the depression that began in 1929. Families who had prided themselves on being self-supporting social groups were forced to turn to private charity or to government relief. The financial institutions temporarily abdicated by declaring bank holidays and depending upon the government for security. Within the government itself a shifting took place. The local poor boards, finding their sources inadequate for the emergency, passed their burden to the states, and they in turn appealed to federal agencies. The old ways of meeting human need had been replaced by new measures which in the emergency functioned none too efficiently. Insecurity, confusion, and a transfer of functions from one group to another are characteristic in the process of disorganization. When the crisis is past, the old institutions may resume their former work or the emergency measures may grow into a permanent and more efficient program. In either case disorganization is followed by a trend toward a new stability.

Personal individuation. An individual may have a sense of freedom either because he is so harmoniously related to the culture of a society that he is free of conflicts, or because he has escaped from social bonds, and, as his own judge, feels free to choose which way he will go. The former type of freedom is characteristic of an integrated society, the latter of a disorganized one. The individuated person—that is, this latter type which has been released from social constraint—finds that his freedom is not an unmitigated blessing. Although bound by no social responsibility, he is also deprived by his isolation of all cooperative assistance. In desperation he may turn first to one group and then to another, or he may try to escape the problem of choice by a “flight from reality.” The large number of youths who were set free by the social breakdown of the depression to become the “boy and girl tramps

of America" were finally recognized by the government as constituting one of its most baffling social problems. This lack of rapport between the individual and society may be a problem in itself, but for our purpose it is a sign of an underlying maladjustment in which group controls have disappeared because the mores, themselves, are in conflict. Individuation is a symptom of social disorganization, a symptom so important that Thomas and Znaniecki make it basic in their definition of the process, itself:

We can define social disorganization briefly as a *decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon individual members of the group.*⁵

Cultural lags and leads as causative factors. What causes the social maladjustment to which these various symptoms call attention? According to the analysis of the previous chapter, the causes are to be stated in terms of the stress and strain on the social organization which follow from unequal rates of change. These unequal rates of change are known as *cultural lags and leads*. Where once a close integration was maintained in a slow-moving equilibrium of all of the parts of a culture, there now appear breaks in the pattern as one phase steps out in the lead of change and another clings to traditional forms; conflicts replace accommodation, and unity yields to disorganization. This sequence—unequal change, followed by a development of social tensions, and then by a breakdown in the group organization—may seem a lucid and reasonable explanation, but it falls short of revealing

⁵ Thomas and Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 2. The same authors point out that individuation does not necessarily imply personal demoralization; *cf.* pp. 2 f. In a discussion of factors which limit and which are conducive to the individual's participation in a culture, Sanford B. Winston contrasts simple societies in which "practically the entire group participates in the whole culture," with complex societies in which numerous barriers reduce the individual's participation to segments of the culture. Building on this general thesis, we might characterize disorganization as a condition in which the social barriers and the segmental nature of a culture are greatly increased. With the different aspects of culture at variance with one another, the individual is isolated first from one group and then another. A reduction in participation with an increase in social isolation is, therefore, another way of characterizing individuation as a symptom of disorganization. *Cf.* Sanford B. Winston, *Culture and Human Behavior*, chap. 10, quotation from p. 165, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1933.

the detailed steps in the process which gives to any age its "social problems." To what supplementary principle may we turn for insight?

The answer to this question is contained in the implications of the general social theory that every society is an interacting unit of conflicting and cooperating forces. Normally, an equilibrium exists between the two; individual or segmental interests are granted freedom, but that freedom is limited by the group's definition of what is consistent with its general welfare. Among some of the Rhodesian tribes in Africa the individual is free to satisfy his hunger by taking grain from any field he happens to be passing through, with the limitation that whatever he takes must be prepared and eaten on the spot. If he carries a surplus away he is guilty of stealing. As long as no new element enters the situation the individual is responsive to the dictum of the group; it does not occur to him that he can be otherwise. In other words, in a stable society most conflicts between the individual and the group are potential, not real. When, however, the situation is changed in some respect, this adjustment between the inclusive and the lesser interests may be broken.

A famine, a tribal war, a migration, the discovery of new techniques of farming, contact with a different culture, or any other ecological or social break in the usual routine may so unsettle the established life of the society that its traditional mores lose control over individualistic desires. Especially do the poorly adjusted persons take advantage of such periods of unrest, by following their own whims or by advocating a newly introduced pattern of behavior. For example, if at such a time the worldly-wise foreigner told the native Rhodesian tribesman that he was foolish not to carry away extra grain and later sell it when everyone's supply was gone, the latter might need no further stimulus than this to experiment with the white man's system of profits. At first he would do so surreptitiously to avoid public censure, but later as the new pattern spread to other individuals, he would feel support in their company and openly contest the old mores. In the general confusion that followed, still other departures from the traditional ways would be made by individuals and small groups all going at different tangents unregulated by any inclusive controls or objectives. *This splitting of a society into conflicting units is the essence of the process of disorganization.*

In such a situation, those phases of social organization which are so entrenched in the customs and authority of the group that they successfully resist change for a time constitute the *cultural lags*, while the departures from the old ways are the *cultural leads*. Disorganization is manifest in the tensions and conflicts between the two. If one or a merger of several of the new trends finally gains ascendancy over the old and itself becomes the universal pattern for the society, then reorganization has been achieved. Since this step in the sequence of change is to be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, we shall here limit our attention to the period of unrest and conflict. If the foregoing analysis is theoretically valid, it should provide a practical approach to an understanding of the disorganized conditions of any one period, which the people of that period commonly call their "social problems." We shall try it out with reference to some of our own.

Crime is a much discussed problem of modern times. Its long-time causes comprise such unsettling developments and events as the industrial revolution, the rise of cities, the World War, increased ease of communication, widespread immigration, and increased emphasis upon private as opposed to common property. In this general setting of unrest in which no one cultural standard has the right of way, but each is challenged by a divergent trend, comprehensive social control breaks down, and individualistic interests are liberated. In crime, the person or small group places a limited value upon what society had traditionally called a social value. Until society once again agrees upon a standard, the criminal and his cohorts go merrily on their way knowing that the public is too disorganized to control effectively their variations from a forsaken norm. When the Eighteenth Amendment was suffering this last stage of its demise, the violators of the old mores of temperance laughed with contempt at the supporters of the passing order.

Our experience with economic breakdown is another illustration of how individualistic ends supersede group welfare when the tensions created by lags and leads liberate persons from traditional mores. In this case the cultural leads were similar to those previously listed, the technological improvements in exploiting nature and in trading goods and ideas. The lags were the outworn controls whose feeble grasp could not restrain the economic giants of modern industry. As cities with their factories came, a society once

organized around the primary principle of mutual aid and common welfare was split into a mass of independent, striving units each following the promptings of its own conscienceless soul, happily oblivious to the way its success had wrecked the purposes of another. All nature's resources, even her land, were made to pay their present exploiter a maximum return; special subsidies, mass immigration, monopoly rights on patents, and a cornering of supplies were all a part of the great game in which everyone tried to grab the lion's share while the other fellow was not looking. In such individualistic times few standards could assert authority throughout an entire society. General welfare was an unpopular subject when everyone was preoccupied with his personal freedom. Not until the disorganization had gone so far that freedom from restraint meant freedom to starve to death, at least for millions of participants, did the next stage of reorganization get seriously under way.

These are but two illustrations of how the implications of our theory serve as guides to practical analysis. Any other current social problem could similarly be approached in terms of lags and leads in social change, in terms of a break in the balance between common objectives and particularistic strivings.⁶

Crisis as a precipitating factor in disorganization. As an abandoned campfire may smolder for days before bursting into a forest conflagration, so the early stages of disorganization give little indication, to the casual observer, of an impending calamity. Often not until a *crisis* occurs do people become aware of the tensions which have been developing over a long period of time as potential conflicts. The crisis is at the same time the climactic stage in this period of conflict incubation and the precipitating factor in either the disorganization or the reorganization that follows. As broadly defined by William I. Thomas, crisis is any occurrence which interrupts smoothly running habits by focusing attention upon a conflict situation.⁷ The murder of the Archduke of Austria did not cause the World War, but it was the dramatic factor which

⁶ Cf. also the analysis of the cultural lag concept in W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, part 4, pp. 220-284, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, 1922; and James W. Woodard, "Critical Notes on the Culture Lag Concept," *Social Forces*, vol. 12, pp. 388-398, Mar., 1934.

⁷ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 16 ff., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1909.

focused attention on the growing animosities and converted them into overt behavior. Once the conflict was in the open, the disorganization of European relations spread rapidly. Superficial observers refer to the stock market crash of 1929 as the cause of the depression. It was merely the signal for the beginning of a general breakdown in our economic society, the causative factors for which had been accumulating for decades.

As soon as the group defines the situation as a crisis, tensions heighten to the breaking point, suppressed fears become open panic, and everyone is aware of insecurity, but is helpless. Then dangers of irrational, precipitate action are greatly increased. "The most trivial incident, in such periods of tension, may plunge a community into irretrievable disaster."⁸ The direction of the action may be defined by a timely leader who is readily followed if he can suggest a way out, irrational though it may be.

It is under conditions of crisis that dictatorships are at once possible and necessary, not merely to enable the community to act energetically, but in order to protect the community from the mere play of external forces.⁹

Many types of incident may serve as precipitating factors in disorganization, but in every case the crisis must be sufficiently dramatic to demand attention, to stir the group out of its equanimity.¹⁰ William I. Thomas broadly includes as a crisis situation any break in the routine which necessitates readjustment. The following are only a few of the types which he mentions:

Such conditions as the exhaustion of game, the intrusion of outsiders, defeat in battle, floods, drought, pestilence, birth, death, adolescence, and marriage, while not unanticipated, are always foci of attention and occasions for control. . . . Other crises arise in the conflict of interest between individuals, and between the individual

⁸ Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 793, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1924. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

⁹ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹⁰ Cf. Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology*, p. 676, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1929.

and the group. Theft, assault, sorcery, and all crimes and misdemeanors are occasions for the exercise of attention and control.¹¹

There remains one other approach that contributes to an understanding of the process of disorganization. We refer to the efforts that have been made to measure the extent of social breakdown through the use of various indices. We shall review only samples of the research done in connection with this measurement approach to disorganization.

INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Except for some of the general *symptoms* which we have already described, the selection of indices of disorganization is likely to betray the point of view of the investigator. To the socialist, for example, any trend toward fascism would be evidence of social breakdown, while a fascist observer would call it a step toward an organized society. In a sense, every measure of disorganization represents a value-judgment of its author as to what constitutes an organized as opposed to a disorganized society, or as to what constitutes social progress as opposed to social deterioration. Leaving these questions of ultimate judgment to the philosopher, we shall here attempt the much less ambitious task of examining short-time indices of change within limited areas of society. Whether ten or a thousand years later they are adjudged disorganizing or organizing trends need not concern us here. What are some of the measures of these limited movements with which social scientists have been experimenting?

Population movement as an index of social change. When Mustafa Kemal Pasha, dictator of Turkey, decided it was time the world should know how many Turks there were in existence, he issued a decree requiring everyone throughout the land to remain in his home on a specified day so that the census takers could make an accurate count. Many who read the account of this incident in the newspapers were surprised that this was the first thorough census ever made in Turkey. There are still many peoples on the earth's surface who have never been included in any population count, and we have to guess that the total world population is about one and three quarters billions people. But

¹¹ Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 17. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

with the advance in census taking during the past century many countries can now supply accurate data regarding population changes by decennial periods. Furthermore, they can report shifts within areas, such as changes in rural-urban ratios and movement from one section of the country to another.

Since any society is necessarily organized in terms of the individuals who constitute it, a decided change in the number or type of people may be considered one index to social change. By *index* we mean "a relatively simple phenomenon which indicates a more fundamental but less readily observable phenomenon."¹² The change in the number of people in cities is the simple phenomenon that serves as an index to the complex phenomenon known as the rise of urbanism. An index is not only a measure of a trend but it is also a pointer or guide-post directing the attention of the social scientist to conditions of change which warrant more intensive study.

In this connection, the census taker has perfected many specialized pointers. He not only knows where people live, but also how long they have been there, where they came from, and how they are distributed according to age, sex, income, occupation, religion, etc. The investigator who follows these leads finds himself directed to fundamental social changes. For example, the "normal" sex and age distribution of a people takes the form of a pyramid or a triangle with the children at the base constituting the largest number and the very old people appearing at the apex in small numbers.¹³ The left division of the triangle which represents males and the right which represents females are about equal. Now if the census taker reports a distorted population pyramid, the student of social change at once follows this clue to see what processes are at work. From past investigations he knows that a population figure lopsided in favor of males may indicate that the area is becoming a hobohemia where women are conspicuous by their absence, or that it is a frontier community to which women have not yet come in large numbers. A triangle suspended in mid-air without the usual number of children at the base may reveal the presence of a rooming house district where single men and women

¹² Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, p. 21, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1934.

¹³ Cf. Frank Lorimer and Frederick Osborn, *Dynamics of Population*, p. 7, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

and childless couples live. The shift of an area from one triangle "profile" to another is indicative of changes in the type of people who inhabit it, which in turn has a fundamental effect upon its social organization. These cases illustrate how a population index announces the presence of social changes, and guides one to a study of their source. Furthermore, it serves as a measure of the extent to which the change has taken place. A great many other uses have been made of population data, but we cannot go further into the question here.¹⁴

A composite social index of disorganization. A number of investigators have found that one index of disorganization is often correlated to some extent with several other symptomatic conditions. The areas which Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay designated as having high rates of delinquency and crime were also distinctive because of the mobility of their population and the excessive amount of dependency, desertion, and non-support.¹⁵

Harvey W. Zorbaugh had a similar experience in his intensive study of a rooming house area in Chicago.¹⁶ Not only did it have a distorted population triangle, but in addition it contained high rates for suicide, crime, delinquency, gang behavior, non-support, and burial in the "potter's field." From a study of such statistical indices he "guessed" that the area was quite thoroughly disorganized. This hunch was confirmed when he completed his close-up study of conditions in the community. He found that it was an area of conflicting cultures, especially conflicting mores, that life there was highly individuated, and that it was sadly lacking in any inclusive social organization. His intimate knowledge of its disorganization, secured through case studies, direct participation in the life of the community, and innumerable interviews with social workers, revealed to him the fundamental processes of disorganization to which the statistical indices had pointed in a super-

¹⁴ The social significance of population trends is further illustrated by the treatise by Lorimer and Osborn, *op. cit.*, whose emphasis is revealed in the sub-title, "Social and Biological Significance of Changing Birth Rates in the United States."

¹⁵ Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency*, vol. 2 of Report Number 13 on *The Causes of Crime*, a publication of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1931.

¹⁶ Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

ficial way. Although in his study the indices were not actually combined mathematically into one formula, yet when they were compared with one another a rough correlation was so apparent that they could be said to constitute a composite index of social disorganization.

A similar procedure followed by Andrew W. Lind in his study of Honolulu was useful in gauging the disorganization of the various social areas. Although this author also realized that an intimate knowledge of the culture of the city was necessary before any final generalizations could be reached, he saw value in combining a number of objective measurements. In his description of the method he states:

In spite of the difficulties involved, an effort has been made to devise an index of disorganization based upon the following criteria: the frequency of cases appearing before the juvenile court; the rates of dependency as measured by the cases receiving assistance from the largest social welfare agency in the city; the distribution of cases of suicides; and the rates of vice as measured by police arrests. One index serves as a check upon, and supplement to, the others.¹⁷

When these independent measures were grouped as a composite index they showed considerable consistency:

A comparison of five maps showing the distribution of cases of juvenile delinquency, dependency, suicides, and common vice reveals a uniform concentration in two areas, Palama and Kakaako, both located immediately outside the central business district of the city. These are the areas of transition between residence and business, of high value and low residential rents, characteristic of all cities. The rates of dependency and delinquency fall off, although not uniformly, as one moves outward from this zone along the three main gradients. A rough correlation with land-value gradients is likewise observable.¹⁸

In a summary of his study the author concludes that, "social disorganization proceeds according to laws which may now at

¹⁷ Andrew W. Lind, "Some Ecological Patterns of Community Disorganization in Honolulu," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 36, p. 209, Sept., 1930. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 211 f. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

least be hypothetically stated," and that "certain of these laws or principles lend themselves to most effective statement in ecological terms, i.e., position and movement."¹⁹

We shall now turn to another method of measuring disorganization which is not dependent upon yardsticks of physical distance and ecological distribution, as has been true in these cases, but which rests upon the strictly sociological concept of social distance.

Social distance as an index of disorganization.

The sense of nearness or remoteness in regard to other persons or groups is often called *social distance*. Towards members of our own congeniality group, our family, our comrades, our neighbors, our race, or our nation we feel intimate and friendly. Toward members of other families, communities, nations, and races we feel much more remote, much more distant, much less intimate or kindly. The degree of intensity of in-group *versus* out-group feeling may be measured along a scale of social distance.²⁰

An increase in out-group feelings, that is, in social distance, may be used as a qualitative measure of disorganization. In a *closely organized group* the members may have many differences but they also feel near to one another in sentiment because of their similar customs and traditions, and because of the common interests of their daily existence. Such a unified society characterized by a minimum of social distance between the persons who comprised it was picturesquely described by an Eskimo in Peter Freuchen's *Arctic Adventure*:

"Up in our country we are human! And since we are human we help each other. We don't like to hear anybody say thanks for that. If I get something today, you may get it tomorrow. Some men

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 220. Reprinted by permission of the publishers. For additional examples of indices of disorganization which are ecological in nature, cf. Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago*, chap. 7, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933; Robert E. L. Faris, "Cultural Isolation and the Schizophrenic Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 40, pp. 155-164, Sept., 1934; Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, chap. 1 and insert map, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927; Paul G. Cressey, *The Taxi-Dance Hall*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932.

²⁰ From Kimball Young's *An Introductory Sociology*, copyright, 1934, p. 97. Used by permission of American Book Company, publishers.

never kill anything because they are seldom lucky or they may not be able to run or row as fast as others. Therefore they would feel unhappy to have to be thankful to their fellows all the time. And it would not be fun for the big hunter to feel that other men were constantly humbled by him. Then his pleasure would die. Up here we say that by gifts one makes slaves, and by whips one makes dogs."²¹

Moving from these personal relationships toward a society whose members and groups are indifferent to one another's needs and jealous of one another's successes brings one toward the opposite extreme on the scale of social distance. When a society is on this side of the scale, its unity has been replaced by social barriers which mark off the differences between the factions and protect their individualistic interests at the expense of social unity. Then it is that secondary relationships come to the rescue by providing formal means of bridging the barriers. Such formal types of organizations as laws, governments, and police forces are a common means of maintaining outward unity when inwardly the society is divided against itself. When finally the point is reached at which formal organization is no longer effective in accommodating the divergent interests, then crisis and disorganization follow in rapid succession. The two maxims which summarize this analysis can be simply stated: The less the social distance the less the need for formal organization; and, the greater the social distance the greater the difficulty of maintaining unity even with the aid of organized controls. Theoretically, every group can be plotted at some point on this scale of social distance, and that point is an index of the degree of its unity or of its disorganization.

In applying such an index one encounters the problem of measuring accurately the in-group and the out-group attitudes, or the sense of nearness and of remoteness, of the persons involved. In race relations this measurement has been attempted by preparing opinion scales on which a person can register his likes and dislikes toward another race, with the assumption that these opinions indirectly reveal underlying attitudes.²² If in answer to standardized questions one person expresses a willingness to have

²¹ Peter Freuchen, *Arctic Adventure*, p. 42, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1935. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

²² For a more complete discussion of method in the measurement of attitudes, see chapter 9.

his daughter marry a member of X race, while another person opposes the slightest contact with X race, we conclude that the two belong at quite different points on the scale. Their exact position can be located after the different answers to the test have been standardized and weighted according to the degree of antipathy which they represent. If all or a large number of the persons tested show strong antipathies for X race and if, in turn, members of X race, when tested, show a similar attitude toward the others, we have a basis for saying that the unification of the two groups in one society is unlikely; that, on the contrary, the index of social distance has revealed a condition of disunity and disorganization. In chapter 9 we noted the many technical difficulties which complicate the problem of measuring social attitudes. As was mentioned there, although a great many tests have been devised, the problem is still in the experimental stage. We can, nevertheless, suggest in what fields attitude tests will be useful as a guide to disorganization and a measure of its extent.

The degree of unity or of disorganization of even such a small group as a family is indicated by the social distance of the members. In cases of disorganization the increasing distance in attitudes between husband and wife could be plotted on an ascending curve as petty quarrels merged with major personality clashes and culminated in separation or divorce. Divorce rates, themselves, have often been taken as an index of family disorganization. Although they have the advantage of being entirely objective, they are crude indices because they ignore the many families which are sociologically disorganized even though legal separation has not yet taken place.

Certain phases of economic disorganization could also be subject to measurement by the index of social distance. As hostile attitudes increase between laborers and employers, between strikers and "scabs," between farmers and city workers, between pro-tariff and anti-tariff interests, between advocates and opponents of child labor legislation, between adherents to private control and advocates of government ownership, between chain store corporations and independent retailers, and between consumers and manufacturers, these attitudes serve as forewarnings of interaction based on conflict instead of cooperation. These or similar clashes of interests spelled the doom of cooperative organization under the National Industrial Recovery Act, account for the historic schism within the

ranks of organized labor between the trade and industrial unions, explain why the movement toward "industrial democracy in industry" has made such little headway, and why advertising agencies and consumers' research organizations are frequently in conflict.

Social distance is also a useful concept in gauging the organization or disorganization of rural communities. In Grundy County, Missouri,²³ the farmers were hostile toward the townspeople because they thought the merchants exploited them economically and adopted superiority attitudes socially. In turn, the business men resented the farmers' patronage of the mail-order houses and trips to the larger city for supplies. The distance between the two groups was so great that there was no inclusive organization. The subsequent reduction of this social distance, even to the point of intimate friendship, which followed from the efforts of certain leaders to build new social attitudes and establish an inclusive group life constitutes a happy ending to this story of community conflict and cooperation. The latter developments in this case illustrate the final stage in the sequence of social change which we are to study, namely, social reorganization.

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Chapter 28

SOCIAL REORGANIZATION

THE LOWER NORTH COMMUNITY COUNCIL¹

THE MAN who came, in the spring of 1919, as the first secretary of the Lower North Community Council had been fired with enthusiasm aroused in many parts of the country by the social unit experiment in Cincinnati. He saw in the community converts the possibility of a greater organization of local life in the city. With a balance in the bank, turned over to the Community Council from the Council of National Defense, he launched upon an ambitious program.

The plan was to organize from the bottom up—to make the council both communal and democratic. The immediate objective for membership was placed at five thousand. The direction of the activities of the Council was to be placed in the hands of an executive committee and delegated to sub-committees. On these committees every language, race, and color, every shade of political and religious belief, every degree of economic and social position was to be represented. The work of the Community Council was to consist in the coordination of agencies and efforts devoted to the amelioration of conditions on the Near North Side, to the securing of needed improvements for the Near North Side, and, above all, to the building up of a spirit of neighborliness and a community of interest among the varied groups living on the Near North Side.

A large number of committees immediately organized and set to work. A health committee began investigating sanitary conditions in the slum, attempting to organize blocks to clean up homes, streets, and alleys. A "pied piper" was hired by a member of this committee to rid the entire district of rats. A man was sent out on the streets of

¹ Adapted by permission of the publishers from Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, pp. 204-207, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929.

the slum with a bat and ball to search out groups of street gamins, gangs, and "athletic clubs," and to direct their interest from gang fights and gambling to organized play. A committee on housing also set to work in Little Hell. There were other committees on education, industry, spare time, a substitute for the saloon, music, community celebrations, a public forum, and the like. A community bulletin was printed weekly; a committee on membership began a drive to carry the membership of the Community Council to every group on the Near North Side. Italians, Persians, Germans, and Negroes served with Gold Coasters on these committees.

The program of the Lower North Community Council proved too ambitious for realization. The effort to recapture the neighborly feeling and the community solidarity that characterizes an old-time rural village or a primitive group proved to be a failure. The Council eventually became metamorphosed into a social agency with a much more limited purpose; it became an organization concerned more with amelioration of a few of the worst family situations and with solving some of the recreation and health problems in the worst part of the area. It ceased to attempt a reorganization that would affect the life of the whole original constituency.

Not all reform movements meet with such poor success as this one. Many triumph over difficulties and achieve real social changes that eliminate some of the maladjustments and reduce the disorganization in at least some aspect of community life. If the problems of social disorganization are as numerous as was indicated in the last chapter, then it is worth while to consider ways and means of *social reorganization*. Continuing the discussion of social change from the short-time viewpoint, this final chapter will be devoted to considering some of the forms of reorganization that may take place in a society and some of the ways in which the changes that make for reorganization come about.

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL REORGANIZATION

First we must make sure we understand what social reorganization implies. Is it something that takes place automatically when disorganization becomes severe enough, or does it depend upon human deliberation and planning? A yes or no answer is

not possible to this question; it all depends upon the point of view. If the observer is far enough from the society, then disorganization-reorganization appears to be as natural a process as the seasonal changes that take place in the organization of an ant colony. If on the other hand the observer is himself a part of the society, then he is conscious of human dissatisfactions with things as they are and of aspirations toward improvement. He sees reorganization as the fruit of man's struggle for self-betterment in the face of difficult odds. Both viewpoints have their values in the understanding of social processes. In adopting the second in this chapter we must not forget that as we come closer and examine reorganization through the eyes of a participant observer it is more difficult to maintain objectivity, for the aims and methods of social reform in our complex culture are matters about which it is hard to be dispassionate, since they are of such vital concern to us.

Social reorganization and social progress. All activities that come under the head of deliberately planned social reorganization imply some projected goals toward which efforts are directed. In a comprehensive program for reorganization, the goal is better organization for the whole society and increased welfare for all its members. In a more limited and partial movement for change, the end to be achieved may only be improved conditions of life for a relatively small proportion of the population, a clique, a social class, a pressure group, or the inhabitants of a local area. Wherever deliberate social change is undertaken, however, there will be some professed aims, usually of lofty character, which attempt to define what constitutes betterment for the members of the group. These aims imply a belief in the possibility of what we call *progress*, and they define what progress is for the particular group.

We are so used to this idea of progressive self-improvement that we do not always realize how recent it is in human thinking. It is in fact one of the peculiar characteristics of our culture that we cherish this belief in controlled social change. In primitive society people were more concerned with keeping to the good old ways than in inventing supposedly better new ones. The old ways served to ward off some of the evil influences in nature; all else was Fate or Destiny. It was not until man began to have much more control over nature that a belief in the possibility of improving his lot began to gain acceptance. The viewpoint at first

was optimistic, and progress was believed to be, like evolution, inevitable. Disillusionment has come since, however, and while in America at least there is still a firm belief in the possibility of progress, it is recognized that human betterment is not something achieved automatically. It has to be earned.²

So long as progress is regarded as inevitable, there is little need to attempt to define it; but once it becomes a matter of struggle and effort, then one must know what to struggle for. All sorts of criteria of progress have been put forth,³ ranging from the naive "bigger and better" doctrine (bigger hence better) of the local booster to the carefully worked out standards of utopian social philosophers like Edward Bellamy⁴ or H. G. Wells.⁵ Not only are there general conceptions of progressive social change, applying to the whole of society, but also more specialized theories relating to particular aspects of life or special social institutions. One hears often of progress in municipal government, in child welfare, in industrial efficiency, in artistic creativeness, in scientific knowledge. Implicit in any local or specialized set of progress criteria is a more general ideal of welfare to which the particular improvements advocated contribute, but the inclusive ideal often remains vague and unformulated. The feminists can, if pressed, tell you how woman's suffrage will benefit the whole of humanity, and so can the single taxers with respect to their program, and the W. C. T. U. with respect to theirs. But all three groups may at first find it difficult to do so, for they have been thinking in terms of goals more specific and immediate. The woman's suffrage group, rather than formulate a complete theory of woman's place in the ideal society, might simply be content to rest their case on the dogmatic doctrine of natural rights.

All this goes to show that while we nowadays act as if we believed in progress, we are for the most part content to define it on a common-sense immediate gain or loss basis, leaving more

² For a history of the idea of progress see J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, Macmillan and Company, London, 1920. See also Carl Becker, "Progress," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, pp. 495-499, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934.

³ Cf. Arthur J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922.

⁴ *Looking Backward, 2000-1887*, Boston, 1889.

⁵ *A Modern Utopia*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1905; also *The Shape of Things to Come*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933.

systematic charting of the course toward improvement to a professional intellectual cult. Reorganization is defined in terms of next steps and needs of the moment rather than as a part of a long-time universal plan.

The scope of social reorganization programs. Even with this limitation, the social reorganization concept still manages to cover a very wide range of reform activities. At one extreme there are the mildly ameliorative programs of the well-meaning conservatives, the charitably inclined, the social work profession,⁶ the service clubs of business men, and the large majority of the churches. These groups can see social disorganization in its small-scale aspects. They organize to improve the morale of individuals and of families and other groups who have been frustrated by life conditions. They attempt also in a piecemeal way to improve these conditions; to decrease vice, to promote temperance, to increase home ownership and improve housing, to provide better educational facilities, to cut down the accident rate, to improve the standards and increase the availability of medical care. In order to attain these various ends toward which different groups work separately, some changes in social organization are necessary. But they are changes localized in one or another part of the structure and do not fundamentally affect the pattern of the whole.

Of course, at the opposite end of the scale from the conservative reformers are the so-called radical groups who want change to be greater in amount and much more sweeping. They are not satisfied with attempts to patch up what they call the "old order"; they wish to scrap it for a new one in which the whole organization of society will be fundamentally changed. Different groups differ as to just what sort of a new social order is needed to eliminate all the strains and maladjustments of modern life, but they are

⁶ The social worker has often been accused of helping to patch up an outworn system and thus to stand in the way of needed revolutionary change. In recent years there have been some signs of a dissatisfaction with their philosophy and methods by social workers themselves. While the social work profession remains officially conservative, except as far as reforms promoting the efficiency of the ameliorative program are concerned, there are apparently an increasing number of individuals within the group who are joining movements for more sweeping social reform. For a discussion by social workers of the reconstructive implications of social work programs see Ellery F. Reed, "Efforts of Social Workers Toward Social Reorganization," and Grace L. Coyle, "The Limitations of Social Work in Relation to Social Reorganization," *Social Forces*, vol. 14, pp. 87-102, Oct., 1935.

all at one in believing that no half-way measures will serve the purpose. To them social reorganization means not merely social reform but social reconstruction. Most of them have visions of a new scheme of things which can be attained only by revolutionary social change.

In between these two extremes of liberal-conservatism and radicalism come the large majority of social movements. They are not entirely local or concerned with one phase only of the institutional framework; neither are they aimed at tearing down the whole framework and building anew. The peace movement, the labor movement (in the United States), the progressive education movement, the movement for inter-church unity, the anti-crime crusade, all have reform programs that possess implications for many phases of social existence without encompassing the institutional pattern as a whole.

The sequence pattern of social reorganization. The reorganization process begins when some individual or small group of individuals becomes conscious of a need for change in some part of the social organization. Thereafter reorganization tends to follow a sort of cyclical pattern.⁷ First there is a period of growth for the movement during which the original instigators gain converts, effect a preliminary organization, and formulate a program. Then come increased and more systematic efforts to gain adherents, the exertion of pressure of some sort on those in authority, and finally a showdown. The program in part or in whole is accepted or rejected. If accepted, the changes that were urged are gradually made, and there is a new social fabric perhaps with fewer stresses and maladjustments. If rejected, the movement either collapses or reorganizes for a new trial of strength at a later date. Usually neither complete acceptance nor complete rejection is the outcome of the agitation, but rather a partial victory or some sort of compromise. Thus the progressive education movement has begun with triumphs in the fields of grade school and secondary education, but as yet has been largely balked by the colleges. Similarly, American feminism, after repeated defeats and disappointments, finally won women the ballot. In most states it has still to gain

⁷ For a slightly different description of the sequence pattern see Jerome Davis, *Contemporary Social Movements*, pp. 8-9, The Century Company, New York, 1930.

them the right to sit on juries and has yet to remove all of their disabilities at law.

There are many variations in practice from this typical life history of a reorganization movement. Some of them will come out as we discuss the methods and procedures of social reform in greater detail.

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The beginnings of the reform movement. Out of a situation of social unrest and dissatisfaction, a state of social disorganization, there will arise sooner or later individuals who will lead the sufferers in protest. These persons may not be the ultimate leaders of the organized social movement that is to come. Their immediate function is to crystallize emotion and make people conscious that here is an issue important to them at stake. Sometimes the first leader of a movement is a prophet and a visionary who creates a crowd following by promulgating panaceas that are unreal and that provide only a form of escape.⁸ Sometimes the first man to gain adherents is simply the one who is most indignant and most vociferous; he blurts out what others have been thinking but have perhaps not dared to say. There are, however, other types of instigators who are more foresighted and planful. Often the discontented are incited to action to serve the purposes of a shrewd politician who wishes to ride into power (and plenty!) on the wave of indignation he has stimulated. Then too there is the special interest group in business which hopes to profit by a reform movement that helps it or hurts its competitors. One can imagine, for instance, that the voting machine manufacturer might take a fatherly interest in a campaign for ballot box reform, and burlesque show proprietors would be all for clean drama—in the movies. Finally there is the sincere and at the same time clever and resourceful reform leader who starts a movement and sticks with it to the finish. Jane Addams and Margaret Sanger would fall under this latter type.

Resistance to reform. There is latent resistance to any proposal to change the *status quo*. As soon as a reform movement appears on the social horizon there is an immediate alignment of

⁸ Cf. the discussion of social movements with crowd characteristics in chapter 12.

forces against it. The final success of the movement will depend upon its ability to overcome the obstacles that will inevitably be placed in its way.

The natural conservatism of habit is perhaps the most serious obstacle a reform movement has to overcome. The old ways, even though they have not produced ideal conditions, are still the familiar ones, and people have to be worked up to the point of chancing their present security (insecure though they may really be) for the possibility of betterment. Thus the unemployed man, even though he is dissatisfied with present conditions, still does not want to risk the hazard of a social revolution.⁹ He is adjusted psychologically to the old order in which he once had a job and a future; he finds it easier to hope for a new job and a new future when "things get better." He does not know what his opportunities would be or where he would fit in if society went through any fundamental change.

This sense of uncertainty, of unfamiliarity, in relation to the proposed new order is what seemingly appalls individuals. It is the chief basis of the phenomenon which sociologists call *cultural inertia*. The older people grow, the more rigid and fixed become their ideas and the harder it is to enlist them under any reform banner. Youth plus a relatively few older persons who are intellectual liberals, habitual radicals, or desperate and unhappy failures constitute the potential public in support of movements for fundamental social change. The rest are conservative in outlook, and hard to arouse in support of reform programs. They are a drag on or a desirable balance wheel in (depending on the viewpoint of the appraisers) social reconstruction.

Besides these rather vague but nevertheless potent antipathies toward the new and the unfamiliar there are also some much more definite reasons for opposing social change on the part of most of us. We have what are called *vested interests* in things as they are. A vested interest is a preferred position, a point of vantage in the struggle for existence that has been obtained under a given socio-economic system and according to a given set of "rules of the game." When someone comes along who proposes to change those rules so that our painfully acquired skills and techniques are useless and our hard-won advantage is swept away, we are likely

⁹ Especially if he gets his relief check regularly.

to exhibit much more than mere distrust or apathy. We are ready to fight against the iniquitous reform program that seems to bring about social betterment solely at our expense.

The big economic vested interests of business which combat any changes in the American system of free private enterprise are, of course, well known, but there are many more subtle vested interests whose influences are powerful but not so well publicized. There is a tremendous vested interest in organized religion; thousands of men and women live by and gain prestige in the community through serving the church, and with the best will in the world toward their fellow man, it is hard for them to see merit in any new order that does not preserve their position. The same might be said of the school teachers who have a vital interest in maintaining our elaborate system of formal education, of the military cult which must believe in "preparedness," in fact of any social institution that has existed long enough to develop a system of immunities and privileges. Even on the campus one finds vested interests. The successful upperclassman who has worked hard to gain his managership and other extra-curricular activity honors is likely to feel aggrieved and resentful when some younger iconoclast pokes fun at the whole system, calls it a prolongation of adolescence, and advocates more attention to world issues and less to "petty" campus affairs.

Finally, reform programs compete among themselves. While the conservatives are united in opposition to all change, the reformers are usually divided. It is a common saying that a left wing socialist hates a right wing socialist more than he does a capitalist, and while the statement is probably untrue, it serves as a good illustration of the divisions that nearly always characterize the reform element. These divisions are costly, for, as Hertzler points out:¹⁰

. . . in the struggle over progress along a certain line the 40 per cent of conservatives who resist this change, or any change, may more than hold the 60 per cent who desire the change. The conservative minority opposing the progressive move are in agreement. On the other hand the 60 per cent (and it may just as well be more), while they are in

¹⁰ Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social Progress*, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1928.

favor of progress along the particular line, are not agreed on just what they want or how they want to bring it about, and pull in different directions, thus neutralizing each other's progressive efforts, and are stopped or even dominated by the unified "won't" power of the conservatives.¹¹

Organizing the reform movement. If a social movement is to grow beyond a small clique of protestants, it must develop an organization for the propagation of its ideas. The type of organization which will be developed will depend upon the resources of the instigators, upon the constituency they wish to reach, and upon the cause they desire to further. The organization will nearly always contain a small group or directorate of insiders who will control the funds and the campaign strategy. Some of these people may be silent partners in the enterprise while others "front" for them before the public. The composition of the group—Giddings called it a *protocracy*¹²—will change as the movement gains added following. Some of the original leaders will be forced out, and others, more able or more unscrupulous, will take their places, while around the nucleus or inner circle will gather a larger and larger body of aides and lieutenants. As the organizational framework grows larger and the payroll bigger, the movement itself becomes institutionalized, with its own workers having a vested interest in its continuance. Often after the original ends of the movement have been achieved the organization will linger on. There will be strong pressure to find some new goals to interest the financial sponsors so that the staff can continue to work and draw salaries.

As the organization grows it also becomes less flexible, more formalized. If it gains power it tends to use it to maintain the new status it has created. It becomes a conservative force, and new reform groups arise and attack it, thus beginning anew the cycle of social change.

Program making and planning. While a reform movement arises out of protest against things as they are, it soon acquires a program for making them better. It is by the program that the movement often is identified, and it is on the basis of the proposals

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 118. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

¹² Franklin H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 268, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922.

n it that the movement, ostensibly at least, makes its plea for support. Generally the program is formulated by the leader or the inner circle; rarely does it arise out of discussion in any large group, although it may be modified in response to group protest. Often there is a form of ratification procedure gone through with in order to command more loyal group support.

Programs may be vague and general or detailed and specific, mildly corrective or revolutionary. What is more important, they may be practical and possible of achievement or visionary and doomed to failure. Sumner long ago pointed out that reform programs which run counter to the mores have little chance of being generally adopted.¹³ If, as Ernest W. Burgess suggests, the three dominant elements in our American mores are *individualism*, *democracy*, and *humanitarianism*,¹⁴ then it would follow that reform programs not in accord with these three principles would stand little chance of success. We need not fear fascistic movements or be worried (if we are) about collectivist tendencies, for they are strange and unwanted importations in our American scheme. "Changes that run with the mores are easily brought about, but . . . changes which are opposed to the mores require long and patient effort, if they are possible at all."¹⁵

Of course, the limitation on change implied in the previous paragraph is a too rigid one. Some leeway for reform is provided through conflicts within the mores; when individualism and humanitarianism clash there is a chance to get groups to cede some of the former in the interests of the latter. Then too, one must not forget that the mores themselves are not eternal. Due to changing technology they are in our time forced to speed up their usually imperceptible rate of change. The moral then is not to despair of reorganization in society, but not to expect it to come too quickly. Programs must be made in the light of the prejudices, convictions, and stereotypes even of those whom the change will eventually benefit. People must not be expected to go too far beyond their present positions so long as the current mores have any meaning for them. They cannot be "reformed" over night.

¹³ William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 87-93, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1906.

¹⁴ Ernest W. Burgess, "Social Planning and the Mores," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 29, p. 4, Aug., 1935.

¹⁵ Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

All this has implications for the current movement for *social planning*. The planner differs perhaps from the typical reformer in that he utilizes the best fruits of scientific research as well as his humanitarian impulses in program making. He takes the social welfare ideals current in modern social work and mental hygiene, combines them with factual data supplied by economics, political science, human geography, and engineering, and evolves a *plan* for improving conditions in an industry, an institution, a community, or a regional area. The three five-year plans in Soviet Russia, the Tennessee Valley Authority experiment in the United States, and the garden city movement in England are conspicuous examples of planning technique. The Lower North Community Council illustrates planning on a smaller scale.

Undoubtedly we need to utilize this sort of approach to social problems much more fully, but in doing so we must not forget the sociologists' caution. Forcing people to change their way of life "for their own good" is a difficult business. The expert who tries to manipulate them like counters is in for a disillusionment because they will perversely resist his efforts. The whole matter has been well summarized by Burgess and we cannot do better than to quote from him in conclusion:

The popular feeling of distrust of the specialist is largely due to his abstract treatment of human situations. To the average man the expert and the reformer are alike in their disposition to formulate and champion welfare programs without sufficiently taking into account the feelings, attitudes, and wishes of the human beings involved.

The feelings, attitudes, and wishes of people are part of the situation and should also be considered. It is . . . the sociologist who by training and interest is fitted to deal with the human factors in the situation, that is with human nature, traditions and customs.¹⁶

Gaining adherents for the reform program. Even when a plan or program has been formulated so as to attract and not repel the public for which it was conceived, there is still the problem of making the people aware of it, of pointing out its merits and showing how it meets one of their real needs. If the plan

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 16. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, publishers.

does not emanate from those already in authority, it is necessary also to build up a large band of followers capable of giving strong support when the time comes for social decision on the issues raised. Both the breaking down of resistance to an officially inspired plan and the creation of a widespread public demand for an unofficial one involve the arts and techniques of the public opinion manipulator. What sort of an appeal is most effective? How can Mr. Average Man's apathy and "sales resistance" with respect to the panaceas in the reform program be broken down?

The use of symbols and stereotypes. As Walter Lippman has shown so clearly in his classic book on Public Opinion,¹⁷ the average citizen has neither the time nor the background knowledge to become really informed about any but a very few issues. He has only a few over-simplified and frequently distorted "pictures in his head" about the real facts pertinent to the appeals for his support that are constantly being made to him. On the basis of these pictures or, as Lippman calls them, *stereotypes*, he makes his judgments as to the merits and demerits of reform programs. Often he knows that his information is scanty and unreliable, and he trusts someone else to decide the matter at issue for him. Other times he assumes the essential correctness of his stereotypes and makes his decision on them. He decides that the Canadian-American trade agreement is bad because "all lowering of tariff barriers exploits the American worker." He argues in favor of the T. V. A. because he has heard somewhere that "this is an age of giant power."

Even these conclusions represent some reasoning, although the premises are faulty and the logic much too simple. But many times the citizen has no basis for deciding on rational grounds at all. If then he is to be enlisted in any crusade it must be through his emotional adherence to general, high sounding catchwords or phrases which represent "his principles" or stand as symbols conditioned to arouse his prejudices. The crowd leader knows that he must not present a reasoned argument in support of a carefully thought out and complex program if he wants to keep his following. The reformer trying to create public opinion would not dare present such an appeal to his potential adherents either, except

¹⁷ *Public Opinion*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1922.

perhaps to a small group who are technically well-informed. For the mass he must subordinate the scientific and intellectual to the dramatic and emotion-arousing. If he is trying to work up a campaign for a municipally owned electricity plant he will talk about the community's owning its own facilities (an appeal to civic pride), about independence from "Grasping Power Monopolies," the promise of "Lower Rates," and "Better Service." For the slightly more intelligent citizen there will be some comparative figures showing the advantages of municipal ownership in other carefully selected cities. These are designed to build up a stereotyped belief in public ownership and operation which has worked "everywhere else" and must therefore work in our fair city as well.

The opposition will make its campaign on about the same level. Neither side will attempt to discuss publicly the really complicated accounting and management problems involved; they are only for experts. The public will be given information in homeopathic doses (which is all it can tolerate) and will be fed largely on slogans and symbols. For once the citizen has developed an approving attitude toward the moral principles and the general aims professed and has acquired confidence in the standard-bearers, it is relatively easy to convince him about the details of the program. He will take the details "on faith."

Publicity and propaganda. While there are some secret cabals and underground agitations that may not use the ordinary channels of publicity, most social movements depend upon public speeches, the radio, moving pictures, and especially books, pamphlets, and newspapers as a means of disseminating material favorable to their cause. So great is the competition for the little time and attention the average citizen devotes to public issues that the appeals seem constantly to grow more blatant at one extreme and more subtle at the other. A new professional group of *public relations counsels* has appeared to aid all types of social movements in getting a hearing before the public.

When possible the reform group tries to get its publicity for nothing by convincing newspaper and newsreel editors that information about its activities and program should be classified not as advertising but as *news*. Public relations counsels are experts in finding news value in the most prosaic events and in dramatizing the most stodgy programs. So clever are they that the modern

newspaper now contains each day a large number¹⁸ of news stories that originated as publicity handouts from interested sources. There is nothing particularly sinister in this arrangement so long as sound editorial judgment continues to be exercised, and frequently the press releases from special interest groups and reform organizations contain more accurate and more valuable information than the reporter, acting by himself, would be able to secure. A newspaper, however, has just so much space in which to deal with a million events of news interest that occur daily. If news comes to the editor free of charge and sufficient in amount to fill all the gaps between the day's big stories, why bother to send reporters out for more? It is therefore a publicity "release" self-prepared or no publicity at all so far as most reform organizations are concerned.

Not all publicity is propaganda nor all propaganda publicity, but the two are very closely related. Rightly used, the term "propaganda" need connote nothing sinister or underhanded. It is simply "the transmission of attitudes that are recognized as *controversial* within the community."¹⁹ Publicity that relates to debatable issues and that is tendential in aim, i.e., aimed to convert or convince, is one form of propaganda. But propaganda may be disseminated non-publicly through word-of-mouth gossip, "whispering campaigns," appeals sent through the mail, or house-to-house canvass. The use of propaganda material in some form is almost indispensable in creating a reform public; only when a crisis produces a sudden wave of feeling in a community and precipitates a conviction and a desire for action can its use be avoided. People will not know about an article for sale unless it is advertised; they will not espouse a new attitude unless its advantages are made known.

Propagandizing is an art, not a science, and it is as difficult to

¹⁸ Silas Bent insists that "the better half of our news sifts through publicity screens" and reports that "newspaper men estimate that there are five thousand publicity agencies and persons . . . in New York City alone, and in Washington . . . three thousand." These agencies maintain constant pressure to get material into the news columns of newspapers.—*Ballyhoo*, pp. 122, 123. Reprinted by permission of Liveright Publishing Corporation.

¹⁹ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Study and Practice of Propaganda" in Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*, p. 3, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1935. Lasswell points out that the transmission of *non-controversial* attitudes is not propaganda, but *education*.

summarize its technique as it is those of the musician or painter. A good propagandist must understand people, their desires, fears, prejudices, and enthusiasms. Since his ideas must reach them chiefly through the medium of language, he must be familiar with their slang and jargon and especially those symbolic words and phrases that at the time have especial power to move them. Finally, he must follow some such principles as those outlined in Knight Dunlap's "six fundamental rules" of propaganda. Dunlap's rules are:

1. If you have an idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly. Keep talking (or printing) systematically and persistently.

2. Avoid argument, as a general thing. Do not admit there is any "other side"; and in all statements scrupulously avoid arousing reflection or associated ideas, except those which are favorable. Reserve argument for the small class of people who depend on logical processes. . . .

3. In every possible way, connect the idea you wish to put over with the known desires of your audience. Remember that wishes are the basis of the acceptance of ideas in more cases than logic is.

4. Make your statements clear, and in such language that your audience can repeat them, in thought, without the need of transforming them.

5. Use direct statements only when you are sure that a basis for acceptance has already been laid. Otherwise, use indirect statement, innuendo, and implication. Use direct statement in such a way that the attention of the audience shall be drawn to it sufficiently to take it in, but not sufficiently to reflect upon it.

6. For the most permanent eventual results, aim your propaganda at the children; mix it in your pedagogy.²⁰

Perhaps after reading this somewhat cynical but undoubtedly quite accurate propaganda primer one may understand why propagandists have such a bad name. And yet, once we stop to consider, we realize that the fault lies not with the propagandists' methods, since they are grounded in human psychology. If we object to a propaganda it may be because it is untrue, and truth is slow to catch up with and neutralize error. It is more likely,

²⁰ Knight Dunlap, *Civilized Life*, pp. 360-361, Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1934. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

however, to be because we do not like the propagandist's aims. How to eliminate vicious propaganda that aids exploitation, that enhances prejudice between class and class and nation and nation, that propagates lies, and that in the long run promotes social disorganization rather than reorganization is the problem. But who is to determine what is true and what is in the social interest? If the analysis of the problem of controlling propaganda is carried through it leads inevitably to one of two conclusions. The first is dictatorship. The second is the conclusion of Lasswell:

The only effective weapon against propaganda on behalf of one policy seems to be propaganda on behalf of an alternative. Legal regulations to enforce publicity, to censor or punish for fraud, libel, and slander can be effective only when there is a consensus on the meaning of integrity. . . . Repression unsupported by concession and propaganda merely drives hostile propaganda underground.²¹

Leadership. The role of leadership in connection with social movements has been discussed in an earlier chapter.²² Frequently the personal ascendancy of some one individual is more important in the growth of a reform public than tons of newspaper propaganda. People develop sentiments of loyalty and devotion to the man himself; they believe in his pronouncements and they vote, demonstrate, contribute money, send telegrams to Congressmen when he tells them to. Propaganda tends to be evaluated not only in terms of its content but also of its source, and when the source is an admired or beloved leader the effect upon the attitudes of the propagandized is greatly enhanced.

What manner of man possesses this sort of power over his fellows? L. H. Moore²³ lists democratic attitudes, vitality, positiveness, friendliness, enthusiasm, sympathy, trustworthiness, and perseverance as traits the possession of which will endear a leader to his followers. To these must be added the previously mentioned ability to dramatize issues and to define in clear-cut phrases the

²¹ From Harold D. Lasswell, "Propaganda," *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 12, pp. 526. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²² Chapter 12.

²³ L. H. Moore, "Leadership Traits of College Women," *Sociology and Social Research*, vol. 17, p. 53, Sept.-Oct., 1932.

group's own unrest. Trotter sums up the requirements for political leadership in cynical but probably accurate fashion thus:

If a man is fluent, dextrous, and ready on the platform, he possesses the one indispensable requisite for statesmanship; if in addition he has the gift of moving deeply the emotions of his hearers, his capacity for guiding the infinite complexities of national life become undeniable. Experience has shown that no exceptional degree of any other capacity is necessary to make a successful leader. There need be no specially arduous training, no great weight of knowledge either of affairs or of the human heart. . . . The successful shepherd thinks like his sheep, and can lead his flock only if he keeps the shortest distance in advance. He must remain, in fact, recognizable as one of the flock, magnified no doubt, louder, coarser, above all with more urgent wants and ways of expressing them than the common sheep, but in essence to their feeling of the same flesh with them. . . . If a leader's marks of identity with the herd are of the right kind, the more they are paraded the better. We like to see photographs of him nursing his little granddaughter, we like to know that he plays golf badly, and rides the bicycle like our common selves.²⁴

Men like Huey Long, William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas Heflin, "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, William Hale Thompson would doubtless qualify under many of these specifications. One must remember, however, that it is the person *plus the group* and *plus the situation* that make the leader, and there are many different kinds of reform groups and many different types of crises into which the group may fall. Woodrow Wilson, a relatively austere intellectual, for a while held the people of the world in his thrall. John Dewey, a philosopher with little forensic skill but with many new and vital ideas, has been a world-wide leader of reform in education.

As a social movement continues to grow it acquires a framework of organization. There are officers who are vested with authority to speak in the name of the cause's adherents and to impose such discipline as is necessary to keep the movement compact, vital, and concentrated on the achievement of its professed aims. Often these officers are *headmen* rather than leaders, per-

²⁴ From W. I. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, pp. 116 f. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

forming functions that have already been routinized. But there must be real leadership somewhere in the movement if it is to preserve its drive and its sense of mission. There is nothing like personal loyalty to a leader or to an ideal which a leader symbolizes to preserve that important thing called *morale*.²⁵ Morale is something no reform group can afford to be without.

THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL DECISION

So far we have been discussing the preparatory stages in changing the cultural pattern, the mobilizing of a "will to change" in the form of a social movement. Now it is time to deal with the actual process of change itself. From the short-time point of view, this may be called the process of *social decision*; society is "making up its mind" whether to follow the new ways or the old.

Of course, society has no "mind" that is more than a composite of the minds of its members;²⁶ consequently, whenever any one person's attitude is changed, a part at least of a social decision has taken place. In many realms of culture there is simply a slow and gradual shift of opinions from one point of view toward another, and while this means that social decision is taking place, the process at any one time is almost imperceptible. When a strong social movement is developed to back some reform program, then the decision process is brought out into the open and speeded up. Even here the exact moment at which the "decision" can be said to have been made is indefinable, but at least it can be placed between narrower time limits. No one knows just when society "decided" to adopt the one-piece bathing suit or the now standard arm signal for left-hand turns in driving; they were not pushed by reform agencies. But national women's suffrage, the adoption of

²⁵ For a penetrating analysis of the relation between leadership and morale see Paul Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, pp. 291-303, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1935.

²⁶ This is an ancient issue in sociological theory. But the "group mind," at least in its simple form as an actual entity, has been generally discarded. There would still be some difference of opinion as to whether a public opinion is a mere aggregate of individual opinion or whether it has a *gestalt* or form-pattern that is a function of the *relations* between the opinions as well as of the opinions themselves. Cf. Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 465-466, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1928; Earle E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, pp. 163-164, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1932.

a city-manager plan in Cleveland, or a reapportionment of representatives in Congress can be assigned each to a fairly definite date.

It is the decisions that are the result of some type of formal strength-showing, a vote or a combat by contending factions, that are the easiest to plot on a time scale and to examine. The issues then are formulated more definitely, and the public is more aware that a decision is taking place. There are many different ways in which the relative strengths of different opinion-groups can be determined. There are also different conclusions that may be drawn by majority and minority after a showdown. What recourse is left to the loser after a public opinion trial of strength?

Social decision through democratic procedure. Theoretically, democratic procedure implies majority rule. Whenever a social movement can show that it has 51 per cent of the public back of its program, the measures advocated should be put into effect. The minority is expected to acquiesce in the decision although reserving the right to upset it by democratic processes in the future. No coercion is necessary since all parties agree to abide by the results of a vote in which each citizen casts one ballot. Each adult person counts just as much in the decision as, but no more than, anyone else.

In a small community the simple democratic process of voting in town-meeting will produce a social decision that really reflects majority and minority views. In any small self-contained organization like a church congregation or a student body of a small college, the same thing is true. Just as soon, however, as the group affected becomes so large as to make the use of delegates or representatives necessary, elements other than the simple counting of adherents enter in to complicate the decision process. The delegate may not know how his constituency thinks on the particular issue at stake, or he may disregard their opinion if his position is secure and it is more profitable to him personally to do so. Minority interests, through being better organized and better able to punish the delegate for his actions on issues vital to them, can often stave off or overturn a majority. Where social decision takes place through the formal political process of legislation, an apathetic majority public is constantly being balked by a small but active minority pressure group. The pressure group may be the creation of an economic special interest (The Chamber of Commerce, The National Electric Light Association, The Farm Bureau, The

American Federation of Labor, et al.), or it may be another name for an organized reform movement like The Anti-Saloon League, The American Birth Control League, or The National Council for the Prevention of War. Through propaganda directed at the delegate or representative, through an exchange of favors which only sometimes reaches the stage of bribery, through threats to go back and defeat him in his district, the pressure group exerts influence on the delegate that is out of proportion to the numerical importance of its following. To this must be added its advantage in being on the spot, alert and informed, at the time when the decision is to be made. Not many "wires" can be pulled from a distance.

The process of group thinking. The failure of the town-meeting type of democracy to function in modern complex society and the tendency toward control through power-groups has led to much soul-searching on the part of those who still believe in democratic principles. If the person is to become more and more a puppet in the hands of special interest groups who manipulate him and change his opinions (as far as the mores will allow) by propaganda, and who corrupt or intimidate his chosen delegates, the future of the democratic ideal is not a bright one. How to restore some meaningful function in social change to the individual citizen in a world that presents problems too complex for him to understand is the question. Can he through some revived process of public discussion be re-endowed with the ability to make up his mind intelligently on social issues? Or must he, except in the very small realm of affairs that concerns his family and his other primary group relations, lose all possibility of intelligent and independent choice?

No answer can yet be given to these questions. One group of sociologists have, however, put forth some tentative hypotheses concerning a "new state" in which social decisions will be the results of "creative discussion" among individual citizens to a much greater degree than is now the case. What is meant by "creative discussion"? It is a process of *group thinking* in which the members through interaction produce a higher thought synthesis. Mary P. Follett describes the process thus:

Let us imagine that you, I, A, B, and C are in conference. Now what from our observation of groups will take place? Will you say

something, and then I add a little something, and then A, and B, and C, until we have together built up, brick-wise, an idea, constructed some plan of action? Never. A has one idea, B another, C's idea is something different from either, and so on, but we cannot add all these ideas to find the group idea. They will not add any more than apples and chairs will add. But we gradually find that our problem can be solved, not indeed by mechanical aggregation, but by the subtle process of the intermingling of all the ideas of the group. A says something. Thereupon a thought arises in B's mind. Is it B's idea or A's? Neither. It is a mingling of the two. We find that A's idea, after having been presented to B and returned to A, has become slightly, or largely different from what it was originally. In like manner it is affected by C and so on. But in the same way B's idea has been affected by all the others, and not only does A's idea feel the modifying influence of each of the others, but A's ideas are affected by B's relation to all the others, and A's plus B's are affected by all the others individually and collectively, and so on and on until the common idea springs into being.

We find in the end that it is not a question of my idea being supplemented by yours, but that there has been evolved a composite idea. . . . The course of action decided upon is what we all together want, and I see that it is better than what I had wanted alone. It is what *I* now want. We have all experienced this at committee meetings or conferences.²⁷

This sort of interaction is an art that can be acquired only with practice. Too often a conference group turns into a debating society in which different factions try to defend or justify rather than explore and integrate. One must have faith in the possibility of ultimately achieving a synthesis rather than a compromise of divergent views and one must also cherish respect for the potential contribution of even the most unpromising group member if one is to get over the slow preliminary stages of exploration and mutual self-discovery and on to the point where new ideas begin to appear. The role of the leader in such a conference is a skilled one; in Lindeman's terms, it is "to discover and assure the integrative

²⁷ Mary P. Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*, pp. 24-25, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1918. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

possibilities of participants,"²⁸ to facilitate rather than dominate the process that is going on.

Under the name of *The Inquiry* a group of believers in the conference or group discussion approach to the problems of democracy have been making observations and conducting experiments.²⁹ The hope is to re-establish community habits of discussion of public issues, on the theory that an integrated community-public can discover its common interests through conferencing and make them felt in the world outside.³⁰ This is the community organization movement in another form. Whether it will succeed in this guise and become the savior of democratic ideals in an urban civilization is questionable, but the fact that conference methods are being used more and more widely in the community,³¹ and especially in education, is testimony to the "group thinking" movement's vitality and promise. At present, however, the general trend is still away from democratic and non-coercive and toward autocratic and force-imposed social decision. We must consider a few examples of this latter type.

Social decision through the use of coercion. When the pressure group threatens to finance a campaign against a recalcitrant legislator to keep him from re-election, a form of coercion is undoubtedly being employed. While there is no actual use of physical force, there is strong "moral suasion" exerted to make the representative abandon his convictions and line up with those who are in a position to do him harm. This sort of *non-violent coercion* is resorted to constantly in a representative democracy when the reform lobby or the special-interest pressure group has an important legislative issue at stake.

Non-violent coercion. There are, however, some more overt and public forms of non-violent coercion to which groups resort in order to influence social decision. One of these is the agreement

²⁸ Eduard C. Lindeman, *Social Education*, p. 196, New Republic, Inc., New York, 1933.

²⁹ For a summary of the work of *The Inquiry*, 1923-33, see Lindeman, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³⁰ Cf. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 203-219, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1927.

³¹ The public forum projects sponsored by the U. S. Office of Education in a score of American communities is one notable illustration of this trend. Cf. John W. Studebaker, *Plain Talk*, National Home Library Foundation, Washington, 1936.

on the part of the members of the group to refuse to carry on their usual function, in other words to *strike*. When the functions being performed are vital ones and when the strikers are not easily replaceable, the strike may be a very effective way of getting a program of reform adopted. The *general strike* of all organized workers is potentially an extremely powerful weapon against an unpopular government policy; actually it has proved abortive the few times it has been used.³² More limited protest strikes are useful in demonstrating the solidarity of the group of protestants, and this sometimes influences government or general social policy. Strikes against war, against some form of discriminative legislation, or for reform in the suffrage have sometimes been effective.³³ The strike, however, because it is a form of coercion and a direct challenge to the other elements in society, often arouses quite surprising resistance. This is especially true when there are outbreaks of violence. Because it does imply overt conflict with accompanying costs to all parties, the strike is a weapon to be used as a last resort.

Closely akin to the strike as a form of non-violent coercion is the *boycott*. The boycott may be defined as "a withdrawal of social relations of any kind for the purpose of forcing an opponent into acceding to the demands made upon him."³⁴ Putting a group into coventry, refusing to have anything to do with them, is one form of boycott. The more common form, however, is confined to the economic realm; it is withdrawal of patronage from a selected group of enemy firms. Legislation and court decision have placed severe limitations on the use of economic boycotts in the United States. So long as the reform group itself boycotts the products of some manufacturer, perhaps because of his labor policy or his failure to cooperate, the process is probably legal, but the effort to induce third parties to join the boycott is likely to meet with court injunction. National boycotts against the products of another country have often been used as a part of state policy and are frequently agitated by groups within one

³² Wilfrid H. Crook, "The Revolutionary Logic of the General Strike," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 28, pp. 655-663, Aug., 1934.

³³ Cf. E. T. Hiller, *The Strike*, pp. 232-242, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1928.

³⁴ Cecil C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning*, p. 100, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1932.

nation who have cause to disapprove of the policies of another. Thus the boycott of German goods organized by American Jewry is a protest against the anti-Semitic persecutions under the Nazi regime.

A third type of non-violent coercion is *passive resistance* or non-cooperation. The passive resistant recoils from the use of violence as a means to any end. He relies on the policy of loving one's enemies and appealing to their better natures to see the justice of his cause. At the same time he may refuse to cooperate in any activities which run counter to his moral convictions and defy the opposition to punish him. As a martyr to their persecution he is an effective protest symbol, shaming his enemies and converting those on the sidelines to his point of view. American pacifistic sects and the Gandhi-led movement in India have exemplified this approach.³⁵ Since it depends upon a pre-existing moral consciousness in society its effectiveness is likely to be limited in times of crisis when the basic and more animal-like emotions are released in men.

The use of violence. Violence is sometimes a purely spontaneous reaction to injustice and persecution, but it is also employed deliberately and planfully by some types of social movement as a way of bringing about social change. North³⁶ classifies the ways of deliberately using violence under two heads, *terrorism* and *revolution*. The former is employed by a relatively small minority and is designed sometimes to frighten the majority, more often to induce them to make martyrs by retaliation. Terrorism takes the form of whippings, tar and featherings, and frequently assassination of persons associated with the terrorist group's opposition. There may also be destruction of property through bombing, arson, or sabotage. Groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the more recent "Black Legion" have engaged in terrorist tactics and so have anarchist, syndicalist and nationalist groups all over the world. There seems some doubt, however, as to the long-time effectiveness of terrorist methods. They tend to stimulate even more oppressive tactics on the part of the dominant group while at the same time

³⁵ Cf. Haridas T. Muzumdar, "Non-Violent Non-Co-operation as a Technique of Resolving Interracial and International Conflict," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. 25, pp. 90-94; Clarence M. Case, *Non-Violent Coercion*, pp. 46-284, The Century Company, New York, 1923.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

only negligibly depleting its resources. Worse, they alienate the liberal groups and others "on the fence," who might become supporters of the movement. Terrorism is more a counsel of desperation or a method of vengeance than a really effective means of social reform.

What are usually called revolutionary methods are employed by a reform group which bides its time until a favorable moment and strikes hard in an effort not to win simply minor concessions but to overthrow completely the group in power. Revolutionists are prepared to use violence if necessary, and they regard the conflict with the ruling group as a form of warfare in which the end to be achieved justifies all means available. The revolutionist believes that the cards are stacked against him in any attempt at democratic reform procedure and that he cannot afford to abide by what he regards as enemy-made rules of the game.

Successful revolutions, however, demand long preparation and perhaps more often put the seal on social change already largely accomplished than actually instigate it. As Lyford P. Edwards remarks:

A real revolution is almost always a slow, essentially peaceable, and largely unnoticed process. The violent outbreaks commonly called revolutions are, in great measure, due to that conservatism which makes the economically favored classes unwilling to recognize the fact that a real and peaceable revolution has already occurred.³⁷

This makes revolution a process rather than a method, implying that the conservative classes never will yield without a fight even when their doom has already been written by social change. Whether this is necessarily true is a question. Certainly open conflict with the inevitable destruction of property and loss of life is a tremendously wasteful and inhuman way of making necessary social readjustments. We ought to be able to devise a better way of overcoming vested interests and maintaining the dynamic (not static!) equilibrium that is implied in the rapid rate of modern cultural change.

The aftermath of social decision. Even after a social decision is acquiesced in by a majority, there are still unreconciled minorities to deal with. The immediate problem is then one of

³⁷ Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, p. 9, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927.

administration and social control. The victors must make public the fact that a decision has really been arrived at, and set up penalties in social disapproval, ridicule, loss of jobs, fines, and prison sentences to coerce the bitter-enders into line. This is all a part of consolidating the newly won position and preparing to defend it against counter attacks. It is a short-time process that must be supplemented by the more fundamental adjustment technique of *education*. A new generation must be brought up to accept the changed way of life as the natural, accepted order before the social decision is really complete.

By then, however, new inventions will have introduced new maladjustments and new social decisions. In this dynamic world we live in, a comfortable and changeless Utopia can never be reached.

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